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Kinship Networks and the Culture of Early American Capitalism 
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This study examines the international flow of ideas and goods in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century New England port towns through the experience of a Boston-based 
commercial network.  It traces the evolution of the commercial network established by 
the intertwined Perkins, Forbes, and Sturgis families of Boston from its foundations in 
the Atlantic fur trade in the 1740s to the crises of succession in the early 1840s.  The 
allied Perkins firms and families established one of the most successful American trading 
networks of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and as such it provides 
fertile ground for investigating mercantile strategies in early America.  An analysis of the 
Perkins family’s commercial network yields three core insights. 
First, the Perkinses illuminate the ways in which American mercantile strategies 
shaped global capitalism.  The strategies and practices of American merchants and 
mariners contributed to a growing international critique of mercantilist principles and 
chartered trading monopolies.  While the Perkinses did not consider themselves “free 
traders,” British observers did.  Their penchant for smuggling and seeking out niches of 
trade created by competing mercantilist trading companies meant that to critics of British 
mercantilist policies, American merchants had an unfair advantage that only the 
liberalization of trade policy could rectify.  Following the Perkinses allows for a 
reconsideration of the Anglo-American relationship in the East Indies, especially China.  
For example, the special relationships the Perkinses established with the Wu family of 




success in business.  Yet these relationships developed out of the Perkinses’ geopolitical 
position as Americans.   
Further, the project shows that family life, gendered ideals, and particular visions 
of the life cycle were central to how Americans came to terms with expanding trade and 
evolving markets.  In the late eighteenth century, Americans began to exalt family as a 
sentimental unit whose central aims were personal fulfillment and the raising of future 
citizens.  But this new ideology of family masked the institution’s continued political and 
economic utility.  Family has never been the promised “haven from the heartless world” 
of market perils; in fact, well into the nineteenth century it was the opposite:  family was 
a core market institution used for protection from risk and speculation.  Even as the 
Perkinses embraced the speculative potential of commerce and investment, familial and 
gendered ideals shaped how they understood profit, risk, and even what it meant to be a 
merchant. 
Finally, in recent years, scholars have integrated New England into the Atlantic 
World; I demonstrate the importance of New Englanders in shaping American 
involvement in Asia and the Pacific as well.  The Pacific continues to be a central space 
of American empire and influence, from former colonies to trust territories.  Its history 
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In July 1789, twenty-five year old Thomas Handasyd Perkins first arrived in 
Batavia (now Jakarta), capital of the Dutch East Indian Empire and longtime entrepôt of 
South Asian commerce.  Perkins marveled that the harbors and canals overflowed with 
peoples and vessels from an “astonishing” array of nations:  Hollanders, Armenians, 
Moormen, Chinese, and Malays.  Americans had only recently entered the East Indies 
trade on their own account.  In the 1789 voyage, Perkins traveled as the supercargo 
(sales’ agent) for the Astrea, a ship owned by Salem merchant Elias Hasket Derby.  
Perkins bore letters of introduction to Dutch officials to smooth his path, but they did 
little.  During his first day of petitioning, Perkins reported that a British captain received 
permission to sell, “but we, poor, despised devils, were absolutely denied the liberty of 
selling a farthing’s worth.”1  As Americans, recently independent from the British 
Empire, Perkins and his compatriots had little influence.   
Perkins wrote of the pomp and pageantry of Batavia, of dinner with “twenty 
ladies at the table; their dress, manner, style of putting up their hair; sitting by 
themselves; toasts, huzzas, bouquets, rose-water; superfluity of everything which Europe 
and the Indies can give.”2  Something of a nabob himself within the more modest context 
                                                 
1 Thomas G. Cary, Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins (Boston: Little Brown, 1856), 14, 18, 23.  
Handasyd is pronounced Handy-side.  
2 Cary, Memoir of Thomas Handasyd Perkins, 17.  His writings blended notes of self-discovery 
with tropes common to the travel and discovery literature of the era.  Travel writing and the discovery 
literature have much longer histories, but this type of writings became especially popular in the eighteenth 
century.  For the use of shared tropes in travel narratives see Casey Blanton, Travel Writing:  The Self and 
the World (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1997), Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 





of Boston, Perkins recognized that the opulence of Batavia surpassed anything he might 
find at home.3  Yet Perkins also suggested that it was his ability to navigate this world—
his fluency in French, his comportment, and his sociability—that eventually gained him 
license to sell the Astrea’s cargo.  Perkins depicted himself as an explorer and a pioneer 
even though, as he was well aware, these distant waters were already peppered with 
Americans.  In a way, Perkins was a pioneer.4  At a time when traders played an 
important role in exploration, expansion, and even simply global interaction, much of the 
news and narratives of the broader world came from the pens of merchant-mariners.5   
                                                 
3 Perkins’s experience paralleled that of other Americans traveling abroad at the same time, to the 
extent that a comparison is useful.  In the opening of Empire of Liberty, Gordon Wood describes the 
reflections of Thomas Lee Shippen during his presentation to the French Court at Versailles by Thomas 
Jefferson in 1788.  Shippen, son of a prominent Philadelphia merchant family, recognized his own 
penchant for “the tinsel of life,” but discovered the republican—indeed, the American—within when 
confronted by the elaborate courtesies, the “Oriental splendor and magnificence,” and the transparent ennui 
of the French Court.  Shippen and Perkins both lumped European and Asian opulence together as allied 
decadent societies.  But they also both sought a middle space for themselves, as cosmopolitan republicans 
who could navigate such dense social worlds while, at the same time, maintaining their virtue.  Gordon 
Wood, Empire of Liberty:  A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 5-6.  On republican ideology as shaping moral as well as political outlooks amongst early 
Americans, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge,: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic:  Political Economy in 
Jeffersonian America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York,: Norton, 1972), Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the 
American Revolution, 1st ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992).  
4 “Pioneer” here is meant with all of the historical baggage implied in the term:  going boldly 
where many had gone before.  Yet it also refers to the fact that Americans themselves heralded early 
merchant adventurers to the East Indies as pioneers.  Ships in American harbors shot off twelve gun salutes, 
crowds flocked to the wharves, and newspapers published poems to honor their arrival.  Perkins was not 
alone in seeing his experience as one of national import.  On mariners and merchants as forgotten 
American literary protagonists, see Jacques Downs, "Fair Game:  Exploitive Role-Myths and the American 
Opium Trade," Pacific Historical Review 41, no. 2 (1972): 133-149. 
5 From the vantage of the eighteenth century Atlantic, trade was not important for its own sake 
alone, but also for the health and well-being of the state.  While in the early national period Americans 
relied upon overseas trade to obtain necessary manufactures and consumer goods, challenges to the nation’s 
ability to trade had further reaching implications.  According to the political economic logic that Adam 
Smith dubbed the “mercantile system,” commercial advantages of one nation deprived those of another.  
Colonial commerce, a category apart from overseas commerce, was felt to improve the colonial power’s 
wealth by providing raw materials on the one hand and markets on the other.  Overseas trade played an 
important revenue function, as duties on international trade promised a relatively stable source of funds for 
states’ coffers without the political upheaval connected with land taxes.  John J. McCusker, "British 
Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies," in The Cambridge Economic History of the United 





Before the American Revolution had even officially ended, American speculators 
laid plans for voyages into markets newly opened to them by their rebellion against the 
British Empire.  In the fall of 1779, Thomas Perkins’s brother James set sail for the 
French West Indies.  Another group of ambitious Americans set about an adventure 
aboard the Empress of China, the first American vessel to arrive in China.6  The Empress 
was not the first vessel to depart for China.  That honor belonged to the smaller Harriet, a 
fifty-five ton sloop that departed from Boston in December of 1783.  By the time the 
Congress of the Confederation ratified the Treaty of Paris ending hostilities on January 
14, 1784, American merchants were already on the move.7   
Perkins was a part of this burst of commercial energy.  Perkins and his uncle-in-
law, James Magee, used their experience aboard the 1789 Astrea voyage to gain a toehold 
in one of the most exciting markets of their day:  the East Indies trade.  In partnership 
with his older brother, Perkins would use this toehold combined with the aggressive 
training and recruitment of family members, friends, and contacts to establish a trading 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1996), 337-362.  As John Brewer has shown, a decisive factor in British competition with 
France in the long eighteenth century was Great Britain’s ability to swell its national debt. John Brewer, 
The Sinews of Power : War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783, 1st Harvard University pbk. ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).  Further, sailors and merchants’ vessels doubled as 
the “nation’s naval reserve,” thus enhancing the martial potential of the state.  John E. Crowley, The 
Privileges of Independence : Neomercantilism and the American Revolution (Baltimore ; London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993), Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government : Origins of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (Oxford England ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 86.  John McCusker disputes the idea that this “pursuit of a merchant marine” was ever a 
mercantilist policy objective.  McCusker, "British Mercantilist Policies and the American Colonies," 346.   
6 Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, The Empress of China (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Maritime 
Museum, 1984).   
7As Cathy Matson has shown, many Americans expressed an optimistic and often unrealistic 
economic exuberance following the Revolution.  But they also banked on it.  Cathy D. Matson, 
"Capitalizing Hope:  Economic Thought and the Early National Economy," Journal of the Early Republic 
16 (1996): 273-291, Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political and Economic 
Thought in Revolutionary America (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1990).  On speculations 
based upon this exuberance, see for example chapter 7 of Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of 
Enterprise:  Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University 





and investment network of global proportions.  Perkins’s entrepreneurial eye spotted 
many an opportunity for himself and his business partners, but long-distance trade was as 
risky and expensive as it was potentially lucrative.  As others before him had discovered, 
building upon existing social ties helped to curb the risks and the costs of such trade.  
Together, Perkins and his brother James assembled a kinship-based commercial network 
centered first in the West Indies and then in the East Indies trade.  By the first decade of 
the nineteenth century, the Perkins family had become the foundation for one of the most 
significant trading lineages of Boston.  Their trade in the East Indies rivaled not only 
American competitors like John Jacob Astor and Stephen Girard, but also challenged 
well-known British companies such as the East India Company and later Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. and Dent & Co.  But, as I will show, the challenge to foreign 
competitors had less to do with the size of their trade than their methods.  
This study examines the strategies employed by the intermarried and intermingled 
Perkins, Sturgis, and Forbes clans as their commercial network stretched from an Atlantic 
to a global sphere of trade, from the 1780s to the 1840s, in order to ask two central 
questions.  First, how did the Perkinses’ embeddedness in a particular nation-state, the 
United States, influence their commercial operations?  In other words, how did 
independence shape the norms and practices of merchant capitalists in the early national 
period and, conversely, how did the norms and practices of American merchants abroad 
shape prospects for the nation?8  While the literature on the domestic work of early 
                                                 
8 “Merchant” here refers to the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth century implication of “overseas 
merchants,” and not the broader range of traders, shopkeepers, or artisans involved in commerce at any 
level.  On this usage, see for example, David Hancock, Citizens of the World : London Merchants and the 
Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785, 1st pbk. ed. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 9.  On mercantilism, see Lars Magnusson, Mercantilism : The Shaping of an Economic 





American nation-building is considerable, we know far less about the international 
component of early American development.9  Second, how did social strategies, 
especially their use of kinship, shape the Perkinses’ mercantile strategies?  At a time 
when the literature on Atlantic exchanges has transformed historical approaches to 
geographies of interaction, this project further aims to push our attention to the 
intersection between Asian, Pacific, and Atlantic circuits of trade and influence.  While 
Atlantic goods and markets, especially those of Britain, dominated the American 
economy, Asian and Pacific goods and markets played a disproportionate role in the 
American imagination.  Given their centrality in trade with the East Indies, especially 
China, the Perkinses shaped perceptions of the American involvement in the Pacific.10   
                                                 
9 As Thomas Bender and Eric Foner argue, we know more about how Americans shaped the world 
than how “our history has been shaped from abroad.”  Thomas Bender, A Nation among Nations : 
America's Place in World History, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), Thomas Bender, Rethinking 
American History in a Global Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Eric Foner, "American 
Freedom in a Global Age," The American Historical Review 106, no. 1 (2001): 1-16. 
This project builds on Doron Ben-Atar’s argument that interest in the formation of American 
national identity augers a new opening for diplomatic history as foreign affairs was one of the few arenas 
where early Americans were thinking about the United States as a nation.  I would add to this Kristin 
Hoganson’s critical reflections on the nature of early American foreign relations versus diplomacy—the 
former extending into the messier field of merchants, consuls (who were often merchants), and foreign 
intercourse.  Until the formation of a professionalized diplomatic corps later in the nineteenth century, it 
hardly makes sense to limit such discussions to formal state missions.  Doron Ben-Atar, "Nationalism, Neo-
Mercantilism, and Diplomacy:  Rethinking the Franklin Mission," Diplomatic History 22, no. 1 (1998): 
101-114, Kristin Hoganson, ""Hop Off the Bandwagon: It's a Mass Movement, Not a Parade"," Journal of 
American History 29, no. March (2009): 1087-1091.  This is not to argue that American merchants always 
improved the nation’s standing or supported the nation-state.  As Gautham Rao’s dissertation on 
customhouses of the early republic argues, American merchants all over the country avidly undercut the 
ability of the federal government to enforce trade restrictions through the end of the War of 1812.  While 
Rao argues this was due to merchants’ “capture” of revenue officers and judges, the popular opposition to 
the same trade restrictions suggests a broader phenomenon than Rao allows.  Gautham Rao, "Visible 
Hands: Customhouses, the National Market, and Federal Power in Antebellum America" (University of 
Chicago, 2008).  Nevertheless, Rao raises important questions about the relationship of trade, merchants, 
and duties as a form of revenue to state formation during this period, which I hope this dissertation will also 
further. 
10 While it has become commonplace to cast a cynical eye to nineteenth century American-
Chinese trade, particularly given that the trade never lived up to the hype of a massive market for American 
goods, there are several reasons for maintaining historical emphasis.  As Walter LaFeber has pointed out, 
the hype itself is significant.  China and the East Indies captured people’s imaginations.  From Columbus to 





Not all American merchants were as well-off or as successful as the Perkinses.  
Yet as one of the most well-known commercial networks of New England, they provide a 
fruitful field for the analysis of early American mercantile strategies.  While the 
Perkinses appear in countless monographs considering nineteenth century New England 
capitalism11, class structure12, or the American China trade13, the closest monographs to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Indies drove massive undertakings.  Ideas about Asia – whether as producers of amazing things, tradition-
bound peoples, or as a massive market for American goods – frequently found a place in the American 
mind.  Walter LaFeber, The New Empire : An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, 35th 
anniversary ed. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), xxvii. John King Fairbank, Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast : The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design : Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian 
America (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China (Hong 
Kong ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Ernest R. and Fairbank May, John King, America's 
China Trade in Historical Perspective : The Chinese and American Performance (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), Thomas J. McCormick, China Market : America's Quest for Informal 
Empire, 1893-1901, 1st Quadrangle pbk. ed. (Chicago, [Ill.]: Quadrangle Books, 1970). 
11 Robert F. Dalzell, Enterprising Elite : The Boston Associates and the World They Made 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), Norman Scott Brien Gras and Henrietta M. Larson, 
Casebook in American Business History (New York,: F.S. Crofts & co., 1939), John Lauritz Larson, Bonds 
of Enterprise : John Murray Forbes and Western Development in America's Railway Age (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), Glenn Porter and Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and 
Manufacturers; Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971), Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business 
Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1970), Olivier Zunz, 
Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
12 Peter Dobkin Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 1700-1900: Private Institutions, 
Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality (New York: New York University Press, 1982), William F. 
Hartford, Money, Morals, and Politics : Massachusetts in the Age of the Boston Associates (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 2001), Frederic Cople Jaher, The Age of Industrialism in America; Essays in 
Social Structure and Cultural Values (New York: Free Press, 1968), Frederic Cople Jaher, The Urban 
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Community, 1700-1850, ed. Conrad Edick Wright and Katheryn P. Viens (Boston: Massachusetts 
Historical Society : Distributed by Northeastern University Press, 1997), 297-323, Ronald Story, The 
Forging of an Aristocracy : Harvard & the Boston Upper Class, 1800-1870, 1st ed. (Middletown, Conn.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1980), Tamara Plakins Thornton, Cultivating Gentlemen : The Meaning of 
Country Life among the Boston Elite, 1785-1860 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 
13 Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia; a Critical Study of the Policy of the United States 
with Reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1922), Jacques M. Downs, The Golden Ghetto : The American Commercial Community at Canton and the 
Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1997), Foster Rhea 
Dulles, The Old China Trade, 1st AMS ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1970), Yen-p ing Hao, The 





published studies of their commercial circle are the 1971 biography of Thomas Handasyd 
Perkins by Carl Seaburg and Stanley Paterson and John Larson’s biography of John 
Murray Forbes.14  The principal reason for this may well be the gaps between the various 
firms’ ledgers.  In spite of this shortcoming, firm and family records provide a 
considerable source base for a more qualitative study of their worlds.   
To some scholars, New England merchants differed significantly in both 
commercial resources and methods and thus must necessarily tell us less about the nation 
than about the conditions and character of New Englanders themselves.  More than 
America’s other key ports—New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston—
Bostonians suffered from poor soils and thus a lack of agricultural staples for export.  
Philadelphia and New York were America’s commercial capitals of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries respectively.  Both had more diverse populations, greater in- and 
out-migration, and higher turnover of firms than Boston.  “The hub,” by contrast, 
underwent a commercial consolidation in the late eighteenth century as the economic 
activity of the New England littoral increasingly concentrated in and through Boston.15  
                                                                                                                                                 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), He Sibing, "Russell and Company, 1818-1891:  America's 
Trade and Diplomacy in Nineteenth Century China" (Dissertation, Miami University, 1997). 
14 Larson, Bonds of Enterprise : John Murray Forbes and Western Development in America's 
Railway Age, Carl Seaburg and Stanley Paterson, Merchant Prince of Boston, Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764-
1854 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).  Note, however, that Jacques Downs pays 
considerable attention to the Perkinses in Golden Ghetto, and Duncan Yaggy’s dissertation on John Murray 
Forbes also includes an insightful consideration of the broader commercial network of the Perkinses.  
Duncan Yaggy, "John Forbes: Entrepreneur" (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1974).  Tim Sturgis, 
himself a descendant of Russell Sturgis, wrote on an episode in the network’s history that pays particular 
attention to the broader network of firms and families as well.  Tim Sturgis, Rivalry in Canton : The 
Control of Russell & Co 1838-1840 and the Founding of Augustine Heard & Co 1840 (London: Warren 
Press, 2006). 
15 Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 (New York: Scribner, 1970), 
Robert Greenhalgh Albion, William A. Baker, and Benjamin Woods Labaree, New England and the Sea, 
1st ed. (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1972), Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime 





Relatively homogenous in terms of ethnicity and culture, Bostonians seem to have relied 
upon kinship and intermarriage to cement business and social ties more than their 
counterparts.16  To Steven Watts, Boston Federalists’ preference for a patriarchal, 
deferential society on the one hand and involvement in speculation and luxuries trades on 
the other produced a cultural dissonance within Boston of the early republic.17  On the 
one hand, these arguments of New England exceptionalism are valid and, if not taken to 
extreme, valuable.  The premise of this study is not that the Perkinses typified all 
American merchants, but that they help us to identify patterns of merchant capitalists 
operating as Americans abroad.  And in that, they tell us about New England capitalist 
development – including the funneling of Boston capital through New York – but also 
about American commercial strategies. 
Drawing upon a combination of personal and commercial letters and journals, 
ledgers, newspapers, and government publications, I demonstrate that the Perkinses relied 
upon mercantile strategies commonly associated with the Napoleonic Wars—the type of 
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industrialization.  See Dalzell, Enterprising Elite : The Boston Associates and the World They Made, 
Bernard Farber, Guardians of Virtue:  Salem Families in 1800 (New York: Basic Books, 1972), Betty 
Farrell, Elite Families : Class and Power in Nineteenth-Century Boston (Albany: State University of New 
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Commerce in Puritan America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).   
17 Steven Watts, "Ministers, Misanthropes, and Mandarins: The Federalists and the Culture of 
Capitalism, 1790-1820," in Federalists Reconsidered, ed. Doron S. Ben-Atar and Barbara Oberg 
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niche trading enabled by America’s political neutrality, for example—well after the peace 
after 1815.  Many of these techniques fit within what Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick 
labeled the “shadow trade,” in which merchants operated within the shadow of the law, 
such as smuggling or other illicit practices.18  But these techniques included other 
strategies deployed in the shadows of foreign monopoly and empire.  Competing British 
and Spanish monopolies allowed them to flourish in the trade of Pacific furs between 
North America and China.  Regulations favoring the British East India Company’s 
monopoly on Indian opium provided an opening for Americans in the Near East.  And 
competition between metropole and colony in Spanish America created an opportunity 
for Americans to trade in prized South and Central American ports.  A key implication of 
this argument is that rather than simply looking at the role of the United States 
                                                 
18 On the “shadow trade,” see Stanley M. Elkins and Eric L. McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 382, Alice Keith, "Relaxations in the British Restrictions on 
the American Trade with the British West Indies, 1783-1802," The Journal of Modern History 20, no. 1 
(1948): 1-18.  While it is tempting to see these niche-based strategies as unique to the Perkisnes due to 
Boston’s notable lack of agricultural resources compared with Philadelphia or New York, traders operating 
out of the latter ports also used these strategies, including the aforementioned John Jacob Astor and 
Stephen Girard.  Indeed, Thomas Doerflinger suggests that, amongst Philadelphians, New Englanders even 
had a reputation for being especially prone to “sharp” practices.  To Doerflinger, this is not necessarily a 
bad thing.  He argues that adverse New England conditions fueled Yankee entrepreneurialism.  Yet the 
observations of William Pollard and Stephen Girard, whom Doerflinger cites, should be taken with a grain 
of salt as it is rather a case of the pot calling the kettle black.  Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise, 
340.   
As Wim Klooster suggests, the history of American smuggling is as long as the history of the 
Americas, but how prevalent it was at any point in time remains a question, perhaps an unanswerable one.  
Wim Klooster, "Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800," in Soundings in Atlantic History:  
Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 141-180.  Klooster offers an excellent selection of the 
literature.  See especially Catherine Cangany, "Frontier Seaport:  Detroit's Transformation into an Atlantic 
Entrepot, 1750-1825" (University of Michigan, 2009), Peggy K. Liss, Atlantic Empires : The Network of 
Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), Gautham Rao, 
"Visible Hands:  Customhouses, the National Market, and Federal Power in Antebellum America" 
(University of Chicago, 2008), Joshua M. Smith, Borderland Smuggling : Patriots, Loyalists, and Illicit 
Trade in the Northeast, 1783-1820 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), John W. Tyler, 
Smugglers & Patriots : Boston Merchants and the Advent of the American Revolution (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1986).  On the difficulty of writing histories of clandestine trading practices, 
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government in supporting trade (or not), be it through policies, diplomacy, or naval 
support, the geographic lens must be widened to consider the ways in which American 
merchants benefited from the state or martial power of others, including competitors.19   
I show that the strategies and practices of American merchants and mariners 
contributed to a growing international critique of mercantilist principles and chartered 
trading monopolies.  Nowhere was this more visible than in the use of American trade to 
critique British trading companies.  James Fichter recently argued that American 
competition in India provided a primary justification for Parliament to revoke the British 
East India Company’s monopoly of trade in India.20  Even British manufacturers pointed 
to the Americans in their detractions of the Company’s charter.21  This dissertation 
reveals that similar debates took place regarding the Company’s monopoly in China, 
regarding American trade in the Pacific Northwest, and more.  British public figures 
successively used Spanish, Dutch, and French competitors as yardsticks for what 
strategies were or were not fair in trade; by the nineteenth century, this position was taken 
                                                 
19 Contemporary competitors themselves complained that American merchants were, in essence, 
free riders, that their cheaper shipping costs could at least partially be attributed to the fact that they piggy-
backed on the circuits of trade established by others.  See, for example, such complaints made in the Pacific 
Northwest trade as discussed in Sister Magdalen Coughlin, "Commercial Foundations of Political Interest 
in the Opening Pacific," California Historical Society Quarterly XLX, no. 1 (1971): 15-33, James R. 
Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 
1785-1841 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992). 
20 James R. Fichter, So Great a Proffit : How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American 
Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 232. 
21 Fichter, So Great a Proffit : How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American 
Capitalism, 234.  P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism : Innovation and Expansion, 1688-
1914 (London ; New York: Longman, 1993), John and Ronald Robinson Gallagher, "The Imperialism of 
Free Trade," The Economic History Review VI, no. 1 (1953), Yukihisa Kumagai, "The Lobbying Activities 
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up by Americans.22  But if to some foreign observers, early American merchants of the 
era seemed to be “free traders,” we must ask ourselves what modes of hidden work went 
into constructing “free.” 
This expansive picture of the Perkinses’ commerce is incomplete without an 
analysis of the local, personal, and even intimate ties that enabled the growth and 
flexibility of the Perkinses’ investments.  For the Perkinses, the success of their 
commercial network relied upon their ability to mobilize kinship-based and kinship-like 
strategies to minimize risk and maximize loyalties.  While Americans rejected proposals 
to form European-style chartered trading companies and even resisted corporations for 
economic rather than public purposes, the type of collaborative trust network established 
by the Perkinses allowed for a broader organization of market activity than that of an 
individual or partnership.23  Overlapping personal and business ties furthered prospects of 
cross-cultural collaboration, most notably the Perkinses’ relationship with the Wu family 
                                                 
22 While the term “free trade” is often used by historians to study the rise of ideological opposition 
to protectionist trade barriers in the vein of Richard Cobden, this study relies upon an earlier use for the 
term, to denote on opposition to state-based monopolies in trade.  See Fichter, So Great a Proffit : How the 
East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism, Paul A. Gilje, "'Free Trade and Sailors' 
Rights':  Rhetoric of the War of 1812," Journal of Early Republic 30, no. 3 (2010): 1-23, Lars Magnusson, 
The Tradition of Free Trade (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
On the vacillation of favor and opposition to “free trade” and mercantilist practices in the 
American colonies and early United States, see Crowley, The Privileges of Independence : 
Neomercantilism and the American Revolution, Christian J. Koot, "A 'Dangerous Principle': Free Trade 
Discourses in Barbados and the English Leeward Islands, 1650-1689," Early American Studies 5, no. 1 
(2007): 132-163, Cathy D. Matson, Merchants & Empire : Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).  As Matson argues, mercantilism and free trade or “economic 
freedom” were not sequential ideologies, but were repertoires of economic thought that people drew upon 
in complex and even contradictory ways.   
23 On resistance to chartered trading companies and corporations in early America, see, for 
example Fichter, So Great a Proffit : How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism, 
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, "The Partnership Form of Organization:  Its Popularity in Early-Nineteenth-Century 
Boston," in Entrepreneurs : The Boston Business Community, 1700-1850, ed. Conrad Edick  Wright and 
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of Canton (Guangzhou), especially Wu Bingjian (伍秉鑒), the Hong merchant better 
known as Houqua (浩官).  Despite cultural and legal differences, the alliance between the 
two business groups used kinship to establish a chain of recourse beyond firms, into 
families.  Similar examples of collaboration are increasingly being recognized by 
scholars, but, in considering Chinese-American relations, it cuts against the grain of 
historical writing which has tended to emphasize proto-imperial tensions, racism, and 
commercial knowledge as traveling from west to east.24  Above all, the connection of 
commercial and social interests molded the aspirations and expectations of many a 
member of the Perkinses’ trade network and thus shaped the prospects for the larger 
group.  Through the socialization of children, self-conscious maintenance of social bonds, 
and inheritance practices, kinship networks played a pivotal role in the development of 
American capitalism during its “take-off” period and paved the way for later imperial 
interest in the Pacific.  
The Perkinses’ use of kinship is not surprising.  Scholars have long remarked 
upon the importance of social institutions to commercial networks, especially their 
prominence in facilitating long-distance trade.  Religion, ethnicity, regional identity, and, 
of course, kinship, all served as important foundations for commercial networks.25  Yet 
                                                 
24 As I hope will be clear later in the text, to argue that individual Chinese merchants proved 
influential or even powerful relative to their American allies is not to argue that their relationship was 
harmonious or untouched by the political discord and colonial imbalances of the early nineteenth century.  
But nor should such political contexts obscure other forms of power and politics, especially prior to the 
Opium War.  On Chinese-American relations, see Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast : 
The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854.  For a trenchant criticism, see Tani E. Barlow, Formations of 
Colonial Modernity in East Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).  On cross-cultural collaboration, 
see for example Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers : The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and 
Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
25 The literature here is enormous.  See, for example, Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in 
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the relationship of kinship and commerce is ripe for reanalysis.  In most scholarship on 
kinship-based business networks, families operate as ciphers for trust and loyalty.26  
Family itself is not interrogated.  Family ties either worked, or they did not.  As Sylvia 
Yanagisako argues, scholars often treat family “as a stable cultural resource rather than a 
historically situated, negotiated process that is itself continually produced.”27  But how 
did these ties work?  As the experiences of the Perkinses demonstrate, even within 
families, trust and loyalty required cultivation.      
The scholarly discussion on the relationship between family and firm continues to 
be framed by the work of Alfred Chandler.  In 1977, with the publication of the Pulitzer 
Prize winning The Visible Hand, Chandler wrote a new orthodoxy of nineteenth century 
economic development:  the decline of “personal” or family capitalism in favor of a 
“managerial capitalism” rooted in the rise of a professional class of managers.28  
                                                                                                                                                 
York: Berg, 2005), Frederick Barnes Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House; the Quaker Merchants of 
Colonial Philadelphia, 1682-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1948). 
26 This is true of many thoughtful works in part because family has long been considered 
epiphenomenal to materialist causation.  Family appears more as structure—kinship—than as a social and 
thus personal, contingent institution.  Franco Amatori and Geoffrey Jones, Business History around the 
World (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Mark Casson, Entrepreneurship 
and Business Culture : Studies in the Economics of Trust (Aldershot, Hants, England: E. Elgar, 1995), M. 
W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose, Business Enterprise in Modern Britain: From the Eighteenth to the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Routledge, 1994), David S. Landes, Dynasties : Fortunes and Misfortunes of the 
World's Great Family Businesses (New York: Viking, 2006). 
27 Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, "Family and Household:  The Analysis of Domestic Groups," Annual 
Review of Anthropology 8 (1979): 161-205.  I also draw upon Yanagisako’s work for defining family.  
Where I use household in its more specifically residential sense, I attempt to allow the Perkinses 
themselves to define “family.”  I pay particular attention to genealogical considerations (hence the 
genealogical charts at the start and end of the text), but I seek out cultural markers of kinship and 
connection in order to consider the meanings and boundaries of family:  inclusion in inheritance, rituals, 
familial language, etc.  In an article that continues to be canonical, Yanagisako argued that “there is but one 
way to decide who are the members of the family in any particular case:  that is by asking the natives to 
identify the culturally meaningful ‘kinship’ units in their society.”     
28 Alfred Dupont Chandler, The Visible Hand : The Managerial Revolution in American Business 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1977).  Historians generally see kin-based business networks as 





Managers enabled more complex business relations and larger economies of scale.  Thus, 
it was not simply the corporate form that gave rise to big business in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, but also the proliferation of specialized middlemen.  In 1990, 
Chandler pushed the argument even farther.  In Scale and Scope, Chandler compared 
twentieth century American business practices with those of Germany and Britain, and 
explicitly argued that the dependence of the latter two on personal and family ties held 
those countries back.29  In other words, family bonds in business inhibited economic 
growth. 
While Chandler’s insights continue to be valuable for understanding business 
expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, his narrative situates family in 
business within a modernizing narrative of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.  In this view, 
family and personal relations in business were obstacles to be overcome.  This depiction 
of kinship as static and premodern obfuscates a larger history of kinship’s continued 
importance in business, not only in societies depicted as “more tradition-bound” like 
Korea and Japan, or even—per Chandler—England and Germany, but also within 
American business.30  It shrouds the vigorous and variable ways in which capitalism and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise, Hall, The Organization of American Culture, 1700-1900: Private 
Institutions, Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality. 
29 Alfred Dupont Chandler and Takashi Hikino, Scale and Scope : The Dynamics of Industrial 
Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1990). 
30 David Landes’s recent book, Dynasties, points out that the family firm is alive and well and 
nowhere more so than in the United States.  But Landes is virtually alone in keeping American businesses 
in the mix.  Most critics argue that Chandler exaggerated the inefficiencies of family in capitalism.  They 
reject views of family as a mere dependent variable in economic history and point to the social 
embeddedness of market culture.   But many of these scholars suggest that American business was uniquely 
anti-family.  Conditions ranging from the lack of an aristocracy to the ready availability of land contributed 
to looser family loyalties in the United States.  Mark Casson’s argument that American business culture 
emerged out of a “low trust society” can be read in this light.  To Casson, immigration and mobility 
produced a social instability, so that Americans trusted institutions more than they trusted each other.  Mark 





family have interacted over time, from the prevalence of family businesses to inheritance 
patterns and financial instruments such as trusts.  Moreover, this view of kinship and 
capitalism obscures the extent to which market meanings themselves are historically and 
culturally contingent.  Kinship did serve as an important tool for early modern business.  
Family ties provided a mechanism for pooling capital, mitigating risk, and ascertaining 
reputation before the advent of banks, insurance companies, or credit rating agencies.  
But this fact should not lead us to ignore family’s longer, dynamic connection to 
commerce and capitalism.   
Rather than seeing the Perkins network as an exemplar of a bygone stage, I argue 
that a more fruitful analysis can be derived from considering their commercial network 
within a longer history of investment networks.  Different modes of organizing capital 
suggest different personal and business strategies.  Thus, it behooves us to examine the 
types of internal work being done within the Perkinses’ network in conjunction with 
changing modes of accessing capital and changing valences of family life.31  In the late 
eighteenth century, Americans began to exalt family as a sentimental unit whose central 
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aims were personal fulfillment and the raising of future citizens.32  This new ideology of 
family masked the institution’s political and economic value.  Family has never been the 
promised “haven from the heartless world” of market perils.  Well into the nineteenth 
century it was the opposite:  family was a core market institution used for protection from 
risk and speculation.  Kinship continued to be a significant consideration in organizing 
capital, at times as family businesses, but also in terms of investment logics for 
perpetuating family itself.  Thus, the question is not simply how family strategies or 
business models changed.  Investigating family strategies like those employed by the 
Perkinses illuminate how the two adapted to each other. 
   
The Commercial Network 
The commercial network established by Thomas Handasyd Perkins and his older 
brother James began with the brothers’ partnership in Boston in 1792.  It grew into one of 
the most successful American trading networks of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  “Network” is not a term the Perkinses used to describe themselves, but it is 
nevertheless useful for understanding the Perkinses’ overarching commercial strategies 
and the overlap between personal and mercantile practice.  Network, here, signifies more 
than their roster of clients and corresponding agents, although it was that.  It refers to the 
inner circle of regular co-investors on their shipping ventures and investments.33  In the 
                                                 
32 In fact, if Sarah Pearsall is correct, the increased prevalence of long-distance trade networks like 
that operated by the Perkinses may well have fostered what contemporaries referred to as “family feeling.”  
Sarah M. S. Pearsall, Atlantic Families : Lives and Letters in the Later Eighteenth Century (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008).   
33 The very malleability of the term “network” lends itself to understanding social, religious, 
immigrant, militaristic, as well as various types of economic relationships.  But the concept’s utility also 
leads to challenges over definition and scope.  Joel Polodny and Karen Page, for example, define networks 





words of sociologist Charles Tilly, this inner circle constituted a “trust network.”  As 
Tilly notes, networks permeate social life.  But trust networks differentiate themselves 
from other networks of commerce and communication in that “the configuration of ties 
within the network sets the collective enterprise at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, and 
failures of individual members.”34 The Perkinses, as merchants, participated in a network 
of corresponding agents, suppliers, and clients, but within this broader web of commerce, 
they cultivated a tighter circle of trusted collaborators. 
For the Perkinses, the regularity of collaboration constituted the network.  The 
Perkinses sold freight on their ships and freighted cargo on other merchants’ vessels, but 
a bulk of their trade proceeded through cooperation with clusters of recurring co-
investors.  In the Pacific-China trade, for example, the brothers regularly turned to 
Russell Sturgis, James & Thomas Lamb, and Bryant, Sturgis & Co.  In the West Indies-
European and even the India trade, they collaborated with Stephen Higginson, his sons, 
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and their brother Samuel G. Perkins.  Periodically these relationships would result in 
interlocking partnerships, such as the partnership of James and Thomas Perkins in 
Perkins & Co. of Canton or John Perkins Cushing’s stake in James P. Sturgis & Co. of 
Macau.  It was this regularity that created the greater benefits—reduced risk, cost-
splitting, enhanced trust and stability, secure channels of information, greater clout within 
specific markets—but also that regularity which put the group at risk to the iniquity or 
ineptitude of collaborators.   
Yet the collaboration often proceeded on a more casual basis as well.  Interested 
parties owned shares of a shipping adventure which entitled them to portions of the profit 
and loss.  One firm might manage the venture—outfitting and perhaps even owning the 
ship, hiring the mariners, selecting the cargo, purchasing insurance, instructing the 
captain and supercargo, keeping up regular correspondence with the captain and agents 
abroad, and, finally, storing and selling off commodities and remitting profits back to the 
investors.  Splitting ventures allowed the interested parties to reduce risk on multiple 
counts:  the risk for any single adventure declined, investors broadened the number of 
adventures they were interested in, and they invested with known parties.  The merchants 
had no need to solicit prospective investors to freight with them—a time-consuming 
chore that lengthened the time any cargo languished in a warehouse, waiting to ship.  
And, as their interests often aligned with trusted collaborators, these casual partnerships 
gave them greater political and economic clout in specific markets.   
Broader linkages of corresponding agents changed frequently; thus, regular 
collaboration with an inner circle of fellow merchants offered greater stability.  Risk is an 





particular uncertainty and high stakes.  The investment of time, capital, and resources 
increased exponentially in the shift from a trade between Boston and the West Indies to 
Boston and the East Indies. Where the former might require only a month round trip and 
an investment of $20,000, the latter might well take over a year and an investment of 
$120,000.35  While a merchant or firm might well engage business with the West Indies 
on their own, the larger costs and greater risk of the latter adventure demanded a different 
set of business and social strategies.  Many merchants participated in this trade by buying 
shares in long-distance mercantile ventures, purchasing cargo space, or, like the 
Perkinses, participating in a regular circle of trusted investors:  their commercial network.   
While this project centers on the commercial network formed by an inner circle of 
kin and colleagues, it nevertheless sheds light on their broader network of clients and 
correspondents.  Networks are especially useful for examining pre-corporate commercial 
patterns.  The tenuous nature of mercantile partnerships of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries meant that individuals might be involved in rapidly changing enterprises.  
Partnerships provided flexibility and convenience, but started and failed with such 
frequency, the business environment could be unstable.36  A partnership might last for 
only a few years, ending with the departure or death of one partner, only to reappear in a 
new configuration, with new partners.37  From 1807 to 1831, for example, the Perkinses 
                                                 
35 Clarence L. Ver Steeg, "Financing and Outfitting the First United States Ship to China," Pacific 
Historical Review 22, no. 1 (1953): 1-12.  As I discuss in chapter one, where a Boston-West Indies venture 
took a month round trip, the Empress of China returned almost fifteen months after her departure.  While 
Daniel Parker & Company spent approximately $20,000 to outfit the Comte de Artois for France, the 
Empress of China cost five times that. 
36 As Naomi Lamoreaux has argued, the impermanence of partnerships was both a strength and a 
nuisance for early American entrepreneurs.  Lamoreaux, "The Partnership Form of Organization:  Its 
Popularity in Early-Nineteenth-Century Boston."   
37 A firm might hand off their contact roster to a new or established house—both as a courtesy to 





did business with William Lorman of Baltimore.  Yet over the years, their connection 
appeared to shift from Fulford & Lorman, Lorman & Son, to Wm. Lorman & Co.  Even 
beyond the core Perkins network, such an approach accounts for the underlying 
continuities of their mercantile connections amidst the overarching variability of early 
American business.  
Thus, methodologically, studying the Perkinses’ broader commercial network 
promises insight on several fronts.  A network approach moves overlapping business and 
social connections from periphery to center.  Certain charismatic individuals were more 
significant to the network’s operations than others, Thomas Handasyd Perkins being a 
case in point.  But Perkins’s success in overseas trade depended in large part upon his 
participation in a broader commercial network.  As Mark Granovetter has argued, social 
life must be taken out of the “black box” if we are to gain a more nuanced appreciation of 
economic action.38  The fact of the matter is, while the literature on commercial networks 
is already overwhelming, we still have much to learn.  A focus on commercial networks 
allows for research on the slippage between economic policies and mercantile pressures 
from the bottom up.39  Geographically expansive networks offer a venue for recognizing 
                                                                                                                                                 
that a partner might attempt to make off with the business of the clients.  In this way, when Bryant & 
Sturgis of Boston decided to focus on investing in domestic corporations, William Appleton & Co. 
inherited their trade along with a Sturgis son-in-law as a partner.  When Appleton retired, the son-in-law 
continued the trade as Samuel Hooper & Co.  Many core relationships—such as that of Russell & Co. in 
Canton and Cary & Co. in New York—continued through all three of these firms.  Thus, as firms closed or 
merchants retired, the network persisted. 
38 Mark Granovetter, "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 19, no. 1 (2005): 33-50. 
39 Charles A. Jones, International Business in the Nineteenth Century: The Rise and Fall of a 
Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), Magnusson, The Tradition of 
Free Trade, Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 





the contingencies of state-based power.40  And analyzing the social work that goes into 
such networks facilitates an understanding of changing meanings and sensibilities of 
capitalism itself.41   
 
Chapter Organization 
This study breaks down into six thematic chapters that follow the inception and 
expansion of the Perkins network.  The network outlived its founders.  Perkins & Co. of 
Boston lasted from 1792 to 1838 in various incarnations.  Perkins & Co. of Canton, 
which the Perkins brothers established in 1803, merged with Russell & Co. in 1830.  But 
the nodes of trade continued with many firms established by alumni of the Perkins firms, 
especially Forbes, Sturgis, Cabot, and Cary kin.42  The larger commercial network 
established by the Perkins brothers frayed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but 
                                                 
40 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns : State-Building and Extraterritorial 
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), Tilly, Trust and 
Rule. 
41 Joyce Oldham Appleby, "The Vexed Story of Capitalism Told by American Historians," 
Journal of the Early Republic 21, no. 1 (2001): 1-18, Davidoff and Hall, Family Fortunes : Men and 
Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850, Toby Ditz, "Secret Selves, Credible Personas:  The 
Problematics of Trust and Public Display in the Writing of Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia Merchants," in 
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University Press, 2000), 219-242, Ditz, "Shipwrecked:  Imperiled Masculinity and the Representation of 
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Middle Class : The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790-1865 (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), Sylvia Junko Yanagisako, Producing Culture and Capital: Family Firms in Italy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
42 In using the term “the Perkinses,” I refer to the progeny of Elizabeth Peck Perkins and James 
Perkins, as listed in the appendix.  Yet I also use the term “extended Perkins” family in order to include 
relations by marriage.  Many of these individuals would not have seen themselves as “Perkinses,” but 
would have recognized the import of the Perkins firms and entrepreneurs in their lives.  Finally, there are 
several firms (see Chart 1) that I include as a part of the Perkins network not because the partners were 
strictly beholden to the Perkinses, but because they featured within the inner circle of regular collaborators.  
Often these firms either began out of a Perkins firm or inherited a client list from a Perkins firm.  Russell & 
Co. of China included many individuals who bore no connection to the Perkinses.  But much of the firm’s 
strength came from its merger with Perkins & Co. of Canton in 1830.  Even as control of the firm became 
increasingly contentious in the 1840s on, Russell & Co. continued to be largely dominated by Perkins 





private family trusts and investment networks established with profits from these firms 
continue to this day.  This study focuses on the period from 1792 to 1838, the lifespan of 
the Boston-based Perkins & Co., but it casts an eye both forward and back in order to 
gauge larger shifts in family, trade, and politics visible through an examination of the 
kinship-based commercial network. 
The first chapter traces the roots of the trading network established by Thomas H. 
Perkins and his brother James.  When the two brothers opened a counting house in 
Boston in 1792, they drew upon capital, contacts, and education culled from the 
transatlantic trading of their mother and maternal grandfather as well as their own prior 
experience in the West and East Indies.  Partnership between Thomas and James was not 
expected or compelled from within the family, but nor was it surprising.  The sizeable 
circle of Perkins siblings was in and of itself a resource.  The circle of “kith, kin, and 
allies” amassed through early business and social relationships provided the foundation to 
their broader commercial network. 
Chapter two considers the expansion of the Perkins network during the French 
Revolutionary Wars of 1793 to 1815.  The Perkins brothers found themselves well-placed 
to take advantage of American neutrality during the French Wars.  I show that the French 
Wars provided a space for experimentation as well as expansion for Americans.  This 
experimentation demanded social as well as economic capital.  Scholars often refer to the 
“Perkins network” or the “Boston Concern” to denote the Boston firm’s collaboration 
with Bryant & Sturgis, with John Perkins Cushing in Perkins & Co. of Canton, and with 
James P. Sturgis & Co. in their China trading.  But co-investing was a broader 





associational mechanisms to advance their influence in specific markets and in politics.  
Unlike contract-based partnerships or state-chartered corporations, this type of regular 
association offered no formal backing.  Still, informal networks enhanced stability in 
trade and influence in specific avenues of trade.  As the Perkins brothers expanded their 
interests from Atlantic to global trade, they relied on more extensive relationships based 
on overlapping social and economic ties. 
Chapter three examines the internal familial strategies of the Perkinses.  It 
considers mechanisms for the cultivation of obligation between the generations, as well 
as the repercussions of success, failure, and rebellion for family and firm.  I show that, for 
the Perkinses, commercial aspiration and familial subjectivities blended in significant 
ways.  Beyond the paternalism discussed in other chapters, this chapter also emphasizes 
the importance of maternal networking in terms of a broad array of educational, marital, 
and occupational opportunities.  Obligation itself was patently gendered, not simply in 
terms of the divergence of expectations as daughters and sons, but in the use of gender to 
exhort kin into compliance.  Inequalities within the family helped to structure succession.  
In many ways, the story of intergenerational expectation for the Perkinses followed the 
classic narrative of the family firm:  success killed succession.  Thus, in the 1840s, 
Forbes cousins inherited the Perkins network.  The Perkins network continued but 
without the Perkins name.  While most scholarship on family firms emphasize the demise 
of the firm as a failure of succession, it is not clear that the Perkinses saw the closure of 
Perkins & Co. in this light.  In passing on a considerable inheritance and social standing 
to the next generation, family firms enabled succession of the family rather than the 





Chapter four turns to kinship as a repertoire for a broader, cross-cultural circle of 
business relationships from the formation of the Perkinses’ Canton-based office in 1803.  
In stretching their trading network across the globe, individuals within the Perkins 
network mapped several of their most significant business relationships on paternal and 
fraternal ties.  While these ties were highly contingent, I suggest that modeling such 
connections on kinship offered a certain level of stability and reciprocity of expectation 
than they otherwise might have expected.  The fact that the Perkinses were Americans 
was itself valuable to Chinese and British allies.  Finally, the chapter challenges the still 
common perception that business strategies, capital, and leadership flowed from west to 
east by demonstrating the importance of Chinese merchants to American and British 
trade.   
Chapter five looks at sociability, sexuality, and marriage as a factor in the 
commercial network.  Here the project focuses on the relationship between Canton—
where women were not allowed—and the mixed-sex community that sprang up in 
Macau.  This chapter shows that profit was personal.  While many Chinese regulations 
governing the foreign community at Canton were overlooked by local officials, the 
prohibition of foreign women in Canton was enforced.  This sex-segregation shaped the 
social prospects of foreign merchants stationed in southern China.  For American 
merchants abroad, China’s connection to personal aspiration and sacrifice meant that 
traveling evoked deep feelings of hope, desire, despair, and resentment.  
Finally, chapter six examines the dialectic between British and American 
observers of Anglo-American trade in Asia and the Pacific over meanings and methods 





operating outside the bounds of chartered trade monopolies, to British merchants of the 
early nineteenth century, Americans were the real free traders.  I use the Perkinses’ fur 
and opium trading as examples of American cognizance of the opportunity foreign 
monopolies provided to non-nationals.  British opponents of the East India Company 
used American trading practice to assail the Company’s monopoly in China.  Participants 
in the Perkins network did not write of themselves as “free traders.”  Rather, they 
depicted themselves as ordinary merchants seeking to keep trade open to all comers 
against the threats of imperial powers.  This “open trade” argument was central to private 
rationalizations of smuggling as well as public arguments legitimating American 




















CHAPTER 1.   
ATLANTIC FOUNDATIONS, 1740s-1792 
 
The commercial network established by the Perkins brothers of Boston had its 
roots in the aftermath of the American Revolution.  By chance or by circumstance, the 
Perkins brothers’ progress in trade mirrored the nation.  The brothers found themselves 
well-placed to take advantage of mercantile opportunities that emerged to them as 
Americans.  Yet this luck should not obscure the fact that when opportunities did not 
present themselves, the Perkins brothers were not adverse to making their own 
opportunities as smugglers and “shadow traders.”  In the perilous business of commerce, 
the Perkins brothers specialized in managing risk—and, at times, courting it. 
Like other aspiring New England merchants of their generation, brothers James, 
Thomas, and Samuel Perkins all got their start in the Atlantic.  Many Americans 
expected that, after the American Revolution, trade with the British would resume as 
before.  It did not.  While Americans remained a principal consumer of British products, 
they also faced new restrictions.43  British leaders had little incentive to offer trading 
privileges to the newly independent Americans, to the point of arguing that provisions for 
their West Indian colonies could and should be brought in from Nova Scotia and Canada 
rather than from American ports.  In fact, British parliamentarians who argued for 
                                                 
43 Beginning in 1651, a series of Navigation Acts directed British colonial trade.  The Navigation 
Acts structured the British mercantilist system:  they aimed to limit foreign powers, especially the Dutch, 
from developing a carrying trade between English colonies (British after 1707) and Europe.  The 
Navigation Acts necessarily pushed the American colonies into specific patterns of commerce.  In the 
seventeenth-century, Barbados was usually the first stop and in the eighteenth century Jamaica.  As New 
England exports outstripped what the British islands could absorb in the eighteenth century, French, Dutch, 






Canadian provisions—most famously Lord Sheffield in his Observations of the 
Commerce of the United States—overestimated capacity of the Canadian colonies and 
new patterns of smuggling and ‘exception’ clauses ensued.44  But between 1784 and 
1787, British West Indian demand for American ships, freight services, and goods 
plummeted.45  New Englanders continued older patterns of trade, exchanging fish, 
timber, livestock, rum, and other provisions for West Indian sugar, coffee, and molasses, 
and European manufactures and luxuries, but some, like the Perkinses, constructed new 
networks of correspondents outside the British Empire.   
All three Perkins brothers cut their commercial teeth on the New England-West 
Indies trade based out of Saint Domingue (Haiti), trading with the French rather than the 
British West Indies.  Where it seems likely that the Perkins brothers would have 
otherwise built upon their family’s British contacts, the Revolution and its aftermath 
pressed them to seek out new connections in the French Caribbean.  They received this 
opportunity through the efforts of their mother, Elizabeth Peck Perkins, a considerable 
merchant in her own right.   
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45 Despite negotiating an “open port” policy in the September 1783 Treaty of Paris, British 
officials under William Pitt issued one proclamation after another limiting American trade in British ports.  
An Order in Council of July 2, 1783 prohibited American-built ships in British waters as a bulwark for the 
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prohibited American vessels from fishing or whaling in their Canadian colonies, barred American fish, 
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1985), 351-377.  Still, in spite of these hurdles and the damage to America’s maritime and export 
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manufactures never replaced the British market.  Even the Perkinses largely purchased French luxuries.  
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In September 1792, James and Thomas formally allied as the Boston-based 
trading house of Perkins & Co.  While scholars often write of the firm as if family was 
destiny, by late 1788, the two brothers were on distinctly different paths.  James was still 
in the French West Indies.  Thomas was in Boston, laying plans for a voyage to the East 
Indies with his uncle-in-law, James Magee.  They were in partnerships with other people, 
interested in different markets, trading in different circles.  But by late 1791, the 
suggestion of a partnership presented itself.  Circumstances had brought them back 
together.  In late 1791, when James Perkins first proposed the partnership, the Haitian 
Revolution ate away at his business prospects in Saint Domingue.  His clients in the 
Caribbean themselves suggested Perkins invest their salvaged property in Boston.  And 
Thomas was uncertain as to his own future as well.  He had two adventures on their way 
to the Pacific Northwest and China, but had been unable to do more.  Thus, when the 
opportunity of partnership arose, both brothers welcomed the prospect.  These earlier 
partnerships—Perkins, Burling & Perkins and Perkins & Magee—extended the contacts, 
interests, and experience base that the two brothers built upon in their new firm.  Here, in 
addition to their mother’s support, were the building blocks of the Perkins network.  
Thus, to understand the foundation of the Perkins network, it is important to consider 








Thomas Handasyde Peck & Elizabeth Perkins:  Fur Trading Foundations 
The Perkins brothers began their Atlantic commerce with a foundation of capital 
inherited from their mother and their maternal grandfather’s fur trading.  By the 
eighteenth century, fur trading was virtually nonexistent in New England.46  Yet Thomas 
Handasyde Peck (1712-1777) was successful enough as a furrier to leave his wife a 
house, chaise, and an annuity of £80, in addition to leaving several properties along 
merchant’s row to his grandson.47  In exchange for providing rifles and powder, hunters 
brought back a variety of pelts from New England and Newfoundland to Peck’s store.  
Sables, minks, otter, bear, mongrel, grey, and red fox, wolves, fishers, and raccoons were 
all either sold locally or, more commonly, shipped across the Atlantic to Mess. Lane & 
Company of London.  Lane & Company purchased Peck’s furs and hats and, in trade, 
offered finished goods, shot, and other necessaries as well as tea, wine, and luxury items, 
obtained insurance on cargoes on Peck’s behalf, and negotiated bills.  While the tensions 
leading up to the Revolution strained relations between Peck and the Lanes, they were on 
sufficiently good terms for Peck to recommend the relationship to his daughter as she 
entered business in 1773.48   
Thomas Peck and his wife Elizabeth had two children, a son and a daughter.  The 
couple’s son John became an apothecary while their daughter, also named Elizabeth, 
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Docket #16305.  Volume 76, 200-204.   
48 Thomas Handasyde Peck Letterbook.  MHS.  T.H. Peck’s mother, Margaret Maynard Peck, may 
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married one of her father’s apprentices, James Perkins.  And in fact it was Elizabeth 
rather than John who inherited her father’s business.  Most of what we know about 
Elizabeth Peck Perkins (1736-1807) comes from retrospective accounts given by her 
children and grandchildren.  These memoirs tell of the woman Elizabeth became when 
faced with the exigencies of her husband’s and father’s deaths in the lead up to the 
American colonial rebellion against the British:  a shrewd woman with a strong mind and 
the capacity to enforce her will.  Her great grandson traced the family’s entrepreneurial 
lineage back not to her husband or father, but to her.49  As evidence of her financial 
acumen, her eldest son told of Dutch trading partners who assumed she must be a man, 
“Mr. Elizabeth Perkins.”50  We have no evidence that she worked in commerce for her 
father, yet he clearly viewed her capable of handling her husband’s affairs.51  More, she 
parlayed her husband’s business into trade with the French and Dutch, thus pushing 
beyond even her father’s commercial connections.   
Elizabeth’s husband James Perkins (1733-1773) apprenticed with her father.  
According to family lore, young James had been intended for Harvard and showed a 
strong inclination toward scholarship, but at age fourteen received an offer that he could 
not refuse:  an apprenticeship into mercantile affairs with Thomas H. Peck.52  More than 
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50 Elizabeth Perkins Cabot, Reminiscences of Mrs. Eliza Cabot(date).   Cabot Family 
Papers.)(Schlesinger.) , "Memoir of James Perkins," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society  
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51 Cornelia Dayton’s work on eighteenth century women in Connecticut offers a sense of how 
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(Williamsburg Va.), Women before the Bar : Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel 
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likely, James’ father arranged the apprenticeship as a less costly or perhaps even more 
promising path for his son.  In eighteenth century New England, commerce became an 
increasingly esteemed profession.53  James was the second youngest of nine children and 
his eldest brother, Henry, was also a merchant.  On December 24, 1754, at the age of 22, 
James married the master’s daughter.   
By reputation, James Perkins was a handsome man with a courteous, restrained 
way about him.54  Where his father Edmund was a burly, bear of a man with a “roving, 
eccentric” nature, Perkins rebelled against his father in every way:  his dress, his 
comportment, and even his accounts were impeccable.  In one favorite family story, 
Perkins would go riding with his good friend, Paul Revere; the latter would return 
covered in mud, but no dirt would stick to James Perkins.55  Writing from the late 
nineteenth century, Perkins’s great grandson wrote that in learning and in business, 
Perkins displayed considerable acumen.56  If this was true, his profits were not in his own 
name.  The inventory at his death listed only £351 worth of property for his wife and 
eight children.57  While not inconsiderable, this was no great wealth.  By contrast, each of 
the Perkins children received £66 13 shillings and 4 pence in cash upon their majority 
from their maternal grandfather’s legacy, in addition to tracts of land in Maine for the 
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sons.58  Perkins died in late April 1773, with obituary notices simply inviting friends and 
acquaintances to a funeral at his home on King Street (later State Street) on the 4th of 
May.59  Perhaps Perkins became sick when he visited England in 1771 to plead the 
Bostonians’ cause.60  Or, as some have intimated, perhaps he was in fact supplying guns 
to the patriots in the run up to the American Revolution and caught ill.61  Whatever the 
cause, James Perkins’s death left Elizabeth with eight children and a business to care for 
as Boston descended into war.  To make matters worse, Elizabeth’s father was also 
unwell and died of a “lingering indisposition” in 1777.  Her mother died not long after.62   
Between 1773 and 1775, Elizabeth managed the store on King Street.  
Advertisements up to April of 1775 announced:  
Elizabeth Perkins, at her Shop two Doors below the British Coffee-House, 
North-Side of Kingstreet, hath for Sale, An Assortment of China, Glass 
and Stone Ware, among which are Pickle Pots of various Sizes, and Half-
Pint Dram Bottles, A few Crates of black and yellow Ware, Also 
Groceries of all Sorts, viz. Capers by the Bottle, Keg, or Pound, 
Anchovies, Choice Durham Mustard … Flask Oil, Double & Single 
refined Loaf Sugar, Coffee, Chocolate, Spermaceti Candles, Hard 
Soap ….63  
 
From April 1775 through March 1776, New England militias surrounded Boston in an 
attempt to choke off the British soldiers garrisoned in the city.  The city became a 
dangerous place to live.  Elizabeth moved her family from Boston to Barnstable on the 
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southern Massachusetts coast to stay with a family friend, Edward Bacon, and enrolled 
the children in school locally.  When the patriot militias successfully forced the British to 
depart, the Perkinses returned to the city.  While advertisements for Elizabeth’s store did 
not pick up again after the war, we know from her sons that she continued in trade.64  
In addition to the property and upbringing she provided, Elizabeth Peck Perkins’s 
management of her children’s careers and marriages laid the groundwork for the trading 
network established by her sons.  Elizabeth was a firm matriarch with definite ideas about 
her children’s futures.  To her granddaughter and namesake Eliza, “Madam Perkins” was 
an indomitable woman.  She had strong ideas about society and had no compunction 
about acting on her views.  In advance of the wide acceptance of Unitarianism in Boston, 
Elizabeth referred to herself as a “universalist.” Like her father, Elizabeth balked at the 
idea of everlasting damnation.  When Bishop “John” Cheverus came to Boston in 1796, 
Elizabeth gave him her barn to preach in.  For most Americans, the French Catholic Jean-
Louis Lefebvre de Cheverus slowly brooked anti-Catholic prejudice through his 
selflessness and missions work.  But Elizabeth had heard of Cheverus’s “boundless 
charity” from a poor woman who sometimes worked for her, and thus invited him to her 
home.  When family members grumbled about how Barbara Higginson Perkins treated 
her children, the family relied upon Elizabeth to chastise her daughter-in-law.65 
Of Elizabeth’s eight children to reach maturity, all but one married into 
mercantile families.  In a society as small and homogenous as late eighteenth century 
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Boston, it was easy for social and commercial connections to overlap.66  But as Peter 
Dobkin Hall writes, the notion of who was a desirable marriage partner changed over the 
course of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries:  New Englanders especially prized 
religious and political connections in the earlier period; by the latter half of the 
eighteenth-and start of the nineteenth-centuries, merchant families increasingly pooled 
resources through intermarriage.  In 1773, Elizabeth’s eldest daughter, her namesake, 
married one of her grandfather’s younger apprentices, Russell Sturgis.  Like T.H. Peck 
and James Perkins before him, Russell Sturgis began as a furrier before extending his 
business interests in collaboration with his brothers-in-law.  Two of Elizabeth’s daughters 
married shipping captains:  Robert Cushing and Thomas Doubleday.  Several siblings 
similarly married into prominent New England mercantile families—the Eliots, the 
Higginsons, and the Forbeses—while the eldest, James, married into the wealthy Paine 
family of Worcester.  Often business relations preceded marriage, but not always.  Just as 
family provided a resource for labor and capital in the Perkinses’ enterprise, so, too, did 
their business provide a resource for employing kin.  Here, in this extended kinship 
circle, was a core of the foundation of the Perkins commercial network. 
Elizabeth further laid the groundwork for her family’s commercial network in 
guiding her son’s careers. In the eighteenth century, locating a promising apprenticeship 
was an important step.  Her two eldest sons, James and Thomas H. Perkins, both 
                                                 
66 Nathaniel Cutting, a friend and colleague of the Perkins brothers, called on Mrs. Perkins and her 
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daughters of expectation,” these “human blossoms,” seamlessly blended commercial and social aspirations 
with personal desires.  His journal records days spent visiting a variety of friends for meals, for social 
events, and for mercantile news.  The facility with which these three blended demonstrate their overlap in 





apprenticed with the prominent Boston trading house of William and John Shattuck.67 
Trading during the American Revolution, the Shattucks and the Perkinses branched from 
established contacts with British merchants into business with the French, especially via 
Saint Domingue (Haiti).68  In March of 1779, James Perkins (1761-1822) achieved his 
majority and attempted to sail aboard a Shattuck ship to Virginia for a tobacco 
speculation to England.  Instead, the British captured the vessel, put him ashore at New 
York, and he made his way home to Boston.  In the fall of the same year, James tried 
again.  This time, he made passage on the Beaver, co-owned by the Shattucks and his 
mother, to the French West Indies.  The French government had chartered the Beaver to 
deliver a cavalry of horses to Cap François (now Cap Haitien), the capital of French 
commerce in the West Indies.69  James’s two brothers, Thomas and Samuel, both 
followed their brother to Saint Domingue.  All three partnered at various points in the 
Cap François firm Perkins, Burling & Perkins (1786-1793).  By a quirk of fate and 
politics, James Perkins and subsequently his brothers all began their careers in the French 
West Indian trade. 
                                                 
67 On William and John Shattuck, see Lemuel Shattuck, Memorials of the Descendants of William 
Shattuck (Boston: Dutton & Wentworth, 1855), 155.  The Shattucks, unfortunately, got tangled up in the 
financial disasters that accompanied the French Revolution.  Their trading house failed after being called to 
pay the debts on several notes they had endorsed valued at over $100,000. 
68 Shattuck, Memorials of the Descendants of William Shattuck, 155.  The Shattucks, 
unfortunately, got tangled up in the financial disasters that accompanied the French Revolution.  Their 
trading house failed after being called to pay the debts on several notes they had endorsed valued at over 
$100,000.  It is interesting to note that James G. Forbes, James Perkins’s future brother-in-law, also 
attempted to get his start in the British West Indies (Jamaica), but also ended up in Saint Domingue.  
Forbes had been uncertain as to whether or not his loyalty remained with the British, or if he would become 
an American. His inability to find passage to Jamaica decided his nationality. 
69 “Notes from Thomas H. Perkins’s Memo, 1847.”  JEC Extracts.  Seaburg and Paterson, 





MAP 1:  Saint Domingue and Santo Domingo circa 1770, with the principal towns.  
Source:  David Geggus, “The French Slave Trade: an Overview,” William & Mary 
Quartlery 58, no .1, Based on Eltis et al., eds. Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database. Map 
Drawn by Rebecca Wren.   
 
The French West Indies:  Perkins, Burling & Co., 1786-1793 
In the wake of the American Revolution, America served as a hinterland to the 
French West Indies.  In 1784 and 1785, France opened five West Indian ports to 
American shipping, especially broadening the provisioning trade.  The trip between 
Boston and Cap François took approximately two weeks in good weather.70  A vessel 
arriving from the Atlantic would first arrive at the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo 
before jockeying around the coast for the French Saint Domingue.  This was the island 
first known to Europeans as Hispaniola per Columbus’s arrival in 1492.  The French 
capture of rights to the western portion of the island in 1697 marked a turning point in the 
                                                 





colony’s economic development.71  From 1700 to 1704 alone, sugar plantations jumped 
from 18 to 120.72  On the eve of the Haitian Revolution, the colonists produced enough 
sugar to compete with Jamaica, Cuba, and Brazil combined, and grew roughly half of the 
world’s coffee.73  Sugar flourished in the plains and coffee in the mountains; between the 
two, Saint Domingue became known as the jewel of the Caribbean.   
For Americans, Saint Domingue was especially significant.  The French colony 
provided almost all of the United States’ sugar and molasses, and, in 1790 for example, 
took in 16% of American exports:  23% of American flour, 73% of livestock, 77% of 
processed beef, 63% of dried fish, and 80% of pickled fish.74  Saint Domingue became 
the United States’ second largest trading partner, second only to Great Britain.  It 
accepted more American exports than all the other West Indian islands combined.75 
James Perkins was the first of the Perkinses to travel to Saint Domingue, where he 
was fortunate to find a position in the trading house of Samuel Wall and Gabriel Tardy.  
Wall & Tardy was an American house that specialized in French commerce.  The firm 
opened for business in Cap François in July 1782 where, according to the circular 
                                                 
71 Sugar was first grown on the island as early as 1530, but in the eighteenth century, coffee 
became a new boom crop.   
72 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 19. 
73 Dubois, Avengers of the New World : The Story of the Haitian Revolution, 21. 
74 John H. Coatsworth, "American Trade with European Colonies in the Caribbean and South 
America, 1790-1812," The William and Mary Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1967): 243-266, Donald R. Hickey, 
"America's Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806," Journal of Early Republic 2, no. Winter 
(1982): 361-379. 
75 Note that it was cheaper for Americans to purchase French goods in the Caribbean than in 
France, thus Saint Domingue also became a transfer point for trade between the United States and France.  
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Philadelphia's Vantage onto the Early Haitian Revolution," The William and Mary Quarterly 62, no. 3 
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announcing the move, they had established a partnership “in friendly relations” with 
Jonathan Williams, “the first American merchant who had settled in France.”76  In 1783, 
James Perkins partnered with a fellow clerk by the name of Walter Burling of Baltimore 
to form a branch house of Wall & Tardy.  The Port-au-Prince house was known as 
Perkins, Burling & Co., but the circulars made clear its relationship to Wall & Tardy.77  
When the original house closed its doors “by mutual consent” in 1786, Wall & Tardy 
handed off their contact base to Perkins and Burling.  The two established a new firm as a 
three-way partnership between James and Thomas H. Perkins with Walter Burling:  
Perkins, Burling & Perkins (1786-1793).  The recently married James would reside in 
Boston and “hold himself at all times furnished with a state of their markets,” while 
Thomas and Walter would manage commissions at the Cape.78   
As a commission agency, the partners of Perkins, Burling & Perkins served as 
middlemen between vendors of all types.  They exchanged West Indian sugar, coffee, and 
molasses for goods from New England fisheries, lumber yards, and rum distillers, 
Baltimore flour millers, Charleston rice plantations, as well as “Guinea ships” bringing 
                                                 
76 John Carter Brown Library, Annual Report, 1910-1911, Providence, 1911, 27.  Jonathan 
Williams had earned this distinction by serving as the commercial agent to Nantes for the Continental 
Congress from 1776-1778.  He received this position through his connection to his grand-uncle, Benjamin 
Franklin, himself a commissioner to France during this period.  As late as June 1782, Gabriel Tardy was 
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Samuel Wall, hailed from Providence.  Mumford, Gurdon S. to William Temple Franklin, 1782 June 
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online finding aid:  http://www.amphilsoc.org/mole/view?docId=ead/Mss.B.F86-
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slaves from Africa.79  Their principal clients, not surprisingly, operated out of New 
England—per the Perkinses—and Baltimore—from whence Walter Burling hailed.   
Perkins, Burling & Co.’s stock in trade was the cultivation of contacts in order to 
know where, when, and how to receive worthwhile prices and to pull political strings 
when clients’ vessels were captured or plundered.  Trade laws pitted European nationals 
against each other in the West Indies, but regulations were often made more with the 
metropole than the colony in mind.  While many West Indian colonies were legally off 
limits for American shippers, in practice local governors, customs officials, and planters 
collaborated with merchants like Perkins, Burling & Co. to secret provisions onto the 
islands.80  Regulations changed frequently, as did the exigencies of trade.  In a 
fundamentally risky business, the firm worked to manage risk and profit their clients. 
As was common in the Caribbean, Perkins, Burling & Perkins engaged in what 
has been referred to as “the shadow trade”:  trading through special dispensation of island 
officials, outright smuggling, and indirect smuggling by re-exporting through legal 
entrepôts.81  The firm’s business correspondence sheds insight into their management of 
                                                 
79 This per their correspondence in the JEC Extracts and L. Vernon Briggs, History and Genealogy 
of the Cabot Family, 1475-1927 (Boston: C.E. Goodspeed & co., 1927), Seaburg and Paterson, Merchant 
Prince of Boston, Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764-1854, 41.   
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political clout in the metropole.  Frances Armytage, The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A 
Study in Commercial Policy, 1766-1822 (London: Published for the Royal Empire Society by Longmans, 
Green, 1953), Coatsworth, "American Trade with European Colonies in the Caribbean and South America, 
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played by Americans in organizing contraband activities in Saint Domingue.  “One sees them touring 
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contraband trade.  They directed a 1787 ship to Baltimore from Cap François without 
colors, for example, declaring from the free Dutch port of St. Eustatius rather than allow 
it be known she was from a French port.82  And in packing for the return voyage, the firm 
ordered deliveries of herring and smuggled flour inside the herring barrels.  When the 
return vessel arrived off the coast of Saint Domingue, smaller vessels called droghers 
would be sent out to unload the flour in order to smuggle it to port separately.83  Another 
gambit was to trade slaves between the islands, bringing African slaves from Martinique, 
through the Spanish side of the island, to Cap François or off to Havana.84  This was 
precarious work.  In rationalizing a commission increase to 2 ½%, the partners wrote 
Salem merchant William Gray, Jr. that “there are so many dangerous consequences, we 
think it at least but a just and reasonable charge.  Indeed in a government like ours 
smuggling is a heart rending business.”85  If the hazards made the trade lucrative and 
narrowed competition, it also required strong nerves.   
For Walter Burling (~1762-1810) of Perkins, Burling & Co., Saint Domingue 
may not have been too difficult of an adjustment.  Burling was born into a New York 
                                                                                                                                                 
"The Major Port Towns of Saint Domingue in the Later Eighteenth Century," in Atlantic Port Cities : 
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colors from a contact for a venture to New Orleans in 1790.  Perkins, Burling & Co. to Clark & Rees, New 
Orleans August 1790.  JEC Extracts. 
83 Perkins, Burling & Co. to James Clarke, Baltimore 9 January 1787, to Samuel & John Smith, 
Baltimore 22 March 1787.  JEC Extracts.  Similar tactics were employed by other American merchants as 
well, such as Elias Hasket Derby.  See Richard H. McKey, "Elias Hasket Derby, Merchant of Salem, 
Massachusetts, 1739-1799" (Ph.d. dissertation, Clark University, 1961), 204. 
84 Perkins, Burling & Co. to John Monnoreau, Martinique 29 May 1788.  JEC Extracts. 





Quaker family and likely grew up with firsthand knowledge of his father’s distillery and 
the West Indian shipping that supplied it.86  The Burlings lived a peripatetic life, settling 
for a time in a Quaker settlement in the Caribbean island of St. Croix, later in New 
York—where Thomas Burling, Walter’s father, twice received censure for his slave 
trading—and then in Baltimore.  Perhaps this itinerancy explains something of Walter’s 
roving character.  He never settled down for more than a few years at a time.  While this 
served his mercantile pursuits to some extent (he accumulated too many debts along the 
way to profit in the long run), it must have been difficult for those closest to him.87  In 
late 1786, Walter’s parents Thomas and Phebe Burling moved the family from Baltimore 
to a plantation in Natchez, then part of Spanish Louisiana.  Apparently, part of the reason 
for the move was to escape scandal left behind:  on February 23, 1781, Walter’s sister 
Elizabeth gave birth to a son, Samuel.  In 1784, she married a kinsman of the baby’s 
father, Richard Whittell, the father to her later daughter.  But in April 24, 1786, Walter 
traveled to New York where he challenged young Samuel’s father to a duel.  If the 
family’s reputation had withstood poor Elizabeth’s condition, the fatal shooting of 
Samuel Curzon, a “respectable citizen” and “eminent merchant,” at Walter’s hand was 
too much.  The Burlings bought a plantation in Natchez, while young Samuel Burling, 
then a tender lad of five years, was sent to Boston under the care of the Perkinses.  Walter 
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returned to the Cape.88  But Walter and Samuel Burling both remained connected to the 
Perkinses for the rest of their lives. 
In contrast to Burling, Thomas H. Perkins (1763-1854) did not adapt readily to 
the West Indies.  He first traveled to Saint Domingue in 1785, before journeying north to 
Charleston to visit with a fellow former Shattuck apprentice, William Crafts, for the 
winter.  He carried with him introductions to several Revolutionary war heroes of South 
Carolina and thus moved amongst the “best circles” of Charleston society.  Perkins 
returned to Santo Domingo in the spring of 1786 to partner with Burling and his brother 
James.  After one season, he returned to Boston claiming ill health.  By 1788, Samuel G. 
Perkins (1767-1847) replaced his brother Thomas as the second “Perkins” in the 
partnership, and James was once more in the West Indies with his new wife.89   
Samuel Perkins had been to Saint Domingue intermittently since 1785.  He knew 
the principals; he knew the trade; he knew the instability of imperial politics in the West 
Indies.  But nothing could have prepared Samuel for the difficulties ahead.  The tensions 
in France that sparked the French Revolution also roiled Saint Domingue.  The partners 
of Perkins, Burling & Perkins initially saw war as an opportunity.   Letters to constituents 
in late 1787 and early 1788 refer to the “advantageous” and “hoped for” prospect of 
war.90  But the war they hoped for was in Europe, not in Saint Domingue. 
The revolution in Saint Domingue—the Haitian Revolution—had deep roots, but 
the conflict began over discontent with representation in the metropole.  When King 
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Louis XVI agreed to call the Estates General in 1787 in France, agitation began in Saint 
Domingue for representation.  Who would have a voice?  Tensions in the colony crossed 
both class and race lines:  white planters, creole planters and merchants known as grands 
blancs, the petits blancs who managed local stores and industry, the gens de couleur or 
free mulattoes who could themselves be well-to-do planters or artisans, and, finally, the 
black slaves who made up five-sixths of the colony’s population.91  In December of 1788, 
the colony elected 37 delegates, but the election only exacerbated the conflict.  The 
matter was complex:  many Africans on the island feared that a greater voice for the 
grands blancs would lead to harsher conditions on the island, while some gens de couleur 
argued that the Declaration of the Rights of Man meant they, too, should have a voice in 
the polity.  Just as the tensions crossed many lines, so, too, did the violence.  Smaller 
uprisings and rebellions rocked the island well before the overthrow of the colonial 
government in 1791. 
By October 1789, Perkins, Burling & Co. wrote to their clients that all was in 
confusion in the Cape.  Where on May 27, 1789 they exulted that all kinds of American 
produce, including flour, could now be legally exported to the Cape, by February 1790, 
turmoil on the island had brought business to a standstill.92  On the ground, it was 
difficult to gauge if the discontent would stop trade or make it all the more lucrative.  The 
partners vacillated between confidence that the French troops would and could ensure 
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eventual peace in their most profitable of colonies and utter frustration.  A partner wrote 
that he “almost wept at disappointment” at the armed rebels in the street.93  James Perkins 
reported to brother Tom, “We are again embroiled in a War with the Mulattoes, who have 
taken arms in the neighborhood and menaced the capital.  Our Collections suffer 
inconceivably by it.”94  James sounded weary, but hardly frightened.  On August 22, 
1791, revolution officially came to the capital with a slave uprising in Cap François.  
Nine miles from town, a group of slaves broke into a refinery and killed the owner and an 
apprentice.  The slaves moved on the town to claim their independence.95  The revolution 
had begun. 
At the time of the insurrection, James and his family were visiting with the Comte 
d’Hauteval.96  According to Sarah Perkins, James’s wife, they stopped at the Rouvry 
plantation for dinner on their way back to the Cape.  Madame de Rouvry arrived at the 
plantation that afternoon with news that the whole country was in turmoil.  The guests 
attempted to quietly secure belongings before the information reached the slaves, but as 
evening came, a slave from a neighboring plantation passed through with an account.  
“We soon discovered what had happened by the changed manner of the slaves,” Sarah 
reflected.  “Their insolence and bravado, their noise and general deportment, but we 
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nevertheless, sat down to dinner from rich service of plate, though we ate little and spent 
but a short time at the table in gloomy silence.”97  Apparently, the company also received 
both the tip off and assistance from a slave of the Perkinses, Moussa (a corruption of the 
French title monsieur), who helped the party escape.98  Madame de Rouvry ordered the 
carriages to be made ready for departure and gathered her silver.  With a bribe to the 
coachman, the six women, two children, and two armed men forced their way to the 
village of Fort Dauphin in three coaches and a man on horseback.  “On reaching the 
center of the village, Madame de Rouvry’s postilion drew up and stopped the whole 
party.  We now gave ourselves up for lost.”  Sarah was not certain what budged the 
servant, Madame de Rouvry’s fierce demeanor or, more likely, Monsieur Baury 
brandishing a sword on horseback.  The man led them to the harbor.  From there, the 
company obtained a drogher which carried them the forty miles to Cap François.99  
From August 1791 to May 1792, James stayed in Cap François.  He, Burling, his 
brother Samuel, and other resident Americans fought alongside the local and French 
militias to put down the uprising.  He wrote to one correspondent that “the whole Country 
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has been thrown into a State of Confusion.  All business suspended & martial law 
proclaimed in the Garrison.”100  And yet the partners stayed, tried to salvage what 
property they could, and continued to do what trade as they could.  They mostly diverted 
shipments to Port au Prince, Martinique, and Havana.   
Newspapers throughout the American north carried the “letters from James 
Perkins” in which he described his experiences and the state of affairs in the colony.101  
That his letters were so widely printed is hardly surprising:  merchants’ letters were the 
most thorough and current news on the conflict.  Even Thomas Jefferson, then the 
Secretary of State, urged Nathaniel Cutting—himself an intimate and guest of the 
Perkinses in Cap François—to keep him apprised of events as it was the most up-to-date 
news to be had.102     
The partners of Perkins, Burling & Co. supplied residents of Cap François with 
what provisions they had in stock.  They were afraid not to.  They dared not raise prices 
lest locals simply take what they wanted, despite scarcities.  Simon Newman has argued 
that while Republicans lambasted Federalists as aristocrats and monarchists, “those same 
Federalists were actively aiding the most radical revolution of their age.”103  The Perkins 
brothers certainly fit within this class of merchants, but, as with many Federalists, their 
                                                 
100 James Perkins, Cape Francis, to Arnold Welles 13 September 1791.  Thomas Handasyd Perkins 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.2.  MHS. 
101 Extracts appeared in the New Hampshire Gazetteer and the New Hampshire Spy, the New York 
Journal, the Philadelphia General Advertiser, the Western Star, the Daily Advertiser, and the Independent 
Chronicle of Massachusetts, and much more.  The most southerly paper to carry the letters appears to have 
been the Maryland Gazette of Annapolis, Maryland.  
102 Simon P. Newman, "American Political Culture and the French and Haitian Revolutions:  
Nathaniel Cutting and the Jeffersonian Republicans," in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the 
Atlantic World, ed. David Patrick Geggus (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, 2001), 72-89. 
103 Newman, "American Political Culture and the French and Haitian Revolutions:  Nathaniel 





provisioning of the rebels was less about principle than profit.  Even in the face of a 
revolution fought for a liberty so resonant of their own revolution, the Perkinses 
continued to traffic in slaves.104  For the Perkinses, their sympathies were with the 
planters run out of their plantations, several of whom ended up refugees sleeping on the 
floors of Perkins’ family homes in Boston.105  Both Thomas H. Perkins and his brother-
in-law and trading partner, Russell Sturgis, served on a committee to aid the French 
refugees.106  But the Perkinses were first and foremost merchants and they kept their firm 
active in the French West Indies as long as they could.  The principle involved, to them, 
was the right to engage in the commerce.       
The destruction of Cap François in 1793 was immediately but not ultimately 
devastating to Perkins, Burling & Perkins.  Despite early luck with war speculations and 
in escaping with their lives, much property was lost.  Fires wiped out their warehouses in 
the Cape, leaving the French government their only hope of restitution.  Years later, 
Samuel would write of watching the great city burn, one of the many “miserable tenants” 
of the ships who dotted the outskirts of the Cap François harbor.  Sam and Walter Burling 
sailed for Port-au-Prince in hopes of recovering their funds at the colonial capitol.  The 
two men sailed separately with what property they could carry.   
Their luck (bad) held.  A British merchantman captured Walter Burling’s vessel 
with the $15,000 the two men managed to secure from the wreckage and carried it to 
                                                 
104 To say that the Perkins brothers did not see it in this light is an understatement.  In his 
reminiscences of the revolution, Samuel Perkins blamed the uprising on unthinking instigators in France 
such as Abbé Gregoire, mistakes made by white plantation owners, and, above all, “the secret arts of the 
free mulattoes.”  To him, the slaves were pawns.  The entire revolution was a tragedy for the loss it brought 
to the formerly prosperous colony and her people, including the slaves who, under slavery, “barely needed 
work at all.”  Briggs, History and Genealogy of the Cabot Family, 1475-1927, 483-484.     
105 Cabot, "Reminiscences of Mrs. Eliza Cabot." 





Jamaica.107  The brig carrying Samuel Perkins docked at St. Mark’s where, upon learning 
those on board hailed from Cap François, French officials carted the lot of them to the 
local jail.  With the assistance of some of the town’s white inhabitants and coin, Perkins 
and his fellow castaways managed to secure a late supper and a separate room in the jail 
where they slept undisturbed by the other inmates, but Samuel’s hopes of getting to the 
capitol had to wait for the arrival of the local governor.  When Perkins finally arrived in 
Port au Prince a few days later, French officials evidently notified him that he required 
evidence of the debts owed the government to receive compensation, for he soon 
embarked on a return voyage to the Cape in search of certification from the local 
commissary.  In the Cape, Sam encountered a friendly Boston captain of his 
acquaintance.  The captain, sensibly, was horrified at the news Samuel intended to seek 
restitution, and urged him to stay aboard the Betsey and not endanger his life.  But 
Samuel had to try.  He took refuge aboard the Betsey at night, but at daybreak, he stole 
into town with a hat pull low across his brow.  It took him several days of petitioning to 
receive the French commissary’s certification of the debts owed the Perkins firm.  Once 
received, Samuel was able to conclude his business.  Much had been lost in the violence 
of revolution, but here, at least, was something.108    
Still, despite all of the upheaval and the damage to agricultural output, the 
revolution in Saint Domingue did not put an end to American trade on the island.  As late 
as November of 1803, the Perkinses informed correspondents that they still endeavored 
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to obtain cargoes of coffee from the colony, albeit with difficulty.109  In November of the 
following year, they wrote that they expected the Haitian trade to be interdicted entirely.  
Martinique, Guadeloupe, and India would be their only remaining coffee suppliers.110  
They purchased sugar and molasses from Havana.  The official end to their trade did not 
really happen until 1806, when President Thomas Jefferson finally pushed legislation 
through congress making it illegal to provision the republic of former slaves.111   
 
MAP 2:  Pacific Northwest Fur Trade in World Context, circa 1790 to 1840.   
Source:  Created by Pfly, April 10, 2010.  
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Maritime_Fur_Trade-WorldContext.png>   
 
  
                                                 
109 James & Thomas H. Perkins & Co. to J.M. Forbes, London, 4 November 1803, to T. & A. 
Cremer, Rotterdam, 7 November 1803.  JEC Extracts.     
110 James & Thomas H. Perkins & Co. to T. & A. Cremer, Rotterdam, 24 November 1804.  JEC 
Extracts.   





The East Indies:  Perkins & Magee, 1788-1801 
While his brothers concentrated on the French West Indies trade, Thomas 
Handasyd Perkins moved in a new direction.  In March of 1788, Thomas married Sally 
Elliot, daughter to the prosperous Boston merchant, Simon Elliot.112  And on October 14, 
1788, Thomas partnered with his new uncle-in-law, James Magee.  The two men opened 
a store on Butler’s Row not far from Simon Elliot’s tobacco shop—one of three 
properties owned by Elliot on Butler’s Row alone.  Perkins & Magee’s declared ambition 
was to manage a commission agency focused on exchanging New England rum for 
European wines and Charleston rice.113  Already, however, Magee had already been 
approached by the Salem shipping magnate, Elias Hasket Derby.  Magee agreed to 
captain Derby’s Astrea to the East Indies and, in turn, brought in Perkins as the 
supercargo or shipboard sales’ agent.114  For Perkins & Magee, the paint on their shingle 
barely dry, this shipping venture was an entrée into the East Indies trade on their own 
account.   
  
                                                 
112 George Sweet Gibb, The Saco-Lowell Shops; Textile Machinery Building in New England, 
1813-1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 15-17.  Elliot left an estate valued at close to 
£15,000 at his death in 1794.  He owned four stores, three on Butler’s Row and one on State Street, and a 
mansion on Federal Street.  Elliot was especially known for the snuff mills he built along the banks of the 
Charles River by the Newton Upper Falls in the 1780s and 1790s.  He completed the first snuff mill in 
1782, followed by another three, a grist mill, and a nail factory over the course of the next twelve years.  
These were some of the early manufacturing factories built in the region and made use of the Newton 
waterways.  Thomas Perkins would later attempt to use these properties in constructing a cotton mill, the 
Elliot Manufacturing Company. 
113 Seaburg and Paterson, Merchant Prince of Boston, Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764-1854, 42. 
114 Magee agreed to make the voyage in late 1787 and was heavily involved in the organizing of 
the adventure’s investors, cargo, crew, and course.  See James Magee to Elias Hasket Derby, 17 December 
1787, 15 March 1788, and more.  Box 1, Folder 8:  Ship’s Papers, Astrea, 1789-1790.  Derby Family 






IMAGE 1.  Thomas Handasyd Perkins. 
Source:  Justin Winsor, Memorial History of Boston, including Suffolk County 
Massachusetts, 1630-1880 (J.R. Osgood & Co., 1881), vol. 4, p. 118.    
 
When he partnered with Perkins in 1788, James Magee (1750-1801) was a gritty, 
experienced ship captain of thirty-eight years.  He and his brother Bernard were Irish sea 
dogs turned Revolutionary War heroes.  During the American Revolution, James Magee 
captained American privateers such as the Independence which captured the British 
Countess.  He also commanded the General Arnold, a vessel whose maritime fate 
shocked even hardy New Englanders.  A day out of Boston, a violent wind shattered the 
ship against a shoal off of Plymouth.  Almost 80% of the crew died from exposure to the 
elements and Magee was lucky to survive with his limbs and, according to one version, 
escaped such a fate by pouring brandy into his boots.115  In spite of that horrific 
experience and a later capture by British privateers, Magee felt bound to the sea.  He had 
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amassed a nest egg from small adventures here and there.  New England shippers often 
gave freight privileges to a ship’s officers and sometimes even the crew.  A precursor to 
corporate stock privileges, this investment in an adventure’s success allowed mariners to 
participate in the mercantile life of the ship.  Magee had managed to parlay these smaller 
speculations into larger commercial investments, enough to go into business for himself 
or settle down.  But he was in no mood to retire.  In 1786, at the helm of the Hope, 
Magee was the first Boston captain to visit China and the first American to dock at 
Batavia (Jakarta).  Returning in 1787, Magee was in great demand by American 
merchants interested in the China trade.116 
In early America, trade with the East Indies signified more than luxury goods and 
spectacular wealth.  The commerce was also a physical manifestation of independence 
and American commercial potential.117  Before the American Revolution, East Indian 
produce such as tea, pepper, and spices were colonial goods, imported to the Americas 
largely through British trading companies and Dutch smugglers.  Thus, when the 
American Empress of China embarked from New York on February 22, 1784—the 
birthday of George Washington himself—guns fired their salutes, crowds cheered, and 
Philip Freneau captured the nationalism of the moment in poetry: 
To that old trade no more confined, 
By Britain’s jealous court assigned 
                                                 
116 Lee, "The Magee Family and the Origins of the China Trade," 105-106.  A consortium of New 
York merchants owned the Hope, including Samuel Shaw, Isaac Sears, etc. 
117 The aforementioned Observations on the Commerce of the United States by Lord Sheffield 
proclaimed in 1783 that America’s commerce would surely continue through Britain as much as it had 
before.  “The superior credit afforded by England will always give the preference; and it is probably many 
foreign articles will go to America through Great Britain.”  To many Americans, from Philip Freneau to 
Benjamin Franklin to merchants such as Joseph Barrell, ventures like that of the Empress of China were an 
opportunity to prove the British wrong.  See Edward D. Graham, American Ideas of a Special Relationship 





She round the Stormy Cape shall sail 
And, eastward, catch the odorous gale… 
 
Thus commerce to our world conveys 
All that the varying taste can please; 
For us, the Indian looms are free 
And Java strips her spicy tree….118 
 
At a time when  most avenues of trade were closing for Americans—trade with 
the British, Spanish, and even French West Indies—the East Indies offered hope for new 
beginnings.  Yet not only were such voyages long, capital intensive, and risky, they were 
also ventures into the unknown.  Where a Boston-West Indies venture might take a little 
over a month round trip, the Empress of China returned fourteen months and twenty-four 
days after her departure.  While Daniel Parker & Company, the firm managing the 
Empress of China adventure, spent approximately $20,000 to outfit the Comte de Artois 
for France, the Empress required a whopping $120,000.119  Few American merchants 
could amass this kind of capital for a single venture.  
By 1788, as Perkins & Magee set up shop, Elias Hasket Derby had already made 
a name for himself in the East Indies trade.  Here was the man dubbed “King Derby” by 
Nathaniel Hawthorne in The Scarlet Letter.  Derby reputedly rode through Salem’s 
narrow lanes in a gilded coach and sported, when spotted, elegant attire topped off with a 
                                                 
118 Ver Steeg, "Financing and Outfitting the First United States Ship to China," 10.  A Hingham, 
Massachusetts vessel, the Harriet, was actually the first to embark for China in December of 1783.  But the 
little 55-ton sloop never made it past the Cape of Good Hope.  Encountering British East Indiamen off the 
Cape, the British officials offered more than double her weight in Hyson tea to keep her from continuing 
the voyage.  The Harriet lost her place in history but made fantastic profits for her owners.  Morison, The 
Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860, 44. 
119 Ver Steeg, "Financing and Outfitting the First United States Ship to China," 8-9.  Outfitting a 
vessel included purchasing the ship, hiring the mariners and officers, provisioning the ship, securing the 
cargo, and, usually, insuring the ship and cargo.  Justin Winsor quotes an Independent Chronicle article 
from June 23, 1785 in which hopeful investors hold a meeting in New York to attract subscriptions (at a 
share of $100 each) to partake in such a voyage.  Justin Winsor and C. F. Jewett, The Memorial History of 





gold-headed cane.  Derby was not the first American merchant to send a vessel for trade 
beyond the Cape of Good Hope.  But he was one of the most heavily involved American 
merchants in the region.  In 1784 and again 1785, he sent out the Grand Turk for the Isle 
of France and China respectively.  By the fall of 1786, he outfitted another three vessels 
for the Indian Ocean.120   
Where most Derby adventures were joint ventures between closer family and 
friends, the management of the Astrea took place through the careful solicitation of a 
broader circle of merchants.  Both Magee and Perkins were heavily involved in the 
planning for the voyage.  The Articles of Agreement for the voyage were made between 
Derby and the individual merchants, with stipulations that Magee and Perkins were to 
manage the sales.121  David Sears and Samuel Parkman were they key initial investors, 
with a stake of $20,000 each, followed by the Shippeys and Seamans (connected 
families) of New York.122  Officers for the voyage, however, were personal choices:  
Perkins, Philip Howland, and John Russell were all Magee picks; H.J. Bettle and Samuel 
Derby were both Derby picks.   
 Magee and Perkins also agreed to take a fair amount of the risk for the Astrea 
adventure upon themselves.  As was common to such voyages, the shippers purchased 
insurance for the vessel and cargo.  Russell Sturgis secured the London insurance at a rate 
                                                 
120 McKey, "Elias Hasket Derby, Merchant of Salem, Massachusetts, 1739-1799." 
121 See individual letters of articles of agreement in Box 1, Folder 8:  Ship’s Papers, Astrea, 1789-
1790.  Derby Family Papers.  PEM.  Sears and Parkman were both wealthy merchants, and Magee had 
done considerable work for the Sears family, especially Isaac Sears.  Special thanks to Jessica Lepler and 
Lesley Doig for their insight on the Derby family and mercantile practices. 
122 Apparently the involvement of New York men (i.e., not New England men) was a source of 
tension between Magee and Derby.  In February 1789, Magee wrote “I dare say there will be as much 
money or freight as we had right to expect, but I never understood that I was confined to the town of 





of 8% and noted to Derby that he had been able to negotiate a lower premium, “owing to 
her sailing in what they think will be a good season.”123  In a less customary turn, Derby 
purchased additional insurance in the form of subscriptions at a rate of 12%.  Some of the 
subscribers were also interested in the voyage themselves, but many were not.  
Subscribers included merchants and firms:  William Gray, John Fish, John Norris, 
Benjamin Pickman, John Cabot, Francis Cabot, as well as Brown & Thorndike, Lee & 
Cabot.124  And finally, the contract and invoice for outbound cargo for the voyage 
included the following provision:   
I do hereby acknowledge to have received of Capt. James Magee fifteen 
hundred dollars of Mr. Thos. Hand. Perkins the sum of five hundred 
dollars, which is by agreement to be taken out of the sales of the Cargo at 
Canton.  Provided Capt. Magee should loose (sic) my ship & Cargo & 
save the money on board ship in that case, Mr. Derby will pay one fourth 
of the sum and the quarter part of his property is not insured.125   
 
Beyond the planning of the voyage itself and their personal investments, Perkins and 
Magee were contractually implicated by the success or failure of the Astrea’s voyage. 
For merchants with the funds to invest, the Astrea speculation was clearly an 
exciting prospect.  Together, Magee and Perkins attracted eighteen subscribers and a 
cargo of mostly ginseng and silver—38 tons of ginseng, $30,000 worth of silver—as well 
as beeswax, butter, Philadelphia beer and New England rum, codfish, spermaceti candles, 
                                                 
123 Russell Sturgis to Elias Hasket Derby, 20 June 1789, Box 1, Folder 8, Derby Shipping Papers.  
PEM. 
124 “Know all men,” 14 February 1789, Box 1, Folder 8, Derby Shipping Papers.  PEM 
125 “Invoice of sundry merchandise shipt by Elias Hasket Derby of Salem on board the Ship Astrea 
James Magee Master bound for Batavia and Canton on Account and risqué of the Shipper and consigned to 
Master and Mr. Thomas Perkins for Sales and Returns, viz. 14 Feb. 1789,” Astrea:  Invoice Book, 





tobacco, bar iron, and sundries.126  William Cabot even packed up the household silver, 
plates, platters, tankards and all, to be sent to China in trade for teas.127  For their trouble, 
Magee and Perkins were to receive 5% commission on the sales of cargo headed out, 2 
½% on cargo brought home, and another 5% on goods sold between Batavia (Jakarta) 
and Canton.128 
The Astrea departed in February 1789 and arrived in Batavia in July.  As the 
vessel neared Java Head, Magee ordered the guns mounted in case they met up with 
pirates, only to discover that the shot would not fit their guns.  A tense crew made their 
way to port, luckily meeting no harm, only to discover from another Derby vessel, the 
Three Sisters, that Dutch officials refused the Americans’ trade.  Here we arrive at 
Perkins’s petitioning, per the introduction.  Day after day he approached the governor-
general with petitions and wooed officials and other residents by night at dinners and 
social events.  Finally, on July 21, the Astrea received permission to sell her cargo.  Yet 
another rude awakening awaited.  The merchants, Perkins felt, joined together to force 
the outsider-Americans to sell low.  On July 28, Perkins consented to sell what he could 
in order to be off.  The vessel had still to make her way to her destination in China.129 
In September 1789, the Astrea arrived in Macau, a peninsula downriver from 
Canton.  For Perkins, a supercargo in a new market, the challenges came hard and fast.  
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127 William Cabot to Elias Hasket Derby, 12 February 1789.  Box 1, Folder 8:  Ship’s Papers, 
Astrea, 1789-1790.  Derby Family Papers.  The plate included the following:  “Tea kettle, tankard, coffee 
pot, half pint can, 2 porrengers, tea pot and cream, old spout cup, 2 old wrought plates (1 L, 1 Sm), 1 old 
bowl, sundry pieces.  Est. value 255.16..12.” 
 
128 Seaburg and Paterson, Merchant Prince of Boston, Colonel T. H. Perkins, 1764-1854, 44. 





Trading in China did not require the intense petitioning of Java, but merchants needed to 
know how to navigate the complex system of ship pilots, customs officials, compradors, 
linguists, and Hong merchants.   Simply traveling from Macau to Canton required 
entertaining customs officials en route and offering appropriate “cumshas” (gifts or 
bribes) to officials and “tidewaiters” (to deter smuggling along the river).  A first Chinese 
pilot navigated the foreign vessel from Macau to the customs house at the Bocca Tigris, 
or mouth of the Pearl River.  From there, after a vessel’s papers passed inspection, a 
second, more skilled pilot guided the vessel upriver to the Whampoa Anchorage.130  
From Whampoa, small Chinese sampans or “chop boats” carried merchandise up the 
shallower portion of the Pearl River to Canton to be sold under the consignment of a 
licensed Hong merchant.  Hong merchants were elite merchants of Canton and, officially 
at least, the only ones legally allowed to sell to foreign traders.  In exchange for 
privileged access to the foreign trade, Hong merchants were responsible for the foreign 
vessels consigned to them, and the behavior of its occupants.   
At Whampoa, Perkins found more than a dozen American ships already 
congregated.  The cluster raised the prices on teas and lowered the prices for their own 
all-too-similar cargoes.  Making matters worse, Elias Hasket Derby owned four of the 
vessels:  not only the Astrea, but also the Three Sisters, the Atlantic, and the Light Horse.  
The latter two vessels had been intended for Isle de France (now Reunion, off the eastern 
coast of Africa), but a Derby son who was stationed there sent the vessels along to China 
in hope of better prices.  The four Derby vessels alone glutted the market with ginseng.  
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The Astrea itself contained nearly 75,000 pounds of the root.131  Like many Americans, 
the Derby investors hoped the Chinese would appreciate the native American ginseng.  
Samuel Shaw expressed this faith in the article following his return from the Empress of 
China adventure in a letter to Secretary of State John Jay:  “Though a very small portion 
of [American vessel’s] funds consisted of specie, they see them all returning with full and 
valuable cargoes.  Such are the advantages which America derives from her ginseng. . . . 
It is probably that there will always be a sufficient demand for the article to make it 
equally valuable.”132  This optimism was ill-founded.  Americans tended to amass 
ginseng without attention to quality, a fact that also made the cargoes a difficult match for 
the more refined Chinese market.  But the large quantities of ginseng imported to China 
make far more sense in this light.  
Perkins and his fellow Derby agents decided to combine to sell off their cargoes 
and two vessels—New England ships being one of the few items actually in demand—
and loaded the Astrea and the Light Horse with 2,000 chests of black and green teas, 
nankeens, and mercury.  Returning to New England in 1790, the merchants found the tea 
market itself was overdone.133  Thus, on his first voyage to the East Indies, Perkins 
experienced what later became recognizable as a pattern in the American-China trade:  
the booms and busts of new commodities and new markets, from American ginseng, to 
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Pacific furs and sandalwood, to Turkish opium.  If anything, the experience seemed to 
sharpen Perkins’s resolve to be more aggressive in future speculations. 
For Thomas H. Perkins, this East Indies adventure shaped the rest of his career.  
While still in Canton, Perkins and Magee witnessed firsthand the potential profits to be 
had in the Pacific fur trade.  On October 5, the British Iphegenia arrived in Whampoa 
with a cargo of pelts, followed by the American Columbia on November 17.  Sea otters 
from the Pacific Northwest had extremely fine but dense fur that gave the pelts a soft 
radiance for which they were prized.  The pelts of either the north Pacific Enhydra lutris 
lutris or their more southerly compatriots the Enhydra lutris neireis shimmered brown, 
black, and silver, but the former were said to be darker and far more lush than the latter.  
William Sturgis, a Perkins nephew, would later write that the luster of the sea otter pelts 
rivaled the appeal of a beautiful woman or newborn babe.  A smuggled pelt valued at 
only a few dollars off the Pacific coast of North America, Perkins discovered, could bring 
as much as $70 in Canton.134  Seizing the opportunity, Perkins and his business partner 
quietly approached the first mate aboard the Columbia, Joseph Ingraham, and contracted 
with him to captain a new venture upon his return to Boston.   
The strategies by which Perkins and Magee embarked on their first independent 
venture are instructive for understanding the foundation of the larger Perkins network.  
The Astrea arrived in Boston in June of 1790, the Columbia on August 9.  While awaiting 
Joseph Ingraham’s return aboard the Columbia, Perkins and Magee pooled resources with 
Perkins’s brother-in-law, Russell Sturgis, to purchase a small two-masted brigantine, the 
Hope.  Perkins arranged with his school friend Harrison Gray Otis, then a Boston lawyer, 
                                                 





to secure a letter from the American government as well as from the Spanish Ambassador 
to smooth the vessel’s reception in Spanish America.135  Where in the West Indies and 
Europe James Perkins drew upon a core of contacts inherited from Wall & Tardy and 
brought his brothers in to an established circle of merchants and retailers, in the Pacific 
Northwest and China trade, Thomas H. Perkins’s initial foray built more immediately 
upon kin—including in-laws James Magee and Russell Sturgis and a 1/16 share for 
Perkins, Burling & Co.—and friends.   
Perkins and Magee threw themselves into the Pacific Northwest trade with both 
feet.  On the morning of September 16, 1790, the Hope set sail for the Pacific, followed a 
year later by the Margaret.  The Hope had only a 71-ton capacity, barely 1/5 the size of 
the Astrea, with a crew of fourteen men, a boy, and a dog.  This included the 28-year old 
Captain Ingraham , a Hawaiian islander and friend of Ingraham by the name of Opie (he 
had arrived in Boston with the Columbia), and Ebenezer Dorr, Jr., son to a local 
mercantile family, as supercargo.  Dorr, much like Thomas Perkins in his Astrea voyage, 
aspired to use the voyage to gain experience and contacts in specific markets and sea 
lanes for his own family.  The Hope’s small vessel and crew meant it could be discharged 
without delay, getting a hoped-for jump on the competition.  The Margaret, on the other 
hand, was a partnership between Perkins, Magee, and brothers James and Thomas Lamb.  
The Margaret was built for the trade, complete with a copper bottom to stave off 
barnacles and eight swivel guns to protect against pirates or Indians.136  Magee once more 
took to the helm to oversee the latter adventure himself.    
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While Magee returned to sea, Perkins handled their affairs from Boston and took 
on commissions from Perkins, Burling & Co.  He had never entirely left his brothers 
behind.  For example, he invested James and Samuel in the Hope speculation.  Yet much 
was up in the air.  In correspondence with a colleague in May of 1792, he felt that his 
friend would be surprised not to find him back in China.  Perkins explained that the 
prospects had been so “unpromising that I have been laying on my oars.”137  He had 
attempted to organize a new China voyage through Elias Hasket Derby, but to no avail.  
Several merchants involved in the Astrea voyage indicated that if he returned to China, 
they wished to ship with him, and he led Derby to believe that such a voyage was 
imminent.  But he had not been able to solicit sufficient subscriptions for a voyage.  
While seeking merchants to freight with him, those who had initially indicated interest 
employed their funds elsewhere.138  Here was a weakness of the consignee model for 
young merchants.  No merchant wished to see their property or capital languish; delays 
might undermine an adventure altogether.   
The year 1792 could have found Thomas Perkins en route to Canton.  Instead he 
was in Boston, where, by July, he accepted a proposal from his brother.  The two would 
form a new agency based in Boston but centered on the West Indian trade.  Ironically, the 
partnership began at the suggestion of the more circumspect James.  The offer was purely 
business, James wrote, and not his idea. “At this moment the Confusion in France and in 
this Colony, the Planters are looking for new resources,” James explained.  “We make 
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you this Proposition as merchants, for in Trade we are told there is no friendship.”139  As 
originally proposed, Thomas would form a branch house of Perkins, Burling & Perkins to 
handle their Boston consignments.  Thomas batted his brother’s diffidence away, “You 
quote the old adage that there’s not friendship in trade, tho’ I’m confident when you 
wrote it y’r own feelings gave the lie to it.”140   
Thomas expressed to his brother of his confidence at the prospect.  The chance at 
“‘clubbing our stocks’ is a thing I have always looked forward to with great pleasure,” he 
wrote.  “The inducement to strangers to connect themselves in business ought to be great.  
A want of Confidence, and of course a Jealousy in the parties, must be productive of 
great uneasiness to them, and make them appear unfavourable in the public eye. 
There are a thousand causes wh. give rise to the low suspicions wh. we so 
often see reigning between partners, wh. were the furthest from their 
minds when they connected themselves. . . . On the other hand a 
connection between brothers is both natural and beneficial; they have 
fewer distrusts and are more communicative, wh. strengthens their 
confidence and makes their business but amusement.141 
 
For many relatives, kinship promised no such openness, trust, or harmony.142  The 
Perkins brothers were fortunate—at least in each other.   
 
Boston:  James & Thomas H. Perkins & Co., 1792-1822 
In 1792, Boston newspapers proclaimed that as of 29 September “Thomas 
Handasyd Perkins respectfully announces to the Public, his connection in business with 
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142 One example of brothers who collaborated to ill effect, is Stephen Girard and his brother Jean.  






his Brother James Perkins, jun. under the firm of James & Tho’s H. Perkins.”  The 
trading house had a new shipment in with cotton, brown sugars by the hogshead, tierce, 
barrel, or loaf, as well as Madeira wine and sherry in pipes and quarter casks, all for sale 
at their new store on No. 11 Long Wharf.143  The firm was not a fresh beginning for 
either of James or Thomas, but a merging of existing interests.  The adventures, business, 
and contacts of both Perkins, Burling & Co. and Perkins & Magee became enmeshed in 
the new trading house.  This range of experience and connections proved a boon to the 
Perkinses, both for the firm and the larger family.  As Thomas wrote to his brother about 
the prospect of James returning to Boston for the sake of the partnership, “our good 
Mother renews her age on the idea.”144  While Perkins & Co. faced several stumbling 
blocks—vessels captured by warring nations and pirates, swindlers, glutted markets, and 
ill-fated speculations—the brothers engaged in commerce during a period of considerable 
opportunity for Americans.  And the firm proved energetic in seeking out new openings.  
Time and again, Perkins & Co. located niches of trade where competition between larger 
powers opened up a space for smaller American merchants.    
The Boston of the Perkins brothers’ childhood was a commercial center amidst a 
broader coastline of New England ports; by the time they returned to establish a trading 
house in 1792, Boston was the undisputed political and economic capital of the larger 
region.  Merchant families of outlying ports increasingly relocated to “the Hub,” bringing 
capital and commercial experience with them.145  And why not?  Boston boasted a natural 
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harbor with a narrow inlet and a large, calm bay.  Some eighty wharves cropped into the 
city’s harbor, offering anchorage to a good five hundred vessels.  Among these was the 
1700-foot, aptly-named Long Wharf, where the Perkins set up shop.146  This central 
wharf jutted out from State Street, formerly King Street, and the equivalent to early 
Boston’s Main Street.  Boston of 1790 may have only had a population of 18,320 
compared with New York’s 33,131 and Philadelphia’s 28,522, but New England 
merchants still competed effectively in trade. 147  What the region lacked in agricultural 
abundance, it made up for in commercial elbow grease.  
Yet the Boston the Perkins brothers settled into was still a relatively intimate 
space where business and social worlds coincided.  To Thomas, the streets of London felt 
akin to Boston after the churches let out on Sunday—or, more likely, when the fire bell 
rang.148  Nathaniel Cutting’s journal of his return to Boston during 1792 offers a window 
into the comfortable overlap of social and mercantile worlds.  Cutting was a good friend 
to the Perkinses, and returned home to Boston with them in the aftermath of the Haitian 
Revolution.  His journal traces his visiting habits.  On September 12, 1792, for example, 
Cutting went with his brother to visit Mrs. Eliza Gray at Salem, but she was not at home.  
He left his card and returned for Boston—running into an old friend, Captain Jonathan 
Ingersoll.  Cutting then went to visit with Thomas H. Perkins, who read to him a letter 
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just received from his brother and Cutting’s companion of Cape François, Samuel 
Perkins.  The two men then considered the prospects of the West Indian trade and Perkins 
plotted out a plan for a sugar adventure.  Cutting promised to return that evening to 
discuss the prospect further.  He returned home to find Mr. Murray and several gentlemen 
had dropped by to dine, a lovely evening.  After this, he called at “chez Perkins” and 
passed an hour with Thomas and his wife.  Cutting journeyed easily from the docks to a 
relaxing tea, from the Boston Exchange, to dinner with friends, to the theater.  While 
visiting with the Perkinses, he conferred with “Madam Perkins” about business and 
politics and flirted with the “youthful daughters of expectation”—unmarried sisters—
among them.149  A marriage could have very easily come out of the scenario.  While the 
Perkins brothers did not live in their store, nor did they leave business at the 
countinghouse. 
James and Thomas worked well together in part because they had different 
temperaments that allowed them to split their responsibilities effectively.  James handled 
the “inside work” of supervising the accounts, the clerks, and the apprentices; Thomas 
oversaw the “outside work” of managing their fleet, maritime employees, as well as 
being the more public face of the firm.  James had long felt an affinity for accounting.150  
During his apprenticeship with William Shattuck, it was James who introduced the new 
format of double-entry bookkeeping into the firm.151  Double-entry bookkeeping had 
been around for centuries, but only gained prominence within the United States at the 
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turn of the nineteenth century.  By balancing the credits as well as the debits inherent in 
every business transaction, double-entry bookkeeping allowed for a more precise 
understanding of the impact of each transaction on a firm’s accounts.  This was an 
innovation James brought to Perkins & Co. as well.  While less publicly acclaimed than 
his charismatic brother, James nonetheless played an important role in the partnership.152  
Where James enjoyed the studious scribbling of the clerks, Thomas preferred to 
gossip with merchants at the Exchange on State Street or, after 1808, at the Boston 
Exchange Coffee House around the corner on Congress Street.153  He was at his best 
when surrounded by people or making a deal.  Fellow Boston merchant William 
Appleton once confessed that making money was devilishly addictive; Thomas would 
have likely agreed wholeheartedly.154  Thus it was Thomas who negotiated contracts, 
purchased provisions, and oversaw the outfitting of vessels for departure.  Thomas 
recruited the employees necessary to each voyage:  ship captains, sailors, dockworkers, 
shipwrights, and more.  Ship captains and officers were critical to the success of any 
adventure and had to be selected with care.  In hiring a crew for the Thomas Russell in 
1798, for example, wages varied considerably according to position, experience, and time 
with the Perkinses.  John Purdy, one “ordinary seaman” was to receive fifteen dollars a 
month, where Asia Morse, with the same classification, was to receive only ten.155  If not 
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enough sailors could be found in Boston, Thomas traveled to neighboring ports to secure 
additional men.  According to a testimony Thomas gave before a state commission, 
between 1793 and 1813, Perkins & Co. of Boston employed an average of 100-150 
mariners per year.156 
The firm’s initial business built on the trade of Perkins, Burling & Co.  James & 
Thomas H. Perkins & Co. kicked off its career in the closing months of 1792 as Boston 
agents for several vessels owned by Daniel McNeil:  the Katy, the Clarissa, the Willing 
Quaker, and the Delight.157  They received 5% for outfitting the vessels with flour, rum, 
tobacco, and other provisions, dispatching the vessels to Africa and to Saint Domingue, 
Havana, and the Windward Isles where a willingness to import slaves would gain them 
entry to purchase their molasses, sugar, and coffee.   In spite of legal prohibitions on 
Americans engaging in the slave trade, the Perkinses continued in the trade under foreign 
colors.  Captains knew to keep the whole of the trade outside American waters.  Had they 
been caught, the Perkinses would have faced a prohibitive fine of £50 per head.158    The 
revolution in Saint Domingue did not dislodge the Perkinses involvement in the island, 
but their West Indies trade increasingly incorporated Martinique and, especially, 
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Havana.159  Their brother Samuel initially served as their agent in Cap François and 
helped to direct their Havana trade, but by 1794 he went to work for his soon-to-be 
father-in-law:  Stephen Higginson.  Walter Burling announced an intention to retire in 
1793, but remained involved in many adventures with the Perkinses.  He served as 
supercargo for several Perkins-owned voyages.   
 
Conclusion 
Despite the Perkinses early intention to focus on the West Indies, the expected 
war in Europe finally erupted in 1793.  The ensuing wars—known collectively as the 
French Revolutionary Wars—changed everything.  Suddenly, opportunities to carry not 
only American produce but foreign luxuries such as West Indian coffee and sugar, East 
Indian tea, textiles, and coffee, and European manufactures abounded.  James and 
Thomas H. Perkins threw themselves into the new trade.  By the mid-1790s, Perkins & 
Co. focused on three circuits of trade:  short-term speculations in the West Indies; 
medium-length adventures to Europe; and long-term voyages to China via the Pacific 
Northwest and the Mediterranean.160  In the process, the brothers assembled a network of 
corresponding agents.  Within this however, they cultivated an inner circle of regular 
collaborators.  The very practice of fostering, maintaining, and using the network through 
cooperation and making demands of others, made and remade their commercial network.  
Well after the firm of James & Thomas H. Perkins or even Perkins & Sons closed its 
doors, the circuit of agents connecting specific markets continued.     
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CHAPTER 2.   
EXPERIMENTATION AND EXPANSION:   
THE PERKINS NETWORK  
IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS, 1793-1815 
 
In the years following its formation in 1792, James and Thomas H. Perkins & Co. 
expanded rapidly from transatlantic trade to a solidly global enterprise.  They were 
fortunate to partner at an auspicious moment for American traders:  the French 
Revolutionary Wars transformed the economic landscape for neutral powers.  After the 
execution of King Louis XVI of France in January of 1793, European powers united in 
opposition to the French Republic.  The resulting wars lasted intermittently until the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 and touched all corners of the globe.  As France came under 
the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799, the French Republic became a vehicle for the 
upstart general’s ambitions.  By the 1802-3 Peace of Amiens, France controlled much of 
Western Europe through either conquest or alliance.  The British opposition relied upon 
their naval advantage on several geographic fronts.  Most significantly for the Perkinses, 
British blockades in Asia and the Americas created opportunities for them to expand their 
own trade by stepping in for the Dutch, Spanish, and French in distant colonial ports.161 
The French Wars proved especially profitable to Americans.  According to 
Douglass North, international trade and shipping was the key source of growth in the 
early republic, above all the re-export trade arising from the French Wars.  “The 
expansion of the carrying and re-export trades was a result of the disappearance from 
international trade of the ships of every belligerent save England,” North 
writes.  ”Holland, France, Spain, and others ultimately drawn into the conflict were all 
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important carriers leaving the vast colonial trade of Europe in the hands of neutrals, 
specifically the United States.”162  Gradually, all other neutral powers on the continent 
found themselves pushed or pulled into the conflict, from Denmark and the German 
States to Russia, leaving an open playing field for the Americans as neutrals.  While the 
domestic exports of the coastal trade or the Mississippi River trade doubled between 
1790 and 1807, re-exports grew exponentially:  from $300,000 to $59,643,558.163   Prices 
and wages surged.  Shipbuilding boomed.  This early trade produced many of the early 
American fortunes that, in turn, capitalized the antebellum expansion of American 
infrastructure and industry.164  The Perkinses were in the thick of this capitalist boom, 
both as merchants and investors.   
But the French Wars should be recognized as more than a period of profit for 
Americans:  it was also a period of immense experimentation.  The niches in trade 
opened by American neutrality in the French Wars produced lasting involvement in new 
markets.  And even markets where involvement was not lasting were significant.  
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Merchants had no idea what the long-term outcome of the wars would be or how long 
they would last.  Many aspects of the aftermath of the wars would have been difficult to 
predict.  The end of the war should have pushed Americans out of trade in British India, 
but did not.  The flood of British manufactures crushed budding industrial experiments in 
the United States, only to see an industrial boom in the next decade.  This uncertainty 
encouraged merchants like the Perkinses to take greater risks while opportunities existed.  
For the Perkins brothers, the exigencies of the wars led them to seek out new 
opportunities away from French territories toward those occupied by the Dutch, the 
Spanish, and the British.  Experimentation gave American merchants a taste for possible 
openings.  They sought out a variety of new routes of trade and new investment 
possibilities after the war.  Most significantly for the Perkinses, the wars reduced 
competition in the East Indies so that by the early years of the nineteenth century, they 
were one of the most significant American firms involved in trade in China and the 
Pacific.   
Taking advantage of these opportunities required social as well as economic 
capital.  Global trade networks depended upon an ability to pull together cohorts of 
dependable employees.  Merchants needed to be able to trust hirelings would not take off 
with their cargoes (which they sometimes did)165 and could handle themselves without 
constant oversight.  Part of what made the Perkins network function was the ability to tap 
and train potential talent into their ideals of commercial practice and civility.  Leading 
partners placed protégés where they might be best made of service to the network itself.  
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Many of the young men who traveled abroad as part of the Perkins network got their start 
in J. & T.H. Perkins & Co. and worked their way up the rungs of the Boston house or 
aboard Perkins-financed ships.  Several founded firms that collaborated regularly with 
Perkins & Co., including Perkins & Co. of Canton, Bryant, Sturgis & Co. of Boston, 
James P. Sturgis & Co. of Macau, and Russell, Sturgis & Co. of Manila.  Friends and 
family who did not travel also played critical roles in the network by maintaining the 
relationships with those who did travel, representing them at home, transmitting 
information, and training the next generation into family and business life.   
This overlap of economic capital and social capital generated interdependencies 
conducive to long-term cooperation and group investing:  a commercial network.  This 
chapter examines this intersection of social and economic capital in the network’s 
expansion during the French Wars.  The chapter begins with James and Thomas Perkins’s 
strategies for taking advantage of the United States’ neutrality during the French Wars:  
co-investment, locating foreign agents, and tapping young clerks as supercargoes and 
agents abroad.  It then looks more specifically at how that patronage extended into 
experiments in new markets, including expanding and solidifying their interests in the 
East Indies, Spanish America, and the Pacific.  Finally, the chapter turns to the 
relationship between wartime opportunities and spoliations and the Perkinses’ 
investments into domestic industry.  Here we see another element of the commercial 
network:  regular correspondence with politicians and fellow merchant lobbyists who, 
with mixed results, collaborated with the Perkinses to advocate pro-commerce policy.  In 
1815, the Congress of Vienna finally brought a lasting peace to Europe and the United 





dust settled, it became clear that American merchants including those enmeshed in the 
Perkins network were primed to take advantage of the new geopolitical landscape.   
 
Neutrality & Networking in the French Wars 
  While President George Washington did not have confirmation of a declaration of 
war until early April of 1793, the Perkinses saw war between France and Britain as 
certain by the 25th of February.  They wrote to a correspondent on March 15th that they 
had “every reason to apprehend that a War has taken effect.”166  They began to plan 
accordingly.  “What can prevent our success?  There will be scarcely any Neutral flag but 
our own,” reveled Walter Burling.167  And indeed, they were correct:  on February 1, 
1793, the Republic of France had declared war on Great Britain and Holland.  On March 
25th, Perkins & Co. produced a circular for distribution in Cape François, urging French 
planters to ship their produce and property to France via Boston, where it could be 
shipped without risk of being taken as war prizes.168  By May of 1793, the Perkins 
brothers had made arrangements to send several ships from West Indian ports to France 
and Holland.  The Perkinses threw themselves into the opening created by war with both 
feet. 
Washington officially proclaimed America’s neutrality in the French Wars on 
April 22, 1793.  To Americans, this was a relief; to the French, it was a betrayal.  The 
United States was still bound by the 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France from America’s 
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Revolution, which should have given France preferential treatment.  Now that the French 
Republic faced attacks on all sides, the French accused, the United States abandoned her 
ally.  In fact, Americans initially rejoiced over news of the formation of the French 
Republic.  The principles of the new republic echoed their own.  The prospect of a second 
republican nation in the heart of Old Europe was immensely gratifying and citizens of the 
major American cities from Savannah to New York to Boston held festivities in honor of 
France.  The Boston celebration, held on January 24, 1793, was the grandest of all.  
Complete with two parades, a great banquet at Faneuil Hall, and a fireworks display, no 
one could doubt Bostonians support for the French Republic.169  But just as French 
society before their revolution differed profoundly from American society, so the nature 
of the two revolutions diverged.  The carnage of the French Revolution shocked 
Americans.  While French ambassador Citizen Genet sought to paint the 1793 war as the 
French republic defending itself against old Europe—not untruthfully—Americans and 
Europeans alike knew that, even had there been popular support, the United States was in 
no position to enter the war.  Even devoted French supporters such as Thomas Jefferson 
did not wish to see America enmeshed in this conflict.170  The country’s best option was 
neutrality.   
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When the United States Congress approved the Neutrality Act in 1794, the legal 
and practical meanings of neutrality were vague.  For neutrality to be effective as a 
national policy much less an international one, a general understanding had to prevail.  
Neutrality had to be systematized.  President Washington and his Cabinet drew up a list 
of policies to frame just such a system.  The policies established that vessels could not be 
taken as war prizes within a sea league (three miles) of American territory.  They barred 
foreign consuls from using American soil or waters to hold or condemn prizes of war as a 
violation of sovereignty.  They forbade the recruitment of American citizens or the 
arming and equipping of foreign belligerents.  Finally, the American government 
proclaimed their acceptance of the principle of “free ships, free goods”:  as neutrals, no 
matter who owned the cargo, American-registered vessels should not be subject to 
seizure by belligerent powers.171   
Of course, it was one thing to proclaim the rules of neutrality and quite another 
for other nations to respect them.  American merchants may have been overly optimistic 
about the respect that belligerents would have for neutrals.  On July 22, 1793, Thomas H. 
Perkins oversaw a meeting of Boston’s leading merchants to urge President Washington 
to not risk undercutting American neutrality by authorizing privateers—three of which 
had already received approval in Boston alone.  By September 12 of the same year, as the 
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violence American shipping faced on all sides became apparent, the merchants met again 
and reversed their stance:  American ships required protection!172   
Belligerents periodically found it preferable to allow, and even encourage, neutral 
trading between Europe and West Indian colonies.  Between 1793 and 1802, for example, 
the British suspended the Navigation Acts which forbade Americans from shipping goods 
within the British Empire.  British officials attempted to reinstate the Navigation Acts in 
1804, but Jamaicans simply ignored the law.  By 1805, officials agreed to suspend the 
law once more.173  French policies vacillated even more erratically than this:  a law that 
allowed French privateers to make prizes of any vessel bound for an enemy port first took 
hold on May 9, 1793.  The French government rescinded the law on May 23, restored it 
May 28, rescinded July 1, restored July 27, rescinded March 24, 1794, restored 
November 18, and then rescinded on January 2, 1795, and restored again by the Edict of 
July 2, 1796.  This fluctuation was not as irrational as it seems:  the law’s cycle of 
instatement and repeal had less to do with political principle than the exigencies of grain 
shortages and replenishment—which included frequent gluts from shippers—a depleted 
treasury, and local pressures.174  For merchants, it was hard to keep up with the changes.  
Letters of instruction to ship captains often included a list of prioritized ports to try for 
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selling off goods and securing return cargoes.  As Sylvia Marzagalli has noted, the impact 
of the French Wars at any given time depended on the status of the port.175   
At the same time as belligerent powers sought to secure the benefits of neutral 
trade for themselves, they were understandably jealous of neutral interlopers.  Not only 
did neutral shippers accumulate profits for carrying trade that previously belonged to 
their merchants, but neutrals carried provisions to their enemies.  Hence the French law 
of May 9, 1793 legalizing the capture of neutral vessels carrying provisions to enemy 
ports.  And hence the British answer of June 8:  Parliament issued a provision order that 
made all grain ships bound for France fair game to British privateers.  The vicious circle 
of retributive laws, orders in council, and blockades generated economic warfare that 
targeted neutrals and belligerents alike.  
Despite the dangers, Americans recognized the wars as a chance to extend their 
interests into Europe.  Before the war French ships monopolized the trade between the 
West Indies and France; now the Perkinses could transship goods between American 
ports, the West Indies, and Europe.  In June of 1793, James Perkins (in collaboration with 
Stephen Higginson) sailed the Charlotte for Martinique where she picked up a cargo of 
sugar and coffee for Bordeaux, and back to Boston with wine, oils, soap, and other 
French luxuries.176  By the fall of 1794, the brothers had their eye not only on trade with 
France, but also Holland and England.  Thomas Perkins sailed for France on May 11, 
1794 with the twin purposes of making contacts and lobbying the British government to 
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recover $15-20,000 owed them from spoliation claims on vessels already taken as prizes 
by British privateers, the Charlotte and the Delight.  Together with Joseph Russell, 
Perkins traveled through France, the Low Countries, and England to assess commercial 
prospects.  By August of 1795, he was in London, awaiting the adjudication of the 
Charlotte’s case by the British “prize masters.”177 
As with their previous career in smuggling goods between the United States and 
the West Indies, the Perkinses felt that unfair laws demanded creativity, not obedience.  
While in London, for example, Thomas Perkins expressed wonder at the number of 
American seamen suffering through the trials of the British admiral system.  “I don’t see 
the necessity of declaring the vessel bound to France,” he observed.  “Why not as well 
pay to Hamburg in her clearance and give the captain verbal orders?  It is a Shame.”  To 
Perkins, the exigencies of the circumstances “obliged” them “under the present 
circumstances to use any sort of collusion as is necessary.”178  In 1794 James sent a letter 
to Thomas in Europe of one such plan to get around the wartime imbroglio.  He 
recommended they ply the trade between France and England via the neutral ports among 
them:  Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam.179  When the French captured Amsterdam 
in 1795, the Perkinses pushed north to Hamburg, albeit continuing to ship goods in 
through Rotterdam.   When Napoleon annexed Hamburg in 1810, the Perkinses smuggled 
commodities through Tönning in Denmark.180   
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Wartime opportunities led Perkins & Co. to extend into new branches of 
commerce.  They located corresponding agents in new ports through a combination of 
introductions, reputation, and personal trial and error.  In 1795, Thomas Perkins confided 
to James that “There is nothing more embarrassing than to know where to consign your 
property to have justice done you without having some one to push on it.”181  He found 
the merchants in Le Havre (Paris) wanting—including their own agents, Homberg & 
Homberg.  “Homberg is a solid house and perhaps as good a one in other respects as 
there is at Havre, but unless someone is present to urge the sales, your goods which are in 
store may stay there twelve months.”182  It did not help to be affiliated with the “best 
houses” if those merchants did not prioritize your business.  The optimum approach, he 
felt, was to station an agent abroad.183  As the Perkins brothers contemplated their 
prospects, they began to incorporate techniques that merchants often reserved for riskier, 
long-distance trade into their regular practice:  splitting ventures, sending shipboard 
supercargoes to manage trade from port to port, and stationing agents abroad.   
The instability of wartime trade may have made regular collaboration in shipping 
speculations all the more ideal.  Many of the Perkins & Co. adventures to Europe were 
joint investments with Stephen Higginson & Co. (later Samuel G. Perkins & Co.) and 
Russell Sturgis.  The Perkinses split shipments to the Pacific Northwest with Russell 
                                                                                                                                                 
Forbes (who was himself brother-in-law to James and Thomas Perkins), was the U.S. consul in Hamburg.  
He personally facilitated the smuggling of American cargoes into Hamburg via Denmark.  Forbes had been 
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even he could not reassure the Danish that the French would let them be.  By the end of 1810, the Danish 
loophole had closed. 
181 Thomas H. Perkins, London to James Perkins, Boston, 3 August 1795.  Cabot Family Papers, 







Sturgis, James and Thomas Lamb & Co., and later Bryant, Sturgis & Co.  And firms such 
as Samuel Williams and Henry Higginson & Co. in London and Perkins & Co. in Canton 
played an important role in directing their trade abroad during the 1807 Embargo.  The 
extent to which this inner circle worked together can be overstated:  these firms did not 
always have the same agents in foreign ports, for example.184  But, their regularity of 
collaboration for a variety of types of speculation (shipping, manufacturing, financial 
institutions such as insurance companies), gives a sense of the associational mechanisms 
used in mercantile ventures. These associational mechanisms cut costs and curbed risks, 
but they also held the potential for a cluster of firms to wield greater authority, such as in 
influencing politics or in cornering markets.185  
The Perkins brothers regularly tapped their young clerks, themselves already 
connected to the Perkinses through family or friends, to serve as supercargoes and agents 
abroad.  Agents and supercargoes were not mutually exclusive positions, but often stages 
on the ladder of mercantile advancement.  Into the early nineteenth century, mercantile 
education was an extension of family life.  Or, more to the point, households included a 
more diverse population than kin alone.  The eldest children of James and Thomas 
Perkins, James, Jr. and Eliza, both born in 1791, remembered their fathers’ clerks as a 
part of their shared childhood.  Eliza wrote in her memoirs of her father’s clerks 
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performing puppet shows for them under the tall mercantile desks.186  And until the late 
1810s, young clerks and apprentices lived with the partners in their homes. 
But family dynamics also shaped firm life.  Consider for example, the varying 
relationships younger men and women had with Elizabeth Peck Perkins.  To her 
granddaughter Eliza, Grandmother Perkins was “silent, reserved,” albeit “a very 
remarkable woman, very dignified, and of great strength of character.”187  But Eliza’s 
cousin John turned to their grandmother for support and to soften his relationship with his 
uncle.  Sam Burling, a young man who apprenticed with the Perkinses and lived for a 
time with various family members, also saw Elizabeth Perkins as a protective, maternal 
figure.  And Nathaniel Cutting wrote that he saw her as “one of the most worthy and 
agreeable old Ladies existing.”188  For Eliza, her memories of her Grandmother Elliot 
were of tasty treats and political gossip in a warm kitchen.  Grandmother Perkins was 
intimidating.189  But for the young men, apprenticed to James & Thomas Handasyd 
Perkins & Co., Grandmother Perkins was an intermediary in the intersecting worlds of 
family and business.   
Young apprentices and their families expected, or at least hoped for, a paternal 
bond of filial respect and obligation in exchange for mentorship and tutelage.  In practice, 
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training standards varied.190  Merchants earned reputations for the level of guidance and 
support they gave young men under their care so that some apprenticeships were more 
desirable than others.  For example, being placed with Elias Hasket Derby was attractive 
not simply because he was a formidable merchant, but also because he systematically 
provided for young men’s success.  A lad would graduate from an academy at the age of 
15, spend several years in Derby’s countinghouse, followed by instruction in maritime 
navigation under a retired sea captain, a few voyages as supercargo aboard Derby’s 
trusted old West Indian vessel, the Rose, before graduating to serve as supercargo for one 
of Derby’s sizable East Indian voyages.  On these latter adventures, a young man could 
earn a nest egg sufficient to set up his own trading house or buy into an existing firm.191  
Once an apprentice came of age, legal obligation ended, but a social sense of obligation 
did not always end with independence.192 
Like Derby, the Perkinses gave their clerks opportunities to rise through the ranks 
and serve as supercargoes in order to gain experience in specific markets and to profit on 
their own account.193  Letters of instruction included routes to take, commodities to seek 
in specific markets, fair prices, and agents to consult with, but for mentees, they also 
included recommendations on comportment and skills to seek out—such as learning a 
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foreign language or firms to apply to for a position.  While such support might prove a 
boon for young merchants, it came at a cost.  Ephraim Bumstead established one of the 
most important American trading houses in China in partnership with the Perkinses, but 
did not live to see its success.  John Perkins Cushing became a millionaire as Bumstead’s 
successor, but regretted that he spent nearly thirty years of his life apart from his family 
and friends.  Frederick W. Paine lived in London and Leghorn as agent for the Perkinses, 
but like Cushing, found it difficult to get the Perkins brothers to allow him to resign his 
post so he could come home.194 
Paternalism resonated with aristocratic ideals of obligation and deference and thus 
inequality, but it was also part of an occupational model in which individuals expected to 
rise in skill and rank in connection with mentors above, and mentees below.  While by 
the 1830s this path to business success seemed increasingly distant, at the turn of the 
nineteenth century the model held promise.195  Just as subordinates relied upon senior 
merchants for education and opportunity, so, too, did superiors rely upon protégés for 
business continuity.  Paternal obligation could provide a safety net for those at any point 
along the spectrum.  When the firms of Gabriel Tardy and William Shattuck failed, for 
example, former apprentices turned merchants sent them relief.  The Perkinses sent funds 
to both Tardy and Shattuck, albeit not much.  The flip side of obligation, however, was 
expectation.  Those same paternal bonds could burden a merchant, especially if he or she 
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faced persistent failure.  When a friend of the Perkinses from Providence, William 
Megee, found himself ever deeper in debt, he abandoned his debts and his family to run a 
boardinghouse in Macau.196   
In many ways, paternalism—realized through the practices of “patronage”—was 
the glue to the commercial network.  In addition to obligation, paternalism fostered a 
cultivation of “commercial friendships” as conduits for information, influence, and 
especially, stability.  Patronage melted readily into collaboration which could be a 
powerful tool in business.197  The Perkins brothers took their paternal obligations 
seriously, toward their immediate households, their broader circle of kin, friends, and 
employees, and toward their community.  Colonel Thomas H. Perkins in particular felt he 
knew what was best for society and did not hesitate to act on his convictions.  This 
quality made him both a leader of Boston society and a source of resentment for several 
in the next generation. This paternal affinity cannot be taken for granted; as Randolph 
Klein’s research on the Shippen family of Philadelphia shows, not all eighteenth century 
merchants aspired to a paternal legacy or family successors.198  And, as the next section 
shows, relationships patterned on paternalism were nonetheless highly contingent.  The 
“glue” did not always hold.     
In examining the expansion of the Perkins commercial network, it is useful to not 
only follow the money, so to speak, but also to follow the agents:  Ephraim Bumstead, 
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John Perkins Cushing and a rush of Sturgis and Forbes kin in Canton and Manila; Samuel 
Burling’s travels in the “Spanish Main,” Thomas Doubleday in Cadiz, and Henry Sturgis 
in Lisbon; Thomas Sturgis to Ile de France, Fred Paine to Leghorn, as well as 
collaborators in the Pacific fur trade such as William Sturgis.  These young men clerked 
in the Perkins brothers’ countinghouse.  John Perkins Cushing and William Sturgis were 
the most significant of these men to the expansion of the overarching network, but 
examining experiences of several of the less successful connections are also instructive.  
This next section turns to the Perkinses’ expansion in the East Indies trade. 
 
Expansion & Experimentation:  the Boston Concern 
The French Wars allowed American merchants to step into foreign markets where 
European traders had already cultivated contacts and successful trade routes.  This was as 
much the case in the East Indies as it was in the West Indies. Even as Americans sought 
to make their way in Asian and Pacific markets, they frequently followed European 
merchants into well-established entrepôts with known commodities.199  For the Perkins 
brothers, this meant that in addition to extending their interests from the French West 
Indies into trade with Europe, they also used their toehold in the Pacific and East Indies 
trade per the Hope and Margaret adventures to experiment more expansively in trade in 
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the Pacific basin and Asian waters.  With the 1803 establishment of a branch firm in 
Canton and the 1811 partnership of William Sturgis and John Bryant, the Perkins 
brothers gathered an influential inner circle of regular co-investors for their Asian and 
Pacific commerce.  Together, these firms became known to contemporaries as “the 
Boston Concern.”  
Rivalries between larger powers opened profitable niches for neutral American 
traders.  Thus European politics often set the tone for American interests even into these 
distant ports.  This could mean that the limitations of the American state also limited the 
ability of American merchants to negotiate trading privileges abroad.  But the reverse was 
also true:  American weakness and her distance from the European continent opened up 
opportunities as well.  As war constrained European trade abroad, American merchants 
seemed less threatening than other colonial powers.  The Perkinses and their fellow 
Americans consciously sought out niches of trade between European rivalries to see what 
might be made of them, for the short-term or the long.  In doing so, Americans shored up 
European colonial power in Asia and the Americas.200  
The Dutch East Indies 
American involvement in the Dutch East Indies provides an example of the 
openings created by the French Wars.  The Perkinses were part of a cohort of Americans 
who attempted to usurp trade routes previously occupied by the Dutch.  The French Wars 
left Dutch shipping vulnerable to attack by British privateers, creating openings for 
Americans.  Between 1796 and 1807, a good 65% of the vessels that visited Batavia 
                                                 






(Jakarta) were American.201  In May 1797, for example, the Perkins assessed their 
prospects of replacing the tea trade of the Dutch East India Company (the Vereenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC).  They hoped to carry goods between Batavia and 
Canton in the East Indies to Holland and sought recommendations from their Dutch 
connections in order to put their plan before the officers of the VOC.202   
The plan faced roadblocks, not from the Dutch, but from the British navy:  the 
British ensnared their vessel the John Jay, bound for Rotterdam, in their European 
continental blockade.  As the Perkinses shared with a correspondent in Havana, the 
British blockade of Dutch ports had cut them off from the markets they considered the 
most flattering for their West Indies produce, forcing them to the Baltic, Hamburg, and 
the Mediterranean.203  These ports were themselves entry points for smuggling into the 
Batavian Republic (as Holland was known between 1795 and 1806) and France.  In 1804, 
the Perkinses obtained a permit from the VOC to export tea to Holland.204  In 1806 the 
Boston firm declared to their Canton agents that they considered the time for selling teas 
to Holland had passed, but the very next year they bragged that two of their vessels, the 
Montezuma and the True American, had been mistaken by the Dutch to be cargoes 
packed by one of their own.  This was a high compliment to the Canton firm as the Dutch 
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were known for the quality of their tea selections.205  While the carrying trade between 
Holland and the East Indies petered out during the American embargo and War of 1812, 
Dutch ports proved important export markets for the Perkins network following the peace 
of 1815. 
There are other examples of Americans stepping into Dutch trade routes during 
the French Wars as well.  For example, Dutch officers outsourced their annual voyage 
from Java to Nagasaki to eager American traders between 1797 and 1809.  In the 
seventeenth century, Japan limited its trade with Western merchants to an annual visit, a 
privilege the Dutch feared losing under the blockade.  In1799, a Perkins vessel made the 
voyage:  the Franklin under Captain James Devereux.206  The charter between the Dutch 
and the Americans stipulated that in exchange for a freight of coffee and spices, the 
Franklin should carry a cargo of cloves and sugar, cotton, chintz, tin, sapan-wood, and 
elephants’ teeth as well as supplies for the VOC agents stationed at Nagasaki. In return, 
the vessel would load copper, camphor, boxes, and boards.207  While the Nagasaki 
voyages created no permanent trade relations, it was not for lack of American effort.  The 
first vessel to make the trip, in fact, was the Eliza under Captain William Stewart.  
Captain Stewart was so excited at the prospect, he attempted to negotiate his own bargain 
to trade with the Japanese.  He returned in 1800 and again in 1803.  At first he claimed to 
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have lost his first cargo and to be in need of a new shipment.  When that failed, he simply 
sought permission to trade as an American.  Neither gambit worked.  Instead Stewart 
faced charges by the Dutch for making off with their 1798 ship.  After 1809, however, 
Americans were again cut off from Japan. 
The China Market 
But the Dutch East Indies was only one arena where the Perkinses sought to 
expand their trade during the political morass of the French Wars.  At the time James and 
Thomas H. Perkins formally partnered in 1792, they were already interested in two 
Pacific Northwest and China-bound voyages per the firm Perkins & Magee:  the Hope 
and the Margaret.  The business of the Hope proved a disaster, for which the Perkinses 
blamed Captain Joseph Ingraham.208  The men of the Hope collected fewer furs, sold 
them at lower prices, and, worst of all, obligated the adventure’s backers to Chinese 
merchant Consequa for adulterated teas purchased at exorbitant prices.209  The Margaret, 
on the other hand, brought a profit of nearly half a million dollars.  Having collected 12-
15,000 otter skins off the Oregon coast, the captain and supercargo were then able to sell 
the skins in China for $30 to $40 apiece which they exchanged for teas, silks, porcelain, 
and East Indian cottons called nankeens.  The entire adventure yielded a whopping $2000 
per share for the Margaret’s investors.210  As Colonel Perkins’s second adventure to the 
East Indies, the Margaret seemed particularly auspicious as to the potential profits to be 
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found in China and surrounding Asian and Pacific ports.  The Perkinses felt their firm 
could create a niche in selling high quality teas in the United States and Europe.211  Many 
of Perkins & Co.’s business, social, and political strategies of the 1790s and 1800s can be 
traced back to this ambition. 
In the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries, the China market itself was 
imagined as part of a larger cluster of ports and commodities known collectively as the 
East Indies.  The Perkins brothers sought to strengthen their position in markets with 
commodities marketable in China:  Spanish silver, Pacific furs, and Mediterranean 
opium.  This narrow circle of interests can be misleading, however.  Just as the Perkinses 
kept an eye out for new opportunities in Europe, they similarly opened themselves to new 
avenues of trade in Asia and the Pacific.  Thus, they traded a variety of articles, from 
purchasing Spanish American hides and tallow for the English glue industry to selling 
Pacific furs to Mediterranean consumers.   
 Perkins & Co., Canton, 1803-1830 
By 1803, China had become substantial enough to the Perkins’s trade that the 
brothers sent out their head clerk, Ephraim Bumstead, to establish a firm in Canton to 
handle their trade locally.  Bumstead had made the voyage previously, in 1798, as 
supercargo for the Perkins vessel Thomas Russell.  Yet it was one thing to have charge of 
the sale and collection of cargo for a single adventure, quite another to administer trade 
for the East Indies trade as a whole.  At the time that the Perkinses made preparations to 
send Bumstead abroad, agents for the American China trade usually traveled aboard the 
                                                 





vessels—superintendents for specific cargoes, a.k.a., supercargoes—rather than living 
abroad.   
Myra Wilkins lists three common early American strategies for locating 
commercial agents abroad:  sending independent “transplanted Americans” to live 
abroad; sending family members who would serve as agent to the family and others on a 
commission basis; and, in ports where business was not sufficient to warrant sending an 
agent, connecting with independent foreign agents.212  In moving to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the French Wars and expand their trade, the Perkinses 
employed all three of these strategies.   
There were advantages and disadvantages to establishing a branch office abroad.  
Benefits included prioritization and personal attention for your business, better 
information on markets, more beneficial credit arrangements, better storage facilities, and 
being able to keep the profits in-house.  But no matter the level of business, establishing a 
branch office meant fixed costs:  the salary to the agent abroad, rent and expenses for 
warehouses and offices abroad, as well as losing any privileged local knowledge or 
financing opportunities that came from having a foreign agent native to the market.  
Thus, business had to be sufficient to at least cover these costs.  And, of course, 
merchants expected a profit above this.  To establish a branch office then, the home firm 
needed to be prosperous enough to entertain the risk and have the foreign business 
sizeable enough to make the risk worth taking.213  The Perkinses were willing to take this 
risk, but their expectations of their agent abroad were considerable. 
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The arrangements for the new firm were as follows:  Bumstead would establish a 
trading house in his own name.  The Perkinses provided the largest chunk of capital, 
$20,000, followed by their brother-in-law Russell Sturgis with $10,000.  But the other 
investors were not inconsiderable:  Andrew Dorr invested $9,000, Thomas Amory 
$5,000, Adam Babcock $5,000, Trott & Bumstead $5,000, Samuel P. Gardner $4,000, as 
well as $6,500 of Ephraim Bumstead’s own capital.214  Many of these men collaborated 
with the Perkinses in trade and had their own interests in having a known and trustworthy 
commission agent in China.  Yet the Perkins brothers also had their own plans for 
Ephraim Bumstead & Co.  The Boston firm sent six vessels to China in 1804, two of 
which alone were laden with approximately $400,000 in specie.  The Perkinses sent their 
nephew along to clerk for Bumstead and thus be trained into the Canton trade.  And the 
Perkinses began to petition President Jefferson for Bumstead’s appointment to the 
American consulship at Canton.215   
An 1805 letter gives a sense of the commercial and geographic scope of the new 
position.  The Perkinses charged Bumstead with surveying the Indian ports, noting that 
the captains involved in the country trade—trade between India and China—were a likely 
source of information on which ports to load at, the usual price of cotton, the best season 
for traveling to Bombay, “and generally everything that can be interesting in the 
promise.”  They wrote of their hopes for obtaining specie via the Spanish colonies.  And 
they sent out a snuff sample to see how tobacco sold in the region.216  While located in 
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Canton, Ephraim Bumstead & Co. was to oversee trade and information for Asia and the 
Pacific:  literally, the other half of the globe.   
While chapter four offers greater detail on the operations of this firm, the greatest 
challenge for the Perkinses was finding a capable agent willing to stay abroad long 
enough to be worthwhile.  For young men training into commerce, traveling to the East 
Indies was at once a tremendous opportunity and a tremendous sacrifice.  Most of these 
agents aimed to only stay abroad long enough to secure a foundation of capital with 
which to establish themselves in business at home.  This could be as short as three to five 
years, depending on the market itself and family resources.  While this fleeting strategy 
made sense for the individual, it could be costly to the agent’s patrons unless another 
similarly adept candidate was in the pipeline to take on the agent’s commercial 
responsibilities and personal connections.  Bumstead, tragically, grew ill not long after 
arriving.  He wrote to the Perkinses on November 12, 1804 that he planned to leave 
Canton in an effort to preserve his health—a letter the Perkinses did not receive until 
March 20, 1805.217  Days later the Perkinses learned Bumstead had departed from China 
on the Guatamozin, captained by his brother.  He died soon after. 
The Perkins brothers got lucky in young Cushing.  John Perkins Cushing quickly 
ripened into a savvy, confident man of business.  Following Bumstead’s death, Cushing 
found himself in a tight spot.  All of the Perkinses’ China ventures rested on his young 
shoulders.  In April of 1804, Colonel (Thomas) Perkins wrote to him a florid but frantic 
letter that he wished he could have had such an opportunity to distinguish himself as a 
                                                 





youth.218  By the following summer, after many months of haggling to secure one of their 
more experienced protégés voyage to Canton to replace Bumstead, James and Thomas 
Perkins wrote a calmer, ingratiating letter but with no less expectation.  Suddenly, 
Cushing represented them and their capital in the East Indies:   
You will consider yourself as the principal agent of an important 
Establishment.  Your mode of living and dressing you will conform to 
your wishes:  independently of which we shall allow you $500 pr. ann. for 
private expenses, and also ship on y’r own acct. any adventures you may 
think proper.  
 
… Persevere as you have begun and we shall have reason to continue the 
patronage wh. we have always been inclined to extend to you ...  We now 
close this long letter with our affectionate love and regards, and hope it 
will find you in as much happiness as can be enjoyed away from y’r 
friends and connections.219 
 
Cushing himself likely grappled with similar doubts as to his ability, but in the end, he 
performed admirably.  His success ended his apprenticeship early.  In April of 1806, as 
Cushing prepared to celebrate his nineteenth birthday, his Perkins uncles wrote that “in 
lieu of putting off your introduction into the House until y’r age makes you legally free, 
we shall consider you a partner in the House of Perkins & Co. from the time of Mr. 
Payne’s (sic) arrival … we do it as a tribute to y’r manly, unremitted attention to your 
duty.”220  
Much of the success of the overarching network was due to Cushing’s prowess.  
This was not simply because he built Perkins & Co. of Canton, but also through the 
protégés that he cultivated and recruited.  Over the years, even clerks who came to 
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Canton through the ranks of the Boston firm felt more flattered by his attentions and 
more attached to Cushing than to James and Thomas Perkins.  The Forbes brothers—
Thomas, Bennet, and John—all certainly found themselves under Cushing’s wing, at 
least in part because of his close friendship with their mother, Margaret Perkins Forbes.  
George Russell, who would partner in the Manila firm, Russell & Sturgis in 1828, 
similarly wrote that it was Cushing, not Manila, that turned his head.  He gave up his 
intention of working for Samuel Russell & Co., and traveled to the Philippines to 
establish a trading house in conjunction with Perkins & Co. of Canton.221  But he was not 
the only one:  Russell Sturgis was a Boston lawyer traveling in Europe when he met his 
cousin, the great China trader John Perkins Cushing.  Russell overheard Cushing 
complain of a certain unnamed someone’s disinclination to go to China.  In a rush of 
blood and air, Russell blurted that he wished the chance was his.  It was not simply the 
lure of the East that drew him, but also the character and career of Cushing himself that 
flattered Sturgis into accepting the opportunity.  Like Thomas Handasyd Perkins before 
him, Cushing was a capitalist legend, a merchant prince, an East Indian “nabob” in the 
eyes of the New England and trading circles who monitored such fortunes.  Russell 
Sturgis, according to his son’s memorialization, was chosen by destiny and John Perkins 
Cushing himself.222  For nearly three decades, Cushing’s patronage extended the 
patronage and influence of the Perkinses and the broader network. 
Pacific Furs & Incense 
  Chinese consumption of furs drove the Perkinses expansive involvement in the 
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Pacific coast of North America.  As Adele Ogden has shown, interest in China 
transformed the Pacific into a space of European, Russian, and American commercial 
rivalry.  The Pacific – its islands, its littoral, its peoples, its flora, its fauna – was already 
a source of imperial and scientific rivalry in the mid-eighteenth century.  But in 1778, 
mariners aboard Captain James Cook’s third and final voyage made a discovery that 
changed everything.  They found that sea otter skins purchased for a pittance brought 
great favor in China.  James King, Cook’s Second Lieutenant, reported that pelts from 
this first foray brought £90 or $120 per skin, an astronomical return of 1800%.  King 
wrote that, “The rage with which our seamen were possessed to return and buy another 
cargo of skins to make their fortunes at one time, was not far short of mutiny.”223  
Scarcely a year later, after England attacked the Spanish in the Philippines, English 
deserters in Spanish Manila regaled Spaniards with the Resolution’s good fortune.  By the 
time the official account of Cook’s Resolution confirmed the story in 1784, legends of 
velvety sea otter pelts and Chinese favor had spread across the globe several times 
over.224  The new commodity attracted vessels that otherwise would have traveled east 
around the African Cape of Good Hope to instead charter a longer, more hazardous, but 
now potentially more lucrative route round the American Cape Horn and across the 
Pacific.  The rush on sea otter pelts launched a new phase of Pacific exploration and 
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competition.  Washington Irving characterized it best in his classic Astoria:  “It was as if 
a new gold rush had been discovered.”225   
The Perkinses first became involved in this trade in 1791 when Perkins & Magee 
dispatched their first ship, the Hope, bound for the Pacific Northwest and on to China.  
By 1798, in addition to Russian competition, primacy in the sea otter pelt trade had 
shifted from British traders to Americans.  By 1800 Bostonians predominated.226  Yet this 
dominance requires explanation.  Despite being on the North American continent, New 
England was an ocean away from the Pacific coast.  And there was another rival far 
closer at hand:  the question is not merely why New Englanders did so well in this trade, 
but why they were not edged out by the Russians, the British, and, even more, the 
Spanish?  Why did the Spanish not take advantage of their strategic position in 
California, Mexico, and the Philippines, with their annual galleon voyages between 
Acapulco and Manila, to monopolize the sea otter trade?  American dominance in this 
trade is partly explained by the French Wars, but only partly. 
The Spanish knew of the existence of the sea otters well before the Americans or 
British:  as early as 1733, Spanish travelers in California remarked the animals could be 
found in such numbers that sailors could simply chase after them with sticks and return 
with a good twenty pelts.227  In the mid-1770s, before Captain Cook’s men discovered the 
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prized sea otters further north, Spanish sailors exchanged pelts along the coast for 
abalone shells from Monterey and Carmel.  The trade was appealing to Spaniards on the 
coast for multiple reasons:  as an alternative commodity to American silver in trading 
with China, to develop Spanish interests in California and up the coast, and to stave off 
imperial rivals.  In the 1780s, Spanish missionaries and soldiers began working with 
indigenous hunters to collect pelts in earnest and send them west to China with the annual 
Manila Galleon.  Of the several schemes advanced to carry out a Spanish American fur 
trade, the most significant was the 1784 plan outlined by Vicente Vasadre y Vega.  
Between 1786 and 1789, Vasadre sent 9,729 pelts to Manila, earning the Spanish Crown 
$3,120,00.  The stage seemed set for Spanish ships to capture the market.  228  Instead, by 
the nineteenth century, Americans not only had hold of the Pacific-China fur trade, but 
also sold manufactures to Spanish and later Mexican California. 
The Spanish foray into Pacific fur trading failed for two principle reasons.  First, 
the Spanish traded California sea otter pelts, which were a lower quality, less profitable 
commodity than those collected by Russian, British, or American traders further north.  
Native hunters in California lacked the tradition of sea otter trapping and thus skill of 
their northern counterparts.  And the habilitados who compensated hunters for the pelts 
regularly cheated native hunters.  Soldiers received 3-4 reales per skin while native 
hunters received a few beads, some thread, or a piece of flannel in exchange for fine, 
large skins.  These issues and more came to a head in the colonial politics of California.  
Missionaries, soldiers, and colonial officials bickered over the means of the trade, from 
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issues of fair compensation to competing influences over native populations.229  Second, 
efforts to direct a Spanish fur trade to China faced jealous opposition from the Compania 
Real de Filipinas, or Royal Philippine Company.  The Madrid-based directors of the 
Compania had their own plans for trading furs while jealously guarding their monopoly 
rights to sell East Indian goods in the Americas.  Despite several proposals for a Spanish 
Pacific fur trade, interimperial jealousy made it difficult for Spanish merchants to find a 
profitable model for the trade.230 
The French Wars put a strain on European trade and expansion in the Pacific, 
creating yet another opportunity for Americans, but New England merchants were also 
able to operate more efficiently than their rivals.231  There were several possible reasons 
for this.  James Gibson has argued that the skill and economy of Yankee sailors was itself 
a tremendous advantage.  He quotes Sullivan Dorr who noted that even if mariners from 
New England cost two to three dollars more per month in wages, the cost was readily 
made up in peace and order on the ship and economizing in rations and shipboard 
supplies.  And the sailors were skillful, obedient, and honest.232  In contemplating this 
very question, why New Englanders outperformed British competitors in the Pacific and 
even Asia, foreign merchants gave precisely this argument.  British observers complained 
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that American mariners as a whole tended to be better behaved and less prone to 
disorderly squabbles and drunken riots than their British counterparts.233   
Shipboard organization aboard Yankee ships also encouraged a more compliant 
crew.   Specifically, American merchants commonly gave ship captains and officers a 
stake in the venture’s success through freight privileges.  Cargo space was relatively 
expensive, but by allowing the officers space in the cargo hold for their own speculations, 
the ship’s officers were just as interested in the adventure’s success at every level as the 
larger investors.  Mariners, too, would often buy smaller trinkets in foreign ports to sell 
along the voyage to supplement their wages.234  Merchants credited these labor policies 
with facilitating the success of their voyages and some—John Murray Forbes wrote about 
this explicitly in his memoirs—transferred the idea of employee stakeholding from their 
maritime to their industrial corporate ventures.235  For Americans trading in the Pacific, 
these methods proved profitable.   
By the 1800s, Russians and Americans dominated the China-Pacific fur trade.236  
Of the Bostonians active in the Pacific Northwest, Perkins & Co. together with Russell 
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Sturgis, the Lamb brothers, and Theodore Lyman, led the pack.237  These firms traded 
iron, textiles, and firearms for pelts with indigenous hunters of the Pacific Northwest, a 
variety of textiles, manufactured goods, and luxuries for sandalwood in the Sandwich 
Islands (Hawai’i), and later provisions and manufactured goods for hides and tallow in 
Spanish California.  Of these Boston firms, the Perkinses, Sturgis, and the Lambs 
regularly collaborated on ventures. 
Only in considering the Perkinses broader network does their contract with 
Theodore Lyman make sense.  On June 8, 1807, the Perkins brothers signed a contract 
with Theodore Lyman to withdraw from the Pacific Northwest trade for seven years.  For 
this, the brothers agreed to pay $8000 due in one year.  As part of the bargain, they 
purchased his vessel, the Vancouver, and the remaining goods from the trade.238  Lyman 
seemed delighted with the offer:  at fifty-four years of age with a country estate in nearby 
Waltham, he was ready to retire.  For their part, the contract gave the Perkinses a virtual 
monopoly on the Pacific fur trade.  With Theodore Lyman out of the trade, the Perkinses, 
Lambs, and Sturgises expected to have the run of the trade.  As the Perkinses triumphed 
to one of their Northwest shipping captains, they felt they had “at length got the N. W. 
Trade into our own hands, and shall thereby experience the advantage of having the 
Business conducted in such a manner as will make it more productive.”239  While they 
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knew the market was vulnerable to new entrants, John Jacob Astor being a case and 
point, the barriers to entry were such that only a larger play like Astor could make any 
money off the trade.  Or, alternatively, Lyman’s son George, using advantages culled 
from his father. 
Their planned monopoly did not work as well as they had hoped.  The contractual 
arrangement had always been vulnerable to outsiders, in spite of the barriers to entry.  
But they expected that Lyman had “relinquished to us his trade and obligated himself not 
to engage in it again for seven years.”240  As early as November 1808, however, they had 
reason to believe Lyman himself was back in the trade, “undertaking largely . . . tho’ he 
is doing it under the rose.”241  Lyman, they maintained, used his son as a front for his 
own trade, and they took him to court for the contractual breach.   
The Perkinses alleged that in March of 1809, Theodore Lyman’s Hamilton 
embarked for the Pacific coast, outfitted specifically for that trade, in violation of their 
agreement.  Lyman countered that this was not his adventure, but that of his son George.  
True, he owned the vessel and gave his son the capital—on credit—to undertake the 
adventure.  But the vessel was being sold to his son.  His only interest in the adventure 
was as a father and a creditor.  Lyman swore that he spoke with the Perkins brothers 
about these speculations and invited them to participate—which they agreed happened, 
but later than Lyman implied.  They purchased a share of the adventure, but in October of 
1809, after the Hamilton had sailed, and only to save themselves from being undercut in 
the market.  To the Perkinses, Lyman’s explanation was thin.  In the contract both had 
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signed, Lyman agreed “that he would not, in his own name, or in the name of any other 
person for him, directly or indirectly, be interested in any voyage to the said coast, or in 
any adventure to that coast, or any species of traffic with the natives of that country.”242  
Entering the trade required considerable knowledge of the geography as well as the ever-
changing tastes of native hunters to barter for the furs themselves.  Lyman’s son could 
not enter the trade without guidance from his father.  The Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts agreed with the Perkinses, both for the case of the Hamilton and another 
vessel, the Lydia, and ordered Lyman to repay the Perkinses with interest.243   
Interestingly enough, the arguments made by the Perkins lawyers paralleled 
British pro-monopoly advocates observing the region.  John Meares of the Royal Navy 
argued in 1790 that the competition in the sea otter trade would necessarily “lower the 
price of them as to make the Trade no longer profitable.”244  One of the arguments for 
monopoly—and, indeed, a criticism of American traders in general—was that a rogue 
vessel representing untried merchants could overply the field and thus ruin the trade for 
everyone.  New merchants might never return, but by then the damage was done.  Fragile 
markets demanded monopoly.   
This was precisely the argument lawyers made for the Perkinses before the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts:  “the said trade is limited as to the number of such 
skins, which amount, on an average, to nine thousand skins annually, and which are 
sufficient only to load, with reasonable expectation of profit, six vessels at most.”  
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Between 1791 when Perkins & Magee first sent the Hope to the Pacific Northwest and 
1807, the Pacific fur trade was becoming more fiercely competitive.  Heavy hunting 
thinned the sea otter population so that it took longer to amass a cargo.  Buying out 
competitors was a reasonable action in order to maintain the trade.  After the courts 
rejected the Lyman claim that father and son had not been in breach of covenant, the 
Lymans took aim at the monopolistic objective behind the contract itself.  They suggested 
that the contract was void at its origin as it was in restraint of trade and thus an injury to 
the public.  The court took the Perkinses line.  Given that “This is a branch of commerce 
very limited in its nature. … A restraint of trade contract could benefit the community by 
preventing a glut in the market.”245   
Bryant, Sturgis & Co., 1811-1841 
In 1811, another trading house with extensive connections to the Perkins network 
and their Pacific trading formed in Boston:  Bryant, Sturgis & Co.  The new firm joined 
John Bryant (1760-1865) of Springfield, Massachusetts with Captain William Sturgis 
(1782-1863) of Marblehead.  The two men began trading together in 1810, including an 
adventure aboard the ship Topaz in collaboration with Andrew Cabot.  An early account 
book for John Bryant makes clear that the firm combined contacts from John Bryant’s 
existing business with the merchants and mariners William Sturgis worked with in his 
Pacific adventures.  Familiar names coursed through ledgers and receipt books:  Lamb, 
Sturgis, Cabot, Lyman, Higginson, Bromfield, Hinckley.  The connection between 
Bryant, Sturgis & Co. and the Perkins firms—Boston or Canton—should not be 
overstated.  The firms were not formally connected.  Nevertheless, the firms regularly 
                                                 





collaborated in ventures to Asia and the Pacific, to the point that observers in the early 
nineteenth century referred to this cluster of firms as “the Boston Concern” or “PCBS”:  
Perkins Cushing Bryant Sturgis.       
Bryant, Sturgis & Co. began where John Bryant’s early adventures left off, but it 
was Sturgis’s business acuity that became renowned throughout the Northeast.  If 
Colonel Thomas H. Perkins tended to overshadow his less gregarious older brother, so, 
too, did William Sturgis overshadow his mild-mannered partner.  At the start of 1796, 
William Sturgis began an apprenticeship in his uncle Russell Sturgis’s countinghouse.  
The next year, he moved to the Perkinses countinghouse.  Sadly, his father died that year, 
leaving him the family breadwinner.  Young Sturgis needed a wage.  Thus, at the age of 
sixteen, he went to sea as a foremast hand on the Eliza, owned by his Perkins uncles.  
Within five years, Sturgis worked his way up the shipboard ranks to be master of the 
Caroline, owned by James and Thomas Lamb.  In 1809, he set sail as captain of 
Theodore Lyman’s Atahualpa with a good $300,000 of silver dollars in his cargo hold.  
Here, Sturgis’s reputation was set:  while just off Macau, Chinese pirates attacked the 
Atahualpa and another ship.  Led by the courageous “Captain Bill,” the two vessels faced 
off against their aggressors and escaped with their lives, their vessels, and their cargoes.  
By the time he returned, Sturgis knew well the sea lanes and markets involved in the New 
England-Pacific-China triangle.  He was primed to go into trade on his own account.  
Through regular collaboration with the Perkins network and Bryant & Sturgis’s own 





capitalists of his generation.  To his contemporaries, Sturgis was “living proof that 
Yankee industry, honesty, and purpose, if properly applied, were the basis of success.”246   
While Perkins & Co. of Boston focused on Pacific furs from the Columbia River 
region or commodities obtained from Pacific Islanders, Bryant and Sturgis shifted their 
attention south to California.  They collaborated with the Perkins firms in Boston and 
China, although by no means only them, but their firm invested in other directions as 
well.  With Mexican independence from Spain, Bryant and Sturgis found Mexican 
Californians eager to exchange cattle and horse hides and tallow for provisions and 
manufactures.  The hides and tallow were then auctioned off for the production of shoes, 
leather goods, and tallow candles and oil.  Bryant, Sturgis & Co. participated in the 
Perkins network, but the firm and its partners operated outside the network as well.   
Silver, Hides, & the Spanish Main 
  The Perkinses’ involvement in trade with China also deepened their interest in 
Spanish America.  The dangers of the West Indian trade during the 1790s made the East 
Indies all the more attractive to those who could afford such long distance trade.  By 
1805, the Perkinses wrote to their agent in Havana that they were “anxious to get out of 
the W. I. trade.  It has cost us more trouble and anxiety than all our E.I. business.”247  Yet 
the 1790s and 1800s were nevertheless a period of overlap:  the Perkinses turned to 
Batavia (Jakarta) as an outlet for Javan coffee as their sources in Saint Domingue dried 
up, for example, and wealthier Spanish American consumers consumed East Indians 
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goods such as cotton nankeens and silks.248  Most significantly, Spanish American ports 
offered the prospect of silver dollars.   
Silver was the preferred commodity in trade with China and India at this point.  
This was especially the case for milled Spanish silver dollars as they were a higher grade 
of silver than other silver coins.  The Perkinses purchased silver in domestic and 
European markets and preferred to receive payments for European goods in silver where 
possible, but openings in Spanish American markets offered access at the source.249  As 
they wrote to their China agent in 1803, “We are in the hopes the Spanish Colonies will 
again be open, and they will flow upon us.”250  Little wonder then that as the Perkinses 
expanded their interests in Asia, they sought entry into Spanish American ports such as 
Montevideo, Lima, Buenos Aires, and Monterey.   
As early as 1792, Perkins & Co. attempted to shift their West Indian trade away 
from Saint Domingue toward Havana.251  In December 1792, for example, James and 
Thomas wrote their brother Sam in Saint Domingue on how to ensure a client’s ship, the 
Delight, gained entry to Havana.  They feared their business partners did not appreciate 
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the importance of the Havana business “as forcibly as ourselves,” according to the letter, 
adding that they did not mean it as a reproach and hoped Sam would not be as “huffy” as 
he had upon receiving earlier advice.252  The Perkins brothers tried to purchase sugar, 
molasses, and coffee from other West Indian ports such as Martinique, but time and again 
they returned to Havana.  In 1793, their agent was a British merchant, Charles Frazier.  
By the turn of the 1800s, New Englander James Gorham was in residence as their agent.  
The problem for the Perkinses was that Cubans demanded American vessels carry slaves 
from Africa to gain entry.  The Perkinses tried to ship horses rather than human chattel, 
but fared poorly.   
While earlier in their careers the Perkins brothers had engaged in the purchasing, 
transport, and sale of slaves, they seemed to want to reinvent themselves at the turn of the 
century.  The brothers claimed in a letter that they had never sold slaves.253  But when 
they first partnered in 1792, their early commissions revolved around slave trading in 
Havana.  In 1803, they sent the Hope to Senegal.  On December 29, 1803, the ship was 
condemned with fifty-six slaves on board.  In 1804, they wrote to Gorham in Havana that 
laws against the slave trade prevented them “from availing of the benefit of promises” 
and that they were much in want of dollars.  Nevertheless, that year they sent the 
Paragon on another adventure to Senegal.254 
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Fortunately, for the Perkins brothers at least, war between Britain and Spain from 
1796-1800 and again in 1800-1804 opened the prospect of direct trade with Spanish 
America.  Throughout the French Wars, Spain found itself caught between French 
alliance and British occupation.255  In 1796, the British blockade of the Spanish trade 
with her American colonies threatened the colonial project itself.  In order to continue to 
supply the Spanish colonies with European manufactures—and thus to ensure native 
industry did not develop to compete with imports via the metropole—the Spanish 
government opened colonial ports to neutral traders in November 1797.  Here, again, was 
an opening for Americans to profit from carrying European manufactures and American 
produce to foreign colonies.  When that policy fell under criticism from traders Cádiz in 
1799, the government narrowed the trade to specially licensed merchant traders who 
would carry goods directly from foreign ports to the colonies.256  Licenses to trade with 
Spanish colonies, much sought after, were bought and sold among merchants.257  The 
entire process was ripe for abuse. 
The Perkinses made a first foray into direct trade with South America in 1800.258  
A Guatemala merchant by the name of Alejandro Ramirez secured them permission to 
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trade with the assurance that the authorization qualified them to trade as long as the 
neutral trade with Spain was open.  Adventures would be as easy as their current trade 
with Havana, Ramirez claimed.259  On June 5th, the Perkinses joined with Stephen 
Higginson & Co. to dispatch the Diana.  They gave instructions for the Diana to sail for 
either Callao off of Lima, Peru or Sonsonate in what is now El Salvador.  While docked 
at Lima’s port at Callao, Spanish officials seized the Diana’s cargo as illegitimate and 
ordered Captain Obed Barnard to depart.  He did, only to be captured again in El 
Salvador.  The captain and the crew were thrown into prison.  When finally released, 
Barnard continued the vessel on her path, sailing to Hawai’i, China, and then to the Isle 
of France where the vessel was sold.260  Whether or not the permission the owners 
received was legitimate, they operated on the premise that it was.261 
The Diana’s seizure was disappointing, to say the least.  While the venture may 
have only been an initial foray, when looked at another way, it is clear that the Perkinses 
had high hopes.  The supercargo for the venture was Samuel Burling (later Curson), who 
had grown up in their countinghouse.  Samuel Burling was nephew to Walter Burling, the 
former partner to both James and Thomas Perkins in their earlier West Indies trading.  As 
                                                                                                                                                 
might be able to secure them entrance at Montevideo.  The Perkinses were clearly looking for possible 
midway points in Spanish America where they could purchase silver for the voyage to China.  While 
Rowan failed because the Spanish authorities knew him, other ventures such as the Montezuma had more 
luck. 
259 Alejandro Ramirez, Philadelphia to James & T.H. Perkins, Boston, 21 April 1800.  JEC 
Extracts. 
260 Alexander Hamilton and Harold Coffin Syrett, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961), 157-158.  Stephen Higginson wrote Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of 
State James Madison, and others to lobby the claim via official channels. 
261 See their letter of 28 February 1807.  JEC Extracts.  “We send the original Permission of the 
Viceroy or Gov. of Guatemala, under wh. our Ship Diana sailed, and also a copy of the order of his 
Catholick (sic) Majesty, wh. recognizes the permission in question, and orders restoration. The Person to 





mentioned in chapter one, young Sam apprenticed with the Perkins brothers in the 
1790s.262  The Perkins brothers had high hopes for Burling’s career.  Another young man 
they recommended to the Spanish American trade was Hibbert Newton.  In 1804, 
Newton sailed as supercargo to the Tarantula, but the Perkinses urged him to win the 
confidence of local merchant Pedro Boyer as well as their Havana agent who might, they 
hoped, have occasion for Newton’s services.  They instructed him to demonstrate “steady 
deportment … without too much familiarity” to remain in Havana if he could and learn 
Spanish.  At this time in his life, the “polar star of [his] conduct” ought to be “making y’r 
self a Man of Business.”263  The immersion of these young men the Spanish market gave 
the Perkinses an entrée as well.   
The Perkinses desired a skilled and trustworthy agent to handle their Spanish 
American interests, but they had only so much control over Burling’s mercantile path.  In 
1804, after Ephraim Bumstead’s death had left them without a fully trained agent to 
handle their considerable business in China, the Perkins brothers attempted to push 
Burling into accepting the post.  But Sam Burling thought his prospects were better in the 
Spanish trade.264  In March 1804, the Perkinses updated his uncle Walter that Samuel had 
traveled to New York for them on a Spanish project; they expected him to succeed, but if 
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not, never fear, they would procure another voyage for him to try again.265  In 1807, 
young Burling was still engaged in the Spanish trade.   
Given the difficulties they faced with the Diana266, one would think that the 
Perkinses would have had little taste for the South America market.  Yet the prospects 
must have seemed too good to overlook.  For the Perkinses, the Spanish colonies 
promised more than profits from the re-export of European manufactures, they offered 
the prospect of a linchpin to their East Indies trade.  In exchange for American produce 
and East Indian commodities such as silk, tea, and spices, the Spanish colonies could, 
they hoped, pay in silver.  By 1804, the Perkinses dispatched at least three further vessels 
for Lima, Chile, and Buenos Aires:  the George Washington, the Cordelia, and the 
Carlota.267  The Perkinses obtained licenses for these ventures through collaboration with 
Gaspar Rico and Julián Hernández Barruso.268  Hernández Barruso met Thomas H. 
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Perkins while traveling to the United States, looking for precisely this type of 
opportunity.  After purchasing part of a license the Spanish crown had granted to the 
Marqués de Bedmar, Hernández Barruso partnered with the Perkinses for speculations in 
South America.  The cargoes were consigned to Gaspar Rico and his cousin, Gaspar 
Antonio de Osma.  The Perkinses were very secretive about the ventures in their letters, 
and they explicitly warned Samuel Burling to be discreet about their involvement with 
Hernández Barruso.269 
The Perkinses gave Burling two sets of instructions for the George Washington’s 
adventure, one on 20 July 1804 and the next a mere three days later.  The differences 
between the two is instructive.  In the first letter, the Perkinses offer smuggling tips.  The 
Washington should sail to Rio de Janeiro where, on the pretence of watering, Burling 
should attempt to sell his cargo.  If this did not work, head to the River La Plata and 
report distress.  Damage the ship, create a leak, anything to allow the ship to dock for a 
substantial amount of time.  Here they expected to sell the cargo to advantage and to thus 
secure a decent cargo of hides and tallow and other goods for Europe or the United 
States.  If all else failed, head to Manila and attempt to trade between Manila and 
Acapulco.  In the letter of 23 July 1804, the tone changed.  Perhaps the Perkinses 
received official permission from Hernández Barruso.  The Washington would sail to 
Montevideo and ask permission to visit Buenos Aires.  Unlike the false distress advised 
previously, “Your conduct should prove to the inhabitants that you intend to pay the 
utmost regard and respect to their customs and ceremonies.  Marked attentions to be paid 
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to the officers of the Gov’t.”  This they felt Burling particularly suited to, noting 
familiarly, “You will have occasion for all y’r Patience, forbearance and vigilance in 
trading.” But this was important:  “We know it is too often the case that the prejudices of 
the People our vessels have visited So. America have been sported with, and their 
religious ceremonies derided—inculcate the necessity of avoiding a similar conduct.”  
Still, they urged Burling to make the visit seem as if the vessel traveled to South America 
on Burling’s own plan—to American officials at least.  And to the officers and crew.270  
Once again, James and Thomas Perkins faced disappointment.  Spanish officials 
at Callao condemned the General Washington, ship and cargo.  The problem they faced 
this time was political.  Their Lima agent, Gaspar Rico, was also the factor for the Cinco 
Gremios Mayores de Madrid, a powerful Spanish trading company.271  As tensions 
mounted between the Cinco Gremios and a competing trading company, the Real 
Compañía de Filipinas and their local allies in Lima, Rico became a pawn between the 
two.272   The American neutral ventures promised to profit Rico and the Cinco Gremios 
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on two counts, both through consignments to Rico (and his cousin) himself and through 
investments made on behalf of the Caja de Consolidación de Vales Reales of Peru.  The 
Caja was a fund for bonds floated by the Spanish Crown.  While in the Caja, the bond 
funds could be invested elsewhere—such as in colonial commerce and neutral shipping.  
According to Patricia Marks, it is likely that the total amount of merchandise imported by 
Hernández Barruso, Rico, and the Caja were a significant portion of Peru’s licensed 
imports.  Perhaps because of this, Viceroy Gabriel de Avilés stepped in to condemn the 
ventures.  The cargoes of three Perkins vessels—the Washington, the Cordelia, and the 
Carlota were all confiscated at Callao.  The Peruvians held the Washington under the 
claim that the Bedmar linceses were annulled by Spanish royal decrees of June 20 and 
July 15, 1805, the Cordelia’s cargo for having been purchased with funds embezzled by 
Rico from the Cinco Gremios, and the Carlota was simply confiscated by the Count of 
Villar de Fuente via an audit of the Cinco Gremios accounts in Lima.273 
Still, this did not end their efforts to trade with Spanish America.  In 1807, for 
example, the Perkinses had goods selected at Manila specifically for the Lima trade for 
the Herald, again in connection with Hernández Barruso, and they dispatched the 
Resource for the Rio La Plata.  Silver was simply too important a commodity for their 
trade with the East Indies to relinquish their hopes.  Not until after the French Wars 
ended did Americans have access to viable alternatives to silver in their East Indies 
trading:  bills of exchange and opium. 
Mediterranean Opium 
                                                 





  Another market the Perkinses experimented in during the French Wars was the 
Ottoman opium trade.  Years before, in 1796, James and Thomas H. Perkins inquired to 
George Perkins in Smyrna (now Izmir in Turkey) of the British Levant Company as to 
the prospects of trade between Smyrna and Boston.  They wrote of a joint adventure 
between them, Stephen Higginson, and George’s brother and their townsman, Thomas 
Perkins.  At this point, however, the letter was simply a foray into advancing their 
reexportation of West Indian produce—coffee, sugar—with the potential of bringing East 
Indian goods to Smyrna.  It had nothing to do with opium.  As the letter explained, the 
war had brought new openings for American traders, and they wondered how an 
American vessel might be received, under what circumstances, and what articles would 
best answer.274  Why then did they return for opium?  During the 1804-5 season, the price 
for patna opium nearly doubled.275  Loaves of poppy cakes arrived in Smyrna from the 
poppy-growing district of Afyon-Kara-Hisar (literally, “opium black castle”) in late 
summer, and from Smyrna (now Izmir, Turkey), merchants purchased the opium for 
shipment to Europe, the Americas, or, more commonly, Asia.     
As early as June 1805, James & T.H. Perkins wrote to their Canton branch 
inquiring as to the prospects for selling Turkish opium in China.276  The Perkinses were 
not the first to discover the possibilities of opium in the China market.  Better quality 
Indian varieties of the poppy juice had long been sold in the region and the British had 
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become very protective of their Indian supply routes.  Nor were they the first Americans 
in the Turkish opium trade.  James Wilcocks of Philadelphia visited the port of Smyrna 
(Izmir, Turkey) in 1804 as the supercargo for the Pennsylvania.  Wilcocks arrived in 
Canton by October of 1805, selling his cargo of opium and laying plans for a new 
voyage.  Clearly the adventure did well:  in 1805, Willings & Francis, Stephen Girard, 
and the Perkins brothers, all American merchants of considerable repute, either sent ships 
to Smyrna or laid plans to do so.277     
Opium had a longer history in the China trade, but the turn of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a marked change.  While the Portuguese and the Dutch brought opium 
to China in the seventeenth century, it was not until the British East India Company took 
control of poppy cultivation and began to orchestrate opium operations in the eighteenth 
century through a system of licenses, advances, and auctions that the drug’s sales surged 
in China.  The Company monopolized the growth of poppies in India, sold the cakes of 
dried poppy juice at auctions in Calcutta to private British traders who specialized in the 
trade between India and China (so-called “country traders”), who then smuggled chests 
of opium off the coast of Nanyang for silver.  The country traders would then exchange 
the silver for East India Company bills, a safe form of remittance for the country traders, 
and the Company would trade the silver for tea that, legally, only it could export back 
into Britain.  By the turn of the nineteenth century, opium was the most profitable 
element of the British East India Company’s operations.278   As Michael Greenberg notes, 
the Company prospered through “the technique of growing opium in India and disowning 
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it in China.”279  The Chinese were the largest opium consumers in Asia, but they were by 
no means the only ones, and the effects of the drug trafficking rippled throughout the 
region.  To historian Carl Trocki, opium was the trap that enmeshed the economies of 
China and Southeast Asia in European—especially British—colonial capitalism.280   
In 1804 and 1805, when the Perkinses and other American merchants began 
carrying Turkish opium to China, the East India Company’s prohibition on fellow British 
merchants bringing opium from Turkey protected the Americans from their most likely 
competitors.281  Because the Company received considerable revenue from its opium 
sales, in 1773 they prohibited British vessels from carrying foreign opium into its 
jurisdiction.  The refusal of Company ships to carry opium to China combined with their 
prohibition on British merchants carrying the drug from other markets to create a niche 
for Americans and other non-British players.  As Charles Stelle put it, “Private English 
shipping could not, and the Company’s vessel would not, carry the drug to China.”282  
The devastating effect of the French Wars on much of European shipping left non-
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Company opium in the hands of a small number of players—most notably Americans.  
The American embargo and the War of 1812 diverted traffic, but after the war’s end in 
1815 the trade surged.  The Perkinses experimented with bringing Persian opium, but, as 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six, they specialized in the lesser quality 
varieties found in the Mediterranean.  In the 1817-8 season, “turkey” accounted for half 
of what Americans brought to China.283   
 
American Politics & the Struggle for Neutrality 
  If the Perkinses had been able to dictate federal policy during the French Wars, 
there would have been no embargo in 1807 and no War of 1812.  Instead, they protested 
through private as well as public channels.  Despite the profits to be had from neutral 
trade, American tempers were naturally frayed by the predations on their vessels.  This 
frustration drew Americans into the French Wars by fits and starts:  in a war of all-but-
name with the French in the West Indies and the American littoral in 1798; through 
economic warfare epitomized by the American embargo of 1807; and finally in war with 
the British in the War of 1812.  Through all of this, American merchants struggled to find 
avenues of profit.  As much as the Perkinses abhorred the prospect of entering the war, 
they feared peace as well.  As they explained to their London agent, Samuel Williams, 
“peace does not promise us a very extensive field in which to range”284 
The so-called “Quasi-War” between the United States and France transpired over 
the sanctioned pillaging of American shipping.  On January 18, 1798, the French 
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government rejected the American neutral position of “free ships, free goods.”  By the 
new French law, the nationality of the cargo would now determine the character of the 
ship.  Therefore, a ship that was registered in Boston but carried goods out of Jamaica 
was considered British.  Rather than changing flags for vessels, merchants now provided 
forged certificates of origins for their goods.285  The French law, however, followed 
rather than generated practice, sanctioning existing pillaging.  Between 1797 and 1798, 
French privateers captured approximately 330 American ships as prizes.  Because neutral 
vessels were not allowed to be armed, the Americans were vulnerable to anyone who 
could muster a cannon.   By early 1798, French privateers hovered off America’s key 
waterways—the Long Island Sound (New York), the entrance to the Delaware Bay 
(Philadelphia)—simply waiting for vessels to depart.  As Stanley Elkins and Eric 
McKittrick put it, Americans could either give up a trade that was one-third of the 
nation’s commerce or they could build a navy.  They chose the latter.  Luckily, America’s 
incipient navy under Benjamin Stoddert mounted a rather impressive response.  Seizures 
by privateers and insurance rates alike dropped drastically over the following year.286   
Despite the obvious evidence of a naval conflict in the Quasi-War, the fact that 
Congress never declared war meant that for all intents and purposes, the United States 
kept its neutral status.  This in and of itself was a feat.  As tensions escalated between 
Britain and France, neutrals got caught in the middle.287  By 1805, the United States and 
Denmark were by and large the only neutral powers remaining.  That year, Great Britain 
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reinvoked a 1756 rule that argued neutrals could only continue trade what they already 
had access to in peacetime.  The rule effectively outlawed the re-export trade:  neutrals 
could not encroach on the trade between colonies and their respective metropoles.   The 
French countered with the Berlin Decree on November 21, 1806.  Any ship approaching 
Great Britain, neutral or no, was subject to capture.  The British retaliated with a similar 
prohibition of trade between the United States and Europe.  The French answered with 
the Milan Decree of November 23, 1807 and its beefed up version of December 17:  any 
ship that “touched” England, whether docking an English port or being boarded by 
English officers, was fair game for French privateers.  Between 1803 and 1807, the 
British seized 528 American ships and the French 389.288   
The Perkinses complained about British as well as French injury to the American 
merchant marine, but there was no ambiguity as to who they favored.  To them, the 
British were “fair and reasonable” and attempted to “appease” Americans, but President 
Thomas Jefferson could not be appeased.289  Despite continued friendships in France, 
politically and economically, the Perkinses aligned themselves with the British.  In many 
ways, the Perkinses were apologists for the British.290  But they were not entirely wrong 
about the Republican president.  To Jefferson, Britain was the greater threat to America’s 
future stability and well-being:  Britain was a naval power with a significant presence in 
                                                 
288 North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860, 37. 
289 James & T.H. Perkins & Co., Boston to Samuel Williams, London, 17 November 1807 and to 
John Perkins Cushing, 29 March 1808.  JEC Extracts. 
290 For example, in August of 1807, they decried to LeRoy, Bayard & McEvers of New York that 
the American government should rebel at the protection of His Majesty’s fugitives “at the moment G.B. is 
struggling for her existence and fighting the Battles of the Civilized World” [to defeat Napoleon].  LeRoy 
was a regular correspondent of theirs for political news and one of the most prominent commercial houses 
in New York.  James & T.H. Perkins & Co., Boston to LeRoy, Bayard & McEvers, New York 13 August 





North America.  While not ideologically aligned with Napoleon, Jefferson reasoned that 
France’s strength was on land—and hence a challenge to the European continent more 
than the United States—and her loss of Louisiana and Haiti lessened the likelihood of 
encroachment upon American interests.  And Jefferson hoped that Napoleon might 
provide openings for American expansion in North America, such as removing the 
Spanish from Florida.  As Jefferson’s own writings make clear, the President did not seek 
to simply disentangle Americans from the French Wars, but to weaken the British by 
withholding the American market.291  
In 1807, the Chesapeake incident provided the necessary public outcry to allow 
Jefferson to act.  On June 22, the HMS Leopard bore down on the USS Chesapeake and 
demanded to see the American vessel’s papers.  The American captain refused.  The 
British commander, Salusbury Pryce Humphrey, suspected four deserters from the British 
navy hid among the Chesapeake’s crew.  Of the four, the Chesapeake’s captain 
considered three to be Americans who had been impressed into the British navy and the 
fourth used an alias in signing on for the Chesapeake.  The Leopard retaliated with 
cannon shot that killed three and wounded eighteen.  Americans were outraged.  The 
incident occurred just ten miles out of the Virginia port of Hampton Roads.  When Robert 
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MacDonald, one of the injured mariners, died several days later, the nation mourned.292  
President Jefferson called on the British government to answer for the attack on the 
Chesapeake, to no avail.  While the British disavowed the actions of the Leopard, they 
rejected American demands for redress and continued to prey upon American shipping.  
To Jefferson, this was further evidence of the low esteem in which the British held the 
United States.   
Upset by the Chesapeake conflict, Jefferson nevertheless saw it as an opportunity.  
An embargo on American trade would provide the benefit of hurting American enemies 
without the expense of mustering for battle.  Commercial rather than military strategies, 
he wrote, would be one of many “useful lessons” Americans could teach Europeans, 
“showing them that there are peaceable means of repressing injustice.”293  On the 22nd of 
December 1807, Congress passed the Embargo Act.  Scholars differ on whether or not 
the Embargo could have been successful had it lasted longer, but for many merchants, 
there was no controversy.  The Embargo promised to hurt Americans far more than it 
would hurt the British.294 The Perkinses summed their opinion in a letter to a constituent:  
“We cannot believe that those who hold the reins of Gov’t will act in so direct opposition 
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to the Will of the People and the best interests of the Country as to plunge us into a 
contest wh. would be ruinous, to defend a principle not worth a Cent to us.”295 
On the news that the Embargo would, in fact, go into effect, the Perkinses moved 
quickly to protect their interests.  They worried that hostilities would allow foreign 
governments to lay claim to funds held by belligerents in commercial houses within their 
borders.  They did not worry that Britain would seize their funds, but France.  Just as 
Jefferson mistrusted the British, so, too, the Perkinses mistrusted the French under 
Napoleon.  “In the present alarming state of things,” they wrote David Parish, “we are 
anxious for the safety of our property in the hands of Hope & Co.; should France declare 
Hostilities ag’st the Country, w’d she not endeavor to secure the property of individuals 
in Holland?”296  They had over $200,000 in the hands of the Dutch bank.  As Hope & 
Co.’s agent in the United States and a friend of theirs, Parish seemed an obvious choice.  
They did not leave the matter there, however, and wrote several times to their London 
agent, Samuel Williams, to see if Hope & Co. might allow him to draw or advance him 
the funds on their behalf.297  While the funds were not deemed safe in Holland, London 
was the next best thing to Boston.   
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They dispatched a flurry of letters to correspondents—agents, partners, ship 
captains, informants—with orders for how to proceed.  Under the embargo, Public 
Dispatch Boat vessels provided the only official means of correspondence with Europe.  
The Boston office asked their London agent to keep their Canton office apprised of 
politics and prices, but to an extent that must have been extremely unsettling, they simply 
had to trust that their agents abroad would see to their interests.  While they hoped to be 
able to sell off their overstock of goods while shopkeepers had no access to fresh imports, 
they expected the immediate effect of the embargo to be a drop in prices as American 
ships all returned to the United States rather than plying other markets.298  This was 
indeed the case.  Prices for staples plummeted:  tea, coffee, sugar, cotton, rice.  Over one 
hundred New York businesses went under in the aftermath.299   
The Perkinses larger network included individuals and firms who were not clients 
per se, but corresponding agents who shared details of politics, prices, as well advocacy 
for the future.  Most of their direct political intercourse occurred through New England 
legislators.  According to Samuel Eliot Morrison, New England Federalists tended to 
view congressional representatives as their “political chanteymen,” elected to represent 
them, to speak for them, and to convey their will.300  Yet this did not prevent the 
Perkinses from lobbying other politicians as well; that lobbying simply transpired 
through less direct channels.  Their circle of correspondents shared advocacy as well as 
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information and advice.  Note, for example, the following letter that the Perkins brothers 
wrote to Prime & Ward of New York: 
We think there is a chance of better times, provided you Yorkers can be 
induced to pepper our good friends at Washington with the artillery of 
petition, remonstrance, memorial, etc.  We should go farther were it not 
thought inexpedient that the fire should be continued here [in New 
England], where they say ‘everything rebellious and wicked is want to 
originate.’  We are surprised at the torpor of your suffering city.301 
 
They wrote similarly to the Olivers of Philadelphia: 
We hope in God your expectations of a change of administration will be 
realized.  Nothing else can save us from destruction.  No paint or other 
means should be spared to produce this desirable end.302 
 
Their correspondent roster included some of the most prominent trading houses along the 
American littoral.  Not all of their correspondents agreed with the Perkinses politically, to 
be sure, but even with their influential correspondents, the Perkinses had little influence 
on the direction of federal policy under the Republicans. 
Merchants worked to get around the Embargo every way they could.  As with 
earlier smuggling, the Perkinses felt unfair laws demanded imagination, not obedience.  
In this, the Perkinses were not alone.  As Donald Hickey has written, it is not “surprising 
that so many Americans in this freewheeling commercial age were willing to defy their 
own government in the pursuit of profits.”303  In June 1808, John Jacob Astor filed 
petitions with the federal government to be able to retrieve property he claimed to have 
left in China.  The Perkinses similarly petitioned to be able to collect the cargo of the 
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Mandarin.  Both were refused.304  To get around the restrictions, the Perkinses partook in 
John Jacob Astor’s ruse to embark a ship from the port of New York to China.  In July 
1808, Astor requested special dispensation from President Jefferson to help a visiting 
mandarin return home aboard the Beaver.  Newspapers reported of jealous merchants 
who visited the ship to see this putative mandarin before the vessel departed and scoffed 
at the trickery.  This was no mandarin, they proclaimed, but a “Chinaman picked up in 
the Park” or a “common Chinese dock loafer” dressed in silks.  President Jefferson and 
his Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, shrugged off the news, arguing that it was 
worth the risk.305   
As long as ships did not return home, they could remain active.  Thus, a common 
technique for those who could afford it was to keep vessels abroad and direct agents 
abroad to make decisions as necessary.  “The Government seems determined to destroy 
our Commerce,” a Perkins & Company letter groused, “and we shall be unpardonable not 
to profit of the Situation of things, as far as in our Power, by Continuing to keep our 
Ships going as long as we can.”306  Luckily, the Perkinses had several vessels abroad.  
The Derby, the Pearl, the Eclipse and the Vancouver were all in the Pacific.  The Levant 
was en route from Boston to Canton.  And the Mandarin and the Cordelia were in the 
Atlantic.  Of these, several wrecked – the Mandarin, the Cordelia, and the Eclipse.  But 
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the Perkinses were nonetheless positioned to continue a certain level of trade.307  In this, 
they were fortunate.  Most of America’s port towns during the embargo had the 
appearance of wastelands with abandoned ships lining the wharves.  One observer 
recalled Boston’s harbor as follows:  “…Sun burnt masts stripped of their cheering 
appendages, exhibited the appearance of a forest, whose stately cedars had been deprived 
of their foliage by a destructive conflagration, or scath’d by the lightening (sic) of 
Heaven.”308 
The Perkinses were especially fortunate to have a branch office abroad to direct 
trade following the embargo.  John Perkins Cushing had arrived home in Boston for a 
visit on April 19, 1807, only to return to China in early June of 1807 aboard the Levant.  
The sea voyage from Canton alone had been longer than his six-week stay.  Nor could the 
visit have been much of a vacation.  On May 24 his grandmother, long ill, passed away.  
Seeing Cushing and knowing of his success must have been a comfort to Elizabeth Peck 
Perkins, but it must have also been difficult for her grandson.  The trip was a whirlwind 
of visits and business meetings.  Yet somewhere in there, the family grieved.   
Cushing’s post abroad already required considerable independence and 
entrepreneurialism, but the Embargo deepened this exponentially.  The Embargo did 
more than cut Cushing off from advice on politics and prices—it cut him off from letters 
from home.  It is hard to fathom how lonely he must have felt.  Cushing put Perkins 
capital to use in various ways, from shipping sandalwood and tin between China and the 
Sandwich Islands, loaning out money in Canton at 18%, and more.  The Perkins brothers 
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hoped that at least the Embargo would allow them to run off their stocks of tea.  Luckily 
for them, they had the capital base to allow them to store the tea in warehouses until 
prices improved. 
Another wartime boom market in which the Perkinses invested heavily was the 
American-Iberian flour trade.  During the French Wars, the American grain trade to 
Britain ebbed and flowed dramatically.  Exports surged in 1801, 1807, and 1809 
respectively and crashed in 1804, 1808, and especially during the War of 1812 when 
conflict between the new nations took the exports from nearly 1.4 million bushels in 1809 
down to a scant 14 recorded bushels in 1814.309  In Spain and Portugal, American flour 
exports to the region surged from 105,196 bushels in 1809 to 825,179 in 1811.310  As 
Napoleon’s troops took on the Spanish, Portuguese, and British in the Iberian Peninsula, 
the troops required food.  Prices soared.  A Virginia merchant wrote in June of 1810 that 
flour sold at $12.50 per barrel in Lisbon; by April of 1811, the Perkinses instructed 
Joseph Cabot to not sell his flour for less than $15 per barrel.311  Merchants knew the 
boom was temporary, but hastened to profit while the embattled conditions continued. 
Even after war began between the United States and Britain, the flour trade did 
not end.  Prices were too good.  By 1812, the Perkinses purchased licenses directly from 
the British government to sell flour to the British-occupied Iberian Peninsula.  In October 
1812, the Perkinses dispatched seven ships to take advantage of this demand, five to 
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Cadiz and two for Lisbon:  the Miser (Samuel Storrow, supercargo), the Factor (Thomas 
Doubleday), the Topaz (John Bromfield), the Ariadne (William Farris), the Spartan (S.L. 
Cunningham), the Argo (Henry Sturgis), and the Bedford (John Linzee).  Of these, 
American privateers captured two and the British one, with the Miser escorted to 
Gibraltar as a British prize for lacking the proper papers:  the papers had been eaten by 
rats en route.312  In January 1813, the Perkinses chided their London agent, Samuel 
Williams, for not having supplied them with British licenses.  They paid $1500 for 
licenses to continue their trade to the Iberian Peninsula; had he sent them from London, 
the price would have been only £10-12 each.  If the British government still allowed the 
provisions trade, they wrote, they were happy to oblige.313   
The Perkinses received dispatches from their political contacts about changes in 
policy that would affect their business.  In April of 1812, for example, the Perkinses 
informed a client that “Thanks to Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Quincy, who sent us early advice of 
the intention to impose another embargo, we have succeeded in disposing of your 
tobacco.” 314  Senator James Lloyd and Representative Josiah Quincy, both Federalists of 
Boston, were good friends to the Perkinses and clearly good friends to have.  With the 
advice from these political contacts, the Perkinses were able to dispatch their flour 
vessels for Cadiz:  the Henry, the Miser, the Washington, and the Nancy, the last out of 
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New Orleans.  They estimated about 12,300 barrels of flour cleared the American ports 
before they closed.315     
Jeffersonian Republicans looked the other way on the American trade with 
British-occupied Iberia.  The Perkinses’ agent in Cadiz was the American consul there, 
Richard S. Hackley.  In April of 1811, they wrote to Hackley about the prospect of taking 
one of their own into his firm.  A “nephew of ours, Mr. T.P. Doubleday sl’d in the Ship 
Newburyport the other day for Gibraltar.  We have been casting about for a Foreign 
Establishment for him, and have concluded to recommend y’r forming a mercantile 
connection for him in Cadiz.  We take the liberty of suggesting to you taking him into y’r 
firm.”316  The Perkinses likely saw this as a longer-term connection to the Spanish trade 
rather than the flour trade which was clearly a temporary, war-induced boom. 
 In 1809, the Perkinses split their London accounts between their established 
London agent, Samuel Williams, and Henry Higginson & Co.  On one level, the business 
decision can be explained by affective ties.  The Perkinses intermarried with the 
Higginson clan several times over, including Perkins brother Samuel’s nuptials with 
Barbara—the belle of Boston—in 1795 and their niece Nancy’s 1803 marriage to 
Barbara’s younger brother Henry.  The second marriage may well have been connected to 
the first.  Barbara and Henry were both the offspring of the Honorable Stephen 
Higginson, one of Boston’s most esteemed merchants and a key ally of James & Thomas 
H. Perkins.  But Samuel and Barbara Perkins also fostered Nancy Perkins Cushing after 
the death of the girl’s mother, the same Nancy who married Barbara’s younger brother 
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Henry.  According to family lore, Barbara fought the connection; for Nancy, the marriage 
was a quick path out of her aunt’s household.317  Nancy moved to London with her 
husband where they entertained many of the American travelers, often merchants, who 
passed through. 
Viewed through the lens of the Embargo, however, the decision to split their 
accounts may well have had to do with the business at hand.  Even when Congress 
repealed the embargo, legislation still prohibited trade with England and France.  And 
this may have been the point:  the Higginson family hired a young man by the name of 
William Tudor, Jr. to help them smuggle British goods into Napoleon-occupied 
Europe.318   
Unfortunately, the Higginsons’ sojourn was short-lived.  On November 3, 1811, 
Higginson approached Thomas H. Perkins, himself then in London to invest the £80,000 
the Perkinses had in war-induced limbo in the British market.  Higginson confided to 
Perkins that nearly half a million pounds of funds that he had advanced to correspondents 
had not been paid back.  He had extended his young firm to the point that he could not 
meet his obligations and thus had little choice but to dissolve the house.  Included in the 
morass was approximately £31,000 of Perkins money.  Samuel Williams and Thomas H. 
Perkins were left to handle the creditors.319  When Stephen Higginson & Co. also failed 
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in 1813, Samuel G. Perkins & Co. began, run by all of the same principals and carrying 
on much the same trade.320   
The American Embargo created other difficulties:  substantive capital the 
Perkinses had amassed from their neutral shipping was stuck abroad.  They lacked the 
means to remit the funds to the United States.  There were three mechanisms for 
remitting profits home:  shipping specie, commodities, or bills.  Specie was expensive 
and dangerous to ship in the best of times and thus relatively rare.  Sending goods, 
conversely, was usually very common.  A corresponding agent invested funds held for 
the American firm in a cargo of merchandise that they then shipped on the Americans’ 
behalf, thus reinvesting the funds in a new venture offering further profits.  But the 
Embargo put a stop to this, at least officially.  There was always smuggling.  Some 
merchants elected to use bills of exchange to remit funds, but given that the exorbitant 
rates, bills tended to be a measure of desperation.321  When they were able to remit profits 
home to Boston, however, the same restrictions on trade led them to seek out investments 
closer to home.  
Wartime Industry:  Monkton Iron, Northampton Lead, & the Eliot Manufacturing Co. 
The Embargo and the War of 1812 did not stymie Perkins & Co. trading as much 
as the partners claimed that it did, but the political turmoil did leave them with excess 
capital on their hands.  As many scholars have noted, merchants who otherwise would 
have sent capital abroad began looking for ways to invest in newly protected markets at 
home.  Without the competition of European (especially British) manufactures, domestic 
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industry had a chance.  Between 1807 and 1815, the Perkinses invested in three industrial 
projects:  Monkton Ironworks in Vergennes, Vermont, a lead mine in Northampton, 
Massachusetts, and finally, they made an initial foray into turning several mills in 
Newton, Massachusetts to the production of cotton textiles.  While peace and cheap 
British textiles shelved latter project, by the 1820s, participants in the Perkins network 
counted themselves as both merchants and manufacturers.  Not surprisingly, 
collaboration begun in splitting shares in mercantile speculations continued in industrial 
speculations.  When searching for investors for a project, the Perkinses turned to known 
principals. 
 In 1807, the Perkins brothers joined with Francis Bradbury, Stephen and George 
Higginson, William Parsons, and Colonel Benjamin Welles to form the Monkton Iron 
Company in Vergennes, Vermont.  The concept began with Bradbury.  In the spring of 
1807, James and Thomas H. Perkins moved their store from to India Wharf, where Frank 
Bradbury and his brother had operated a store for about five years.  Chatting about 
business and likely speculations, Bradbury mentioned the natural bounty of Monkton to 
his new neighbors.  Monkton had iron deposits just below the surface.  The deposits 
stood near the Vergennes Falls on Great Otter Creek in Vermont’s Green Mountains, 
with the forest an obvious fodder for charcoal to fuel the ironworks.  Plus, the local town 
already had significant industry:  a grist mill, two saw mills, a carding mill, a rolling and 
slitting mill, and a bloomer forge.  That spring, the group of prospective Boston investors 
hired a merchant and lawyer by the name of Perkins Nichols to examine the prospects for 
an ironworks.322  The opportunity was hard to resist.  The Monkton investment would be 
                                                 





a companion industry and workers, for the most part at least, would be trained and ready 
for the ironworks.  New England’s shipyards generally shipped iron in from Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey, but the transport costs created an advantage for a Vermont site.  Given 
the context of the Embargo, the question was not whether or not to invest, but how soon 
the ironworks could be up and running.  Here, again, the Perkinses collaborated with a 
familiar circle of capitalists:  Stephen Higginson and his son George, William Parsons, 
Colonel B. Welles. 
 Despite the business proficiency of the investors, an industrial venture—an 
ironworks more specifically—was a new order of things.  George Higginson, Stephen 
Higginson’s twenty-seven year old son, served as the company’s secretary and treasurer 
and thus managed the business side of the enterprise.  Frank Bradbury agreed to move to 
Vermont as the site manager.  And Thomas H. Perkins began tapping contacts for a 
technical expert on the group’s glaring blind spot:  iron.  From Dr. Nathan Howard of 
Plymouth, Perkins heard that a local wheelwright with some knowledge of iron smelting 
by the name of Daniel Johnson might be hired to advise on the project.  Johnson was 
amenable and agreed to travel to Monkton in March or April.  Meanwhile, the investors 
pushed forward.  They leased the land, buildings, and local water rights.  Bradbury 
contracted for coal shipments and, after purchasing what he could locally, hired a crew to 
make charcoal on company land.   Consulting what books and advice the group had been 
able to pool, Bradbury began to build.323 
In many ways Bradbury was in a difficult spot.  Expectations were high because 
the iron was close to the surface.  How hard could it be?  Yet while none of the partners 
                                                 





had anything close to expertise—which made them all the more suspicious of being 
cheated—they were all businessmen keeping an eye on their investment.  They expected 
to approve all large-scale decisions from Boston.  And the preparations required to get 
the ironworks up and running were daunting:  construct a foundry and waterworks, secure 
housing for workers, supply a company store, arrange for workers to mine and smelt the 
iron ore, refine the ore, and then wrought the pig iron into sheets, bars, rods, and nails.  
Some of the supposed local advantages did not pan out.  The workers were mostly 
farmers who hired out during the off-season.  Because they were not as strapped by the 
embargo as the laborers in the port towns, they demanded wages higher than what the 
directors found reasonable.  Bradbury wondered that transporting Boston stone masons 
and mechanics to Vergennes might not be cheaper.  Worse, by August of 1808, the 
promised Daniel Johnson had still not arrived.  Bradbury located a foundryman by the 
name of Bates to build the furnace, a refiner by the name of Otis Pettee, and a few other 
experienced workmen, but the project was already much delayed.  In March 1809, the 
directors received more bad news:  the Embargo was ending, which promised an influx of 
cheaper, better quality iron.  But this was almost immaterial.  The investors had almost 
$200,000 sunk in the project with no product.324 
The War of 1812 was actually a boon to Monkton Ironworks.  The war created a 
new market for iron:  iron balls for the American artillery and iron to fasten together 
timbers for new American frigates.  Luckily for the Monkton directors, Thomas 
Macdonough set up his command in Vergennes.  Macdonough’s reasoning was in part 
because of the presence of the ironworks, in part for the same reasons that had attracted 
                                                 





the directors to Vergennes themselves:  access to shipping on the Hudson, roads to 
Boston, and the natural bounty of the river, waterfalls, and iron.325  Thomas H. Perkins 
entered negotiations with the American government to provide iron balls for shot at a 
price of $120 per ton.  Given that the iron only cost $25/ton to make, per Perkins’s 
estimate, this was no small profit.326  This profit, however, depended upon the exigencies 
of war.  
At the same time as the Perkinses interested themselves in Monkton, they also 
invested in other local development projects.  Their success in trade begot opportunities 
for investment:  speculators wanted the Perkinses involved in their projects, not simply 
for the capital they themselves brought to the table, but for the legitimacy their reputation 
brought and their business contacts.  At a time when merchants rather than banks 
provided seed capital, attracting leading capitalists helped to ensure a project’s success.  
Perkins & co. bought a one third interest in a marble quarry.327  In 1808 and 1809, they 
helped to organize the Lechmere Point Corporation in collaboration with fellow leading 
Boston Federalists such as Harrison Gray Otis, Ebenezer Francis, and Christopher Gore.  
The corporation owned land in East Cambridge with the intention to develop it—
including a toll road.328  And in October of 1809, Perkins Nichols’ brought Thomas H. 
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Perkins east to Northampton to an old lead mine that had closed in the wake of the 
Revolution.  Perkins and Nichols consulted a professor of chemistry from Yale, Benjamin 
Silliman, as well.  The project proved to be the inverse of Monkton:  hiring on twelve 
men, the Northampton Lead Mine sank a shaft fifty feet down—through granite, mind 
you—and immediately found a rich vein of 60% lead, together with silver, zinc, barite, 
and copper.  Perkin and Nichols sold shares to Samuel G. Perkins, to Isaac Davis, and to 
David Hinckley.329 
A final example of their wartime investing is that of the Newton Mills which, in 
1814, the Perkinses thought to transform into a textile mill.  The time was ripe:  the prices 
of cottons had trebled as war prevented cheap British textiles from reaching the American 
market.  And, best of all, Thomas H. Perkins owned land inherited from his father-in-law 
just downriver from Francis Cabot Lowell’s more famous industrial experiment at 
Waltham.  The Newton lands held several snuff mills, a grist mill, and a nail factory and 
access to the Upper Falls of the Charles River.  Half of the Newton properties belonged 
to Perkins, the other half to Simon Elliot, Jr.  Elliot, however, faced financial difficulties 
from poor investments.  The Perkins brothers offered to take Elliot’s share off his hands 
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for $20,000.  Perhaps luckily, before the Perkinses could transform the mills, the war 
ended.  British merchants flooded American ports with dirt cheap textiles—both to 
unload them and to deliberately do away with the budding American textile industry.330  
The Perkinses returned the Newton mills to tobacco and corn, at least until 1823, when 
the formed the Elliot Manufacturing Company. 
Yet, as Carl Prince and Seth Taylor have written, American capitalists’ 
investment in domestic industry and infrastructure during the upheaval of the French 
Wars did not end with the wars themselves.  By the time American merchants received 
funds from the spoliation claims arising out of wartime plunder, the better investment 
tended to be domestic industry.  Prince and Taylor suggest that the payout from Spanish 
spoliation claims beginning in 1820 coincided with the post-Panic of 1819 expansion of 
industry:  the Locks and Canals Company (1821), the Merrimack Manufacturing 
Company (1822), the Hamilton Manufacturing Company (1825), the Lowell 
Manufacturing Company (1828).  In 1831, a French Claims Commission developed out 
of a Franco-American treaty of that year that followed along the same lines as the 
previous Spanish commission.  For both Spanish and French claims, Daniel Webster 
served as lawyer to key Boston capitalists, including Thomas H. Perkins and those who 
made claims through Perkins.  Prince and Taylor qualify that their argument is not that 
the influx of spoliation funds “paid directly for the Boston Associates’ industrial 
expansion … or even that it motivated that expansion.” Still, they conclude that the 
timing is certainly suggestive.  “United States money arrived at the time that venture 
capital was being invested and that it must have been reassuring to replace capital 
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ventured with capital found.”331  Many of the Boston capitalists received funds not only 
from claims as merchants, but also from claims as investors in insurance companies such 
as the Boston Marine Insurance Company and the Massachusetts Fire and Marine.332 
 The investment examples listed above point to continuity between investment 
practices and strategies used in trade with those of early industrialization.  After the 
French Wars ended, the Perkins brothers continued to invest in industry, infrastructure, 
and financial institutions.  They were not industrialists, but capitalists.  But in this further 
extension of their investment interests, as in their trade, they frequently invested in 
groups of known principals. 
 
Conclusion 
  When Americans first arrived in Asian ports in the 1780s as Americans, many 
prospective trading partners mistook them for British nationals.  Few European 
merchants saw them as rivals.333  But the French Revolutionary Wars changed this.  By 
the time a lasting peace finally arrived in 1815, war itself had diminished the mercantile 
capacity of French and Dutch rivals.  The Spanish and Portuguese were fighting to hang 
on to their empires abroad.  America was a growing commercial power.   
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By 1815, James and Thomas H. Perkins were 54 and 51 respectively and had 
spent more than two decades of their commercial lives trading in the shadows of the 
French Revolutionary Wars.  They were fortunate to have entered trade at a particularly 
auspicious moment for American merchants.  But the brothers brought their own 
entrepreneurial energy to their enterprise as well.  This energy was evident in the breadth 
of markets they sought out during the wars, tapping “niche markets” from the Dutch East 
Indies to Spanish America, as well as in smuggling.  As the Perkins brothers recognized 
in a letter to Hope & Co. of Amsterdam, “such times require strong nerves and long 
purses.”334  As chapter six will discuss in greater detail, the repercussions of the 
American “free” trade, especially in niche markets and smuggling, proved far more 
influential than the brothers or their compatriots could have imagined.  
But their entrepreneurial energy was evident on another front as well.  The ability 
of the brothers to cultivate collaboration and even a sense of obligation from fellow 
merchants and clerks was critical to their expansion.  Paternalism served as a social glue 
that held individuals and firms together with a contingent loyalty.  One of the questions 
underlying this chapter was how this associationalism worked in practice.  What could it 
do?  The most obvious answer is that it reduced risks and diversified interests.  But more 
than this, it allowed for merchants to corner markets, as with Pacific furs and 
Mediterranean opium.  While not realized in lobbying against Jeffersonian commercial 
policy, the broader network also promised to shape policy.  
By the wars’ end, the Perkins brothers were ready to pass their place in the 
network off to their sons.  The next chapter examines the network from inside the Perkins 
                                                 





family, considering the reliance of the commercial network on internal familial and 
gendered dynamics.  While the chapter starts with the Perkinses own conceptualization of 
“family feeling,” to use the words of the era, it particularly focuses on how families 
negotiated commercial obligation, rebellions, and failures—especially the failure of 






CHAPTER 3.   
THAT FAMILY FEELING:   
AT HOME WITH HOMO ECONOMICUS 
 
“When he goes to apprentice and the notions of trade are scarce got into his head; 
for the first three or four years they are rather to be taught submission to family orders,  
subjection to their masters, and dutiful attendance to their shops or warehouses.” 
 
Daniel Defoe, The Complete English Tradesman (1724). 
 
“I can wish you no better lot … than to have a wife and children.  
If you are prosperous, there they are to share your prosperity;  
if otherwise, there they are to comfort you.” 
 
Washington Irving, The Wife (1820). 
 
 
The Perkinses were not just any family.  They were a rich, privileged family 
residing in New England’s political, economic, and cultural capital.  Members of the 
Perkins clan worked hard to cultivate a “family feeling” to use the words of the era, albeit 
some more than others.  Means as well as aims varied:  those with resources to do so 
settled family around them in a cluster of homes.  Others corralled relatives into family 
vacations at Nahant and Naushon.  The existence of family firms themselves provided a 
centralizing force.  While family had different meanings to different members, there is 
evidence that the generations shared a “family mind” akin to the intergenerational 
continuity that David F. Musto observed in the Adams family.335  According to one piece 
of family lore, the congregation of kin around Temple Place in Boston produced such an 
accordance of view that one son-in-law, Thomas Graves Cary, would jest at some discord 
with the outer world, “I dare say they are wrong; they do not live in Temple Place.”336   
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Cultivating a sense of family feeling did work for the maintenance and 
perpetuation of family firms.  But, more than this, familial subjectivities—the way family 
was experienced and imagined—were not always distinguishable from commercial 
goals.337  This chapter examines this intersection of commerce and kinship through a 
consideration of intergenerational expectations and experiences.  I examine strategies for 
the cultivation of obligation between the generations before turning to an analysis of 
succession, rebellion, and failure as parents and siblings attempted to mobilize obligation 
in their kin in service of both firm and family.  As I will show, the network was 
astoundingly capacious in terms of allowing for ineptitude, apathy, and outright rebellion.  
The interpersonal ties that structured the network itself protected against precisely these 
frailties, even to the detriment of the larger group.  Yet there were boundaries, namely, 
deceit.  Obligation itself was patently gendered, not simply in terms of the divergence of 
expectations as daughters and sons, but in the use of gender to exhort kin into 
compliance.  Strategies and values of gender and commerce were thus yoked together as 
manly duty and motherly care, for example, in ways that shaped how individuals 
imagined their behavior in the marketplace.338  Finally, I show that economic inequalities 
within the extended family played an important role in structuring opportunity and 
obligation.  I include kin who not only took up the mantle of family and firm, but also 
                                                 
337 As Nicola Beisel reminds us, “reducing moral concerns to economic factors, or treating 
concern about children as ‘symbolic’ rather than a ‘real’ issue, blinds us not only to a fundamental 
motivator of human action—love for one’s children—but leads us to misperceive the causes of a number of 
significant issues in both historical and contemporary political debate.”  Nicola Kay Beisel, Imperiled 
Innocents : Anthony Comstock and Family Reproduction in Victorian America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), 14. 
338 It is instructive to think here of the similarities as well as the differences between the Perkinses 
and the farmers discussed by Daniel Vickers in his discussion of meanings of competency and competition 
in preindustrial America.  Daniel Vickers, "Competency and Competition:  Economic Culture in Early 





those who failed within it, rebelled against it, or were rejected from it.  These areas of 
discord help us to understand the functioning of the network, the priorities of its leaders, 
as well as limits to those shibboleths of commercial networks:  trust, loyalty, and 
obligation.  
The social meanings of obligation are especially of interest for a kin group like 
the Perkinses given the expectation associated with family firms and collaborative 
enterprises.339  In many ways the Perkins brothers, especially Colonel Thomas Handasyd 
Perkins, resembled the archetypical “economic man.”  Colonel Perkins could not seem to 
pass a town or a stream without pausing to inspect the very rocks on the ground for some 
element of profit.  But as Barbara and Kenneth Tucker have pointed out, we need to 
consider how early American cultural norms may have constrained emphasis on 
individualism and self-interest as well as produced it.  To what extent was paternalism 
less a form of social control employed by the elite than a cultural demand placed on the 
elite?340  How were entrepreneurs as individuals constituted by social relationships, 
whether through family strategies for success, through marriage as a signifier of success, 
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or other?  How did commercial successes and failures buttress and even create family 
sentiments?  The Perkinses were one of the central commercial families of early national 
New England, one known for their use of kinship in structuring economic strategies.  As 
such, they provide a compelling case study for examining precisely this.   
In many ways, the story of intergenerational expectation for the Perkinses 
followed the classic narrative of the family firm:  success killed succession.  New 
entrepreneurs within the family invariably came from the ranks of poorer relations, 
daughters, and son-in-laws.  Yet viewed from the perspective of family, we have to ask 
whether patriarchs and matriarchs viewed the demise of the family firms as a failure, as 
having served their purpose, or something else entirely.  By 1838, when Perkins & Co. of 
Boston announced its closure, the firm slipped away without a fight.  The Perkins 
network continued but without the Perkins name.  While the family firms unquestionably 
aimed to profit the partners, producing family seems to have been more than a means for 
the business, but also an end.  Family facilitated business, but the more significant 




The Perkins family’s commercial network began at a moment when, to family 
historians, American family life was becoming less amenable to carrying the burdens of 
enterprise.341  The mid-eighteenth- to the mid-nineteenth-centuries marked the shift from 
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the “functional family” to the “sentimental family.”342  Where Americans depicted the 
seventeenth century family as a microcosm of society itself, by the nineteenth century 
Americans imagined home and hearth as a space apart from the harsh worlds of markets 
and politics.  The earlier household was a public institution:  families provided poor 
relief, cared for the sick and elderly, raised and educated children—or bound children out 
as laborers—and functioned as the core unit of economic production.  The latter 
household was a home:  a private realm shorn of those beyond the nuclear family and a 
space of psychic renewal.  Much of this new ideology of family relied upon new 
languages of sentiment and sensibility that flourished in the eighteenth century.343  By 
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1820, Washington Irving published a short story entitled “The Wife,” in which a proper 
wife was no longer the helpmeet of yesteryear, but a companion whose presence was a 
respite from the harsh vicissitudes of the countinghouse.  The responsibilities of Irving’s 
wife were clear:  to dust off her man and get him back into the market.344  In spite of the 
new ideals and at times in conjunction with them, even patently bourgeois families like 
the Perkinses continued to use the family as a form of social security and, more, as a 
vehicle for speculation and risk.   
For the Perkinses the household slimmed down over generations.  The process 
involved both reimagining and reshaping personal practices of household formation:  
idealizing the family as a domestic circle on the one hand, and excluding apprentices, 
clerks, and even fostered children from the bourgeois household on the other.  Individuals 
re-imagined family first, writing of the “pleasures” and “delights” of “domestic life,” and 
only gradually reconfigured who was included as part of the household.345  When Robert 
Bennet Forbes apprenticed with Perkins & Sons from 1816 to 1817, for example, he lived 
part of the year at the Boston home of his uncle Colonel Thomas H. Perkins with his 
family and summered with his cousin Barbara Perkins (daughter of Samuel G. Perkins) 
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and her husband, Walter Channing.346  By the time Ben’s younger brother John came 
under the Perkins’s employ in 1829, a rented room at a boardinghouse sufficed.  
Paternalist expectation changed in the interim—or at least in the paternalists in question.  
Perkins & Sons formed just as Bennet began his indenture.347  John apprenticed with 
Perkins & Sons, then managed by son-in-law Samuel Cabot.  John still attended Sunday 
night family dinners at Colonel Perkins’s home, but the older merchant was not as central 
a figure in John’s life as he was to Bennet.348   
The household’s structural change can easily be overstated.  Even as apprentices 
and clerks found new accommodations, the Perkinses continued to care for children of 
kith and kin either whose families could not afford to care for them or who attended a 
school nearby.349  For example, Margaret Forbes, older sister to Bennet and John Forbes, 
went to live with James Perkins, Sr. and his wife Sarah as a young girl.  By fostering Peg, 
Sarah and James Perkins helped the Forbes household to consolidate their resources.  
While it is difficult to discern the precise nature of Peg’s relationship with her aunt and 
uncle, the language between them evoked the sentimental expectations of nurturing, 
affective ties.  In her will, Aunt Sarah referred to her as her “dear niece and adopted 
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daughter, Margaret Perkins Forbes.”350  While Margaret was not included in the trust 
Aunt Sarah set up for her grandchildren, she did leave her niece a considerable legacy of 
$1000, a pianoforte, and clothing.  It is hard to imagine Peg was not expected to 
contribute to the household, but it does not seem to have been on par with an 
apprenticeship.351  Visits between the Perkins and Forbes households indicate a 
considerable degree of lassitude in Peg’s experience.  While many young women fostered 
out in the early nineteenth century worked as virtual or actual servants and had very little 
freedom of mobility, this was not the case for Peg.  There are a number of other ways the 
Perkinses may have imagined the relationship.  A fire at the residence of James and Sarah 
scarred poor Margaret as a girl, thus rendering her all the more vulnerable; the couple 
may have felt responsible for the young girl’s care.  Or Aunt Sarah and her husband 
James may have felt raising Margaret eased the pain of losing first one, then another 
daughter.352  Or the couple may have simply opened their home and hearts to the 
daughter of one of their less fortunate siblings.   
The itinerancy of unwed daughters itself points to the continued permeability of 
households.  Unwed women, generally, were expected to earn their keep in other people’s 
households.  Sally Perkins, for example, shuttled between the households of her sisters 
Eliza Cabot, Mary Ann Cary, Caroline Gardiner, and Nancy Cary to help them care for 
their children.  Letters between the sisters negotiated who they proposed Sally stay with 
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based on who they felt needed her most and who had alternate resources—i.e., spinster 
sister-in-laws.353  Visiting customs themselves allowed for a variety of household 
strategies.  Jenny Trumbull visited with Sarah Paine Perkins and the Forbes sisters on 
several occasions, much to her mother’s relief.  Jenny’s grandmother was Sarah Perkins’s 
sister.  As Jenny’s father flitted from one unsuccessful small venture to another, Jenny’s 
lengthy visits with her great aunt Sarah both offered the girl a learning experience and 
lessened the financial burden for her family.354  The household was changing, but 
gradually.   
More significant were changes to how the Perkinses imagined family and thus 
managed familial expectations.  Jan Lewis suggests the profundity of the shifts taking 
place.  In the nineteenth century, the notion of family as a space of comfort and refuge 
from the ravages of politics was such a common trope that by the century’s end, it had 
become hard to imagine otherwise.  Lewis quips:  “We need think only of Shakespeare’s 
families—the warring Montagues and Capulets, the conflict-ridden Lears, the scheming 
Macbeths—to realize how remarkable, how revolutionary was the notion that a family 
might be a source of any pleasure at all, let along the source of everything 
pleasurable.”355  Just as Thomas Jefferson wrote to his daughter “I pant for that society 
where all is peace and harmony,” so Thomas H. Perkins wrote to his wife in 1812 that he 
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“pant[ed] for the delight of domestic life.”356  As with politics, Americans contrasted the 
mayhem of the marketplace to the security and comfort of home.  Home life was not 
apart from economic aspiration, but increasingly envisaged as its culmination. 
Americans of the early republic imagined society as circles of connection, be it 
social circles or family circles.  “Give my love to all your circle” was a common closing 
to familiar letters.357  Family entrepreneurs reproduced these circles physically as well as 
socially.  The Perkinses lived together and they vacationed together.  They socialized and 
schooled together, worked together, and—as family plots at Mount Auburn cemetery 
testify—they were buried together.  While the Perkinses like any family had their share 
of discontents, rumblings, and rebels, they also had considerable resources for fostering 
family feeling.  They lived within a Boston society that prized both the household and 
family as sources of order.  Many of the same efforts that went into fostering family also 
produced family firms, but this is not to say that the values for both were symbiotic.  As 
parents discovered time and again, reconciling the cultivation of manners and taste rooted 
in class aspiration with the capacity for independence and sacrifice was no easy matter.358      
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Living close to one another was a significant mode of fostering togetherness.  
According to Lucy Paton, clustering family dwellings together was “the Boston way.”359  
Thus, for example, when Colonel Perkins bought his Temple Place estate in 1833, he also 
purchased the two adjoining lots to settle his daughters and their families.  Thus, by 1851, 
still in residence at “the Court” (as Temple Place was called) were the families of Samuel 
and Eliza Perkins Cabot at 9 Temple Place, Thomas G. and Mary Ann Perkins Cary at 10 
Temple Place, William H. and Caroline Perkins Gardiner at 11 Temple Place, alongside 
the Colonel and his wife at 12 Temple Place.360  In 1843, Colonel Perkins similarly 
offered a plot of land in Brookline to his son, Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. and his family.  
There was one condition:  his son had to build on the land and live there.  His son elected 
to accept the offer, and thereby joined the family’s country settlement in Brookline:  his 
parents’ estate on Warren Street, his “uncle and aunt James’s” estate at Jamaica Pond, 
known fondly as Pine Bank, “uncle and aunt Sam’s” estate between the two, as well as 
the residences of several cousins (Stephen, Edward, and Charles), all of whom lived 
within a mile of the property.361   
While agricultural families lived in joined plots to consolidate land and thereby 
keep estates viable as family size outstripped acreage, for mercantile families there was 
no longer an economic basis for the strategy.  Motives varied.  Parents with the resources 
to do so used proximity and property ownership to maintain influence over the next 
generation.  Some family leaders desired the psychic benefit of shared emotional bonds, 
while others aimed to promote the lineage’s identity, which could itself advance an 
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individual’s longevity through history and memory.  As Eliza Cabot reminisced, her kin 
and neighbors were her childhood chums.  Together they put on plays and assembled 
museums and ran wild in Boston Common.362  Some families kept kin close, especially 
daughters, in order to care for aging parents or to share family work.  Living near kin was 
especially useful for women in managing households, even those able to hire help.  And 
still other family members supported kin who might not be able to support themselves.  
Clustered dwellings provided a physical manifestation of family togetherness that that 
could foster “family feeling” and shared values.  They also provided the means for a 
shared public face.    
Moving house was often associated with a change in means.  The upward 
mobility of Thomas Handasyde Peck and his wife was evident in their change of 
addresses.  The couple moved from Mackerel Lane just off King Street to Merchants’ 
Row in 1751, and from there to a building on King Street just doors down from the 
Customs House.363  King Street—renamed State Street after the Revolution—cut through 
the heart of Boston down to Long Wharf (see image below).  The aptly named Long 
Wharf was built in 1710.  At one-third of a mile, it allowed even the largest eighteenth 
century vessels to transfer cargoes directly into the shops and warehouses that lined the 
pier (see image below:  Long Wharf is clearly visible).  Peck and his family never moved 
far from this artery of Boston’s maritime life.  But as his fortunes improved, the Pecks 
ensured their residence provided a daily reminder of their success.   
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IMAGE 2.  A view of the Town of Boston in New England and British ships of war 
landing their troops, 1768 (1898, based on 1768 engraving by Paul Revere).  Source:  
Boston Public Library.  This image is in the public domain in the United States.   
 
   
Until her death in 1807, most of Elizabeth Peck Perkins’s offspring lived within 
close proximity to their mother.  Elizabeth herself lived in a West Indian style home on 
Purchase Street, above Sears Wharf.  From the grand piazza that skirted the residence, 
visitors could gaze down upon a large garden of vegetables and flowers or up at the 
seascape vista of Boston’s harbor.  In 1796, Elizabeth still lived with her two unmarried 
daughters, Mary and Margaret, and her one servant, a Scottish woman.364  Her daughter 
Esther had just moved to Charleston, South Carolina with her new husband, Josiah 
Sturgis, but most of the siblings lived within a stone’s throw of the harbor in the “Old 
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South End.”  Her eldest daughter Elizabeth Sturgis lived down the street at a house on 
Atkinson Street with her family, with husband Russell’s storefront on the other side of 
State Street on Merchant’s Row.  Both James and Samuel Perkins had recently moved 
with their families into houses in Charles Bulfinch’s famed Franklin Place experiment, 
numbers three and seven respectively.365  Colonel Perkins and his family resided at 
Federal Street, on just the other side of Atkinson.  The proximity may well have had more 
to do with intimate Boston than strategic intervention by Elizabeth.  Even as Boston’s 
merchants and mariners expanded their interests in global commerce, the population 
increased gradually in the eighteenth century:  between 1743 and 1800, the figure only 
rose from 16,382 to 24,937.366  While the city’s neighborhoods were far more mixed than 
they would be by mid-century, many of Boston’s well-to-do mercantile families already 
congregated in the South End.  Still, as her granddaughter intimated, Elizabeth was a 
powerful figure in the family, a matriarch in deed as well as position.  It is easy to believe 
that her children would have aimed to live within easy visiting distance.367  Elizabeth was 
fortunate that her children had done well enough that they had all settled back in 
Boston—many parents were not so lucky. 
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MAP 3.  Boston, 1796.  Carleton Osgood, Boston (John West, Publisher:  1796).   
Source:  Boston Public Library.  This image is in the public domain in the United States.  
This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first 
publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923.   
 
For individuals who had no real reasons to move besides growing families and 
personal aspiration, the Perkinses moved at an astoundingly frequent rate.  Thomas 
Handasyd Perkins, moved six times in the decades following his marriage to Sally Elliot, 





testament to his upward mobility.  He and Sally began in a rented house on Summer 
Street on the corner of Chauncy Place in 1788, but soon moved to a home they bought 
from two elderly ladies on Purchase Street.  The latter house may have been larger with 
an ocean view, but it was just down the street from his mother—which may not have 
been a benefit in Sally Perkins’s mind.  By 1796, a mere three years later, the family 
rented a house on Federal Street.  The fact that this move brought them closer to the 
Elliots hints that the move may have been instigated by Sally.  In their eldest daughter’s 
fond recollections, her mother and grandmother were close; it seemed as if they lived in 
Grandmother Elliot’s kitchen.368  Nonetheless, the Federal Street house was a refined 
three-story structure with elegant furnishings of mahogany, bronze, and red Moroccan 
leather.  In 1799, Colonel Perkins moved his family to a three-story brick mansion on 
Pearl Street.  By 1810, the family of Colonel Perkins resided at 17 Pearl Street while that 
of James Perkins dwelled at house number 13 (see image below).  At the turn of the 
century, Pearl Street (the erstwhile Atkinson Street) was still relatively open.  Most lots, 
like the one purchased by Perkins, had sizeable gardens and stables.  The neighborhood 
could be what the Perkinses made of it. 
Thomas H. Perkins and his family were doing well for themselves and their 
homes largely reflected these social and sumptuary ambitions—or at least his.  By Eliza’s 
account, Colonel Perkins and not his wife Sally oversaw the decoration of much of their 
homes.  He desired to be fashionable, to keep up with the Otises, while his wife preferred 
the comfort of the nursery.369  During his 1795 European travels, Colonel Perkins secured 
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a sizeable selection of furniture and ornamentation that one suspects came to decorate his 
home and potentially those of family and friends.  The purchases included gaming tables, 
lingerie cabinets, and iron beds with feather mattresses.  Perkins decorated the Federal 
Street house with fine Sevres porcelain and gilded ormolu candlesticks to a Chinese-style 
folding screen and an elaborate collection of maps, books, toys, telescopes to engravings 
of the Italian countryside.370  Perkins’s ideas for the Pearl Street mansion were even more 
elaborate.  His daughter Eliza recalled its rich oak-paneled walls and a white marble 
mantelpiece shot through with handsome streaks of purple.  Perkins’s account books 
reveal a man with money to spend.  Considerable sums went into his home:  he had fresh 
water piped in from Jamaica Pond, running baths, sinks, and bidets, and a water closet 
imported from England.371  He even purchased a refrigerator.  The Perkins mansions 
brought together West Indian, Chinese, and European styles in a medley of cosmopolitan 
styles. 
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IMAGE 3.  James Perkins’s Residence at 13 Pearl Street.   
Source: Boston Athenaeum, The Athenaeum Centenary (Boston, the Boston Athenaeum:  
1907).   
 
On a par with the residences themselves, the gardens on the Perkins estates 
proclaimed the family’s aspirations.  Tamara Thornton argues that by the first decade of 
the nineteenth century, the horticultural ambitions of the “gentlemen farmers” of 
Boston’s elite far oustripped the republican ideals.  Horticulture had long been a passion 
for many of these men, and the lands, as much as if not more than the residences 
themselves, signified a very specific set of ideas about class, stewardship, and 
civilization.372  Men like Colonel Perkins emulated the landscaped gardens and elaborate 
greenhouses on display in Europe.  The Perkins gardens and orchards were known for 
their beauty and the incredible diversity of species on display.  The brothers 
experimented with plants and livestock that they found in their travels, often asking 
                                                 






agents abroad to send them samples to try in their gardens.  Thus, Samuel G. Perkins 
introduced the Golden Nectarine, the French Duchesse d’Angouleme pear, and the 
Franconia raspberry to the United States.373  John Perkins Cushing’s Belmont estate 
contained Asian plants and livestock varieties that drew visitors from far and wide (that 
and the elaborate estate itself, the porcelain said to line the walls, and the Chinese 
servants).  It is little wonder that the esteemed horticulturalist and historian, A.J. 
Downing, featured the estates of these families in his treatises on landscape gardening.374  
And these home and gardens served as landmarks:  by the 1830s, locals and tourists alike 
could visit Perkins properties at certain times of the year.  Concierges at select Boston 
hotels could direct their guests to visit the Perkins (and other) homes to view their 
landscapes and private art collections.375   
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IMAGE 4.  John Perkins Cushing’s Estate at Belmont. 
Source:  Andrew Jackson Downing, A Treatise on the Theory and Practice of Landscape 
Gardening (New York: George P. Putnam, 1852), p. 54. 
 
 Downward mobility also spurred changes in residence.  Just as wealthier kin 
might facilitate the movement to a choice residence, so the same safety net could aim to 
prevent the loss of a home.  But this did not always work.  In 1806, Stephen Higginson, 
Jr. moved with his family to the increasingly fashionable neighborhood of Beacon Hill.  
Charles Bulfinch himself designed the residence along with much of the area.  The 
building represented Higginson’s success in his mercantile partnership with his brother 
Henry.  The mansion stood four stories high with seventeen rooms, two staircases, a 
carriage house, and a driveway.  Stephen had just married the enchanting Louisa Storrow, 
his second wife, and must have felt on top of the world.  Yet by 1809, just a few short 
years after the Higginsons moved into their new home, Jefferson’s Embargo reduced 
Higginson’s fortune so that the family could no longer afford the opulent residence.  





Samuel G. Perkins purchased the mansion for the considerable sum of $36,000.  They 
rented the house back to Stephen, thus transferring capital to the young family while 
allowing them to remain in their Beacon Hill home.  By 1815, financial strains cut too 
deep.  The Higginsons auctioned off much of their furnishings, from bureaus and 
bookcases to chinaware, glassware, and large busts of Alexander Hamilton and George 
Washington.  As Louisa Storrow Higginson lamented in her diary, “On Saturday the 8th 
of April 1815, we left our home, endeared to us by a long and happy residence and by the 
society of dear and kind friends.”376 
Sometimes, however, the neighborhood changed around the homes.  James and 
Thomas Perkins both gave their Pearl Street homes away to prominent Boston 
institutions:  James gave his house at 13 Pearl Street to the Boston Athenaeum shortly 
before he died in 1822, and in 1833, Thomas gave his residence at 17 Pearl Street to the 
school for the blind.  While generous, Colonel Perkins’s donation and subsequent move 
may also have been motivated by the changes to the neighborhood.  By the 1830s, 
warehouses and railroad terminuses encroached into an area known for its grassy slopes 
and private estates.  According to Edward Pessen, Colonel Perkins’s decision to move 
sparked a mass exodus of wealthier residents to Beacon Hill, but his own decision was 
surely sparked by the same concerns that led others to follow him out of the 
neighborhood.  No one wanted to be the last to leave.377  In April of 1833, the idea of a 
                                                 
376 Louisa Storrow’s diary, quoted in Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays, 10.  Elton W. Hall, The 
Colonial Society's House:  87 Mount Vernon Street, Boston ([cited); available from 
http://www.colonialsociety.org/87.pdf, William P. Mason, "Adrian Cremer V. Stephen Higginson and 
Samuel G. Perkins," in Report of cases argued and determined in the Circuit Court of the United States for 
the First Circuit, Verdict for the defendants. (Boston: Hillard, Gray, and Company, 1817)  
377 Edward Pessen, Riches, Class, and Power before the Civil War (Lexington, Mass.,: D. C. 





donation suggested itself.  Elizabeth and Sophia Peabody organized two Blind Fairs in 
Salem and Boston to raise funds for Samuel Gridley Howe’s experimental school for the 
blind.  The fairs auctioned off women’s handicrafts, offered wine at a dollar a glass, and a 
handful of ladies mingled among the crowds with silk purses for spontaneous donations.  
Colonel Perkins promised the Peabody sisters that if they could raise $50,000, he would 
donate his estate to house a new school.378          
Another particularly elaborate example of the physical rendition of the family 
circle was John and Sarah Forbes’s efforts to settle a community of family and friends in 
Milton, just south of Boston.379  When Bennet Forbes first retired in 1834 (he retired 
several times), he used a sizeable chunk of his earnings to construct a home for his 
mother and sisters in Milton.  John and Sarah solicited kin as well as families they hoped 
would provide a positive influence for their children to create their own neighborhood 
settlement in Milton.  Their desires were explicit: John Murray Forbes’s success in 
business had left him something of the family patriarch, even though he was the third 
youngest.  Living together allowed the Forbeses to both ensure the well-being of kin as 
well as to provide a nurturing community for the next generation.380  The hardships of 
their own childhoods fostered a considerable “family feeling” in both John and Sarah 
Forbes—for him financial, for her emotional, growing up as an orphan with her twin 
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sister.  Not everyone the couple approached moved to Milton—New York cousins Paul 
Sieman Forbes and Josephine Forbes never joined them, despite appeals—but they 
proved remarkably successful in creating their desired community. 
Rituals such as family meals and shared holidays within these homes created a 
sense of family, even as they highlighted authority structures.  To clerks and kin alike, 
Sunday dinners at Colonel Perkins’s house manifested the joined patriarchy of family and 
firm around the dinner table.  And given that, according to one daughter, children usually 
ate in the nursery, the ability to dine with the adults in the family must have been a 
marker of maturity.381  In 1852 the Perkinses of Temple Place celebrated what Emma 
Forbes Cary referred to as “the last Thanksgiving.”  Grandfather and grandmother—
Colonel Thomas Handasyd Perkins and his wife Sallie—presided over the Thanksgiving 
meal, just as they presided over a network of kinship, influence, trade, and investment.  
Four generations gathered around a great table that stretched across two large parlors, 
from the end of one room to the end of the other.  “How the tables groaned under the 
production of Hannah Allen’s genius, who was surely a high priestess in the culinary art,” 
Emma mused.  When great grandchild Patty Cabot was lifted to the table and toddled 
“about among the nuts and raisins, looking not much taller than one of the decanters,” the 
vigor and fertility of the family line was on display.382  Events like this fostered a sense of 
kinship even as they purported to simply reflect it. 
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Vacationing together also served the direct function of enjoying (or not) company 
while affirming a long-term sense of kinship.  Many of the aspects of Boston residences 
were equally true of “country residences” in Brookline:  clustered plots of land, shared 
experiences, and concern for both appearance and comfort in construction.  By the 1790s, 
as summer heated Boston’s brick façade to intolerable levels, those who could afford to 
do so escaped to Brookline or Nahant.  Back-to-back yellow fever scares in Boston in 
1798 and 1799 fueled a rush on land in “the country.”  George Cabot, Stephen Higginson, 
Jonathan Mason, and the Perkins brothers all purchased lots in Brookline as refuges for 
their families.  While the desire for country manors can be tied to class interests, the fear 
of pestilence in the city was very real.383  Thomas and Sally Perkins lost their daughter 
Ann in February 1799 to the fever, and quickly packed the family off to brother James’s 
Roxbury farm until the disease dissipated from Boston’s city center.384  Few Americans, 
of course, could simply buy a patch of land in an attempt to outrun yellow fever, much 
less the 61 acres purchased in Brookline by Colonel Perkins in 1799.    
The letters between the Perkins sisters, urging one another out to the seashore at 
Nahant, give a sense of a community of women gathered about the beach, the piano, and 
the parlor.385  In rituals of sociability such as holidays, visiting, shared vacations, and 
correspondence, the extended family affirmed their connection and participation as 
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family and friends.386  Visitors came and went, but the core vacationers appear to have 
been the women and children.  Perhaps this should not be surprising given the emphasis 
scholars have placed on women in creating what Micaela di Leonardo termed “the female 
world of cards and holidays.”387  But summer vacationing and visiting were an important 
part of social exchange and affirmation, for family circles and broader social circles.  The 
descendents of John Murray Forbes continue to promote a sense of connection through 
summer vacations at the shared family island of Naushon.  It became (and still is) central 
to their ability to maintain a sense of family identity over generations.388 
Perkins patriarchs and matriarchs cultivated values that scholars have described as 
archetypical for Boston’s “Brahmins,” “elites,” “conservatives,” the “Federalist (Whig) 
aristocracy,” and “proper Bostonians.”389  Colonel Perkins above all viewed society as a 
space of hierarchy, with civic-mindedness, charity, and leadership from the wealthy and 
deference from the rest of the community.  But as Harlow Sheidley argues, there was a 
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fundamental tension within the Bostonian elite between the ideal of a stable social order 
rooted in a natural aristocracy and the anxieties attendant with achieving and maintaining 
social status.  Sheidley writes that this tension led to an “oppressive demand for political 
and personal conformity.”390  To be sure, to say that the Perkinses may have had a 
“family mind” akin to the Adams family is not to see the extended family or even 
individual households as a homogenous unit, but to see an effort to produce togetherness, 
legacy, and a level of shared norms and values.  Even in the realm of norms and values, 
however, hierarchies within family and business life shaped possibilities.  In the overlap 
between hierarchies of firms and families, different individuals within the core of the 
network had different access to resources and were better able to set the terms of family 
life.   
Faith and religious understanding could also provide an important foundation for 
family feeling.  Yet with a few significant exceptions, discussions or even mentions of 
religious principles in family letters were surprisingly scarce.  Mary Abbot, one of the 
younger daughters of Elizabeth Peck Perkins, wrote loving epistles to her nieces and 
nephews, as did Emma Forbes.  These letters meant a lot, especially for those traveling 
abroad.391  At least two wives sent their husbands copies of sermons in the 1830s, albeit 
to different effect.  For Robert Bennet Forbes and his wife Rose, exchanging sermon 
notes was a form of communion; for John Murray Forbes and his wife Sarah, it was not.  
John thanked Sarah for sending him Orville Dewey’s sermons, a Unitarian from New 
Bedford, noting that the sermons appealed to him in that they were “marked by manly 
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independence and system and vigor” (and thus implied most were not).  But he put it to 
Sarah to “rouse” him to “active religion” and make him “really virtuous.”392   
Sometimes religious feeling appeared when least expected.  Frederick Paine, in a 
letter to his cousin (later wife) Nancy Sturgis, expressed his shock that she was not a 
Unitarian.  He knew he had a reputation amongst their friends as being no better than an 
infidel because he did not attend church, “but I assure you I would not marry the fabled 
goddess of love unless she would bow down to the one Eternal.”  He could not 
countenance that she would follow a doctrine that ascribed such human characteristics to 
the deity as revenge and hatred.    
“Nancy I solemnly assure you that neither in health nor in sickness, in 
danger or in serenity have I since my remembrance ever closed my eyes at 
night without addressing myself to the care of our Heavenly Father …  I 
hope we may be a mutual support to each other and that when we sleep at 
the close of life it will only be to awake to live together thro’ all ages.393 
 
As the example of Paine and Sturgis shows, many but not all of the extended Perkins 
kinship circle followed William Ellery Channing to become Unitarians early in the 
nineteenth century.394  Yet while religious discussions and attending meeting provided 
sites of sociability, mentions of these appeared within letters largely in passing.395   
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 A faith that struck closer to home was Federalism.  Even as the political party 
itself dissipated, Federalist feelings burned in the breasts of newly minted Whigs.  James 
Handasyd Perkins, son to Samuel G. Perkins and Barbara Higginson, wrote that “Aunt 
Esther,” his nurse, raised him with stories of hellfire and the devil himself:  Thomas 
Jefferson.  She would reenact battles from the Napoleonic Wars on her sewing table.396  
Such tutelage would have received wide approval within the family.  The lone 
(Jeffersonian) Republican of the second generation was Russell Sturgis, Sr.  Colonel 
Perkins served as a public figure for Boston Federalists.  References to Perkins as the 
“merchant prince” connoted more than his wealth, but also civic leadership.397   
The fundamental tenets of political creeds became most apparent in domestic 
conflicts.  Two daughters discovered that slavery was a sore subject in Perkins and 
Sturgis households when they faced rebukes from their respective fathers.  For Eliza 
Perkins in about 1808, there is a sense that her father felt sensitive about his own role in 
slave trading in the West Indies. He thus brooked no criticism of the slave trade within 
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his household.398  For Carrie Sturgis, her father’s 1847 censure came less for the issue of 
slavery itself, but from his daughter’s experimentation with abolitionism.  William 
Sturgis suggested abolitionists were a dangerous crowd inappropriate for his daughter.399  
In both cases, fathers dealt with children growing up in a time in which morals changed 
around them—an early nineteenth century generation gap.   
The effort the Perkinses put into creating a “family feeling” indicates that kinship 
was not something that they took for granted.  Economic dependence created its own 
sense of obligation and authority, but the relationships between kinship, firms, and 
market values were more complex than simply considering economic relationships 
allows.  Duncan Yaggy once wrote about this very network that the challenge of writing 
about individuals as a network was that, at the end of the day, the network consisted of 
relationships.  Messy, idiosyncratic relationships.  But examining these relationships 
reveals that commercial leaders were just as enmeshed in social aspirations and family 
foibles as were other families of the era.400 
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Family Values:  Obligation and Its Discontents 
Children raised in commercial households received early inculcation into values 
and skills of a trading life.  To a number of scholars writing recently on literacy and 
epistolary traditions, a transatlantic middle class stood at the center of the expansion of a 
prolific print culture and communications infrastructure built on letter writing in the 
eighteenth century.  Trade was an important part of this expansion.401  The aspiring 
“middling interest” used correspondence as a means of representing self and proclaiming 
social stature in a world made uncertain by physical and social mobility.402  Letter writing 
manuals proliferated in the eighteenth century, in Great Britain and the United States.  
But such training also transpired within family correspondence.403  From a young age, 
parents encouraged daughters and sons to participate in their own correspondence to 
family and friends.404  Many of Eliza Cabot’s letters to her sister, Mary Ann Cary, 
included the childish scrawl of notes from her offspring.  This provided early training 
into both penmanship and a variety of epistolary traditions that helped mark the Perkins 
offspring as the children of a cosmopolitan bourgeoisie.  Epistolary self-making was one 
of many forms of cultural capital parents hoped to pass on to their children. 
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As boys and girls matured, their education and even their play began to diverge.  
Commerce was more than an arena of formal training, it was a subject of play.  Sons 
received encouragement to maintain play account books to track how they spent their 
allowance.  They even engaged in their own speculations.  John Murray Forbes, for 
example, used his allowance to purchase Chinese toys and trinkets from his older brother 
Tom.  He sold the items to his classmates and then reinvested his profits into more 
goods—a schoolyard entrepreneur.  Early speculations often came under the watchful eye 
of an older mentor, especially as a youth worked his way up the ranks from apprentice to 
independent merchant.  Accounting primers and advice books detailed how to be a clerk 
and merchant, but for Perkins sons and cousins, family provided an early training ground 
for both commerce and class polish.405   
Eliza Perkins Cabot describes no such experiences within her own childhood.  
Instead, in her memoir, she and her cousins read as hoydens turned young ladies:  they 
sledded and tussled with the best of their neighbors as girls and morphed into virtuous 
young ladies with their hair piled high within the matter of a few pages.406  In one happy 
memory, Eliza gathered with cousins Elizabeth Elliot, Ann and Mary Magee, and friend 
Eliza Otis to stage Hannah More’s “The Search after Happiness:  a Pastoral Drama for 
Young Ladies.”  The Bristol-born Hannah More wrote “The Search for Happiness” as an 
alternative to the morality of the usual reading material for the impressionable young 
ladies in her schoolroom.  In this first publishing venture, printed in England in 1762, 
More’s future career as a conservative tract writer on domestic ideology was already 
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visible.  Four young shepherdesses seek the meaning of happiness.  Urania, an “ancient 
shepherdess,” instructs them as follows:   
Let the proud sex possess their vaunted powers;  
Be other triumphs, other glories, ours!   
The gentler charms which wait on female life,  
Which grace the daughter and adorn the wife.407   
 
More’s ideas in many ways resonated with later American proponents of women’s 
special moral calling like Catherine Beecher and Sarah Hale.  As Catherine Hall and 
Leonore Davidoff note, between the late 1780s and 1830s, Hannah More stood as one of 
Britain’s most popular authors and as a leading advocate of domesticity.408  Yet clearly 
More was already influential to at least some American women by the first decade of the 
nineteenth century.  
Within the extended family, few markers cut as wide a swathe as gender.  Male 
cousins might enter a family firm by the pen or by sea.  They might sail as a merchant or 
a mariner.  But chances were, their future was in commerce.  Commerce was the family 
business.  Thus, for example, Nancy Sturgis implored her cousin George Washington 
Sturgis for details on “all the rude dangers in crossing the ocean.”  The grass appeared 
greener to Nancy, who grew up with stories of exotic adventures from her father and 
uncles, her brothers and cousins.  George obligingly wrote of his experiences in Chile 
where he saw enough “novelty”—music and cockfighting, fireworks and fandangos—to 
“amaze a raw yankee lad like myself.”  He promised his next letter would regale her with 
“a specimen of Owyhee [Hawai’i] dancing and singing, after the manner of the princess 
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royal which I think would astonish the fair ladies of Boston not a little.”  But the grass 
was also greener to George.  As the letter continued, a note of melancholy crept into the 
droll narration:   
You talk with a provoking degree of coolness of matrimony, the pleasures 
of domestic life &c. &c. without once reflecting that I am probably to be 
immured on this foreign prison some four or five years, or if I return 
home, that I am as poor as Job’s cat and shall be obliged to decamp again 
immediately . . . I should like to take a peek in upon you, about these 
times, seated by a large fire with a bevy of fair cousins and perhaps a 
friend or two….409    
  
Nancy and George grew up in the same circle of families, within commercial households, 
but with expectations that split on gender lines.  Yet, more than simply a divergence of 
expectation, individuals within the family exhorted individuals to comply with familial 
expectations on gendered lines.  These exhortations facilitated the commercial network in 
significant ways. 
Domesticity as Cultural Capital 
In The Complete English Tradesman, originally published in 1726, Daniel Defoe 
dedicated an entire chapter to the importance of wives becoming acquainted with their 
husbands’ trade.  He chastised “gay, delicate ladies,” married to tradesmen and 
merchants, who perceived themselves as gentlewomen.  Defoe urged wives and husbands 
alike to consider the consequences of a wife’s ignorance:  wives forced to marry 
apprentices in order to not become beggars, children’s inheritances squandered away 
from this lack of preparation.  The onus was on the ladies.  “Pride,” he wrote, “is, indeed, 
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the great misfortune of tradesmen’s wives.”410  By 1839, however, when The Complete 
English Tradesman was republished, the later editor felt the need to add a historical 
footnote the chapter:  “Most of the wives of tradesmen above a certain rather humble 
condition would now smile at the idea of their being expected to attend their husbands’ 
shops.”  Defoe, the editor condescended, lived in simpler times.   
[I]n the days of Defoe, when the capitals of tradesmen were less, when 
provision for widows by insurance upon lives was not practised, and when 
the comparative simplicity of the modes of conducting business admitted 
it, a female in that situation would only be exercising a prudent caution, 
and doing nothing in the least inconsistent with the delicacy of her sex, in 
obeying the rules laid down in the text.411 
 
By 1839, the editor implied, new institutions allowed for greater security following a 
breadwinner’s death, but, in addition, business was more complicated  so that it was 
impossible for women to participate so fully in a husband’s enterprises.  Where to Defoe 
the lack of involvement in a husband’s business was a choice made out of class-based 
pretension, to the later editor it was a strategy based on woman’s capacity.  In between 
these two assumptions, however, lies a world of difference.412   
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 By the late eighteenth century, educating daughters of the commercial classes into 
music, art, literature, history, and needlepoint seemed a more prudent investment than 
ensuring daughters could read account books for the Perkinses.413  Family matriarchs such 
as Elizabeth Peck Perkins and Dorothy Murray Forbes were both able to take over family 
finances and businesses after the deaths of their respective husbands.  Forbes received 
formal training in accounting; if Perkins did not receive such training, she was at least 
familiar enough with the mechanisms of trade and accounting at the time of her husband’s 
death that she was able to continue—and expand—the family business.  Indeed, Anne 
Boylan suggests that it was Perkins’s business prowess that led the Boston Female Asylum 
to place its funds into stocks and to operate off of the income.414  But by the next 
generation, not a single woman received similar preparation.  For Perkins, two of her 
daughters faced overwhelming challenges as their husbands either deserted or became too 
ill to provide for them.  One reading of this parenting decision is that Elizabeth, by 
undervaluing skills she herself had, left her daughters vulnerable to economic hardship.  
But Elizabeth made provisions for her daughters that she may have considered more 
practical.   
                                                                                                                                                 
understanding within the United States and Great Britain.  How much did the Revolution and subsequent 
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O'Connor, The Ties That Buy : Women and Commerce in Revolutionary America.  See also the special 
forum on women’s economies in North America before 1820 in the Fall 2006 Early American Studies as 
well as the special section on gender and business in the September 1998 The Business History Review. 
414 Anne M. Boylan, The Origins of Women's Activism : New York and Boston, 1797-1840 (Chapel 





In the 1750s, Dorothy Murray (Forbes) received formal training in accounting with 
her father’s encouragement.  Dorothy was mother to Ralph Bennet Forbes, and 
grandmother to the Forbes men who traded through the auspices of the Perkins network.  
While Dorothy had no daughters, the available records offer rare insight into her 
upbringing and her parents’ objectives for her education.  In the mid-eighteenth century, 
Dorothy’s father James was a North Carolina merchant and plantation owner with strong 
transatlantic ties.415  Young Dolly, however, was raised in Boston by her aunt, Elizabeth 
Murray.  Like her other siblings, Elizabeth Murray followed her brother James from 
Scotland to London to North Carolina.  But Elizabeth pitched a plan to her brothers that 
would allow her independence and a life in the port town of Boston:  she proposed to open 
a millinery shop.  With letters of introduction and credit from her brothers to London 
merchants, she did precisely that.  According to biographer Patricia Cleary, Elizabeth’s 
brothers were supportive but skeptical of their sister’s prospects for success.  They 
repeatedly wrote to her, urging her to move closer and to take a place in their households in 
North Carolina and England respectively.416  But Elizabeth had a flair for business and her 
success was the envy of many of the men of her acquaintance.  It was in this environment, 
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living with her aunt and apprenticing in her aunt’s store, that Dolly received her 
education.417   
Why did James Murray allow his sister, a single woman attempting to build a 
business from the ground up, to raise his oldest daughter?  The answer, likely, had to do 
with the greater educational opportunities of Boston over North Carolina.  In the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, Latin schools were required for towns with over 100 families 
as early as the 1730s.  In the 1750s when Dolly was a student, Latin schools tended to be 
reserved for boys.  But their existence helped to foster a broader educational industry.  
Dame schools, taught by women in their homes, also offered girls and boys an introduction 
to reading and writing.  Tutors offering instruction in sewing and music advertised in local 
newspapers.  At first Elizabeth attempted to train Dolly herself while managing her store, 
but the two were too much.  She placed Dolly with a number of teachers to learn sewing 
and needlepoint, literacy, and accounting:  Miss Purcell on Milk Street, Miss Reed, and 
finally, in 1757, a good friend and protégé of Elizabeth’s, Jannette Day.  And indeed, 
Elizabeth’s success with her business and with Dolly encouraged James Murray to suggest 
that Dolly’s cousin, Annie Clarke, also train into shop keeping under Elizabeth’s 
patronage.418 
Dolly Murray Forbes had no daughters, thus we cannot say if she would have 
passed along her aunt’s training, but it is interesting to note her father’s view on her 
education.  James supported his daughter’s education into arithmetic and accounting.  He 
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cajoled, “If you will write well and beg hard your Papa will let you keep his books.  The 
learning of it, as they do at school, is nothing without the practice.”  The offer was in 
earnest.  Murray proceeded to echo Defoe’s argument  “The learning of it, as they do at 
school, is nothing without the practice.  How many families are ruined by the women not 
understanding accounts:  this you have seen instances of.”419  The knowledge served her 
well.  After her husband’s death in 1783, Dolly managed several properties and worked to 
advance her sons’ educations and ambitions.  While she relied upon her sons and sister’s 
family (especially as she suffered from gout as she aged)420, Dolly fared better than many 
other women might have in her position.   
Dolly met Elizabeth Peck Perkins through their sons’ shared mercantile interests in 
the West Indies trade in the 1780s, but the two may well have felt an early affinity based on 
their similar life experiences.  When Elizabeth’s husband died in 1773, her father, Thomas 
Handasyd Peck, extended her a line of credit with his contacts in London.  While we do 
not know the specifics of Elizabeth’s education or involvement in her husband’s 
business, we do know that she was able to pick up the reigns of his trade after his death.  
Merchants in Boston and London knew her as a tough businesswoman.  Local lore placed 
her in the store and her thumb in the “measures” as she served up her customers.421  
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Elizabeth’s mercantile success paved (and paid) the way for her sons’ advent in trade.  
Elizabeth’s father died three years after her husband and her mother not long after, 
leaving her with eight children to care for, in the thick of the turmoil leading up to the 
Revolutionary War.422  Her commercial acumen served her and her children in good 
stead. 
Elizabeth Peck Perkins knew well the dangers of losing a husband’s support.  But 
this knowledge did not dispose her to provide her own daughters with a commercial 
education.  When two of her own daughters could not support themselves, they sent 
children to live with siblings and received charity from wealthier kin.  Both Nancy Cushing 
and Margaret Forbes faced financial hardship when their husbands either deserted them (as 
with Nancy) or fared poorly in business and health (as with Margaret).  Nancy Perkins 
married the dashing, but “dissipated” Captain Robert Cushing.423  The family disapproved, 
or so the family later claimed.  In 1791, Nancy and her two children moved to Edenton, 
North Carolina to be with her husband.  After a period of silence, Colonel Perkins received 
a letter from a third party in March 1793 alerting him that Cushing had abandoned his 
family and Nancy was ill.  At first Colonel Perkins sent funds, but when Nancy passed 
away, he sent for the children.  Young Nancy was not quite eleven and John even 
younger, a shy five, when the two came into Boston harbor on a coasting vessel.  Colonel 
Perkins escorted the siblings firmly to his mansion on Pearl Street.  “John had lost his hat, 
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and they looked like wild Indians,” their cousin Eliza recalled.  “Father brought them up 
from the wharf in a carriage and he pulled the blinds down, to Nancy’s great 
disappointment, for she wanted to see the town.”424  The two youngsters moved in with 
Colonel Perkins and his family, but when Uncle Samuel G. Perkins married Barbara 
Higginson two years later, Nancy went to live with them.  John soon entered the family 
business.   
Margaret Perkins Forbes, youngest daughter to Elizabeth Perkins, fared similarly.  
In 1799, Margaret married Ralph Benet Forbes.  By all indications it was a love match.  
Her elder brothers did business with Forbes and his brothers, but Ralph was the least 
successful of the three.425  Here, again, the family disapproved the match, but Margaret 
insisted.  “He was a bright man,” Eliza wrote, “but they thought he wanted balance.  He 
made money and lost it.”426  More difficult for Margaret were Ralph’s health problems.  
Ralph was one of those men who people referred to as “unfortunate.”  He was bright and 
good-humored, but his mercantile interests never seemed to come together.  As he aged, 
he suffered from gout and later a stroke that left him partially paralyzed.  Well before 
Ralph died in 1824, Margaret and the couple’s eldest daughter Emma banded together to 
care for the family.  Yet where for Margaret’s mother this had meant picking up her 
husband’s business, Margaret’s choices were limited to internal, familial strategies.   
Margaret and Emma were smart, resourceful women, who maintained a 
household with seven kids while caring for the family patriarch in sickness and in health.  
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John Murray Forbes wrote of his mother’s “patient patching and darning,” cutting down 
trousers from the castoffs of his brothers and cousins.  Mundane decisions had to be 
balanced against the family economy.  When Thomas sent his brother a lovely Chinese 
paint set, Emma and her mother tried to sell it to see if the gift could be put to better use 
for the brother as cash.  Emma kept “a vigilant eye to their wants, corporeal and 
spiritual.”  On Sunday afternoons, Emma read to them from the Bible and taught them 
hymns.  The family lived at a small house in Milton owned by Ralph’s brother, John 
Murray Forbes, Sr.  The Perkins brothers, James, Thomas, and Samuel, pooled an annual 
income of $1200.  John remembered well his mother’s frustration.  “Being an extremely 
proud woman, she insisted on receiving the least possible aid from her brothers necessary 
to a life of the utmost frugality, while at the same time she felt it incumbent on her to 
have a certain regard for external appearances, so as to allow as little contrast as possible 
to appear between our mode of life and that of our well-to-do relations on both sides of 
the house.”427  The siblings were very cognizant of what they were missing.  They visited 
regularly with their Perkins, Robbins, Lyman, and Forbes kin.  To reach his better-heeled 
cousins, John recalled that he and his siblings loaded into a threadbare yellow two-
wheeled chaise that they rented from a neighbor.  The economic difficulties faced by the 
Forbes family made a lasting impression on the children.   
The fact of the matter was, Dolly’s education was exceptional.  Elizabeth Peck 
Perkins may not have been formally educated into commerce, but given the changes 
within her own lineage she was more likely to have spent a fair portion of her youth in 
her father’s store and to have participated in conversations about business than her 
                                                 





daughters and certainly her daughters’ daughters.428  For upwardly striving commercial 
families like those within the extended Perkins clan, a more appropriate education 
proclaimed the status of the pupil’s family and prepared her for marriage.  Domestic 
education was not perceived as a lack, but as important preparation for the prospects of a 
young woman and her family.429  Fathers as well as mothers monitored young women’s 
education and, indeed, sacrificed personal well-being to ensure that a daughter received 
training in needlework, art and literature, music, dancing, sociability, and taste.430  If 
possible, daughters attended schools where they socialized with young women of similar 
stations, attended balls with their brothers, and married into like families.  As Mary Kelley 
documents, the proliferation of schools for women in the early nineteenth century 
demonstrates the importance placed on daughters’ education as a form of cultural capital.431  
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Exponents of domesticity and female refinement extolled women’s public value in 
relationship to their husbands.432  But more than this, the call to family yoked together 
obligation in economic and social spheres.  The entrepreneurialism of female kin became 
evident in fields such as maternal oversight of social reproduction.433  Overseeing the 
education of children into skills, values, and taste  became increasingly fraught.  As 
Leonore Davidoff has argued, “Womanly skills have been consistently seen as generalized, 
almost natural attributes of femininity, despite the reality that adult women taught them to 
young girls.”  434  Here I discuss mothers shaping markets as mothers:  maternal 
networking.  Thus, for example, Margaret’s garrulity and warmth appeared to have 
opened doors for her sons at subtle yet significant moments.  Her sons felt that both John 
Perkins Cushing and William Sturgis, cousins of Margaret’s generation, paid them 
particular attention out of affection for their mother.  And this was not incidental.  Robert 
Bennet Forbes recalled that his mother wrote to Cushing indicating her hopes that he 
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might take one of her sons under his wing in China.435   Cushing was instrumental in 
establishing the careers of all three Forbes boys in China. 
Another example of such maternal maneuvering is Sarah Cabot’s role in her son 
Samuel’s marriage to Eliza Perkins.  Sarah Cabot watched as her sons chased mercantile 
ambitions around the globe.  When her son Samuel Cabot, Jr. moved to Philadelphia in 
1807, she began laying the groundwork for his return on the very eve of his departure.  
He traveled to join his brother Joseph in the commission house Perit & Cabot.436  In her 
very first letter to him at his new abode, Sarah hinted to Samuel that “A Philadelphia 
Beau would be quite an acquisition to our [Boston] Belles.”437  Sarah was not subtle 
about her desires.  She used her contacts in Boston society to keep tabs on her son, and 
also to create opportunities for him.  As Sarah well knew, marital and mercantile 
opportunities went hand in hand.  She learned of Sam’s flirtation with a woman in 
Philadelphia and, in her letters, sought to dissuade him from forming any serious 
connection.  She warned him against women who would want him for his place in society 
rather than himself, about women who were too beautiful or indecorous.438  Finally, on 
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January 10, 1808, Sarah scribbled to her son triumphantly:  if his heart was free, please 
keep it so, for she had found him a “prize” in Boston.439   
The prize in question was Elizabeth Perkins, eldest daughter of Colonel Thomas 
Handasyd Perkins.  Sarah collaborated with Eliza Morton Quincy, wife of U.S. 
Representative Josiah Quincy and neighbor to both the Cabot and Perkins families, and 
the two women played matchmaker for Samuel and the young Perkins “prize.”  Mrs. 
Quincy considered herself to be an intimate of the Perkins family as well as with Mrs. 
Cabot, who was a dear friend to her mother-in-law.440  Eliza Perkins later recalled that 
when she was seventeen, Mrs. Quincy had suggested to her mother that mother and 
daughter call upon the Mrs. Cabot and her daughters.  The Cabots had recently moved to 
Fort Hill from Beverly, and could use visitors to welcome them to Boston.  In Eliza’s 
memoirs, it was the Cabot sisters she was to visit.441  Unbeknownst to Eliza, Sarah Cabot 
and Eliza Quincy had something else in mind for her:  the call served as an interview for 
a prospective daughter-in-law.   
Eliza became good friends with the Cabot sisters, especially Elizabeth Cabot 
(later Follen).  When Samuel came home for a visit, the young couple accepted their 
families’ encouragements.  All went well until Eliza’s father, Colonel Perkins, put the 
brakes on the match:  he feared his seventeen year old daughter was too young.  Colonel 
Perkins set a later date on his daughter’s majority, thus lengthening the couple’s 
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engagement.  This course elicited another flurry of networking within Sarah’s circle of 
merchants, politicians, and their wives to ensure there were no hidden motives.  Would 
Eliza back out of the marriage?  Would Samuel’s entry into the commercial field in 
Boston create ill will that might hurt his prospects?  Her sources assured her no on both 
counts.442   
Sarah Cabot’s aim went beyond marrying her son into one of Boston’s first 
families and to solidify Samuel’s career prospects.  She also desired to bring her son 
home.  “Mr. Joe Lee says that it is as unreasonable for people to think of having their 
children settle about them as it would be to insist on living with their great 
grandchildren,” she mused in one letter.  “How very easily these philosophical old 
bachelors can settle these matters.”443  To Sarah, settling her family in Boston was in the 
family’s best interests.  Few of her contemporaries could have begrudged Sarah’s 
machinations, given that many of those who had the resources to do so endeavored to 
accomplish the very same end.  By drawing Eliza Perkins and Samuel Cabot together, 
marriage settled her husband in the area more effectively than simply reestablishing her 
son commercially.  Marriage, career, and family formation went hand in hand. 
Similar networking can be seen by Sally Perkins in the interest of her daughter, 
Mary Ann Perkins Cary.  In 1821, Thomas G. Cary considered whether or not to accept 
an offer from his brother Henry to partner in his commercial establishment in New York.  
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For the Carys (including Henry), everything hinged on Colonel Thomas H. Perkins, 
Thomas’s father-in-law.  At the time, Thomas worked as a lawyer and farmer in 
Battleboro, Vermont.  The family lived off land owned by the Colonel and received a 
monthly stipend.  Further, Henry Cary was a business associate of the Perkinses.  A 
partnership with his brother Thomas was actually a smooth business move for Henry as it 
strengthened his ties with the Perkins family and firms.  Letters crossed between 
members of the Cary and Perkins families, but a simple plea from Caroline Perkins, Mary 
Ann’s sister, is most revealing: 
My dear Mr. Cary, I hardly know how to begin with this all important 
subject.  My mind has been in such a turmoil ever since I heard of your brother’s 
proposals, that I have delayed writing till the last moment hoping to gain some 
composure but even now.  I feel as unable to express half I want to as ever.  In the 
first place have you any doubts in your own mind?  As I cannot find out from any 
quarter what you think or feel about it! 
 
Eliza and mother fear you only feel influenced from father’s letters to reject it, 
they told me to impress on your mind that his views were wholly in favor of it, 
but that he felt delicate about withdrawing the salary that you now receive from 
him.  Mr. Cabot only wonders that you hesitate a moment.  We all think this is 
your only chance of leaving Battleboro.  Should father do otherways than will you 
are there for life.  I fear my dear Mr. Cary you may think me very impertinent but 
you know how important we think it for Mary.  Ma has just come again from 
talking with father, he says, “I cannot concern that Mr. Cary can hesitate a 
moment and presumes your answer is written to your brother.  I shall not rest till I 
hear from you.  My whole heart and soul are with you.  Believe me your 
affectionate sister, Caroline.444 
  
For Caroline and her fellow partisans, their goal was to relocate their sister in New York, a 
place deemed infinitely preferable to Battleboro, Vermont.  But the demand was not only 
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for Thomas G. Cary to make a career change, from law to commerce, but also for the 
implicit economic backing of Colonel Perkins.445   
Within the network, women frequently served as connections between men and 
conveyors of property.446  As wives and mothers, they brought in new blood.  However 
subordinating, these bonds between men and women also represented several significant 
vulnerabilities within families and, especially, within family firms.   Increasingly in the 
1810s and certainly by the 1830s, the practice of husbands designating executrixes of 
their estates was in decline.  Instead, husbands and wives with the resources to do so 
created trusts.  For some, this meant placing brothers and uncles in charge of managing 
and investing family capital on behalf of beneficiaries.  For others, this meant placing 
their funds in newly forming trust companies.  As capital rather than land or movable 
property came to comprise the bulk of family inheritance, the family began 
experimenting with mechanisms for protecting kin.  Protections developed in both wills 
and in prenuptial agreements.447   
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Elizabeth Peck Perkins explicitly qualified the legacies for her daughters and 
granddaughters with the words “despite coverture.”  She stipulated that 5/8 of her 
property should go to her three sons, James, Thomas, and Samuel, but that 1/3 of the net 
proceeds from that property should be held “in trust” for her daughters Esther, Mary, and 
Margaret, as well as Margaret’s children.  The final 3/8 went to her eldest daughter 
Elizabeth and her two grandchildren by her second eldest daughter, John Perkins Cushing 
and Nancy Cushing Higginson.  John was a merchant on the rise at this point, 
apprenticing for his uncles in China.  Elizabeth and Nancy were both married to 
successful merchants, or so it seemed at the time.  By contrast, Esther, Mary, and 
Margaret were all married to less successful men:  Josiah Sturgis, a middling merchant in 
Charleston; Benjamin Abbot, a schoolmaster; and Ralph Forbes, whose ill health was 
inextricably tied up in his failings in commerce. Elizabeth’s bequests to her female 
progeny outside of coverture may have aimed to keep the funds out of the reach of their 
husbands’ creditors.  But it is likely that she also expected her sons to take a primary 
responsibility for overseeing the investment of the funds and thus ensure that all of the 
family’s womenfolk had income. 
By the early decades of the nineteenth century, trusts and prenuptial agreements 
provided a legal mechanism for families to protect members from the vicissitudes of 
market capitalism.  Trusts themselves were closely tied to gendered perceptions of 
savings, commerce, and republicanism common to the era:  independent men should be 
able to invest on their own account; funds placed in savings banks or in trust were so 
placed because the trustee was a dependent unable to invest for themselves.  Promotions 





Charles G. Loring wrote in 1867 regarding the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance 
Company (MHLIC), “We do not look upon this company as a money-making machine 
for the benefit of the stockholders, but as a great Charity for the safe-keeping and prudent 
care of the property of those who cannot manage it for themselves, or who desire such 
place of deposit.”448  The Massachusetts General Hospital itself was founded in 1811 as 
the third general hospital in the United States.  Founders chartered the life insurance 
company in 1818 with a third of its profits promised to the hospital.  By the time the 
MHLIC began operations in 1823, the potential of the trust business was already apparent 
to its founders, and verbiage allowing for it to hold and invest deposits in trust were 
included in the 1823 amendments to the charter.  By the 1840s, MHLIC was more trust 
company than life insurance provider.449  Several scholars have pointed to the importance 
of the MHLIC as the first trust company and investment firm in the United States and, 
more, as a protector of wealth for Boston’s upper crust.450  For the Perkinses, this was 
certainly the case. 
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The family produced deeply entrepreneurial women.  By the fourth generation, 
several prominent names come to view:  Eliza Perkins Cary Agassiz who both fostered 
her husband’s Louis’s scientific career through her writing and practical acumen and 
provided the foundation for Radcliffe College in Cambridge; Ellen Sturgis Hooper and 
Carrie Sturgis Tappan whose poetry, books, and correspondence with such better known 
figures as Margaret Fuller and Ralph Waldo Emerson were instrumental to what we now 
know as the Transcendentalist movement.  But for as long as the family could afford it, 
their entrepreneurialism was channeled in specific and specifically gendered directions.   
Economic Inequalities within the Family  
In Riches, Class, and Power, Edward Pessen uses John Perkins Cushing, Robert 
Bennet Forbes, and William and Russell Sturgis as examples of Boston men who went 
from wealth to wealth and thus defied the traditional narrative of the second quarter of 
the nineteenth century as an “egalitarian era.”451  But while none of these men went from 
rags to riches and were obviously well-connected, they all worked hard for their wealth.  
Cushing, Forbes, and William Sturgis received their start in trade in the Perkins 
countinghouse through the kinship connection.  They all received assistance up the ladder 
to becoming independent merchants.  Yet their circumstances differed profoundly from 
those of their Perkins cousins.   
Compare for example, the circumstances in which Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. made 
his maiden adventure to that of Robert Bennet Forbes.  Thomas Perkins, Jr. was born in 
1796 in the family’s Pearl Street residence in Boston.  At the age of ten he joined a class 
of his peers at the Exeter Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire, an elite preparatory 
                                                 





academy overseen by his uncle, Dr. Benjamin Abbot.  According to the family narrative, 
Tom was being prepared for Harvard, but fell in with two young men from Baltimore 
who persuaded him to enter St. Mary’s College instead.  The more likely story is told by 
Colonel Perkins’s biographers who suggest Tom’s father recognized the boy’s scholarly 
limits and never attempted to place him at Harvard.  For a Bostonian of means, attending 
Harvard was the path from which all deviations must be explained, and explained away it 
was.  Two of his friends from Exeter—Jared Sparks and Edward Everett (a tutor at Exeter 
at the time) no less—described Tom as quick-minded, handsome, honest, kind-hearted, 
and generous.  But Tom resembled his great grandfather:  he preferred sports, the 
outdoors, and society to the classroom.  He was a footballer, a wrestler, a boxer, a hunter, 
a runner, a skater, and a horse rider, but not a scholar.  Frankly, the same could be said of 
Colonel Perkins.  The difference was the profound pleasure Colonel Perkins came to take 
in the game of capitalism:  locating new speculations and sources of profit.     
In January 1814, Colonel Thomas H. Perkins wrote his eldest son a letter, from 
father to son, in preparation for his son’s first major maritime departure.  “It is my duty 
from the situation I bear to you, that I give you my ideas as to that course you are to 
pursue in the new line of life which you are now commencing,” Perkins wrote.  Much 
like his cousins before and after him, Thomas Handasyd Perkins, Jr. prepared to travel to 
China on a commercial adventure.  And much like his cousins, his parents intended the 
voyage to make a man of him.  He would gain independence, maturity, and 
sophistication. Colonel Perkins had prepared many a man for a life in commerce, but the 
paternal ethos in writing to his son was altogether different.  The stakes were higher.  





father warned, “and you will suppose this is highly interesting to me as well as to 
yourself.”452   
The letter was of a common type:  a coming of age letter offering 
intergenerational instruction for a youth on the cusp of adulthood.  As such, the letter 
elucidates ideals and expectations of character formation.  At the fount of character for 
men of Colonel Perkins’s generation was a single quality:  virtue.  “Remember,” his 
father reminded Tom, “without virtue you have no claim to my esteem.”  And later, “bear 
in mind that you have a mother and sisters who will be made happy by finding that you 
are walking in the path of virtue.”  In 1815, John Adams similarly summed for George 
Washington Adams:  “Virtues and Studies, make Men!  All else are brutes.”453  
Fortunately, Tom’s father gave him explicit instructions on how to be virtuous:  be polite; 
follow the rules of the ship; be friendly, but do not engage in “vulgar familiarity”; keep 
regular hours; have a place for everything; keep accounts of all expenses; be economical; 
maintain a clean appearance; do not drink too much or game—especially for money; read 
but not only for pleasure; continue his French lessons as if a master peered over his 
shoulder; and lastly, religion might be “unfashionable” but there was no better guide to 
life than scripture.  His family’s reputation, especially that of his mother and sisters, 
depended upon his comportment.454 
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For all of these calls to order and economy, Tom’s father provided for him well—
perhaps too well.  Colonel Perkins’s desires for his son in terms of class and comfort 
clashed with his objectives for his son in business.  In addition to his regular allowance, 
Perkins would receive a clothing allowance of $500 per year455 and an investment 
allowance of $5000 to allocate under the tutelage of his cousins, John Perkins Cushing 
and James P. Sturgis.  In order to ensure his clean appearance, his father arranged for him 
enough clothing and linen that, if he changed every Sunday and Thursday, there would be 
enough to last him to China.  Colonel Perkins also packed a trunk of books456 and an 
array of foods.  No hardtack for his son, but a supply of beef, tongue, ham, tripe, apples, 
wine, cider, and porter.  Young Perkins traveled not as a mariner (as had William Sturgis) 
or a supercargo or supercargo’s clerk (as had John Perkins Cushing), but as a 
passenger.457  While Colonel Perkins privately enjoined Captain Roberts to not show any 
preference to his son, one imagines it would have been hard for Captain Roberts to refuse 
                                                                                                                                                 
kind attention to her. You know not the pleasure it gave me. …  For they are worth of your best affections. 
You are under many obligations to them. & in return they will in a few years look to you for protection. 
They as well as your Parents are diserous of seeing you a great & good Man – You are now arriv’d at an 
age which we call coming to years of dissevisteon [sic] but which I think should rather be call’d years of 
folly for they really are so with most young folks. Here again I hope you will be an exception – It would be 
a sad thing if that steadyness & sobriety which has always gain’d you the name of Deacon should forsake 
you when you stand in most need of it You have just began to form a character in the world. The eyes of 
every one Will be upon you & I wish you to be sensible how much you[r] future well-being in both Worlds 
depends upon the next four or five years of your Life. Let this thought influence every action – let it never 
forsake you for an hour – be modest – & diffident in your behaviour.” 
455 Compare Perkins’s clothing allowance of $500 per year—this beyond his regular allowance 
and funds for speculations—to the annual stipend of $1200 his aunt Margaret received to maintain her 
entire family or Captain John King of the Canton Packet (Bennet’s ship, discussed below) who received 
$600 per year as his salary. 
456 The books included the works of Fisher Ames and the Life of Washington; Junius’ Letters as 
“a finished style of writing” that “should be read by everyone”; Moore’s Travels and the works of 
Shakespeare as literature from the land of their forefathers; and of course, the Bible.  
457 His father indicates in the letter that he traveled as a passenger with no specific duties, but 
according to a memoir written by his son from stories shared by family friends—in this instance Captain 
George W. Lewis—Perkins traveled as a captain with mariners who drilled and served under his command.  





the owner’s son favors had he asked.458  Fortunately, the seventeen year old Tom proved 
he was no idler.  In character and in capital, Colonel Perkins intended the yield from this 
adventure to be the foundation of his son’s fortune.  But if his son failed, there was 
always his own fortune to ensure his son’s comfort.   
Both James and Tom Perkins, Jr. experienced their families’ deep pockets from a 
young age and cultivated a refined taste for pleasure.  As Tom sailed aboard the Jacob 
Jones in 1814, James Perkins, Jr. worked for his father.  He traveled to New York that 
summer to visit the esteemed firm of Prime & Ward and transport home $40,000 in 
gold.459  According to that faithful memoirist, cousin Eliza, James seemed promising in 
his youth, but went astray.  To her, the culprit was Harvard, where “he got into a gay set, 
Kirk Boott and others, and I remember wondering as a girl to see Aunt James putting up 
bottles of wine to send out to Cambridge to him.”460  Eliza and James grew up together, 
fighting pitched battles in which the “Fort Hillers” faced off against the “Round Pointers” 
in the Common, even assembling a museum together.461  Yet if his youth was like his 
cousin Tom’s, as his mother packing up cases of wine presumably to share with friends 
suggests, access to personal wealth offered opportunities to win popularity through 
“generosity.” 
Compare Tom’s experience with that of his cousin, Robert Bennet Forbes.  
Looking back on his youth, Bennet confessed that the sea did not tempt him so much as 
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his uncle did.  Bennet wrote his memoirs quite cognizant of the importance of the 
extended family to their personal decisions, yet family letters reveal the strings of 
negotiated family influence structuring individual choices even beyond his ken.  Colonel 
Perkins would drop hints to the boy’s future at the dinner table.  He would tease him 
familiarly about shipboard life.  On scooping pudding to his plate, the older man would 
remark that Ben would not get such delicious pudding off the Cape of Good Hope.  “I 
thus became familiar with the idea I was born to eat bad puddings of the cape,” Ben 
recalled.  And on one fateful day in October of 1817, as Ben rambled amongst the sailors 
of the Perkins’ Canton Packet, his uncle called out to him, ‘“Well, Ben, which of these 
ships do you intend to go in?”‘  To Ben, fate and his uncle seemed one and the same, and 
all indicators pointed to a maritime career.   
In fact, family letters reveal that Ben’s uncle was simply the agent of family 
decision making.  Well before Ben himself decided upon a maritime career, his elders 
had already decided the matter for him.  As early as November 1816, Ben’s father Ralph 
wrote to one of his brothers with the plan James Perkins had laid out for Ben’s education:  
the lad would winter with “Uncle Thomas H.” where he would learn French and 
navigation, and then go to China in the spring.462  In planning for their son’s future, 
Ralph and Margaret Forbes were fortunate to have siblings in a position to take on their 
offspring’s’ education, but this training was not free.  While the prospect of Ben taking to 
the sea at such a tender age worried the couple, they still appreciated the opportunity for 
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their son.  As Ralph indicated in a letter to his brother-in-law in January 1817, money 
was a central underlying preoccupation.  Going to sea saved the family the expense of 
supporting Ben in an apprenticeship in the Perkins’s countinghouse.  Instead, the young 
mariner’s wages now went straight to his parents and thus contributed to the family 
economy.  In the 1817 letter, Ralph thanked Colonel Perkins for his attentions to Ben and 
his interests, but begged his indulgence on his inability to support his son.  “I most 
cheerfully resign him to your joint management.”463   
Private correspondence provides insights into how extended family hierarchies 
operated in practice.  This example shows both the hidden negotiations that could 
structure individual prospects, but also how economic inequalities within the extended 
family shaped power dynamics on a very intimate level—shaping relationships between 
Ralph and Margaret and their son.  As Ben went to sea at the age of thirteen, it was with a 
keen awareness of his family’s debt to his uncles.  His uncle’s influence over his decision 
was clear to Ben, but in the narrative as he tells it in his memoirs, Ben traveled to Milton 
to inform his mother of his decision.  She was “overcome” by the prospect—until, that is, 
“she saw that I had made up my mind to conform to the destiny imposed on my by fate 
and my revered uncle.”  Then, she gave her consent.464   
Thus, in the fall of 1817, the thirteen year old Ben Forbes prepared to embark as a 
mariner aboard a Perkins ship, the Canton Packet.  As with Tom, Colonel Perkins 
prepared young Ben for the voyage.  Even beyond the difference in their positions aboard 
their respective vessels, the disparity in the kinsmen’s positions was stark.  Perkins sent 
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Ben to a shopkeeper by the name of Gedney King to secure a quadrant, a Bowditch’s 
navigator, and a log book.  An older clerk who had been to sea visited a slop shop to 
procure him a chest for his belongings and an outfit of sailor clothes:  checked shirts, 
oversized duck trousers, socks, shoes, and a pea jacket.  He also received a tin pot and 
iron spoon, several knives, a bed stuffed with pig hair, and a blanket.  Colonel Perkins 
saw to Ben’s education, focusing on French, navigation, and trigonometry.  From home, 
Ben received his selection of luxuries:  a ‘ditty bag’ complete with needles and thread 
and buttons to repair clothing while abroad, several well-patched socks and articles of 
clothing, a bottle of red lavender and another of essence of peppermint, a small box of 
broken sugar, and from a neighbor, a barrel of apples.  His Aunt Abbot gave him a 
Testament for the voyage.  Ben recalled that his mother had tried to give him a pillow, 
but the comfort clashed with his idea of a mariner’s life and he refused.  Upon reflection, 
too late, he remembered this his mother had been to sea herself and was fully cognizant 
of the life and dangers he was to face.465  Perhaps the pillow would have been acceptable 
after all. 
 Both Tom and Ben rose to prominent positions in the commercial network, but 
from very different starting points.  As with Tom, Ben’s aspirations were bound up in 
exhortations to consider his mother and younger siblings.  Yet where to Tom this was a 
call to manliness, to virtue, and to honor, Ben’s family circumstances were more meager.  
Manliness, virtue, and honor still mattered, but they were intimately connected with the 
need to contribute to his family’s income.  Ben’s wages contributed directly to the 
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education of his siblings.  When Ben met up with his older brother, Thomas Tunno 
Forbes, in Manila in April of 1825, Ben carried the sad news of their father’s death.  The 
moment provided a period of reflection for the two brothers.  They realized “how much 
we owe our parents and how much we must do for the education and maintenance of the 
younger members of the family” and “were drawn more intimately together than ever 
before.”466   
For the Forbes brothers, the exigencies of caring for their own siblings rendered 
their own hard work and success necessary in a way it could not have been for Tom 
Perkins.  The education, career, and marital ambitions of the Forbes siblings developed 
out of family-based strategies.  Birth order constrained choices so that, for example, 
Thomas T. Forbes had little choice but to go into his uncles’ countinghouse and Emma, 
the eldest, never married but instead took care of her siblings and their families.  While 
John Murray Forbes was able to attend the Round Hill Academy and had broader career 
options (it was initially thought he would go into the clergy), the opportunity was paved 
and paid for by the work of his older siblings.  Mary and Fanny Forbes, the two youngest, 
were similarly able to take advantage of greater preparation than their elder siblings.  
Fanny took riding lessons.  Mary attended Sophia Peabody’s school.  It was here that 
Mary befriended the Hathaway twins.  As Mary Kelley has written, this was one of the 
express purposes of female academies:  the socialization of young women with others of 
similar prospects.467  Through Sarah Hathaway’s friendship with Mary, she would meet 
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her future husband, John Murray Forbes.   But the resources available to the younger 
siblings owed much to the energies of their older brothers and sisters. 
Uncles James and Thomas Perkins looked out for their poorer nephews, but they 
also recognized the potential within the inequalities of the extended family.  Ben and his 
older brother both received considerable support from their uncles:  introductions and 
credit to advance their careers, higher wages than they might otherwise expect, and the 
present of a box of silver dollars for Ben and Thomas to invest independently and thus 
start their careers.468  But the fact of inequality within the family was useful.  Whether or 
not the Perkins uncles looked at their nephews in this light, they were cognizant that need 
made for hard workers.  Consider a letter that Perkins & Co. of Boston sent to their 
Canton house regarding a young ship captain by the name of Drumeray who, they noted, 
had “brought this ship into port in first rate order, and seems much inclined to keep down 
expenses.”  They recommended him not only for his skill, but also for the fact that the 
man’s father had recently died “and his desire to get forward will be increased by the 
loss, from his wish to contribute to the comfort of his mother and family.”469  This 
comment could just as well have been applied to a number of young kinsmen in their 
employ.  Indeed, it echoes many of their own exhortations to said kin to mind their 
obligations to their siblings or parents.  While the uncles established their heirs in 
business in Boston, the nephews worked as resident agents abroad.   
Furthermore, while participation within the commercial network offered the 
opportunity of wealth, of making one’s “lac” ($100,000), lucre was never just about 
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lucre.  It also conveyed social and personal obligation.  When John Perkins Cushing 
himself set sail at the age of sixteen, his uncles’ reminded him that he had a responsibility 
to contribute to his sister’s livelihood.  Cushing’s need for “lucre” was as much about 
obligation as it was about personal gain if not more.  Even beyond his sister’s well-being, 
he had been brought up within his uncles’ countinghouse with an expectation that he 
would contribute to the family business.  His cousin Eliza remarked at his artistic 
temperament, what a shame it was that he should be pressed abroad for his competency, 
but as a young man he required a means to independence.470  He lived in China for nearly 
thirty years, a home that was never quite home, and on several occasions planned for his 
retirement.  But he was a gifted merchant, and partners urged him to stay.  In an 1822 
letter, one uncle sounded a note of relief that Cushing planned to stay until his cousin and 
successor, Thomas Forbes, could run the Canton house on his own.  “I was glad to find 
you intend remaining some time longer,” the uncle penned.  “There are those who would 
gladly see you return and so shall I, when I think you will be contented to set down and 
remain here the rest of your days, but I am convinced that was you to return now, you 
will go back again.  If in three or four years Forbes can be made to be able to do your 
business, it will be very desirable.”471  But Cushing feared he had been a “fool to stay 
away.”472  This sentiments was echoed by John Murray Forbes in reflection upon his time 
in China.  He feared that he had “acted upon a theory regarding ‘happiness’ and did not 
sufficiently consider the stake which I hazarded the risk of life, health and loss of friends 
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the years of youth and probably of happiness which I threw away in Exchange for a 
doubtfull (sic) good money.”473 
The Forbes cousins—Ben, Tom, and later John—could not compare with their 
Perkins cousins in terms of immediate access to financial or cultural capital, but this 
made them all the more upwardly striving and thus useful to the network.  Thus, in 
examining rebels within the family, it is important to consider the parameters of 
rebellion.   
The Privilege of Opting Out 
Not everyone accepted familial expectations.  Parents rejected responsibilities 
toward their children and husbands and wives toward their spouses.  Captain Robert 
Cushing’s desertion of his wife and two children in North Carolina and Barbara 
Higginson’s apparent harsh treatment of her children are both evidence of this.  Sons and 
daughters rejected family expectations of mercantile careers, marriage, or family life.   
James Handasyd Perkins, the youngest child of Samuel and Barbara Perkins, 
provides a prime example.  James did not reject his family, but he did reject the 
expectations of a commercial life placed him on from a young age.  James attended 
public schools before going to a school in Lancaster to Philips Academy in Exeter, and 
then to Round Hill at Northampton with John Murray Forbes.  At eighteen, James left 
Round Hill for his Perkins uncles’ countinghouse. But over the course of his clerkship, he 
became increasingly withdrawn and depressed.  His father sought to intervene and 
arranged for James to take a business trip to England followed by the West Indies.  Here 
was an adventure akin to those taken by Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. and others:  a coming of 
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age voyage.  Instead of reconciling the young man to commerce, however, the trip 
solidified his convictions to seek out some other means of making a living.  In January of 
1831, en route to London, James wrote to his good friend and cousin Walter Channing 
that he felt melancholy “of a particular kind.”  He paused to explain his feelings:  “It is 
not doubt concerning the future, nor sorrow for the past ... but I do not like fashionable 
society, because it scarce appears to me to deserve the name ... I have an itching for 
something beyond and better than eating and drinking and money-making.”474  His 
melancholy continued in England.  His only pleasure seems to have been watching Fanny 
Kemble’s performances on the stage.  Before he knew it, he was again aboard a ship, this 
time bound for Barbados and the Castries. 
James’s experience in the West Indies seemed to epitomize everything he found 
troubling about commerce.  To James, trade required exploitation.  In May of 1831 his 
good friend Channing received the following rant:  “Fortunately you are not a merchant, 
and know not mercantile troubles.  Voici!  A gentleman invites me to his house, treats me 
as kind as possible, does all in his power for me, --and what then?  Why, I must - must 
observe ye - try to bargain him, coax him, drive him, cheat him, out of a dollar or 
two.  I’d rather lose a leg; and yet if I don’t, I’m a fool, a greenhorn, and he’ll take me in, 
because I wouldn’t serve him so.  If I ever get home again, I’ll quit trade rover and 
aye.”475   
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James wrote home that, upon his return, he intended to head west.  He tested the 
waters first:  in 1832, he corresponded with a former teacher who had moved to 
Cincinnati.  He hoped to use the town as a jumping off point for making his way west.  
He inquired into the prospects of finding a short term occupation while he looked for 
land ... and tried to pick up the basics of farming.  “At present I know nothing,” he 
confessed, “being one of that amphibious species, half merchant, half scholar, with a 
strong inclination to become either a cobbler or a blacksmith.”476  James did not know 
what he wanted to do with his life—farmer, cobbler, blacksmith—but he knew what he 
did not want to do, and that was the family business: commerce. 
James never returned to Boston to live, but he visited as did his children.  And, 
ironically, his sons became some of the most successful merchants of the next 
generation.477  This did not come out of any personal encouragement from their parents.  
When James arrived in Cincinnati, he accepted a law position with his teacher, Timothy 
Walker with the caveat that he could leave at a moment’s notice if he found his farm.  
Cincinnati of the 1830s was an up-and-coming western boomtown, teeming with 
Americans and foreigners coming from all directions (albeit predominantly from the 
south).  Many shared James’s ambition to remake themselves in the American west.  
Luckily for James, Cincinnati was also home to a small but tight-knit community of New 
England expatriates:  Samuel P. Chase, Samuel and Elizabeth Foote, Lyman Beecher’s 
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family including sisters Catherine, Harriet, and Isabella, and the Blackwell sisters, many 
of whom came together in a mixed-sex reading group “Semi-Colon Club.”478  In these 
social gatherings, James met Elizabeth Foote’s visiting sister, the sensitive and intelligent 
Sarah Elliott.  The two married on December 17, 1834.   
If James hoped to find his calling out west, he had a difficult time of it.  Yet his 
path illuminates the type of work he found valuable.  James  received admission to the 
local bar, but felt troubled about the moral worth of this work as well.  He next tried his 
hand at journalism, writing first for the Western Monthly Magazine and then, in the 
winter of 1835, purchasing the Saturday Evening Chronicle and merging it with the 
Cincinnati Mirror.  Between monetary and health troubles, however, journalistic and 
literary pursuits did not suit Perkins.  He joined with friends in a mining and milling 
adventure in Pomeroy, Ohio.  Returning to Cincinnati in 1837, Perkins finally bought his 
land, a lot just outside of town called Walnut Hill.  On this property, he built his family’s 
cottage:  Owl’s Nest.  In 1838 and 1839, Perkins worked for a local Unitarian Church as 
minister-at-large to the poor.  His ministry also emerged out of the Cincinnati Relief 
Union which engaged in a wide range of reforms, including educational work and 
improving prison conditions.  His work for the church did not support his family, 
however, and he opened a school for young ladies to pay the bills.479   
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James H. Perkins’s brother Stephen similarly rejected his parents’ offerings of a 
commercial life.  Stephen had studied in Germany under Edward Everett’s guidance 
before going into trade as a supercargo to both the West and East Indies.  He followed the 
traditional path, going into the family business as a resident agent in Calcutta.480  But to 
his cousin, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, “This pursuit he hated and disapproved; all 
his tastes were for art, in which he was at the time perhaps the best connoisseur in 
Boston.”481  Higginson described cousin Stephen as a handsome, cultivated figure.  
Higginson likely knew Stephen during his youth, but in 1842, after six months teaching at 
a school kept by Stephen Minot Weld in Jamaica Plain, Higginson accepted a position as 
private tutor for his cousin’s three sons.  Higginson described Perkins as “the most 
attractive man I had yet met and the one who was most to influence me.  He was indeed a 
person of unique qualities and great gifts.”   
Perkins resembled a Jane Austen character living in genteel poverty.  It is not 
clear that he had an income beyond his earlier mercantile capital and family funds.  
Higginson later wrote of Perkins that he lived “in a state of social revolt, enhanced by a 
certain shyness and by deafness; full of theories, and ready to encourage all independent 
thinking.”482  He valued erudition and art over commercial pursuits.  Rather than invest 
his funds in stocks or bonds, Perkins assembled the funds to purchase a handful of prized 
paintings:  a Reynolds, a Van der Velde, and an oil copy of the Sistine Madonna by 
Moritz Retzsch.  Part of Higginson’s attraction to Perkins may well have been his 
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iconoclasm.  The older man drew about him an eclectic social circle different from 
anything Higginson had experienced at Harvard.  He rejected classical training and yet 
was widely read in French and German.483  He introduced Higginson to authors the 
younger man came to treasure, such as Heinreich Heine and Paul Louis Courier.  Unlike 
other Perkins cousins—John Perkins Cushing, the Sturgis cousins, the Forbes brothers—
James and Stephen Perkins were in a position where they not only felt the will to reject 
their family’s compulsion to commerce, but also that there was a way.  For the other 
Perkins cousins, obligations to siblings and parents made such a contemplation far more 
difficult. 
Daughters rejected the family business as well, only for daughters, this 
increasingly meant marriage.  Two of Samuel G. Perkins’s daughters, sisters to James 
and Stephen, did not marry.  Stephen Perkins’s household included his three sons and his 
unmarried sister who kept his house.  Of Samuel and Barbara’s four daughters, two 
married, two did not.  And of the two that did not, Nancy Maynard and Elizabeth Peck 
Perkins, one cared for Stephen’s household, the other for their parents.  As Virginia Lee 
Chambers-Schiller observes in Liberty a Better Husband, the number of spinsters in 
colonial America was negligible, but it increased over the nineteenth century so that of 
women born between 1865 and 1875, approximately 11% of American women chose not 
to marry.484  Of this third generation of Perkinses, born from 1788 to 1815, nearly as 
many daughters did not marry as did:  7: 9.  For some of these women, spinsterhood was 
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not a choice, or at least not a rejection of marriage.  Emma Forbes never married, but this 
may well have been because her role raising her siblings melted into raising her siblings’ 
children.  For many families, unattached women provided a social safety net by caring for 
aging parents, siblings, and their sibling’s families.485  For other daughters, family wealth 
provided a mechanism for opting out of marriage.486  By the third and fourth generations, 
as wealth came to daughters and sons in the form of trusts, access to a livelihood 
independent of work became a dilemma for family continuity.  Marrying against family 
wishes or choosing not to marry at all, took courage and resources.   
The Limits of Obligation 
Yet if rebellion from a life of commerce did not receive censure from family, 
deception and dishonesty proved the limit.  Here, a sense of responsibility to kin broke 
down.  A salient example of this is John Perkins Cushing’s frank letter to his brother-in-
law, Henry Higginson, regarding his son’s dismissal from Perkins & Co. in Canton.  
Henry Higginson, Jr. resided in Canton during Cushing’s absence and through the tragic 
boating death of Perkins & Co.’s heir apparent, Thomas Tunno Forbes.  Had Higginson 
proved adept, or even adequate, he might have been in line to a partnership in the 
prosperous firm.  But as Cushing shared with Higginson’s father, the young man had 
instead proven himself “totally unworthy of the confidence or good opinion of his 
connexions (sic).”  The letter came from within the family as the only way to penetrate 
the web of protection that the Perkinses’ business and family connections had forged.  
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Cushing was the only one willing to alert the father “as he may and probably will 
misrepresent his conduct here in such a way as may … prevent your adopting such 
measures as will be necessary to … prevent a recurrence of conduct that will not fail to 
disgrace himself and his friends.”   
What could warrant such a rebuke?  Not Higginson’s carelessness or laziness.  
No, Cushing knew of these when he had advanced the lad’s candidacy.  Likely he 
expected Canton’s isolation could force Higginson to apply himself.  But even he was 
surprised at the dissipation, the mendacity, “indeed … almost every bad quality without a 
redeeming good one.”  What is interesting here is not only the lengths it took to earn such 
a reproach, but the defensive mechanisms that came into view to shield the larger 
network from scandal.  The merchants in China charged with handling Perkins & Co. 
business after Forbes’s death had been reticent to send him home and had willingly paid 
off exorbitant debts on his behalf rather than “have his connexions (sic) disgraced by an 
exposure of his conduct.”487  Instead, the censure and dismissal had to come from an 
authority figure connecting family and firm. 
Other limits occurred on a more personal level, such as when Joshua Bates wrote 
to his firm’s agent in Boston, Thomas Wren Ward, to prepare him for potential 
calumny.488  His “reprobate” brother-in-law had sent Bates’s wife a letter accusing her of 
standing between him and funds that Bates would surely otherwise lend him.  Unless 
Mrs. Bates sent him £300, Charles Sturgis threatened to tattle on her misdeeds to the 
newspapers.  Bates supposed these to be empty threats, but warned Ward of the matter 
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nonetheless.  Sturgis felt his sister owed him something in her good fortune.  But 
Charles’s manner of handling the relationship was ineffective.  Another Sturgis brother, 
John Sturgis, cultivated a regular correspondence and sense of patronage and obligation 
with his wealthy brother-in-law.  He, too, expected to benefit from his sister’s favorable 
marriage, but curried favors within a paternalist framework. 
Samuel Cabot similarly put the brakes on funds disbursed in the favor of his 
nephew Joseph in reaction to the younger man’s dishonesty.  Joseph was the son of 
Samuel’s unfortunate brother Stephen and his West Indian mistress, Zamie Feche.  
Beginning in about 1830, Joseph Cabot traveled from either St. Thomas or Port au Prince 
to live with Samuel Cabot and his family in Boston.489  Joseph entered into commerce 
himself but, in the mid-1850s, he claimed he suffered several reverses and could no 
longer manage support payments to his mother in St. Thomas.  His wealthier uncle took 
over the payments until a lack of response to his correspondence led Samuel to inquire 
after Joseph.  Instead of bordering poverty, Joseph turned out to be a prosperous, popular 
merchant in the bustling Mississippi River boomtown of St. Louis.  The news of his 
nephew’s duplicity angered Samuel Cabot so that he not only stopped covering Joseph’s 
obligations to his mother, he called in Joseph’s debts to him with interest to the tune of 
$5-6,000.490  Kinship as lines of duty and affection created business opportunities and 
safeguards.  While apathy, ineptitude, and antipathy toward commerce did not break 
these bonds, deceit did. 
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Inheriting the Firm 
When the elder James & Thomas H. Perkins established Perkins & Sons in 1817, 
they followed a pattern with a long history in commercial practice:  bringing their sons 
into the family business.  As common a dilemma as succession was, it was also one of the 
most difficult steps in family businesses.  The myriad quotes of “shirtsleeves to 
shirtsleeves” and the rise and fall of the family firm in three generations may feel cliché, 
but there is a reason for their prominence.  Succession was hard.  The Perkins brothers 
clearly aimed to pass on the capital, skills, knowledge, reputation, and contacts they had 
amassed over the decades.  Their sons and son-in-laws took up the challenge, albeit the 
son-in-laws more than the sons.  This ambivalent transfer of power became a problem 
that manifested in later crises of succession so that the 1830s became a pivotal period for 
the network.  Perkins & Co. of Canton merged with Samuel Russell & Co. in 1830.  
Perkins & Co. of Boston closed its doors on January 1, 1838.  Successors to the Perkins 
legacy explicitly preferred to use Russell & Co. and a newly formed John Murray Forbes 
& Co. to taking up the mantle of the Perkins name.  The new firms grafted onto the older 
network, but as a “Forbes dynasty.”  Understanding these breaks in succession require 
looking not simply at the life of the firms, but intersections of firm and family life.   
As a family business, the Perkins commercial network can be read as a failure or a 
success.  Perkins & Co. successfully profited the partners and their families, employed a 
broad range of kin, and allowed for the perpetuation of this legacy.  Yet the Perkins 
legacy as a Perkins legacy did not last long.  This was not for lack of trying.  In 1817, 





successors the most promising gift a merchant could give his or her child:  not simply an 
inheritance, but the means to perpetuate that inheritance.  The new countinghouse 
brought together the two juniors with Colonel Perkins’s son-in-law, Samuel Cabot, Jr.  
Business between the two firms would overlap, but without any liability for debts or 
losses for the other firm.  Perkins & Sons would handle a fair portion of the short and 
medium-term ventures of the parent firm as well as any new business the younger men 
brought in.  The original firm maintained the lucrative China trade.  Most significantly, 
the contract for the new firm guaranteed an income for the three young men.  If the 
partnership failed to profit, the older merchants would make up the difference so that the 
younger men had no fear of losing the lifestyle to which they were accustomed.      
The contract establishing the new firm raises the question, was the trading house 
set up for succession in commerce or family life?  While these did not have to be 
alternatives, Perkins & Sons seems to have been intended more for the latter than the 
former.  Thomas H. Perkin, Jr. and James Perkins, Jr. both chafed under the pressure to 
accept the commercial mantle of their fathers, but they eventually came to the table and 
accepted partnerships in James and Thomas H. Perkins & Sons.491  By all accounts, 
however, neither of the two juniors were very involved in the firm.  Descriptions of the 
countinghouse given by Robert Bennet Forbes per 1817 and those of John Murray Forbes 
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and James Handasyd Perkins (son to Samuel G. Perkins) per 1829-1830 all indicated that 
neither of the juniors spent much time there.  John Murray Forbes wrote that while the 
juniors both took a kind interest in the clerks—taking them to the theater or teaching 
them to sail—Samuel Cabot “bore the brunt of the work at Central Wharf” and seemed 
an “indefatigable worker.”  Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. turned up when a vessel returned from 
a sea voyage.  Like his father, Tom preferred the outdoor work of overseeing cargoes and 
mariners.  James Perkins, Jr. appeared to John to not to worry himself with the business 
at all.492   
The juniors accepted the role expected of them, to go into the family firm.  The 
partnership proved profitable enough that the fathers never needed to bail out the juniors.  
But neither did any of the younger men display the entrepreneurial dynamism of William 
Sturgis, John Perkins Cushing, or John Murray Forbes.493  Instead of expanding, the firm 
largely continued with existing commissions until the firm closed in 1838—not for a lack 
of business, but for a lack of successors.  Colonel Perkins probed John Perkins Cushing, 
offering “the Head of our Hong,” but Cushing demurred.494  In 1828, another son-in-law, 
Thomas G. Cary, agreed to partner with Samuel Cabot and Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. 
following the retirement and passing of James Perkins, Jr.   Cary was not inexperienced.  
Beginning in 1821, Cary partnered with his brothers Henry and William Ferdinand Cary 
                                                 
492 Quoted in Cunningham, Owl's Nest, 29-30.  Thomas Perkins, Jr.’s business correspondence 
indicates he did participate in the indoor work to a certain extent, but the overall characterization of Samuel 
Cabot, Jr. as the real workhorse of the firm appears fair.  
493 Even Samuel Cabot seemed more of a workhorse than a businessman.  John M. Forbes, who 
bore deep affection for Cabot, wrote in 1829 that at times the man seemed to prefer a bad deal to a good 
one from the greater certainty of getting paid.  Forbes and Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John 
Murray Forbes, vol. 1, p. 58. 
494 Perkins & Sons, Boston to John Perkins Cushing, 18 May 1827.  JEC Extracts.  “After a busy 
life of 20 years’ uninterrupted labor, we doubt if you will be content to remain quiet.  We offer you the 





in a New York-based commission house.  The Carys came from Chelsea, Massachusetts, 
but most of the Cary brothers followed the eldest, Henry, in establishing themselves in 
New York.  But as Perkins and Cabot sought to retire, there was no one to take up the 
mantle of the Perkins’s commercial legacy.495  Given that the basic sinews of the network 
continued beyond the flagship firm’s demise, the closure of Perkins & Co. of Boston is 
curious. 
Most accounts of Perkins & Co. of Boston suggest that the firm failed.  This is a 
logical conclusion given the firm officially closed its doors on January 1, 1838, not long 
after the nation’s sharp economic downturn in the wake of the Panic of 1837.496  Rather 
than a bankruptcy, the firm’s failure was a failure of succession.  Of the three partners, 
Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. had made moves to retire on several occasions and Samuel Cabot 
had just lost his son and successor, T. Handasyd Cabot, who died of smallpox in Canton 
in 1836.  Thomas G. Cary displayed a willingness to locate a new partner, but found no 
one with the skill, capital, and most importantly the will necessary to energize the 
venerable firm of Perkins & Co.  Thus, after 1838, Perkins & Co. was no more.    
John Perkins Cushing and John Murray Forbes both declined to pick up the 
mantle of the Boston firm at different points.  Both displayed the acumen and returned 
from China with the capital needed to reinvigorate the Boston trading house.  Neither 
found the prospect appealing.  Cushing, certainly, was ready to retire in 1828.  But his 
                                                 
495 Cary & Co. of New York failed in 1837, as did many countinghouses in the wake of the 
financial panic of 1837.  
496 This was not a bankruptcy, but nor was the firm flourishing.  By Samuel Cabot’s tabulations of 
the trial balances in 1838, the firm’s partners stood to make approximately $125,000 at its closure.  This 
was not inconsiderable, but it was a small sum compared with the estimates following the closure of the 
second establishment with the death of James Perkins, Jr. of $1,127,432.49.  Samuel Cabot to T. H. 
Perkins, 9 January 1838.  Thomas H. Perkins Papers, Box 2, Folder 2.9.  MHS; Perkins & Sons, Boston to 





letters to Thomas T. Forbes, his chosen successor, show that Cushing contemplated 
breaking with the Perkinses entirely.  In reorganizing the new Canton house on Forbes’s 
behalf, Cushing laid down fairly stiff terms for the partners of Perkins & Sons.  He 
warned Tom Forbes that if the Perkinses did not comply, he would back out and the two 
would proceed on their own in collaboration with Bryant & Sturgis.  He proposed that the 
two Perkins juniors and Samuel Cabot concern themselves only with supplying cash 
capital (one-third of a million dollars each).497  Cushing aimed to limit the influence the 
young Perkins inheritors had on the running of the firm.498   
These negotiations for a new China house fell apart with Forbes’s untimely death 
in a boating accident.  When Forbes died, Cushing wrote to the young man’s mother that 
“Canton now appears to have lost that interest to me which it formerly possessed when I 
was looking forward to the useful and honorable career of him who is thus suddenly and 
prematurely cut off in the midst of his usefulness.”499  Cushing already seemed reticent to 
join other potential successors in business with the Perkinses.  Yet Tom Forbes’s death 
must have been difficult for Cushing.  The younger man was not just his successor, he 
was his legacy.  After Forbes’s death, Cushing retired from business entirely.  Cushing 
merged the Canton house with Samuel Russell & Co. and made arrangements for Tom 
                                                 
497 Cushing also desired that Forbes should have access to one-fourth of the capital, interest free, 
and that the agency should focus on the China trade.  John Perkins Cushing to Thomas T. Forbes, 23 
November 1828.  Bryant & Sturgis Papers, Volume 12.  Baker. 
498 In Cushing’s letters to Forbes, it seems it was not simply the younger men Cushing desired to 
constrain.  He urged Forbes to be wary of Colonel Perkins writing him to overextend himself with large 
shipments.  “The Col. you must recollect is rather forgetful and sometimes recommends what at other times 
he condemns.”  John Perkins Cushing to Thomas T. Forbes, 14 October 1828.  Thomas H. Perkins Papers, 
Box 2, Folder 2.8.  MHS.  Perkins was more wont to take large risks than Cushing, as in the zeal the elder 
merchant displayed in the Turkish opium market, overextending the firm to a degree that clearly displeased 
Cushing. 
499 John Perkins Cushing to Margaret Perkins Forbes, 21 October 1830.  Bryant & Sturgis Papers, 





Forbes’s younger brother, John, to take a place in the house with a fast track to 
partnership.  He had first offered the place to Robert Bennet Forbes, but after consulting 
with Colonel Perkins and William Sturgis, Bennet opted for a maritime post as captain of 
the Lintin, the network’s opium smuggling vessel.  Cushing handed over his fortune to 
Bryant & Sturgis (and thus his good friend William Sturgis) to administer as an 
investment fund.  Cushing took his place in the family’s circle and supported kin socially 
and financially, but he wanted no part in the running of the Perkins network.500   
By 1837, Perkins & Co. of Boston was at a crossroads.  Both Robert Bennet 
Forbes and John Murray Forbes considered taking over the firm.  Bennet wrote to his 
cousin Paul Sieman Forbes about the prospect, but the Panic of 1837 interceded and 
nearly bankrupted Bennet.501  John suggested the prospect of the same cousin partnering 
with Thomas Graves Cary.  At the time, Cary had pitched a partnership with John 
himself.  John declined.  His explanation was tactful and perhaps sincere, but it was not 
entirely honest.  He wrote:  “I have often thought that if more money became necessary 
to me, I should want  no safer and surer road to a fortune than would be secured by 
joining forces with you in business.  As it is, however, I hope ere long to wind up my 
Canton Concerns, with ballast enough left, to enable me to lead a lazy quiet cottage life, 
without doing more work than is agreeable to me, and that I fear is very little.”502  Forbes 
                                                 
500 Thus, for example, Cushing wrote letters of introduction for kin and loaned Bennet Forbes the 
funds to hide his insolvency from creditors in 1837.  He played chess with Colonel Perkins and had 
celebrated parties.  But by and large, he left commerce behind with his retirement.  This was not the case 
with many of his kinsman, like Colonel Perkins and William Sturgis, who never really retired. 
501 See the letters between Paul Sieman Forbes and Robert Bennet Forbes in the Forbes Family 
Papers, Box 4, Folders 41b and 46.  Baker. 
502 John M. Forbes to Thomas G. Cary, 19 December 1838, 14 December 1838.  Forbes Family 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 14.  Baker.  On Forbes’s future as an industrial investor, see especially Johnson and 





instead went into business for himself as John Murray Forbes & Co.  His “quiet cottage” 
stood across the street from his mother and sisters at “Chateau Forbes,” all of whom he 
put to work helping with both the care of his twin daughters and serving as copyists for 
his continued mercantile affairs.  John M. Forbes’s decision to opt out of a partnership 
may have been personal.  In those economically troubled years following his return, 
Forbes focused on family affairs.  He took on his brother’s as well as his own obligations 
soon after returning to Milton.  He managed funds for his siblings in order to ensure their 
economic security.   
But it is striking that the firm had no other individuals in the pipeline for 
succession.  No one within the family exerted pressure on younger men to take up the 
mantle of the family firm.  While young yet, even as they came of age, the grandchildren 
of James and Thomas H. Perkins showed little inclination to commerce.  Rather, they 
seemed evidence of Cleveland Amory’s old adage of Boston’s “first families.”  Family 
histories followed the merchants:  the ante-merchant era scarcely mattered and the post-
merchant era was largely a matter of not outspending the merchant’s fortune.   
Alternately, the family needed to produce new merchants to make up the difference.  For 
the offspring of James and Thomas H. Perkins, their wealth allowed them to travel 
Europe, collect and write about art, and live leisured lives.503  Contrast this with the work 
                                                                                                                                                 
Process, Larson, Bonds of Enterprise : John Murray Forbes and Western Development in America's 
Railway Age, Yaggy, "John Forbes: Entrepreneur." 
503 The grandchildren of James and Thomas H. Perkins, the partners of the initial Boston firm in 
1792, used their inheritance to participate in philanthropy and artistic circles unencumbered by work for 
wages.  Charles Callahan Perkins was probably the best known of the Perkinses in this generation.  Charles 
Perkins attended both William Wells’s school and Harvard with Thomas Wentworth Higginson, who 
described him as attractive and refined and, best of all, possessor of a liberal income.  Perkins used said 
liberal income to support art and music education and enjoyment in Boston.  He was the first American 
accepted to the French Academy and a founder and honorary director of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts 





that John and Bennet Forbes put into marshalling kin into a “Forbes dynasty.”  Russell & 
Co. was no longer a family firm.  Partners came from a variety of allied families and 
contacts.  But John, Bennet, and Sieman Forbes at various points collaborated to ensure a 
controlling interest in the firm and to keep the family interest alive.504  Russell & Co. 
continued to trade with Russell & Sturgis in Manila, Baring Brothers in London, Cary & 
Co. in New York, William Appleton and Samuel Hooper in Boston (William Sturgis’s 
successors), as well as John Murray Forbes & Co. in Boston, amongst others.  The 
younger men who went to China in the mid- to late-nineteenth century tended to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
books and give lectures about art, architecture, music, and history.  The legacies of the early merchant 
fortunes poured into the creation of a cosmopolitan Boston society. 
Along with the marriages to Harvard professors observed by Ronald Story, Perkins women 
married men with other artistic proclivities and followed their own literary pursuits.  None would approach 
the quiet fame of Carrie Sturgis Tappan or her sister Ellen, but Sarah Perkins (Cleveland) seems to have 
played a similar behind the scenes role of inspiring others.  Mary Louisa Cary married Cornelius C. Felton 
and Elizabeth Perkins Cary married Louis Agassiz, Harvard professors both.  Sarah Perkins, Charles’s 
sister and granddaughter to James Perkins, married Henry Russell Cleveland.  Her cousin Louisa Perkins 
married the painter William Morris Hunt.  Sarah and Henry Cleveland traveled in literary and philanthropic 
circles, but Henry closed his school for boys soon after marrying Sarah.  They both participated in the 
circle of friends known as the “Five of Clubs”:  Hal Cleveland, Corny Felton, Henry W. Longfellow, 
George Hillard, and Charley Sumner.  William Hunt, by contrast, continued an active career as a painter 
and art teacher known for cultivating female artists.  See the Cleveland-Perkins Papers, NYPL and the 
Sarah Perkins Cleveland Papers, Houghton, Henry Russell and George Stillman Hillard Cleveland, A 
Selection from the Writings of Henry R. Cleveland:  With a Memoir (Boston: n.p., 1844), Martha J. Hoppin, 
"Women Artists in Boston, 1870-1900:  The Pupils of William Morris Hunt," American Art Journal 13, no. 
1 (1981): 17-46, Anne-Marie Taylor, Young Charles Sumner and the Legacy of the American 
Enlightenment, 1811-1851 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), Taylor, Young Charles 
Sumner and the Legacy of the American Enlightenment, 1811-1851.  Interestingly enough, several of the 
grandchildren of Samuel Cabot and Barbara Higginson made their way back into commerce and finance, 
perhaps because the middle generation had opted out of commerce leaving little for them to live off.  
Charles Elliot Perkins and his brother Edward both followed this pattern.     
504 The cousins calculated in private letters who within Russell & Co. felt “obligated” to them and 
could be counted on to favor the “Forbes interest.”  As Bennet wrote to Sieman, “The moment you leave 
the field, the Forbes dynasty and control must end—unless you get into the concern men who have some 
obligation toward us.”  In between themselves, the Forbes cousins referred to Russell & Co. as a “Forbes 
dynasty,” but when it seemed Russell Sturgis might manage the house, Bennet Forbes broadened it once 
again to a “Boston concern.”  Robert Bennet Forbes to Paul Sieman Forbes, 23 March 1848, 5 March 1849.  
Forbes Family Papers, Box 4, Folder 47.  Baker.  Sieman wrote to John:  “As you well know my chief 
reason for renewing the engagement with R & Co at the end of 1852 was to keep up the connection of my 
friends with the house and with the view of introducing a nephew of mine when I should finally retire.”  
Paul Sieman Forbes to John Murray Forbes 21 July 1853.  Forbes Family Papers, Box 4, Folder 48.  Baker.  
On the Forbes interest, see for example, Robert Bennet Forbes to Paul Sieman Forbes, 8 December 1843.  





Forbeses, not Perkinses.  Thus, by the 1840s the basic sinews of the commercial network 
proceeded, but without the Perkinses.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter suggests that kinship did psychic and not just structural work for 
merchant families and their businesses.  Understandings of familial obligation shaped 
business strategies beyond a nepotistic desire to profit favored children.  Rather, in more 
subtle ways, the overlap of family and firm directed attention, care, and sentiments in 
ways that helped to construct an elaborate web of filial obligation.  Scholars tend to see 
filial ties as obstructing a more pure and profitable business impulse.  Certainly James 
and Thomas H. Perkinses efforts to provide for their juniors enriched favored sons more 
than the family firms.  But this father-son relationship was not the only way in which 
family ties shaped business and vice versa. 
For sons and brothers, daughters and sisters, the yoking together of gender-based 
obligations to the virtue or well-being of family members could provide a potent call to 
action than a duty to self.  While domesticity is often understood as an ideology removing 
women from marketplace labor (no matter their actual contributions), it is in seeing 
domesticity as a masculine trait in pressing men to work rather than simply keeping 
women from it that most clearly demonstrates the ideology’s productive capacity.  For 
women like Elizabeth Peck Perkins, Sarah Cabot, and Margaret Perkins Forbes, their 
social entrepreneurialism as mothers served the commercial network well.  Opting out of 
the “family business,” either by choosing another career path or refusing to marry, was a 





James and Thomas H. Perkins were both products of a moment and place in 
which wealth carried implications of a particular social merit, status, and obligation.  In 
Thomas H. Perkins’s letters to his son, Perkins wrote of his obligation to his son and his 
son’s obligation to his mother and sisters.  The bonds did not go one way, but demanded 
a sort of reciprocity.  By the time John Murray Forbes and his wife wrote similar letters 
to their children and prospective guardians, the couple emphasized not obligation to 
siblings or themselves as parents, but a need for their children to perform useful labor for 
society. 505  Obligations and interests were not axiomatic, but socially constructed. 
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CHAPTER 4.   
INTANGIBLE ASSETS:   
PATRONAGE, PATERNALISM, AND GLOBAL FINANCING  
IN THE AMERICAN CHINA TRADE. 
 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, James and Thomas Perkins saw China as a 
pivot in their trading interests.  Their other regional interests contained commodities of 
interest to the China market.  Pacific sea otter furs, South American silver, Mediterranean 
and South Asian opium, and Filipino rice made for a global commerce—all of which 
relied upon Chinese demand on one end and the European and American taste for tea on 
the other.  In the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries, a single Canton voyage 
could tie up funds anywhere from a year to three, or even longer if goods were held from 
the market to await an improvement in price.  Long-distance trade demanded not only 
capable agents who would mind Perkins’ interests while on the other side of the globe, 
but also far more capital than had been required for the West Indies trade.  Pooling 
capital with family and friends allowed merchants to amass larger sums while also 
mitigating risk; if a single venture shipwrecked or fared poorly, the loss would be split 
amongst a number of families.  Beyond these basic building blocks of international trade 
however, the Perkinses strengthened their position in commerce through powerful 
partnerships with foreign firms.  While the Perkinses maintained a strong inner circle of 
trusted kin and neighbors and a weaker circle of regular agents with whom they traded 
and corresponded about markets in distant ports, they also cultivated a mid-level tier of 
preferred relationships with the Wus of Canton and the Barings of London.   
This chapter examines the ties between these distinct but overlapping commercial 
circles, assessing the ways in which kinship provided a repertoire of behavioral and 





culminating with their relationship with the Barings.  As Philip Curtin surveyed in his 
Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, traders have built and patterned long-distance 
networks on a plethora of relationships, from kinship and guild ties to religious and 
ethnic groups, from marrying into local societies to maintaining distinct social enclaves 
within a foreign port.506  What is interesting about the Perkins-Wu relationship is that it 
most closely resembled paternalist expectation of father and son, merchant and 
apprentice—a familial relationship not often discussed in terms of cross-cultural inter-
firm behavior.  As such, the relationship challenges the traditional historiographical 
expectations of power and influence running from Western traders into China:  the 
Perkinses’ success depended to a considerable extent on their relationship with the Wu 
family.   
The Barings, by contrast, did connect families.  Baring partner Joshua Bates 
corresponded regularly with his wife’s Sturgis kin.  Russell Sturgis of this clan later 
became a senior partner in Baring Brothers as well.  Americans had more familiarity with 
London’s mode of business and finance than with China’s:  London continued to be 
America’s financial capital well into the nineteenth century, even as New York gained 
ground mid-century.  Even as Americans rushed to launch marine insurance companies, 
banks, and other domestic financial establishments in the wake of independence from 
Britain, they patterned these companies on the London institutions with which they were 
most familiar.  Thus, it was advantageous for the Perkins’s to have the confidence of one 
of the world’s financial heavyweights—London-based Baring Brothers.  This more 
fraternal tie reflected both individual connections and the relative positions of the firms.   
                                                 





The connections that the Perkinses established within Chinese and British 
commercial circles proved essential to their expanding capacity in terms of access to 
capital, information, as well as patronage and mentorship.  These cultivated ties staved 
off crises and kept the network active during economic hard times.507  The Wus and 
Barings extended capital and choice goods and, more significantly, elected to not 
withdraw credit from the Perkins firms at critical moments.508  While the ties differed in 
substance, they similarly blended business and affective connections in order to cultivate 
preferential relationships and to better secure information, advice, and capital.509  During 
the run up to the Opium War in China, for example, the Wus advised Perkins firm 
Russell & Co. on how to negotiate local politics in order to best preserve their position. 
To the Perkinses, these preferred relationships helped them to navigate foreign legal, 
political, cultural, and economic systems.  To competitors, the relationships provided the 
Perkinses with a critical advantage that explained their success. 
 
A Chinese-American Alliance:  The Wu Family of Canton 
In 1842, John Murray Forbes wrote a letter to the esteemed Chief Hong merchant, 
Houqua (Wu Bingjian).  He wrote: 
                                                 
507 David Hancock argues that scholars need to examine failures and not simply focus on 
successful networks.  But part of what is missing in this emphasis on success or failure is an understanding 
of how networks function to help to rescue firms from likely failures.  Hancock, "The Trouble with 
Networks:  Managing the Scots’ Early Madeira Trade."  See also Edward J. Balleisen, Navigating Failure : 
Bankruptcy and Commercial Society in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001). 
508 Russell & Company’s demise in 1891 was at least in part due to the fact that they were no 
longer privy to Wu family funds and the Barings were unable to bail them out.   
509 Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship : The United States and China to 1914.  Where 
Michael Hunt writes that the head of the Wu family, “based his relationship with Americans not on 
sentiment but on a clear and immediate profit basis,” in fact there is little evidence that the connection was 





My dear Friend,   
 
This will be handed by my Cousin P.S. Forbes the son of my Father’s Elder 
Brother and for whom I have the same regard as for a Brother. 
 
He has been a Commission merchant connecting a very large business ever since 
he was 18 years old having begun his commercial operations at the same time that 
I had reached, when you took me under your fatherly care.  Since that time he has 
been hard at work chiefly in South America and possesses the confidence of some 
of the first houses in New York, among others of Howland & Aspinwall who 
have usually sent two or three ships to China yearly.   
 
Last year which in this Country the imprudence of his partner added to some 
matter imprudences of his own, involved him in shipments of coffee by which he 
lost dearly at the same time his Partner Father failed owing them considerable 
sums, his agents in London and in New Orleans both failed and finally three of his 
correspondents in this Country refused to pay for the Coffee they had 
ordered.  How could anyone stand up under such a combination of losses?  I had 
helped him to about 10000$ should have gone farther but the amount was too 
large and so I advised him to stop at once and divide his property among his 
creditors and he did so and in about six months he will probably be discharged 
from anything and whatever he can make from the time will be his own. 
 
I have perfect confidence in his integrity and he has certainly had great experience 
as a merchant, all he wants is an advisor like you to make him remember his 
former bad luck and take no more risks in future.  My Brother and I hope that 
Russell & Co. will soon take him into their house, they have cut down my Brother 
to one sixteenth which I tell him is no object for the risk of keeping his name in 
the House.  I hope you will use your influence with them now that they have 
almost turned old Forbes out to take our Cousin in.  If they do they will get a good 
working Partner and we shall do just as much as we can to promote their interest.  
Whether they take him or not I can only say to you that if you can help him in any 
way you will at the same time help me and that you may trust his integrity just as 
much as you could in mine or my Brothers.   
 
With my best compliments to your Grandson and my best wishes for yourself, 
I remain, Your friend and Servant. 
 
The letter invoked friendship, fatherly care, and family obligation both within the Forbes 
clan and between Houqua and Forbes.  In effect, John Murray Forbes entreated Houqua 
to recall the loyalty and paternal attention the older merchant had given him and to 





In expressing his own obligation to his brother and cousin—whom he had gone to 
great lengths to assist already, in whom he had great confidence, whom he regarded as a 
brother—John put forth a vision of family and commerce that he knew would appeal to 
the elderly Chinese merchant:  one in which the family structured business goals.  This 
was a value the two men shared.  John Murray Forbes went to great lengths to support his 
kin and kinship itself as a value.  But it was also probably a value that his time working 
for Houqua heightened.  In his letter, John referenced a period in the 1830s when Houqua 
took him “under [his] fatherly care.”  Like his brother and his uncle before him, Forbes 
worked as a liaison between Houqua and Western merchants and officials.  He was 
employed both by Russell & Co. and by Houqua’s I-he hong.  Through these liaisons and 
the cultivated ties they established, expressed as bonds of friendship and between 
families, the Perkins and Wu families maintained a preferential business relationship that 
endured over multiple generations.    
The Wu family of Canton collaborated with the Perkinses in trade and investment 
for much of the nineteenth century.  While their relationship was not exclusive, the 
alliance between the two families opened pathways of international commerce and 
investment that might otherwise have been closed to them.  For the Perkinses and their 
later firm, Russell & Co., the Wu family provided prestige, quality teas, and access to 
capital and information.  In return, Perkins connections allowed the Wus to diversify into 
the American and European markets and gave recourse to a network of foreign agents 
and their court systems in case of misconduct.  When American or European merchants 
failed to pay notes owed to Houqua and when the British government confiscated 





1838 and 1878, the Perkinses—or, more specifically, John Murray Forbes—invested 
millions of dollars in American stocks and bonds on behalf of the Wu family.  
While the relationship between the Wu and Perkins families is no mystery to 
scholars510, the relationship challenges historiographical expectations of a natural 
hierarchy of power and influence:  without Houqua, the Perkinses may not have become 
quite so successful.  Further, its existence flies in the face of the emphasis on cultural and 
political antagonism leading up to the Opium Wars and “unequal treaties” of mid-
century.  Much of the China-Western trade literature is dedicated to the questions of what 
led to the Opium War of 1840-1842 and the imperialist, unequal treaties that followed, 
and whether Western trade helped or hindered Chinese economic development in the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries.511  The relationships between the firms considered in 
                                                 
510 Downs, The Golden Ghetto : The American Commercial Community at Canton and the 
Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844, Hao, The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century 
China : The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism, Yen-p ing Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth 
Century China: Bridge between East and West (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1970), Hunt, The 
Making of a Special Relationship : The United States and China to 1914. 
511 Much of the China-Western trade literature is dedicated to the questions of what led to the 
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this chapter are pertinent to both:  the Perkinses were significant opium traffickers, they 
were pivotal in the continuation of trade with China during the Opium War—but also 
shaped the terms of American negotiations of their own “unequal treaty” with Chinese 
officials—and they invested in Chinese development from banks and manufacturing to 
China’s first steamship line.  While the Wu-Perkins connection did not obviate conflict, 
prejudice, or, as we shall see, a willingness to sell opium, it suggests that the Chinese-
American relationship was more complex than the political trajectories allow. 
Preferential ties like that of the Wu and Perkins firms were not uncommon 
between Chinese and Western merchants in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries.  
The Yan family collaborated extensively with Danish traders; the British firm of Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. had close ties with Mouqua, Manhop,and Hingtae; and Pankequa 
favored Swedish merchants.512  In fact, there were several reasons why cultivating 
loyalties, merging business with personal ties, made strategic sense for Chinese 
merchants in Canton in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries.  Chinese merchants 
depended on these personal relationships for recourse if and when other foreigners 
absconded with their funds and merchandise.  Foreign merchants provided an outlet for 
capital in the face of few domestic opportunities for investment.513  And finally, sending 
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out ventures in the names of trusted foreign merchants kept the funds out of the hands of 
grasping officials.514 
The Wu-Perkins relationship joined two kinship-based commercial networks, but 
it began with two individuals:  John Perkins Cushing and Wu Bingjian.  Wu Bingjian (伍
秉鉴)515, better known to contemporaries as Houqua (浩官)516, may well have been the 
richest man in the world in the early nineteenth century.  In 1834, he estimated his wealth 
at $26 million.517  Compare this, for example, with Stephen Girard’s estimated wealth of 
$7 million at the time of his death in 1831, or Nathan Rothschild’s estimated wealth of 
$17.85 million in 1837.518  Houqua’s fame was such that paintings of the elderly 
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merchant decorated the offices and homes of his correspondents, including the Perkinses 
and the Barings.519  Visitors to Great Britain could even see his likeness amongst 
Madame Tussaud’s waxwork collection.520  Over the course of his lifetime, Houqua was 
one of the most significant trading partners not only to the Perkinses and other American 
merchants, but also to the British East India Company. 
Houqua was born in 1769 to a trading family that originated from Quanzhou, 
Fujian, a trading capital along China’s eastern seaboard but whose line had settled in 
Nanhai close to Canton.521  His father, Wu Guoying, began trading in Canton in 1777.  
This earlier Houqua worked his way up as a purser to leading Hong merchant Pankequa, 
where he did well enough to earn solicitations from Chinese officials to become a Hong 
merchant in his own right.522  The word “hong” in Chinese refers to a firm or company on 
the one hand, as in the I-he hong, and a special cadre of merchants (Hong merchants) 
licensed to trade with foreigners on the other.  The Chinese government established the 
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Canton-based Co-Hong in 1760 as a means to protect and stabilize trade with foreign 
traders.   
The Co-Hong was an organization of the wealthiest merchants in Canton and, 
officially at least, the only ones allowed by the government to trade with foreigners.523  In 
exchange for the prerogative of access to foreign trade, Hong merchants were both 
responsible for the foreigners with whom they traded and for the debts of their fellow 
merchants.  Thus, while membership was potentially lucrative, the obligations could also 
be onerous.524  As W.E. Cheong writes in Mandarins and Merchants, “Membership was 
sought after by pursers or cashiers of the old Hong merchants to strike out on their own, 
sons of established merchants by contrast sought every means to evade the duty of 
succeeding their father’s title.”525  Wu Guoying had seen enough of this dubious privilege 
to question its worth.  Initially, he refused Hong membership.  A British East India 
Company official provided the following tongue-in-cheek report of his fate: 
Howqua, Puankhequa’s Purser, had also been mentioned, but positively 
refused to comply; & absconded for some time; as a punishment for which 
he is compelled to be a Salt Merchant which will probably ruin him very 
shortly.  He now repents very sincerely that he did not accept the Hoppo’s 
Offer of Hong Chop.526  
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524 Chen, "The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1843.", W. E. Cheong, The Hong 
Merchants of Canton : Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997), 
White, "The Hong Merchants of Canton." 
525 Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants: Jardine, Matheson, & Co., a China Agency of the Early 
Nineteenth Century, 25. 






For whatever reason, Guoying eventually changed his mind.  Guoying served as a 
member of the Co-Hong from 1784 until 1789 when officials expelled him for the 
inability to pay his taxes.527   
In the Chinese record, Guoying is remembered as a wealthy merchant who earned 
a posthumous title and who, above all, was part of a family that had contributed 
immensely to the southern Chinese city of Nanhai.528  But his reputation was less than 
stellar amongst the foreign merchants.  Rhode Island merchant Samuel Shaw wrote that 
he “delayed performing his contract, absented himself almost continually from his hong, 
smoked opium, absconded on the 24th December, was declared bankrupt, and his effects 
were seized.”529  Perhaps it is not surprising then that when his eldest son, Wu Bingzhun, 
followed his father into the Canton trade, he opted for a new trade name, Puiqua, rather 
than adopt his father’s mantle.  In 1792, Bingzhun received his Hong Chop, or official 
license to sell as a Hong merchant.530  Until his sudden death in 1801, he worked hard to 
restore his family’s reputation.   
When Wu Bingjian followed his brother into trade, he also adopted the name 
Puiqua, but records indicate that Wu was soon using both merchant names, Houqua and 
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Puiqua.531  According to Hosea Morse, he seemed to use the name Puiqua for tea 
contracts and Houqua for diplomatic work, but he used the name Houqua with the 
American merchants from their first contract for tea in April 1804.   532  He continued use 
of the name Puiqua for the family hong until 1827 when he formally changed it to 
Houqua so that his brothers would have no difficulty claiming shares in the firm on the 
event of his death.533  Through his commercial acumen, he recast the name so that rather 
than recall his father’s failure, the name Houqua and that of the family hong, the I-he or 
Ewo Hang  (義和行), connoted his own spectacular success.534   
When 16 year old John Perkins Cushing arrived in Canton in 1803, Wu Bingjian 
had just taken over the family hong from his older brother.  Cushing first traveled to 
China as assistant to his uncles’ chosen agent, Ephraim Bumstead.  At a time when most 
American traders engaged shipboard supercargoes (sales’ agents) to handle their trade 
from port to port, James and Thomas Perkins charged Bumstead with establishing a new 
Canton-based firm to handle trading interests for their circle and his own.  The Perkinses 
bet that having an agent in residence to make on the spot decisions would prove an 
advantage in the competitive East Indies market.  When Thomas Perkins initially sailed 
to Asia in 1789, he found a cosmopolitan community of foreign traders operating out of 
Canton; fourteen years later, when Cushing and Bumstead arrived, the bulk of the ships 
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stopping at the port were British and American.  As of yet, there were still few Americans 
in residence in China, but more and more American ships were arriving every year.  In 
addition to the Canton residents settled by the Dutch, Swedish, Spanish, or British 
companies (in 1799 this population totaled 28), the EIC tally of 1802 included three 
English merchants operating under the auspices of the Prussian flag and two Americans.  
In 1802, the British East India Company (EIC) recorded the arrival of 82 ships, 70 of 
which flew either British or American flags.535  Napoleon’s war on the European 
continent had disrupted the prospects of their competitors across the Atlantic, and the 
Perkinses leapt into the breach.  
The Perkins brothers were anxious to put as many cargoes into play as possible 
while their European competitors remained preoccupied with war on the continent.  In 
early 1805, the Boston firm sent out six ships scheduled to arrive in Canton:  the 
Mandarin, the Montezuma, the Globe, and the General Washington, as well as the 
Hazard and the Caroline circling from the Pacific Northwest.  The Mandarin alone 
carried 300,000 silver dollars in her hold to purchase Chinese goods.536  The Perkins 
placed a lot of faith in their former head clerk.   
As early as February 1804, Colonel Thomas H. Perkins wrote to Ephraim 
Bumstead of the utter dearth of silver to be had by American traders—a shortage they 
contributed to by shipping what could be found to China (such as the above-mentioned 
Mandarin cargo).  The solution, Perkins felt, was to form a close bond with a well-off 
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Chinese merchant who might allow them to further their trade on credit.537  While their 
trade with Houqua began in April of 1804, Bumstead died tragically before he was able 
to see to Perkins’s request.538  As mentioned in chapter two, the Perkinses scrambled to 
find a replacement for Bumstead.  Instead, somewhat ironically, it was the still 
apprenticed Cushing, the nephew already residing in Canton, who saved the day and in 
the process won his uncles’ esteem. 
 This outcome was by no means evident as the Perkins brothers imagined the 
sixteen-year old Cushing standing between them and bankruptcy.  In a harried letter, the 
Perkinses informed Cushing they “calculated upon your throwing off juvenile pursuits.”  
They urged him to “let the warm councils of your Grandmother still vibrate in your ear” 
for “You will have a great charge on you, and such as few young men ever meet with . . . 
future well-being depends on y’r conduct in this crisis.”539  They still worked behind the 
scenes to send Burling out, even as they rhapsodized rather frantically of how they 
wished they had had such opportunities to distinguish themselves in their youth.540  On 
May 4, 1805, the partners wrote with a heavy heart:  the first of their vessels, the 
Guatamozin, had arrived and it was in bad order.  Boxes of tea were broken, rendering it 
unsalable.  Worse, they had not heard from Cushing and had no idea of his condition or 
their prospects.  Was he simply bashful about his abilities, they wondered?  Two days 
later, however, they received a letter Cushing had written on December 10, 1804, 
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followed by the arrival of a second ship, the Hazard, on May 16, 1805.  Both proved that 
Cushing was attentive and able.  The detailed letters that now arrived from Cushing eased 
and elated his uncles’ minds.  In 1808, the Perkins brothers forwarded their nephew a 
letter that proved his worth beyond a doubt:  a letter indicating that Hope & Co., the 
preeminent Amsterdam trading house, was “labouring under the idea that the cargoes 
were selected by a Dutch factor.”541  Given that teas for the American market were 
notoriously lower in quality than those selected for the European market—especially the 
Dutch market—this was a high compliment indeed. 
 In 1805, Ephraim Bumstead & Co. became Perkins & Co. of Canton.  Cushing 
was still apprenticed to his uncles at the time, but was given a share of the partnership 
upon his majority in 1807.  The trading house handled business on its own account as 
well as on commission (generally at a rate of 2 ½%).  The general structure of the firm 
was to have one resident manager abroad (Cushing and later Thomas Tunno Forbes), one 
to two clerks (Forbes and John Hartt), as well as employing Portuguese copyists and 
Chinese servants.     
We do not know how the Wu-Perkins relationship commenced.  Trade between 
the Perkinses and Houqua began as early as 1804, but when did Houqua bring Cushing 
under his wing?  It is possible that Cushing’s ability, especially in selecting superior teas, 
derived from collaboration with Houqua already.  In February of 1804, Thomas H. 
Perkins had called on the Canton branch to seek out a special relationship with a Chinese 
merchant in order to secure in credit.  In commenting on the excellent quality of the 
Hazard’s cargo, for example, the Perkins brothers commented that the packing had held 
                                                 





the teas in perfect order.  Sealed chests rendered it impossible to ensure the quality of the 
teas were as purchased but, the brothers conceded, “in dealing with such men as 
Puankequa and Houqua, we perceive that opening two or three in a chop [official stamp, 
here a quantity bearing the merchant’s official stamp or seal] would suffice.”542   
Initially, Bumstead and Cushing traded with a variety of Chinese merchants, 
Hong and not.  While the Hong merchants ostensibly had a monopoly on trade with 
foreigners, in practice trade with non-Hong merchants fluctuated with official willingness 
to look the other way.  For a fee, Hong merchants allowed shopkeepers to use their 
“chop” on shipments, thus providing the official Hong license for outbound cargoes.  The 
two Americans bought teas from Yamqua, Kinqua, and Houqua, nankeens from Poonqua 
and Youqua, Chinaware from Exching.  On November 25, 1804, however, Cushing 
received a warning.  Consequa, from whom the young firm had purchased a fair stock of 
teas, fabrics, and other goods, passed them counterfeit money.  When they demanded that 
he exchange the counterfeit for good money, Consequa refused.543  As far as can be 
determined, they never traded with him again.544  The experience underscored the 
importance of cultivating relationships with merchants and shopkeepers they could trust. 
There are several reasons why a relationship with an American firm might have 
been appealing to Houqua.  First, when Ephraim Bumstead and John Perkins Cushing 
arrived in Canton in 1803 to establish a local house, there were precious few other 
foreign merchants to trade with.  War between Britain and France took its toll on most 
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European merchants.  Where in the late eighteenth century Americans found a diverse 
community of traders dominated by the British East India Company—Arabs, Armenians, 
Austrians, British, Danes, Dutch, French, Parsees, Portuguese, Prussians, Spaniards, 
Swedes, various kinds of Italians, and Jews from the Near East—the French Revolution 
and subsequent European wars created an opening for the geographically-advantaged 
Americans.545  As Paul Van Dyke has noted, neutral Armenians, Muslims, Parsees, and 
Americans were especially sought after as trading partners in times of trouble.546 
Certainly as important as this, however, was the fact that the Americans were not 
British.  Chinese merchants joked that it was hard to tell the difference between British 
and American nationals, but given the role the East India Company played in 
“regulating” the foreign community at Canton and representing their interests to Chinese 
officials, the difference was not a small one. Houqua likely found it a strategic advantage 
to cultivate ties outside of the British Company officials and their private counterparts.   
Last and certainly not least, Americans came with cash (specie or silver).  During 
the first decade of the nineteenth century, American merchants brought over two million 
Spanish dollars annually.547  Americans pushed the silver market to the brink:  according 
to the Perkinses, American efforts to take advantage of the European distraction had 
drained the silver market on the American continent.  Even the banks were short.  The 
combined impact of rebellions against Spanish rule in South America and Jefferson’s 
Embargo, beginning in 1809, further depleted the China market of American bullion.  
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Americans turned to bills on their London bankers as an alternative to silver.  According 
to W.E. Cheong in Mandarins and Merchants, bills of exchange took off in the China 
trade in the early nineteenth century, but vacillations in the ability to bring silver—the 
end of the “Manila Galleons” or Spanish shipments of American silver to Asia via Manila 
in 1811, political upheaval in the Americas, the drainage of specie, the dangers of 
carrying specie through pirate or privateer-infested waters—all contributed to a surge in 
demand for alternate forms of financing.  The market in private bills (credit) developed 
over the subsequent decades.548  Given the importance of Americans as carriers of silver 
to the China market, their shift to bills and opium marked a significant departure in the 
market.  While the Perkinses shifted to both opium and bills on London, they continued 
to seek silver for Houqua.549 
By 1814, letters from Houqua referred to Perkins & Co. as his “general agents.”550  
Many of these letters were specific to the spillover effect from the wars raging in Europe 
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and the Atlantic, including the British-American War of 1812.  The Perkinses sought to 
navigate the war-torn Atlantic to earn Houqua’s esteem.  They provided recourse against 
other private merchants who owed Houqua money.  They lobbied on Houqua’s behalf to 
secure spoliation claims from the French and British Admiralties from seizures of the 
Chinese merchant’s property.551  The political conflagrations shaped not only prices, 
insurance, and the possibility of attacks on ships in the Atlantic, they also carried over 
into the political and social relations of Westerners in Asia.  During the War of 1812, for 
example, Chinese officials streamlined the entry of ships into the Boca Tigris, the 
entryway upriver to Canton, in order to prevent fighting between belligerents of a war 
half a world on their doorstep.552   
On April 25, 1815, the Perkinses wrote a long letter on the state of Houqua’s 
goods in their hands, concluding with gratitude for the “kindness and friendship” the 
older man had given Cushing:   
We hope now that Peace is restored, we shall be again enabled to give you 
new proofs of our zeal to promote your interest.  . . . We now beg leave to 
make you our warm acknowledgments for the confidence you have been 
pleased to repose in us: & the unvaried kindness and friendship you have 
bestowed on our friend and relation Mr. Cushing.   
 
The relationship had begun.   
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Over the course of the first decade of the nineteenth century, Houqua had 
distinguished himself amongst the Chinese trading community.  Houqua officially 
became head of the Co-Hong in 1812, following the death of Mouqua that winter.  But 
well before this, Chinese and foreign merchants alike came to Houqua for advice and 
authority.  In many ways he took over the role Pankequa had played a generation prior:  
guiding relations between the Chinese and foreign communities to ensure peaceful 
intercourse between the two.  While local officials of the British East India Company 
complained that Houqua was “too timid” to be effective in negotiating with Chinese 
officials (a common complaint of theirs to criticize those who did not fall in line with 
them) and that his wealth was a constant attraction for those officials to squeeze him for 
funds, part of their disquiet came from their dependence on the prominent merchant as he 
handled the bulk of their trade.553  Establishing a preferential relationship with Houqua 
was a coup for the Perkinses, and they knew it. 
As mentioned above, the relationship was not exclusive:  Houqua traded with 
other merchants as well, including Samuel Russell, the original founder of Russell & Co.  
The nature and duration of his and his family’s ties to the Perkinses was unique however.  
For the Perkinses, the relationship with Houqua was treated as a valued asset that they 
passed down from one individual to succeeding family representatives.  When Perkins & 
Co. merged with Russell & Co. in 1828, the Perkinses used their special relationship with 
Houqua to ensure their authority within the new firm.  While Houqua did not accept 
successors uncritically, recommendations from one family member to the next mattered 
and allowed for ties close enough to be used as a negotiating chip for the younger men 
                                                 





within their own firms and in their general business.  The question is, why did the 
relationship take the form that it did?  What benefits did a more paternal relationship 
offer?  Assuming that Houqua took the initiative, and it is hard to imagine that he did not, 
why did he select younger merchants for collaboration rather than peers?      
Much of what we know about the relationship Houqua had with John Perkins 
Cushing and his successors, Thomas Tunno Forbes, John Murray Forbes, and later 
Robert Bennet Forbes comes from later writings.554  John Murray Forbes, for example, 
described his experience in his memoirs: 
Houqua, who never did anything by halves, at once took me as Mr. 
Cushing’s successor, and that of my brother Tom, who had been his 
intimate friend, and gave me his entire confidence.  All his foreign letters 
were handed me to read, and to prepare such answers as he indicated, 
which, after being read to him, were usually signed and sent without 
alteration.  Some of these were letters of friendship, but more often of a 
public or business nature, and occasionally of almost national 
importance.555 
 
In 1835, Forbes explained the relationship to his wife as follows: 
I have great advantages over any one in Canton in Houqua’s head and 
purse; he seems really to be interested for me and has given solid proofs of 
friendship.  Little of a merchant as you are, you can imagine the intimacy 
and confidence of the person who has entire control over the foreign trade, 
and who has a fortune of 15 to 20,000,000--20 millions of dollars--which 
enables him to lord it over the other ten Hong merchants, most of whom 
are poor.  Through his means, we always have money when all the other 
Houses are pinched.  Had I not joined Russell & Co. I might probably at 
this moment have been rich, as I should have shared all the old 
gentleman’s foreign trade which he does under my name to amount of 6 or 
700,000, all of which this year (under my advice) will turn out 
famously.556 
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Houqua and the American merchants communicated in a Chinese-Portuguese-English 
patois “pidgin.”  He could not read or write English, and they could not speak or read 
Chinese.557  The Americans read letters aloud to the older gentleman, translating English 
to pidgin, and penned dictated responses on his behalf, translating them into a more 
standardized English.  They chartered ships and cargoes, managed the loading and 
unpacking of cargoes, and tracked the progress of these global ventures.  In addition to 
his work for Russell & Co., Forbes was an employee of Houqua’s I-he hong.  Forbes 
wrote that before he was even 18 years old he had over half a million dollars afloat in the 
world.558   
 Yet his youth was important.  A rebuke Houqua gave Forbes on a poorly handled 
commission is revealing.  By the late 1820s, Baring Brotherss were the London bankers 
for the Perkinses and thus managed Houqua’s British dealings on their behalf.  The 
Barings placed their own judgment of the Chinese market above Houqua’s orders.  As 
Houqua’s mediating agent, the responsibility for the shipment fell to Forbes.  This was 
not acceptable.  But despite his censure, Houqua sought to affirm his faith in Forbes as 
follows:  “I allow you a wide range of authority,” he wrote, “because I consider that you 
have the advantage of long training under my personal care and must therefore 
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necessarily be better acquainted with my wishes and able to determine what course I 
would myself pursue under particular circumstances, and willing to adopt it.”559  Part of 
Forbes’s value came from the fact that he so readily adapted to Houqua’s mode of doing 
business.  Houqua sought not equal partners, but promising young men amenable to 
training.   
These men of the Perkins family virtually apprenticed under the esteemed Hong 
merchant; Houqua could not help but be a potent force in their outlook on the nature of 
commerce.  John Murray Forbes credited Houqua with as much.  But what precisely did 
this influence mean?  When John Perkins Cushing returned to Boston in 1830, he 
commented that the mode of doing business there was so different from Canton, his skills 
were not transferrable.  This remark, of course, should be taken with a heavy dose of salt:  
Cushing sought to extricate himself from calls to take over Perkins & Co. of Boston and 
instead retired.560  The separation between Canton and Boston was more likely the 
distance between Cushing and Thomas H. Perkins.  John Murray Forbes was perfectly 
able to transfer his skills from Canton to Boston a mere eight years later, but in his own 
firm.  The difference between Cushing and Forbes on the one hand, and Perkins on the 
other, seems to have come down to caution.  Where Colonel Perkins preferred bold action 
in commerce (for example, his decision to send out vessel after vessel to mark his 
commitment to the China trade, as well as his flooding of the China market with Turkey 
opium in the 1820s), Houqua emphasized security and the sure win, “additional 
insurance,” and demanded as much from his trading partners.   
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Correspondence between Houqua and his pupils shared details of family life, 
births, marriages, and personal triumphs.  The tenor of these letters differed substantively 
from that of much of the Perkins correspondence with their agents overseas.  While the 
private news may have been pleasantries, this sharing of intimate details was only found 
within letters to those within their inner circles.  “Do I trust you will always feel an 
interest in whatever relates to me,” Houqua wrote to Cushing in 1833, “it will afford you 
pleasure to learn that my No. 4 son, in whose name is the Hong, has within a few days 
received from the Emperor the highest Evidence of his favor, namely, a Peacock’s 
Tail … I esteem this the happiest circumstance of my life.”561  Later that year he reported 
a reversal:  “This year has brought about a most afflicting visitation in my family.  My 
No. 4 Son, the Hong merchant, was taken sick with a fever and after a short sickness died 
on the 27th day of the 7 month this bereavement has deprived me of the support which 
one of my years can illy dispense with, and taken away nearly all the little courage that 
time had left me and destroyed the main support of my house.”562  He continued to take a 
personal interest in their lives as well.  In 1837 Houqua wrote of Cushing to another 
family member, noting that he felt “quite as much satisfaction as if the possession had 
been my own; and I am amused myself with the contrast of his present luxurious 
accommodations with No. 1, or no. 4, Swedish Hong.”563   
More, the warm language was joined by action.  Houqua helped the Perkinses 
navigate the commercial and legal environment of East Asia.  During the Chinese rice 
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famine of 1825, for example, Houqua convinced John Perkins Cushing to bargain for a 
general reduction in tonnage duties for anyone bringing in shipments of rice to cover 
shortfalls in the Chinese harvest.  This deal proved a boon to numerous merchants, and 
contributed to the Perkins’s decision to set up a trading house in Manila soon after.564  
And Houqua’s wealth and status gave the Perkinses leverage within not only Canton, but 
also in the wider East Indies trade, in the United States, and in Europe.  European tea 
dealers knew Houqua’s chop (official stamp) as a symbol for quality.  After the East 
India Company’s Canton monopoly ended in 1834, when Houqua was officially retired 
but still selling tea through Russell & Co., British merchants beat a path to the American 
firm’s door in order to secure goods with such solid branding.565   
The relationship helped them during troubled periods.  Houqua lent the Perkinses 
money when the opium market became glutted in the 1820s and again when the Panic of 
1837 tightened capital supplies for American merchants.566  Houqua warned his friends 
about the seriousness of Chinese officials in the months leading up to the opium conflict:  
it was through his intercession that the Americans realized the need to voluntarily give up 
their opium stocks and not disregard Chinese orders.   
The assistance was personal as well as professional.  In 1839, Houqua and 
Cushing, both retired at this point, coordinated an adventure specifically for the benefit of 
fellow kinsman and merchant James P. Sturgis.  The older merchant had retired at Macao 
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and professed to relatives that he lacked the funds to return home.  The profits of the 
adventure were intended to provide something of a pension.  Houqua contributed 70,000 
dollars for every 30,000 advanced by Cushing, all invested into China goods bound for 
the United States.567  Thus, the two successful merchants gave of their time and capital to 
provide succor to a partner whom speculation had not treated so well.  
There were few large decisions made in Russell & Co. without conferring with 
the head of the Wu family’s hong, and on countless occasions, Houqua’s backing 
changed the firm’s course and decided major disputes.  Houqua influenced Perkins’ 
family involvement with opium, contributed to their establishment of a branch in Manila, 
and more.  In 1837 and again in 1843, Houqua’s influence played a decisive role in 
cutting one partner out of Russell & Company, and in the latter case accepting a partner 
in.  This was an extraordinary level of control for an outside merchant to have on a firm.   
In 1837, Russell & Co. dropped Joseph Coolidge as a partner.  Coolidge had 
come to Canton in the early 1833 with little training and limited means, but 
recommendations from Robert G. Shaw, William Appleton, and other esteemed Boston 
businessmen.  At the time, the partners of Russell & Co. desperately needed employees.  
The end of the East India Company monopoly in Canton had flooded the market with 
private British traders.  They took the unknown Coolidge on as a clerk and, not long 
after, as a partner.  According to one partner, Coolidge “was a gentleman in his manners, 
but had very crude ideas about commerce, believing in show rather than substantial 
management.”568  For example, Coolidge wanted to give up their residence in the modest 
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Swedish Hong where they paid a mere $1500 rent, and rent a space in the East India 
Company hong as wealthy “nabobs.”  Two of the existing partners, John Murray Forbes 
and John Greene, took an instant dislike to Coolidge.  Both wanted to live quietly, trade, 
and go home. 
The tension between Coolidge and the Forbeses is often attributed to Robert 
Bennet Forbes because Coolidge attempted to block Bennet’s admission to the firm when 
the older man needed it most.569  Forbes hoped to make a competency for himself and his 
family after losing everything in the Panic of 1837, all while keeping his impoverished 
status a secret.  But the anti-Coolidge sentiment began before Forbes had even cast an eye 
to Canton.  John Murray Forbes was no friend to Coolidge.  On November 18, 1835 he 
crowed to his wife that he had finally gotten rid of the man.  “Congratulate me, Sarah 
dear!” he wrote.   
[Coolidge] became such a nuisance that I got quite outrageous and 
determined that he should go or I:  so I went to Houqua and asked him for 
letters of introduction and $300,000 to buy cotton in Calcutta!  He stroked 
his scanty beard, laid his hand on the table and swore by the bones of his 
grandfather that I should not budge a foot – and then with a sly look, 
pointing over his shoulder with his thumb, he said ‘More better you send -
---!  Spose you go, who man take care of business?’570 
 
This was gratifying to John, for the vote of confidence in his ability, for the evidence of 
Houqua’s favor, and finally, because with Houqua’s influence, Coolidge was as good as 
gone.571 
                                                 
569 Sturgis, Rivalry in Canton : The Control of Russell & Co 1838-1840 and the Founding of 
Augustine Heard & Co 1840  
570 Forbes, Reminiscences of John Murray Forbes vol. 1, p. 196. 
571 The relationships with the Barings and Houqua were not distinct.  John Murray Forbes to 
Edward King, 8 June 1839 in Forbes and Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, vol. 1, 
pp. 32-34.  When Coolidge traveled to London, he and Joshua Bates became close friends.  Bates refused to 





In 1843, John Perkins Cushing, John Murray Forbes, and Robert Bennet Forbes 
all beseeched Houqua to help their cousin Paul Sieman Forbes find a place in Russell & 
Co.  Another cousin, Russell Sturgis, objected, but Houqua’s influence proved more 
significant.  Though Houqua did not yet know the new cousin, he vouched for him based 
on the strong recommendations from his former pupils.  Shortly after the new partner 
arrived, Houqua passed away, and the shocked man wrote that Houqua “had become 
identified with all [his] hopes and dreams … that with him was not only connected [his] 
own prosperity but that of [his] children.”572  
This influence is not surprising:  Wu family deposits formed a substantive portion 
of the capital base for Russell & Co.  It was illegal under Chinese law for merchants to 
borrow money from or lend money to foreigners, but this did not stop a lively market in 
capital from developing in Canton.573  For much of the eighteenth century, “bottomry 
bonds” or “respondentia” were a common mechanism for financing adventures, and 
allowed bold adventurers to build a fortune on very little.  Bottomry bonds were part 
loan, part insurance:  a merchant financed a shipment in whole or parts and, if the 
shipment arrived at its destination, the loan came due within a specified period of time at 
an agreed-upon rate of interest.  If the disaster befell the vessel and the shipment could 
not be sold, the loan was null and void.  Rates of interest depended in part on who sought 
the advance.  Chinese junk captains, for example, paid rates as high as 40%.  Conversely, 
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merchants seeking to cultivate a relationship might offer a preferential rate below the 10-
12% common for foreign traders.574  Where it was more common for foreigners to lend to 
Chinese merchants—while risky, as early as 1807 T.H. Perkins reported that funds lent to 
Chinese merchants could bring 18% per year—capital traveled both directions.575   
These loans were beneficial to the Chinese as well.  Investing through foreigners 
was a sort of “tax shelter” for Chinese merchants, like floating Swiss banks.  Anthony 
Chen’s research on the enormously high rates of bankruptcy for Hong merchants 
indicates that the pressure on Chinese officials to “squeeze” merchants significantly 
contributed to this insolvency.576  Thus the Wu family put money into both the trading 
house, Russell & Co., and into the American market, investing through Russell & Co. 
partner John Murray Forbes.  Thus, in addition to the contributions from partners, Russell 
& Company had a floating balance from the Wus at their discretion.  In 1861, for 
example, the commission house’s capital broke down as follows:  $400,000 from the 
partners collectively, $200,000 from the Wu family, and an additional $250,000 from 
other depositors based in China and abroad.577  Russell & Co. partners knew that in a 
pinch, they could turn to the Wu family for an additional $200,000 of capital.  And 
following his return to Milton in 1837, Russell & Co. partner John Murray Forbes 
managed funds for the Wu family in the American market.  These funds offered a failsafe 
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mechanism for Wu Ping-chien’s family in case everything was lost in China.  Wu family 
capital remained invested in the American market for many years through the Perkins 
family alliance.   
In later years, the account was listed under the name “American Stock 
Investment” or “ASI.”  The account paid periodic dividends in silver via the British 
banking house, Baring Brothers, and between 1858 and 1879 the Wu family received 
$1,269,539.91 through this fund.578  Investments ranged from the Iowa Land Association, 
the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad of Iowa, the Burlington and Missouri River 
Railroad of Nebraska, the Michigan Central Railroad of Nebraska, the Michigan Central 
Railroad, the Albany and Boston Mining Co., J.M. Howe & Co., and the New England 
Land Company, several of which were projects Forbes himself was interested in.  Forbes 
managed trust accounts and funds for a circle of kin and their offspring, which gave him 
a larger pool of capital to invest in his own name.  The money allowed Forbes to throw 
his weight around, both in shaping the strategies and decision making of the companies 
he was interested in as well as in raising money on their behalf.  As he gained stature as 
an investor of good repute, his fundraising letters headlined his own level of involvement 
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before asking others to contribute.579  The Wu family formed part of the circle of insiders 
to whom Forbes turned as lenders of first resort.   
Access to Wu family funds provided a foundation of credit that helped to 
establish his operations and his reputation at home.  Nowhere was this more significant 
than in Forbes’s involvement in railroads.580  The managed accounts under Forbes’s care 
allowed him greater access to capital and thus flexibility in his actions.  For example, just 
as the Panic of 1857 dried up supplies of capital, the board of his Michigan Central 
Railroad faced the task of raising $2 million to cover their debt for construction.  Rather 
than sell stocks and bonds to cover the outlays, they sought short term commercial loans 
from friends on the presumption that the going high rates of interest were temporary.581  
Forbes explained the need to his cousin Sieman: 
I have subscribed for 250,000 money expecting to get at most 125,000 and 
it being one of those chances that only come in times of panic I put you 
down (without any definite authority) for 50,000$ which you can 
repudiate by return mail if you choose but whatever you do or not I shall 
use a friend’s privilege and use your notes to raise money or even if 
pushed into a corner rather than fail shall draw on you for 50,000 which 
you must borrow of Houqua or otherwise raise for me at some rate or 
other.582 
 
The Wus of Canton, like the Barings of London, were an important source of capital not 
only for Russell & Co., but also for the Forbes family. 
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 Between 1859 and 1861, Houqua III (Wu Shao-jung, the second son of Houqua) 
withdrew 500-600,000 taels from Russell & Company in order to contribute “loans” 
demanded of the family by the provincial government.583  Further, burdens from inside 
and outside the family weighed him down.  He had a large family depending on him.  
Recent wars such as the Taiping Rebellion destroyed considerable amounts of his 
property.  But much of their capital had been tied to the entrepreneurialism of Wu Bing 
Jianand a system of trade that by limiting foreign trade to Canton, served to enrich the 
Cantonese.  The opening of treaty ports along China’s eastern seaboard as a part of the 
post-Opium War concessions of 1842 and 1844 took its toll on Canton’s economy.  
Numerous veterans of the Canton trade decamped to other ports either on their own or in 
the employ of foreign firms.  Russell & Co. established branch offices in nearby Hong 
Kong, Shanghai, etc.    
In 1878, the Wu family recalled the funds from Forbes, and in 1879 closed their 
account with Russell & Co.584  The request followed economic hard times in both China 
and the United States, so it may well have been that the Wu family needed the funds or 
feared the upheavals of the American market.  But it also might have been that the nature 
of the underlying relationships had just changed too much:  there was no longer a 
personal connection between the concerned parties.  
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Paternalism in business entailed obligation, deference, and reciprocity, values that 
were familiar to both the Wus and the Perkinses.585  While the values did not always 
match reality, and one wonders that paternalism itself did not have substantively different 
meanings for the Chinese and American merchants, there was sufficient space for a 
common ground to maintain a relationship over multiple decades.  Houqua did not need 
for the Perkinses to be a kinship-based network to serve his business ends, but it was 
useful to him that it was.  As one merchant within the network vouched for another, the 
relationship deepened and Houqua maintained correspondence with his Perkins 
associates even as they returned to New England.  The larger organization of family even 
more than business maintained a larger sense of obligation:  when John Perkins Cushing 
had retired to a comfortable estate in Belmont, he was still in contact with Houqua 
regarding the state of the market, mutual friends, and the status of kin.  But as the 
principal individuals passed away, the relationship was difficult to maintain. 
Where Houqua played a paternal role for these American merchants, there were 
aspiring Chinese merchants who may have had similar relationships with them.  A 
comprador (clerk) who worked with John Perkins Cushing in China, Chutang Ahoo, 
traveled to Boston with Cushing to work as an employee.  Ahoo may have been a servant 
akin to the handful of other Chinese servants brought into the employ of American 
merchants in the early nineteenth century, but if so, this raises questions about the 
motivations and opportunities available to Chinese servants in early America.  The visit 
seems to have always been temporary.  While in Boston, Ahoo received part of his pay 
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locally with the bulk paid directly to his family in China by Russell & Company.586  And 
when Ahoo left Boston for home within a few years, Cushing encouraged him in the 
China-America trade.  When Ahoo’s speculation in mulberry trees in Boston failed to 
bear fruit, for example, Cushing wrote that he had “concluded to bear [the loss] himself 
as [he] was probably the cause of [his] undertaking the speculation.”587  Ahoo cultivated 
a relationship not only with Cushing, but also the broader kinship network.  He sent 
presents to Cushing’s children and received warm regards from the Forbes ladies who 
clearly knew him.  When Ahoo returned to China in 1835, he sought employment with 
John Murray Forbes.  While this did not pan out, Ahoo continued to correspond with 
Forbes as part of his own business network. 
The relationship that the Perkinses had with Baring Brothers of London, by 
contrast, was based at least partially on marital ties:  Baring partner Joshua Bates married 
Lucretia Sturgis, whose family intertwined with the Perkinses several times over.  Here, 
bonds of friendship and marriage overlapped, even created opportunities.  The following 
section examines the Perkinses relationships with their various London agents with an 
eye to their valuation of personal ties.  While the Perkins-Baring connection was 
mutually beneficial, the fact of the Perkins network—the Barings’ ability to tap into a 
larger cluster of merchants with strong relationships, especially in the East Indies—seems 
to have been most valuable to the Barings in the end.     
 
London Bankers:  Joshua Bates & Baring Brothers of London 
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Even with national independence, London continued to be a financial capital to 
merchants of the young United States.  Not only was London a central entrepôt for the 
fruits of British industrialization, but Britain continued to be America’s main trading 
partner.588  When Elizabeth Peck Perkins inherited her husband’s business in 1773, she 
picked up her father’s longstanding relationship with Lane & Company of London.  Lane 
exchanged her pelts for manufactured goods, insured ships she sent out, and extended 
credit to run her business:  like her father, when Perkins purchased goods in Britain, Lane 
& Company was her banker on whom she directed firms to draw.  Her sons operated in a 
different commercial milieu.  They had a more extensive network of correspondents with 
whom they exchanged goods, drew upon, and secured remittances.  Banking and 
insurance services could be secured in Boston.  Yet London was still central to their 
enterprises.   
The Perkins brothers selected London agents for acumen in advising them on the 
state of business and politics, access to information and markets, and for the strength of 
their personal bond.  The latter was intimately connected to the prior two, as trust and 
loyalty helped to ensure that the Perkinses would be prioritized in receiving critical 
advice and information.  In the 1790s, John Vaughan who seemed well-placed to advise 
them on how to profit from the trade opportunities arising out of the French Revolution 
and its aftermath.589  When Samuel Williams settled in London in 1800 to handle 
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American spoliation claims arising from these same political tensions, the Perkinses 
shifted their business to him.  A dour man known for his taciturn style and financial 
acumen, Williams managed the London accounts of many of America’s leading 
merchants.  The Perkinses split their business between Williams and kinsman Henry 
Higginson in 1809 until the latter’s bankruptcy in late 1811, and then to Bates & Baring 
and Baring Brothers when Samuel Williams’ firm failed in 1825. 
Samuel Williams served as the Perkins’s London banker for decades.  Thus, it is 
perhaps not surprising that his family felt betrayed when the Perkinses, to them, helped to 
bring about his firm’s demise.  A dour man known for his taciturn style and financial 
acumen, Williams managed the accounts of many of America’s leading merchants.  As 
early as 1823—in advance of the London-based Panic of 1825—Colonel Perkins wrote to 
his nephew Frederick Paine of their urgent need to send an agent abroad.  “Perfect 
secrecy is an object of the first consequence.  If you make your mind up to go, you will 
come here forthwith and let no one know your object,” Perkins penned.590  No one could 
know but his wife.  Paine accepted the offer, but what he found made him “sick in body 
and soul.”591  The 1825 panic left American merchants scrambling to recover what capital 
they could from their British bankers.  “The state of things here is most dreadful,” Paine 
told his father of the London market.  ”Ruin seems to be staring everyone in the face.”592  
The Perkinses had enormous sums in Williams’s hands and charged Paine with the task 
of extricating their property as best as possible.  The Williamses no longer welcomed him 
into their home, which Paine claimed bothered him not at all, save for the loss of the 
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friendship of Williams himself.593  Paine respected Williams, but he was disappointed in 
him.  He confided to a close friend that his opinion of Williams had changed from a man 
who always did right, to a man who always meant to do right.594   
The exact details of Williams’s financial troubles are elusive.  Did the Perkinses’ 
quick actions save their own credit at the expense of Williams?  Did they seal Williams’s 
fate when they might instead have shored him up?  Colonel Perkins expressed his 
sentiments as follows:  “This is a sore thing to Williams, I have no doubt, but I see no 
reason why my personal regard for him should induce me to do that which my judgment 
does not bear me out in.”595  Out of the ashes of Williams’s business came a host of 
competitors seeking American business, including Timothy Wiggins & Co. and Bates & 
Baring.  It was hard for merchants to know who would stay solvent, and some merchants, 
the wealthy Bostonian Israel Thorndike amongst them, went from Williams to another 
firm that eventually collapsed.  Whether or not the Perkinses could have saved Williams 
or not, Williams’s family clearly expected that the Perkinses should have stood by him 
and Paine regretted that they did not.   
What is clear is that Joshua Bates benefited from Williams’s downfall in the wake 
of London’s Panic of 1825.596  Bates was born in 1788 in Weymouth, Massachusetts as 
the youngest child and only son of Colonel Joshua Bates. At the age of 15, Bates began 
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an apprenticeship with the eldest son of William Gray, and clerked for the senior 
merchant until 1809, when he struck out on his own in partnership with a Captain 
Beckford.  In 1812, Beckford & Bates failed, but Gray continued to be so impressed with 
Bates that he brought the younger man back into his employ.  In 1816, Bates traveled to 
London as an agent for the Grays.  While in London, Bates met Peter Labouchère, a 
banker and son-in-law to Francis Baring, who introduced him in turn to John Baring, 
Francis’s grandson.597  In January 1826, Bates partnered with the younger Baring in a 
firm intending to specialize in the American trade.598  While competitor Timothy 
Wiggins aggressively courted Samuel Williams’s client roster, promising to make good 
on his debts, Colonel Perkins signaled to Americans abroad that Bates & Baring was the 
better successor to Williams.599  Little wonder then that Bates credited Perkins with 
helping him to get his start in business.600   
Baring Brothers & Co. was one of the central sources of international banking and 
finance in the nineteenth century.   In 1818, Duc de Richelieu famously said “There are 
six great powers in Europe; England, France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Baring 
Brothers.”601  The Barings initially began investing in the American colonies in 1774.  
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They poured money into the British cause during the Revolution, only to return to the 
United States in 1783 upon the request of Philadelphia merchant William Morris.  By 
1828, Baring Brothers was the largest of the Anglo-American trading houses.602  The 
Perkinses became a client through a side door:  the partnership of kinsman Joshua Bates 
with John Baring, Jr. in 1826.  This was a fortuitous confluence of events for the Barings:  
Bates credited Thomas H. Perkins with establishing Bates & Baring with American 
traders, and Baring scholars credit the Bates & Baring partnership (and its subsequent 
absorption into Baring Brothers in 1828) with the revitalization of the Baring 
enterprise.603  But it was also fortuitous for the Perkinses.  The Bates-Baring tie gave the 
Perkinses a personal connection which could provide preferential backing, and from a 
business connection whose name—Baring—had widespread recognition.  In the context 
of early nineteenth century international commerce, name recognition and a solid 
reputation went a long way.  
Bates was a brilliant businessman and a critical asset to Baring Brothers & Co.  In 
1828, Baring Brothers absorbed Bates & Baring.  According to John Orbell, Baring 
Brothers still retained the prestige of earlier years at this time, but it was no longer a 
profitable business.604  Under the new organization, Bates, Thomas Baring, and Baring 
son-in-law Humphrey St. John Mildmay took charge of the company.605  Baring directed 
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finance for the firm, especially on the European continent; Bates handled commerce and 
agency work for foreign clients; and Mildmay “kept his finger on the pulse of the London 
money market” through his capacity as a director of the Bank of England.606  To Orbell, 
the Thomas Baring-Joshua Bates match up was the “greatest partnership in Barings’ 
history.”607   
Bates changed how the Barings did business. He systematized and expanded the 
countinghouse.  Together with Humphrey Mildmay, he directed regular reports on the 
states of market, Baring balances, and consolidated their accounting by bringing in-house 
functions that had been spun off to other London agency houses and brokerages.  Bates 
sought to improve the flow of information within the firm and with their correspondents.  
“‘While I am in business,” he once wrote of himself, “I like and wish to play the game 
well.’”608    
Bates also expanded the Barings’ America business.  The Barings already had a 
foot in the American market, but Bates convinced them to really turn their heads west.609  
While many big financiers such as the Rothschilds focused on navigating the war to 
invest in the European market, Baring Brothers expanded their involvement in both 
commerce and financing American expansion.  There were a number of reasons for this.  
First, money was worth more in the United States than Britain.  In 1833, market rates for 
capital ranged from 5 ½ to 7% in America, versus 2.73% in London.  Next, the country 
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showed considerable promise.  State governments promoted internal improvements, 
banks, and legal protections for capital.  And while President Andrew Jackson did not 
inspire confidence—he vetoed the Bank of the United States, faced massive controversy 
regarding the so-called “tariff of abominations” including a nullification crisis, and 
more—he was not as hostile to business as many had feared.  The country had low debt 
and no real history of large debts or defaults.610  But it helped that Bates had considerable 
experience and a strong contact base with American traders. 
The Perkins connection with the Barings developed through their existing 
relationship with Bates.  Bates had married Lucretia Sturgis in 1813.  Lucretia was sister 
to John Sturgis of Perkins & Sturgis of New York and cousin to William Sturgis of 
Bryant & Sturgis of Boston.  Letters between the two families indicate that Bates both 
looked out for his wife’s siblings and that he maintained a close friendship with William 
Sturgis.  His correspondence with the Perkinses on business matters preceded his 
involvement with the Barings and even his work for them as a London agent and 
banker.611  By 1831, Bates wrote to the Baring Brothers agent in Boston that while New 
York already seemed the more promising location for their interests, in Boston “Perkins 
& Co. is worth all the others put together.”612 
Collaboration between the Perkinses and the Barings began in the late 1820s and 
surged during the 1830s and 1840s.  While Perkins & Co. of Boston broke up in 1835, 
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the relationship with the Barings continued through Bryant & Sturgis and John Murray 
Forbes & Co., both of Boston.  The Perkinses were useful both in the American market 
and for revitalizing Baring interests in the East Indies.  Peter Austin argues that “By 
bringing the ‘colonial’ Bates into the firm, Alexander Baring also captured the valuable 
American client list which Bates and John Baring had assembled as business partners.”613  
The list contained almost three dozen firms, most of which centered on East Indies 
trading.  While the Perkinses were not the most substantial of the Barings’ American 
trading partners—ledgers reveal a shift to a reliance on firms based in New York in the 
1830s, such as Prime, Ward & King—they were nonetheless significant. 
The Barings tapped into the entire Perkins network, but especially grafted onto 
the Asian houses:  Russell & Co. was easily their favorite of the China-based agencies 
and related firm Russell & Sturgis handled their Manila trade.  As the volume of the 
Barings’ business increased, the London house sent price currents, market reports, and 
recommendations to their favored correspondents.  Ralph Hidy writes that, “Special 
advices and reports on prices of both Far Eastern imports and British manufactured goods 
were sent only” to John Perkins Cushing, Bryant & Sturgis, and Thomas Handasyd 
Perkins.  “Friendship for the Boston specialists in Far Eastern operations was strong 
enough for the Barings to commit the New Englanders without previous authorization to 
a large venture in tea for the French market in 1832.”614  And Bates accepted agents into 
the Baring fold without any further vetting than the recommendation of Thomas 
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Handasyd Perkins, as was the case with Joseph Langdon in Smyrna (modern-day Izmir, 
Turkey).   
The friendship between Joshua Bates and William Sturgis, and their shared role in 
looking after Sturgis kin, strengthened the potential of the business connection between 
the two men.  In fact, the business ties themselves opened up greater facility in 
maintaining personal contact.  Business letters and family advice mixed in seeking to 
advance the careers and independence of Mrs. Bates two brothers, Josiah Sturgis and 
John Sturgis.615  As the family entrepreneurs, Joshua Bates and William Sturgis bore 
more of the responsibility for kin who needed help, something that drew them together 
and fostered their friendship.  While too much can be made of kinship in this relationship, 
for Bates and Sturgis commercial sympathy and family connection grafted on each other 
rather than the relationship being simply about one or the other. 
The Barings’ connections were abundant and diverse, but they looked to a few 
select firms for advice.  Members of the Perkins network continued to be counted as 
advisers and among those with impeccable credit for decades.616  William Sturgis was 
intimates with both Bates and the Baring Brothers’ American agent, Thomas Wren Ward.  
Sturgis had even advised Bates in selecting Ward in 1828, as Bates deliberated on 
whether to approach Ward or Henry Lee.617  Ward was an excellent choice:  well 
respected and well connected, Ward traveled widely and leaned successfully on 
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merchants around the country for information.  And social ties buoyed business 
connections.  Merchants were loath to put choice details on their neighbors and 
competitors into writing; far more information was available in private conversations.  
The Barings relied upon codes in their correspondence, and assigned a number to firms 
and individuals of interest.  Even in considering the relationship between Joshua Bates 
and William Sturgis, social lines of communication structured information:  letters 
indicate that neighborly gossip between Sturgis and Ward were part of the advice 
network that contributed to Bates’s read on the American market.618     
The connection between the Perkinses and the Barings was not always smooth, 
but it was often mutually beneficial.  While the Baring name was useful to the Perkinses, 
the size and hubris of the British firm was also a source of concern.  As early as 1829, 
John Perkins Cushing wrote of his apprehension to Samuel Cabot in the Boston-based 
Perkins & Co.  Cushing felt it unwise to allow the Barings to have too much influence 
over their trade or too be “under obligation” to them, or anyone in Europe.  Cushing 
warned Cabot that when the Barings sought to advise them on what to sell in the East 
Indies to remember that they were bankers not traders.619  Although Cushing left it 
unsaid, the Barings also seemed to share British overconfidence in the prospects for 
pushing British manufactures on Asians.  Cushing had a far more sophisticated grasp of 
Eastern markets:  on a trip to select British and French textiles for sale in China and 
Manila, for example, Cushing secreted patterns and color swatches specific to the tastes 
of those markets to manufacturers.  A few years later, Bryant & Sturgis similarly 
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complained that they could purchase English manufactures for the China trade better 
elsewhere, to which Bates vehemently countered that Baring Brothers was as vigorous as 
any of the American houses.620   
The relationship was beneficial in several ways.  Four examples of these benefits 
are as follows. First, the Baring name helped the Perkinses to shift the financing of their 
East Indies trade increasingly from silver to Bills on London.  Second, the Baring’s 
elected not to call in debts owed by Russell & Co. during the American Panics of 1837 
and 1839.  Third, the Perkinses lobbied on behalf of the Barings as American states 
defaulted en masse on bonds owned by the Barings.  And, finally, the Barings extended 
uncovered credits to Russell & Co. in 1843, which helped the firm stabilize following the 
upheaval of war in China and the death of Houqua.   
First, increasingly in the 1820s, the Perkinses relied upon bills of exchange (and 
opium) rather than silver to finance their trade with China.  Bills of exchange functioned 
as letters of credit or proof of debt.  A bill specified that one person, the acceptor who 
accepted obligation to pay the bill, agreed to pay a fixed amount of money to another at a 
future specified date.  American merchants leapt at the opportunity to use bills as they 
were generally less expensive and more secure than shipping specie.  The Barings and 
other large British houses were generally better known in Asia than American banks, and 
thus stepped in as intermediaries for American merchants.  The growing consumption of 
Indian opium in China fostered a demand for bills on London, which in turn furthered the 
                                                 





use of bills as a way of remitting funds back to London.  For the American government, 
bills were also a boon as they kept specie in American banks.621   
Second, and perhaps most significantly, the Barings stood behind Russell & Co. 
during the Panic of 1837.  While the American economy expanded in the mid-1830s, 
waves of economic expansion and contraction hit various ports connected to the Perkins 
network.622  The British East India Company lost its monopoly on British trade in China 
in 1833, flooding the market with British merchants leading to a crash in prices.  
Financial panic rocked Calcutta in 1834-5.  And in the summer of 1836, when the Bank 
of England discovered that a number of British merchant banks had overextended 
themselves in the American market, the Bank tightened credit.  Perkins & Co. of Boston 
was already winding up its books at this point, but Russell & Co. in China found itself 
overextended.  Had either the Barings or Houqua called in their debts with Russell & Co., 
the firm would have had to close its doors.623   
The Perkinses returned the favor as political allies to the Barings.  They helped 
the Barings’ American agent lobby and pressure states to pay their bond obligations to 
investors in the wake of the Panics of 1837 and 1839.  There was an enormous amount of 
public criticism of Baring influence on politics and business in American newspapers, 
and Perkins allies exerted their own influence in this debate.  William Sturgis and 
William Appleton were both among the select confidantes to the Barings.624  Baring 
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Brothers had been a big seller of American securities abroad, so the panics and 
subsequent defaults were a blow to them, too.625  For example, by contract, Illinois had 
taken early steps to avoid repudiation and reestablished the credit of the state on a 
compromise basis.  The Barings combined with other foreign firms including Magniac, 
Jardine & Co. to appoint a group of prominent Boston merchants who were also Baring 
insiders to represent them.  The so-called “Boston Committee” included the Barings’ 
agent Thomas Wren Ward, Abbott Lawrence, and William Sturgis to represent the 
foreign bondholders in ensuring the completion of the Illinois & Michigan Central.626  
Finally, in 1843, for the first time, the Barings granted uncovered credits to 
American houses in China including Russell & Co. and Heard & Co.  This came at a 
pivotal moment for the American firms, but especially for Russell & Co.  In the late 
1830s, tensions mounted between Western merchants and the Chinese government over 
the opium trade.  Whether the real source of tension was the deleterious effect of opium 
smoking on the Chinese people, the drain of specie out of China because of the trade in 
opium, or British zealotry, the Chinese government insisted in 1839 that the opium trade 
be brought to an end and all opium be delivered to the authorities.  The British refused 
and backed their position with warships.  This first Opium War lasted from 1840 to 1842.  
The British won and, as their spoils, forced the Chinese to sign what became known as 
the first of the “unequal treaties.”  Other Westerners followed suit, including the 
Americans with the 1844 signing of the Treaty of Wanxia.  Of the most immediate 
significance to China traders, the unequal treaties forced the Chinese government to open 
                                                 
625 Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance, 308. 





other ports to Western trade—the so-called “treaty ports.”  The expansion of Westerners 
into Hong Kong, Shanghai, Amoy, and more transformed the trade.  On top of all this, 
the partners of Russell & Co. had just lost a good friend and mentor:  Houqua died in 
1843.  While Russell & Co. continued to have access to Wu family funds, as discussed 
above, they lost the influence and keen insight that were unique to Houqua the individual.  
The new access to credit from the Barings helped Russell & Co. negotiate the necessary 
expansion into the treaty ports and step into the breach following Houqua’s death.627 
Even into the 1850s, the Barings turned to participants in the Perkins network for 
advice, and they turned to the Barings for capital.  Mid-decade, the Barings purchased 
back door investments in American railroads through state bonds and credit for the 
purchase of rails.  Initially, American political tensions over slavery and economic 
uncertainty made the Barings reticent.  But money was cheap.  They consulted a variety 
of correspondents, including John and Bennet Forbes, William Sturgis, and William 
Appleton.628  With their advice, the Barings bought $500,000 worth of 10 year 
convertible bonds in the Eastern Rail Road of Massachusetts in July 1852.  They bought 
another $150,000 in August.629  When the Panic of 1857 made money scarce, and John 
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M. Forbes was charged with the task of raising $2 million in fresh capital or the Michigan 
Central would fail, Forbes turned to Baring Brothers.630 
In 1849, Joshua Bates brought Russell Sturgis into Baring Brothers to test the 
younger man as a potential successor.  He had not been casting about for a kinsman to 
step into the breach of his retirement (his own son died tragically years before), but 
Russell Sturgis himself used the personal connection to apply to Bates for a position.  The 
two had long been correspondents, with letters a mixture of business and family news 
between a senior and junior kinsman.  In 1848, Sturgis queried Bates as to an opening, 
that “an occupation on your side of the water . . . would suit me exactly.”  He quickly 
added, “As I said before, I hope you will not feel annoyed at my broaching this subject, 
for whilst on the one hand your standing and your valuable experience would enable you 
to judge correctly, your personal knowledge of me would prevent any hesitation about 
using all frankness in your reply.”631  Sturgis was not a bad candidate.  He had over a 
decade’s worth of experience in East Indies trading and managed a grueling trial run in 
the London headquarters.  In January 1851, he made full partner.  In 1873, after the death 
of Thomas Baring, Sturgis became the firm’s senior partner until his own death in 1882.  
While it is doubtful that Russell Sturgis saw himself as a part of the network begun by the 
Perkins brothers in 1792, he was certainly a beneficiary of the web of commerce and 
connection they established in the prior century. 
In the end, personal ties provided an opportunity for connection between the 
Perkinses and the Barings more than it guided business decisions.  The relationship 
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between the Perkinses and the Barings was not rooted in the sort of paternalistic, mentor-
apprentice pattern of the Perkins-Wu relationship.  Rather, if anything, it resembled 
fraternal ties.  The marital connection between Joshua Bates and his wife’s Sturgis kin 
did not demand loyalty from either Bates or the Sturgises, but it did provide an 
opportunity for a fraternal connection that linked personal and business ties.  As will be 
discussed further in chapter six, fraternal ties did not always translate into privileging 
those ties over prospective opportunities.    
 
Conclusion 
Trade was not just about financial capital, but about social and cultural capital as 
well.  Personal relationships could also create problems, tensions, and did not necessarily 
bring about profitable business ties, as with the losses Perkins & Co. sustained with the 
bankruptcy of Henry Higginson & Co.  But losses also came out of non-kin ties, as with 
the bankruptcy of Samuel Williams.  Affective ties did work.  When business ties frayed 
through miscommunication or poor economic returns, personal bonds could help to 
sustain relationships.  Correspondents were more likely to receive the benefit of the doubt 
or second chances, giving openings to repair the relationships and soothe tempers.  And 
contacts could be assets that younger merchants could inherit.   
The fact that the Perkinses were organized as a kinship-based network—that they 
not only had a significant contact base of correspondents, but also had a foundation of 
strong ties forged through personal as well as business relationships—was part of what 
made them attractive to both the Wu family and the Barings.  While the bond that the 





more than a single firm or entrepreneurial individual (only Perkins & Co. of Canton or 
Boston, only John Perkins Cushing or William Sturgis).  Both tapped into the larger 
network.   
The differences in the Perkins-Wu and the Perkins-Baring relationship were in 
part due to the fact that the network of Perkins family and firms had different uses for 
each.  For Houqua and the Wu family, preferential ties with the Perkinses allowed for a 
sort of preventive recourse.  The Perkinses as a family, not just as individuals, were 
invested in the relationship, and worked hard to maintain the relationship.  By mentoring 
younger merchants within this context, Houqua trained agents into his approach to 
commerce and thus felt more comfortable empowering them with decision making and 
investing on his behalf and for his family.  Paternalism made sense.    The Perkinses 
helped establish Joshua Bates with American merchants in London and thus played a role 
in the expansion of Baring Brothers after 1828.  More, the Perkinses allowed the Barings 
to graft onto their network of correspondents.  This was useful to the Perkinses in that it 
enhanced the flow of credit and backing in international markets, and useful to the 
Barings in that it gave them new outlets in Asia.  The Perkins-Bates connection was 
significant, but the Bates’ marital connection to the Sturgis family was only part of the 





CHAPTER 5.   
THE WOMAN PIGEON:    
SOCIABILITY, SEXUALITY, AND MARRIAGE 
IN THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN CANTON & MACAU 
 
 
Gem of the Orient Earth and open Sea, 
Macau! that in thy lap and on thy breast 
Hast Gathered beauties all the loveliest, 
O’er which the sun smiles in his majesty! 
 




When the fifty-eight year old James Perkins Sturgis asked Harriet Low to marry 
him in 1832, she thought he might joking.  As one of the few eligible Western women in 
Macau, Low was no stranger to odd propositions.  It was clear to her that this one, offered 
with inept gallantry as it was, required delicacy.632  Harriet’s refusal nonetheless 
devastated Sturgis.  For over two decades, James Sturgis had lived in southern China as a 
merchant connected to his brothers and cousins and later as an independent trader in 
collaboration with kin at Russell & Co., Russell Sturgis & Co., and Russell & Sturgis.  
The devastation had to do with more than just a difference in attraction.  For James, the 
proposal likely meant something very different than for Harriet.  Harriet sought a 
stimulating companion with a competency sufficient to meet her family’s approval.633  
                                                 
632 Nan P. Hodges and Arthur W. Hummel, eds., Lights and Shadows of a Macao Life: The 
Journal of Harriet Low, Travelling Spinster, 2 vols. (Winthrop, WA: Bear Creek Books, 2002), 354. 
633 While in Macau, Harriet became secretly engaged to William Wood, but her family 
disapproved.  Wood lacked stability.  He flitted through several jobs, including clerking for Russell & 
Sturgis in Manila and managing a coffee plantation in Rizal (the Philippines), but with little success.  
Harriet later married John Hillard, Jr. of the New York trading family.  The Hillard family papers, 






James sought those domestic symbols of maturity that trade with China had promised, yet 
instead precluded:  home and family. 
For American traders like Sturgis, Canton was a liminal space connected to 
aspirations for individuals and families to remake themselves through quick fortunes.634  
Men generally traveled early in their careers with expectations tied to that stage of life.  
They would make a fortune in trade, return home, and use that fortune as a foundation of 
capital for both business and marriage.  This happened enough for it to seem a plausible 
expectation, but it was by no means the rule.  Even men who were successful might face 
decades abroad.   
Many facets of life in Canton joined to make trade there a means rather than an 
end, including its distance from New England, its prohibitions on foreign settlement, and 
its exclusion of foreign women.  Yet China’s connection to personal aspiration and 
sacrifice meant that traveling evoked deep feelings of hope, desire, despair, and 
resentment.  Despite the distance and the prohibition on settlement, some merchants and 
missionaries spent the bulk if not the entirety of their lives in China and Macau.  The ban 
on foreign women was another matter.  Between 1760 and the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, 
Chinese law prohibited the presence of foreign women in Canton.  Females who 
journeyed to China from the Atlantic lived in the Portuguese peninsular colony of Macau 
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downriver from Canton.  From 1800 when the British East India Company allowed 
women to travel in the berths of Company ships to 1842, a mixed-sex community 
developed in Macau that was particularly tied to the British and American trade at 
Canton.  Many men had local mistresses and families at Macau, but it was taboo to make 
these families legitimate through marriage.   
This chapter examines the ban on foreign women in Canton and its consequences 
as a way of thinking about the connections between social lives and foreign relations and 
trade in southern China.  While considerable research has been done on trade in Canton 
during this period, far less is known about the connection between Canton and Macau.  
Yet examining the two together sheds insight on connections between sociability, 
sexuality, and marriage and trade and foreign relations prior to the Treaty of Nanjing.  It 
suggests that Chinese officials saw gender as a significant way to manage the foreign 
population residing in Canton.  And it suggests that gender and sexuality were part of the 
confluence of issues that some Western observers felt distinguished them from Chinese 
counterparts.   
For the Perkinses, the centrality of China to their trade meant that sex segregation 
in Canton and Macau played a significant role in the social and business strategies of 
workers and families tied to their network.  Using marital ties to cement business 
relationships was not an option in such a setting.  Those connected to the Perkins network 
who married abroad did so in Manila, California, or South America.  Women who 
traveled to China did so as wives or daughters.  Harriet Low, who arrived as her aunt’s 
nurse and companion, was the exceptional single woman.  Maintaining a Western wife in 





abroad the ultimate status symbol. While costly, the decision to bring a wife could also 
prove a business investment by opening social doors.  Americans in Macau and Canton 
lived, worked, and socialized within a British-dominated community of foreign traders.  
Within this enclave, whether one had a wife opened social doors—and with them, 
business and political opportunities.  While Americans imagined themselves as distinct 
from British outlooks and ambitions in China, sociability between merchants and their 
families fostered an Anglo-American community that, while by no means unified, still 
often shared common strategies for ensuring the ability to trade in China. 
	
“The Woman Pigeon”:  Excluding Women from Canton 
By the time Americans journeyed to China on their own behalf in 1784, 
intercourse between Chinese and foreigners was highly regulated.635  These regulations 
often felt arbitrary to foreign merchants, but they developed out of Chinese efforts to 
mitigate conflict within the empire.  The decision of the Chinese government to limit 
foreign vessels to Canton, a port deliberately distant from the imperial capital of Beijing, 
was part and parcel to these efforts.  Even ships arriving from Southeast Asia (Nanyang 
or southern sea) who traded in other Chinese ports such as Amoy could only do so with 
Chinese sailors in Chinese vessels.636  Foreign merchants in Canton lived not in the city 
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proper, but in a segregated enclave outside of a Cantonese suburb.  As discussed in 
chapter four, Chinese officials expected the leading Cantonese merchants, members of a 
formal organization known as the “Co-Hong,” to guide foreigners through trade and 
navigate any potential difficulties with the foreign population so as to mitigate conflict.  
And in 1760, as part of China’s “Eight Regulations” governing visitors’ conduct in 
Canton, the Chinese government prohibited foreign merchants from living in the city 
year-round and prohibited the presence of foreign women at all.  The rule against foreign 
women became one of many examples foreigners used to decry Chinese law as 
unreasonable, irrational, and inconsistent.637   
According to Colin Crissell, the “Eight Regulations” were originally issued in 
response to the lengthening European trading season in Canton.  Where the custom had 
been for European vessels to arrive on the summer wind and depart six months later on 
the winter wind, ship sizes increased to accommodate greater cargoes, leading merchants 
and sailors to lodge in Canton until the next season.638  This explains the limits on men’s 
yearlong residence in Canton, but why prohibit women altogether?  Especially given the 
paucity of foreign women in the region?639  The most probable explanation is that the 
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Chinese government used sex-based border policies to constrain a foreign population—a 
questionable population in the eyes of the state.  By hindering opportunities for foreign 
men to establish families in China, the Qing government expected the merchants would 
not settle in China.  Prohibiting the residence of foreign women in Canton limited the 
ability of visiting merchants to put down roots. 
An additional explanation, suggested by Stacilee Ford Hosford, is that anxieties 
about foreign women were rife.  Hosford uses a Chinese anti-Christian tract quoted by 
the London Missionary Society in the 1830s to demonstrate that these anxieties did exist: 
“‘Allowing men and women to mix in society, and walk arm in arm through the 
streets, … shewed (sic) that they [foreigners] had not the least sense of propriety.’”640  
Frances Wood similarly contends that “it was considered improper for women to 
associate with men not of their immediate family . . .  Walking in the streets, talking 
directly to men, and dancing were unthinkable activities for demure Chinese ladies and 
such behavior from foreign women not unnaturally attracted critical attention.”641  Wood 
cites a Manchu dignitary who, in 1843, expressed horror at being “saluted” by a Western 
woman in Hong Kong.  And Jonathan Porter argues that Chinese observers were 
fascinated by foreign women, including both Western women and the Eurasian 
population native to Macau, but that such fascination led Chinese writers to favor 
separation.  Commenting on Western women’s dress and “exposed bosoms,” their 
freedom of movement, and their social roles vis-à-vis their husbands, one Chinese writer 
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concluded “this is why Heaven separates the Chinese and barbarians.”642  These scholars 
suggest a concern that by their very presence, Western women would import Western 
gender norms into China and create strife.  But was such a concern present in the 1750s? 
Certainly gender—women’s behavior in particular—was a preoccupation for 
Manchu officials.643  From the very outset of the Qing dynasty in 1644, Manchu officials 
instituted state programs designed to elevate the “virtuous woman.”  Women, especially 
as mothers, anchored the Confucian household and thus the social order.  Distinguished 
writers on Chinese statecraft of the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries penned 
advice manuals on female conduct, specifically condemning behavior “that they deemed 
heterodox or threatening to the Confucian family and political order.”644  Women’s 
participation in Buddhist rituals faced particular censure.  Rules against the presence of 
Western women may have been an extension of this larger concern over unorthodox 
behavior.   
 The prohibition on foreign women was one of a number of regulations that chafed 
the foreign community and was eventually tested.  Many of the Chinese rules were more 
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ideal than reality, easily overlooked for a cumsha or gift.  Boat racing, for example, was 
prohibited but popular.  While foreigners were not supposed to employ Chinese servants, 
all of the factories (buildings which doubled as residences and offices for the foreigners) 
depended on the myriad domestics that cooked, cleaned, and ran errands for them—when 
these servants were withdrawn from the foreign community during the tensions leading to 
the Opium War, merchants in residence divvied up the household duties to comic effect.  
And while the Chinese government mandated that foreign merchants should remove from 
Canton during the off-season, a handful made year-round homes of their factories.645   
This was not one of those rules.  When Americans first arrived in Canton in the 
1780s, they encountered a cosmopolitan society of Europeans (British, French, Swedes, 
Danes, Austrians, Portuguese, Spaniards, and various kinds of Italians) as well as 
merchants from Asia and Africa, especially the Near East including Armenians, Parsis, 
Indians, Arabs, and Near Eastern Jews.646  As the British began to dominate China’s trade 
out of Canton during the eighteenth century, they also engulfed Macau.  While some 
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British wives may have already lived in Macau, in 1800 the British East India Company 
began to allow berths to be used by women, thus allowing wives to travel to China.647  By 
1822, a mixed population of 2,693 non-Chinese women lived in Macau and 604 non-
Chinese men.648  The sizeable population of non-Chinese women was likely connected to 
the Portuguese charitable institutions:  the Misericórdia, the Asylum for Female Orphans, 
and the Asylum of Mary Magdalen.  Still, as foreign women traveled to Canton, they 
made it no further than Macau.  As American women arrived in 1829, they socialized 
almost entirely within the existing community of British women.  
Given the British prominence in Canton and Macau by the late eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-centuries and the history of East India Company challenges to Chinese 
law, it is hardly surprising that the “test” of the Chinese prohibition on women in Canton 
should come from amongst Company ranks.  In February 1830, Julia Smith Baynes made 
a first, probing voyage upriver to Canton.649  Wife to the president of the East India 
Company’s Select Committee, the lovely Mrs. Baynes had a reputation for the dramatic.  
According to British merchant William Jardine, her arrival went “without the slightest 
molestation from the Chinese Govt.”650  The British merchants flouted her presence.  
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Hong merchants called upon her.651  The visit went so swimmingly, several other ladies 
followed in her footsteps.   
Among them were Harriet Low and her aunt, wife to merchant William H. Low, 
who paid their own surreptitious visit to the factories at Canton.  The two were the first—
and at this point only—American women at Macau.  The Low ladies had watched with 
interest the reaction surrounding the efforts of William Baynes to keep his wife in 
Canton.  Harriet wrote to her sister that while great excitement ensued, all expected the 
calamity to die down, and “though the Chinese will never consent to ladies going to 
Canton, that they will wink at it, and, as Mouqua told Uncle, ‘they will shutty eye and 
shutty ear.’”652  Mouqua was one of the leading Chinese merchants and seemed in a 
position to know the political climate.  Low preferred confrontation.  “I should be very 
glad to have the English carry the point if it can be done without bloodshed,” she 
confided to her sister.   
The Chinese are making a great fuss about us poor harmless Fanquis 
(foreign devils), and say, and persist in saying, that ‘that lady’ (meaning 
Mrs. Baynes) ‘must go down,’ but ‘that lady’ is very obstinate, and will 
not go.  They have threatened to send soldiers to take her away, upon 
which Mr. B. has had up a hundred armed sailors from the ships, and 
cannon placed at the gate of factory.    
 
By the time Harriet and her aunt finally made the fateful journey for themselves, tempers 
were already frayed.  
William Low came down from Canton to Macau on November 3 to escort them 
on a small brig that John Perkins Cushing lent to the escapade, the Terrier.  Two days 
later, with the sun barely peeping into the sky, the two climbed aboard.  All of the 
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Chinese hands at the docks turned their backs on the ladies save “one boat-girl, more 
courageous than the rest, who lent us a board to step on as we got into the boat, for which 
she was liberally rewarded with a dollar.”653  A cold wind bore down on the ship and 
cockroaches entertained the ladies in their berth, but the two maintained their resolve.  
Under the cover of heavy cloaks and velvet caps, they transferred to a schooner, the 
Slyph, at the mouth of the Pearl River.  
To Harriet at least, all seemed worthwhile when they arrived in Canton.  Fatigue, 
cold, aching bones, all slipped out of her mind as Harriet’s curiosity got the best of her.  
The schooner approached the factories under a luminous moonlit sky, with pagodas rising 
against the dark and an “endless variety” of boats spreading left and right.  Rows of 
sailing vessels formed water-laden streets:  enormous tea ships, boats with houses within 
them. “It was more Chinese than anything we had seen before,” Harriet exulted.654  They 
walked straight to the Russell & Co. factory without trouble, but did so in disguise while 
the town slept.  Trouble came to them soon enough.  
On November 14, Chinese officials issued a chop, a notice:  trade would cease if 
the Low women did not disembark.  This seemed cruel and unfair; after all, the English 
ladies still resided at Canton.  Harriet blamed the Chinese not for the rule, but “the 
knavery.” Mouqua had explained to her that when Mrs. Baynes arrived, the Viceroy 
called on him for an explanation.  He lied and said that Mr. Baynes was desperately sick, 
and that Mrs. Baynes had come to nurse him back to health.  Then Mrs. Thornhill arrived 
and, again, the Viceroy demanded answers. Mouqua replied that the illness was so 
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severe, as Mr. Baynes’ cousin, Mrs. Thornhill had been allowed to come see him.  But 
for the Lows, he had run out of excuses.  Harriet told her sister that she suspected the 
Hong merchants had forged the chop and the Viceroy knew nothing of the incident.  As a 
large body, the affiliates of the East India Company had influence.  The Americans had 
none.  “If the trade is stopped,” Harriet wrote, “we shall have to budge.”655 
Chinese officials handled the situation with a deft touch.  Instead of halting all 
commerce, they only banned trade with Russell & Co., Low’s firm.  Any resolve the 
merchants may have felt crumbled.  As Harriet noted, “Had they stopped the American 
trade in general, they would have had all the gallant youths fighting for us at the city 
gates.”656  Rumor was, the Emperor had given notice that no foreign women were to be 
allowed to visit Canton in the future, but that the Viceroy was waiting for the seasonal 
departure of Company officials in the spring to make the announcement.  When the 
Company ships left, even officials and wives who remained in Asia disembarked for the 
more temperate weather and social environment of Macau.  By summer 1831, when the 
new trading season began, the stage was reset.  Canton was again a men’s society of 
merchants with wives and children safely ensconced at Macau.   
The 1830 clash underscores two things.  First, we see gender’s potential as a fault 
line for intercultural conflict (as well as its limitations).  The prohibition on women was 
significant enough to be included in the Eight Regulations, upheld as the regulations were 
repeatedly renewed, and, most of all, enforced when so many of the other regulations 
were not.  To Chinese officials, the presence of foreign women held the potential for 
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problems best avoided.  While complaints abounded that the rule against foreign women 
in Canton was arbitrary and unfair, Mrs. Baynes’ situation and Harriet’s desired uprising 
of the “gallant youths” to the ladies’ cause was precisely the sort of conflict Chinese 
officials sought to avoid.  The fact that officials hit upon a peaceful solution may well 
have contributed to the specific outcome of the confrontation.  Second, we see the 
fractious nature of relations between British and American residents in southern Asia.  
The Chinese strategy of targeting the American firm successfully drove a wedge between 
the two groups.  When Harriet Low and her aunt first traveled to Canton, she wrote 
sympathetically of her British counterparts and their efforts.  In singling out one 
American firm, the Chinese hit upon a sore spot.  Their actions reminded the Americans 
that whatever their pretensions to participating in the same social circle as the Company 
families, they were by no means equals. 
 
Canton:  A Bachelor Society 
The prohibition on women in Canton shaped possibilities for trade, sociability, 
and peaceful relations in China.  Where other trading entrepôts of the era such as Calcutta 
and Batavia (Jakarta) became home to clusters of foreign and mixed trading families, in 
China before the Treaty of Nanjing, women, children, and mistresses lived apart from the 
trading enclave at Canton, either at home or in Macau.657  In southern China, by contrast, 
foreign social circles developed with one group at Canton composed of men, the other a 
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mixed-sex community at Macau.  This section turns to the society of foreign men living 
together in Canton, suggesting that the developed as a bachelor space both in its 
demographics and its lifestyle:  Chinese compradors and servants managed households; 
merchants worked hard and played hard; and issues of sexuality and intimacy brought 
foreign merchants into conflict with the Chinese government. 
The Canton of China’s foreign traders was a Canton apart.  Traders lived on a 
small, twelve acre enclave by the western suburbs outside the city wall.  About three 
hundred feet back from the banks of the Pearl River stood the factories where the traders 
both lived and worked.  The term “factories” refers to the residences or offices of a factor 
or sales’ agent, but the buildings could also serve as a makeshift hotel for ship captains, 
play host to church services and club meetings, and more.  Made of brick and granite, 
these rather stately buildings have been memorialized time and again in paintings by both 
Western and Chinese artists, complete with consuls’ flags flying from the rooftops and 
clusters of boats moored along the river.  These long, narrow structures contained a lower 
level with kitchens, servants’ quarters, a treasury, and a godown (warehouse), and an 
upper level with the counting rooms and bedrooms, a dining room and parlors, and often 
a veranda facing the river.  Some factories even had a roof terrace to escape the swelter of 
September nights as the tea season began.658  It was in this twelve-acre space that foreign 
merchants ostensibly lived, worked, and played.  In practice they visited other locations 
                                                 
658 Downs, The Golden Ghetto : The American Commercial Community at Canton and the 





as well—temples, gardens, the countryside—although either with Chinese escorts or at 
their own peril.659   
The factories lined one against the other interspersed with a few narrow streets:  
Old China Street, New China Street, Hog (formerly Hong) Street, and Puantinqua Street.  
These slender byways may have been cramped, but they nonetheless teemed with shops 
and peddlers retailing merchandise ranging from silk, porcelain, jade, and lacquer ware, 
bamboo and even European furniture, to fruits and vegetables, noodles, pickled olives, 
ground nuts, and pastries.  There were butchers, barbers, and book sellers and makeshift 
bars toting tea, congee, and stiff rice liquors such as “samsha” and “Mandarin gin.”660  By 
the turn of the nineteenth century, beggars and street performers thronged to the foreign 
enclave, much to the horror and annoyance of many of the residents.  In 1807, William 
Paine noted in his journal that he had discovered that the beggars reported to a head 
beggar who had “the power of life or death over the others.”661  When Paul Sieman 
Forbes arrived in 1843, he romanticized the Tanka boat women662 with their babies 
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strapped to their backs and the gentleness of the Cantonese, but even he was taken aback 
by beggars who writhed in pain in the street and beat themselves until paid to stop.  “You 
may judge of my surprise when I afterwards learned that this was a trick to excite the 
sympathy of the benevolent intended to deceive some countryman and is a very common 
practice,” he wrote.663  This piece of China was deliberately apart from the rest of the 
empire, and yet it was the China known to most Western travelers. 
The life of the Canton trader varied by season.  Trade ebbed and flowed with the 
monsoons or trade winds which carried ships in on the southwest winds of May and June, 
and carried them out on the northeast monsoons by mid-January.664  While year-round 
residence at Macau allowed sales’ agents to stay longer, cargoes needed to depart on 
these winds or face being stuck at port until the monsoons eased.  During the busy 
season, merchants typically began with a morning bath—the first of many in the sticky 
heat—and a breakfast of tea, rice, perhaps eggs or fish, curry, toast and jellies, and maybe 
rice cakes.  Partners, clerks, and copyists (who were usually Portuguese) then applied 
themselves to trade before breaking for lunch around noon.  Dinner, around half past six 
in the evening, gathered guests and residents alike for a social break.  While in the off-
season dinner would be an extended ritual with many courses, concluding with brandy 
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and the long black cheroots or cigars imported from Manila, during the high season 
dinner went quickly in the rush to return to work.   
For American traders, as with many merchants, most men traveled while young 
and unmarried, although some returned to Canton as married men, usually because they 
needed to recover from bankruptcy.  China offered a possibility for remaking oneself.  
Traveling was a gamble, a speculation in and of itself.  It could yield a fortune, or it could 
carry enormous costs.  A man might gain wealth and with it stature for himself and his 
family, and a woman might marry above her prospects in the metropole.  Or one might 
give up relationships with family and friends, miss out on important portions of 
children’s lives, end up writing letters of well wishes to a personal circle half-composed 
of people never met, and despair of ever having a home life.  The speculation carried the 
possibility of a win or a loss, but the expectation inherent in the gamble shaped personal 
strategies.   For many men, the exclusion of women ensured life in Canton was a means 
and not an end.  The lifestyle of foreigners in the trading enclave reflected this:  men 
worked hard and played hard, hoping to turn a quick fortune and return home.   
Americans could not compete with the extravagance of their British and Dutch 
counterparts, but their mode of living and dining in Canton remained far more sumptuous 
than anything imaginable to them at home.665  Each factory was run by a comprador who 
handled the finances of the factory and its residents.  Servants handled the housework:  
they kept the factories stocked and clean, cooked and served food, brewed tea, brought 
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water for baths, and laundered the linen and clothing.666 The comprador supplied the 
factory complete and received a personal cut from each purchase.  The separation of 
buying and consuming may have contributed to a lavish lifestyle in Canton, but 
extravagance itself bred extravagance.  Robert Bennet Forbes, for example, traveled to 
China to recoup a fortune lost in the Panic of 1837.  Shortly after arriving, he found 
himself writing to his wife in Boston to explain why he needed a yacht.  “Here comes the 
cloven foot say you, there’s the sock he has already split open—but this is not so.  Ask 
[his brother] John and he will tell you that health is capital here & health can only be 
retained by a relaxation from the desk for an hour or two every day after dinner—
therefore the boat is my capital.”667  And how else would he partake in the regular boat 
racing on the Pearl River?  As his brother promised, a racing boat was guaranteed to 
make him popular with the British.668  Owning a serviceable schooner seemed a 
necessary expense. 
While Macau was the center of the foreign merchants’ social world, Canton did 
not lack for recreation.  Merchants hosted and attended dinner parties, gathered for music, 
book clubs, and games ranging from whist, backgammon, checkers, and billiards to team 
sports including cricket and a game the Americans called “ball” (a forerunner of 
baseball).669  By 1816, the British East India Company gave chamber concerts in their 
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factory on Thursday evenings.  By 1841, Russell & Company had a bowling alley in its 
factory.  The most popular activity by far, as shown by Bennet Forbes’s experience 
above, was boat racing.  The races began with East India Company efforts to fill the 
hours for idle sailors at Whampoa, but soon caught on.670  
Despite these spaces of conviviality, manners in Canton were formal.  Men 
referred to each other as “Mr. Cushing” or “Mr. Forbes” rather than the more intimate use 
of given names or family names without the honorific.  To some Americans, this was due 
to the formality of Chinese society.671  To others, the lack of women’s society rendered 
courtesy necessary.  Bryant P. Tilden wrote, “We are such a mixture of gentlemen, 
sailors, and all of us necessarily batchelors (sic), while at Canton, certain etiquet (sic) is 
quite necessary to keep us from becoming as the Chinese say many of us are—’half wild 
mans.”672  Of course, formal manners did not a gentleman make.  British mariners, 
certainly, had a reputation for raucous shore leaves.  Whether or not Canton as a men’s 
society far from the constraining influence of home freed men to behave badly, many 
contemporaries thought it did. 
Settling families, marrying Chinese women, and consorting with prostitutes were 
all illegal for foreign traders, but some were more illegal than others.  Visiting prostitutes 
could bring a fine of several thousand dollars for foreign men.673  One traveler by the 
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name of William Hickey, son to a prominent British lawyer, reported in 1769 that a 
“whole class of water-borne prostitutes” plied their wares to sailors during their “lay-
days” out of Lob-Lob Creek near the Whampoa anchorage, just downriver from 
Canton.674  And Peter Dobell, an American who had visited Canton on several occasions, 
wrote of “flower boat women” as a normal part of the local scenery in 1830.  While 
prefacing with a comment on the “good disposition and friendly conduct” of most 
Chinese, Dobell decried that such a sober nation should have so many “bon vivans.”  He 
described the fancy dress, the gaming, quail-fighting, and womanizing habits of Chinese 
dandies.  The discussion included not only pity for Chinese women and for the quail, but 
also for the city in the face of vice emanating from the flower boats on the Pearl River.   
And in fact, Dobell writes that flower boats were popular places of business.  
Dobell’s narrative included a Hong merchant who shared with him that, by ancient 
custom, tea contracts were made (a year in advance) in the midst of lavish entertainments 
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on flower boats.675 “They have assured me that the women in those boats have more 
agreeable conversation, and are better educated than others, and are more genteel and 
engaging in their manner.  A well-spread table, of which the Chinese are great lovers, is 
always found prepared for the guests.”676  Merchants made up the immense cost of the 
entertainment in the contract.   
The flower boats were one outlet for foreign traders’ impulses to sexuality, 
intimacy, and companionship, but there are suggestions of more private arrangements as 
well.677  In 1828, the British East India Company wrote of a complaint made by the 
Cantonese Hoppo that some Hong Merchants would provide young boys to act as 
servants to the foreign merchants and would bring Tanka boat prostitutes “to supply their 
whoredoms.”678  The reference to servant boys most certainly alluded to sexual behavior.  
The British took it as such and took offense.  In a formal response, the British argued 
“Your edict also mentions, ‘that barbarians use boys, public women, &c.’ The English 
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consider the crime alluded to deserving death.”679  Yet the offense went much deeper 
than questions about sexual mores. 
In the 1828 case, the Hoppo directed Chinese merchants and linguists to persuade 
foreigners to “repress their bad dispositions” and “be transformed (or civilized) that they 
also may enjoy the benefit of a universal glorious peace, and every one kept within his 
own province (or sphere) and quietly trade.”680  Representatives of the British East India 
Company were taken aback:  the Hoppo called upon them to restrain themselves, to be 
civilized, and to take lessons from the Chinese merchants on proper decorum.  The 
British reply fairly sputtered in response:  “It is directed, that the Hong merchants and 
linguists shall continually teach the foreigners, repress their pride and profligacy, and 
insist on their turning, with all their heart, to civilization.  But the men who are directed 
to instruct us, are themselves very ignorant.”681   
The exchange over the sexuality and self-control of British merchants got to the 
very heart of British critiques of Chinese society of the early nineteenth century.  
Merchants and missionaries alike pointed to China as a formerly great but now corrupt 
and decrepit society.  As James Hevia has argued, Englishmen in China saw themselves 
as instructing the Chinese on proper behavior within an international society—how to be 
civilized.  “Civilization” and self-control were the terms on which ideological differences 
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over international relations were negotiated, and sexuality was a part of this.682  While 
there was no formal political intercourse between Beijing and Western diplomats prior to 
1842, despite insistent and often obnoxious efforts on the part of British legations, the 
informal exchanges between merchants and Western consular officials in Canton had a 
lasting impact on developing notions of international norms and international law.683   
Negotiations over concepts such as self-control, morality, and civilization 
rationalized arguments as to which nations had rights under the terms of international law 
and which did not.  While gender and sexuality were only pieces of a much larger 
discourse of laws and norms, it is one that scholars have little examined.684  Such 
linkages were not absent from contemporary discourses on law, civilization, and, for 
example, chivalry.  In an 1839 talk on the topic, the well-known American jurist William 
Kent argued that these three historical institutions developed hand in hand with 
commerce.  Commerce brought trading peoples together and forced them to recognize 
“principles of justice and universal law” through a “jealous observance of rights of 
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property.”  Chivalry provided another mode of morality to guide such interaction by 
prizing courtesy, valor, humanity, and devotion to the fair sex.  These two elements 
intertwined in civilization’s “elevation and freedom of the female sex, which forms the 
peculiar feature of modern manners.”  Woman desired to “become ornaments” while 
man’s inclination to commerce and chivalry allowed him to provide her “the rich furs of 
the north, the gay silks of Asia, the wrought gold of domestic manufacture.”685  Here, to 
Kent, was the pinnacle of civilization. 
For Chinese officials, maintaining the foreign community at Canton as a 
homosocial bachelor society kept that population from putting down roots.  This bachelor 
society necessarily contained many foreign merchants who had no investment in the local 
order beyond “making their lac” as quickly as possible in order to return home and start 
their lives.  Yet it is interesting that gender-based tensions such as the presence of women 
in Canton incited conflict more than issues tied to sexuality such as prostitution, 
concubinage, and miscegenation.  Chinese regulations prohibited not only the presence of 
foreign women, but also marriage between foreigners and Chinese women.  While 
Western merchants ostensibly broke the law by visiting prostitutes or flower boats as 
well, this offense reaped a mere fine and seems to have been seen as part of the cost of 
doing business.  Considering the circumstances of life in Canton is necessarily 
incomplete, however, without a consideration of the linked community of foreigners in 
Macau.  In Macau, there lived the wives, mistresses, and families of foreign traders who 
operated out of Canton. 
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Macau:  Of Mistresses & Marriage 
During the summer “off-season,” foreign traders retired to Macau.  While French, 
Dutch, Danish, English, Swedish, Armenian, and Portuguese supercargoes variously 
spent their summer months in Macau in the eighteenth century and the Qing government 
even required it in 1741, it was not until 1765 that the practice of retiring to Macau 
became standard.686  By the late eighteenth century, however, British ships came to 
dominate not only the trade out of Canton, but also the social life of Macau.  In 1773, the 
British East India Company appointed the “Select Committee of Supercargoes” to 
oversee the Company’s China trade.  Company officials either lived in a stately Company 
house on the Praia Grande next to the Governor’s Palace or in private residences.687  The 
East India Company became known for giving lavish fancy balls and Company wives 
played an important role in setting the terms of society.   
Macau sits on a small peninsula off the southern coast of China, about 90 miles 
south of Canton and 40 miles west of Hong Kong.  Until 1999, Macau was a Portuguese 
colony.  The Portuguese were the first Europeans to make headway in the South China 
Sea.  Vasco de Gama reached India in 1498, and Portuguese sailors first visited Macau in 
1513.  By the end of the sixteenth-century, the Portuguese had turned Macau into a major 
trading entrepôt and a primary way station in trade between Japan and India.688  A verbal 
agreement between Portuguese and Chinese military commanders in 1555 paved the way 
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to settlement:  the Portuguese agreed to pay licensing fees, customs taxes, and a yearly 
lease in exchange for rights to trade off of southern China.689  By the end of the 1560s, 
Macau’s population had grown from 400 in 1557 to nearly 5,000, including Chinese 
residents (mostly fishing families), Portuguese merchants, and African and Indian slaves, 
servants, and mistresses who had been brought to the peninsula by the Portuguese.690  
The colony faded following the abrupt Japanese withdrawal from trade in 1639, but 
conditions improved with China’s decision to open several ports along its southern coast 
to European trade in 1685, and even more when China limited its European trade to 
Canton in 1757.691   
For such a small space, power relations in Macau were surprisingly complex.  The 
colony was governed by a colonial governor and senate appointed by the Portuguese 
crown, while most of the administrative and judicial appointments came by way of the 
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Portuguese Viceroy of the Estado de India headquartered in Goa (India).  The Viceroy 
claimed royal authority to manage Portuguese possessions in Africa (Mozambique), India 
(Goa, Diu, and Daman), as well as Macau.  In practice, however, the Macanese 
government attempted to play Lisbon off Goa in order to chart its own path.  And the 
British “John Company” made its own efforts to shape local politics.  More significantly 
for Macau, the Portuguese colonial government operated at the pleasure of Beijing.692  
Chinese officials threatened and enacted sanctions against Macau residents in times of 
unrest.  The Chinese servants would depart the town.  Provisions, including food, would 
be cut off from the inhabitants of Macau.  Long-term residents bore no illusion as to the 
precarity of Macau’s existence.  Macau was more a product of the sea and the circuits of 
trade that traversed the South China Sea than either China or Portugal.    
 
TABLE 1. 
Demography of Macau, 1583-1834 
1583 900 Portuguese men. 
1622 700-800 Portuguese casados and mestiços 
10,000 Chinese 
1635 850 casados 
150 single and married men with wives in Portugal 
5,100 slaves (6 slaves average per casado) 
1640 600 Portuguese casados 
600 sons capable of bearing arms 
500 native-born casados and soldiers 
5,000 slaves  
20,000 Chinese 
1662 200-300 Portuguese and other Christian males 
~2,000 widows and orphans 
1690s 19,500 inhabitants 
1800 8,000 Chinese 
1822 Christian population listed as: 
604 adult males (14 or older) 
473 boys 
                                                 








1830 1,202 men and 2,149 women denoted as “white” 
350 male slaves 
779 female slaves 
38 men and 118 of mixed races.  
1834 90 total Portuguese residents in the city 
 
Source:  Timothy Coates, Convicts and Orphans:  Forced and State-
Sponsored Colonizers in the Portuguese Empire, 1550-1755 (Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 181, Anders Ljungstedt. An Historical Sketch of 
the Portuguese Settlements in China, and of the Roman Catholic Church 
and Mission in China; a Supplementary Chapter, Description of the City 
of Canton (Boston: James Munroe & Co., 1836). 
 
 
In the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth century China, neither marriage nor 
long-term liaisons with foreign men were allowed by the Chinese government; in fact, 
they were actively discouraged.  Reasons for these regulations may have been more 
fraught than simply seeking to prevent foreign men from settling in China.  Two 
additional explanations for the prohibition are the importance of family to the Chinese 
social order and a demographic crisis that already made marriageable women scarce.  
Wives were significant both as mothers to sons and as guardians of a husband’s family 
lineage.  Qing China experienced a “marriage crunch” in which men seeking wives far 
outpaced women of childbearing age.  Susan Mann writes that these trends led Qing 
officials to clamp down on courtesan culture as the occupation pulled young women out 
of the marriage market.693  In this light, marriage to foreign men seems especially 
problematic. 
With a few exceptions, Western women who arrived in Macau came because they 
were already married.  For employees of the British East India Company, company law 
                                                 





and social custom forbade marriage to local women in Macau.  Those who disregarded 
the law faced punishment, but the ostracism that followed from disobeying custom could 
be worse.  The men and their families were cut off from their commercial networks and 
business partners, leaving them little means to support their families.  East India 
Company employees faced loss of employment and property.694  Sex was one thing, 
marriage was quite another.  It may well have been, given the social weight of the East 
India Company until 1833 when the Company lost its monopoly on the British tea trade, 
that Americans followed this custom as well.  While no one within the Perkins network 
faced marriage restrictions of the kind set by banks, estates, and government services in 
sending Europeans abroad, cultural restrictions may have played the same function.695     
In many merchant networks, including those of overseas Chinese, marriage was a 
common mechanism for cementing alliances between cross-cultural business partners or 
adapting into a local society.696  Alfred Robinson, the California agent for Bryant & 
Sturgis married the young daughter of a prestigious Mexican family.697  Henry P. Sturgis 
and George Sturgis, both stationed in Manila, married into an English East India 
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Company family and a Spanish colonial family respectively.698  While these marriages 
did not necessarily improve their careers, spaces where cross-cultural marriage between 
trading families was an option could cement commercial ties and provide an avenue for 
personal ambition.  European trading companies actively promoted a variety of unions 
abroad, especially concubinage—long term liaisons and families—as an alternative or 
addition to marriage.  Employees and native women formed long-term liaisons in 
colonies ranging from Dutch Indonesia, British India, and more.699  These liaisons could 
smooth a man’s adaptation to a foreign language and culture.  Family life could settle him 
within a place and job in the service of his trading company.  This was precisely what the 
Chinese government hoped to avoid. 
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Nena too seemed exotic on Boston, like ourselves.”  These cousins were all of European and American 
heritage, born in the East Indies.  Filomeno V Aguilar, Clash of Spirits:  The History of Power and Sugar 
Planter Hegemony on a Visayan Island (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), John 
McCormick, George Santayana : A Biography, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 
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699 Ghosh, The Social Condition of the British Community in Bengal, 1757-1800, P. J. Marshall, 
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(2000): 307-331, Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power:  Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, 
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While miscegenation was still common, Ghosh writes that it became increasingly difficult to integrate 





Even after men began to bring wives to China, for bachelor traders, Macau 
offered greater opportunities for liaisons than marriage.  John Heard, a partner at Heard & 
Co., wrote that dalliances were “only looked upon here as amiable weaknesses, and there 
are a lot of bastard children kicking about Macau.”700  He mailed the print of a lovely 
Macanese girl to his friend Charley Brown.  The girl was mistress to an English 
gentleman who resided at Macau.  “She has a sister,” Heard confided, “also kept, who is 
nearly as good looking.  And there is a little girl named ‘Ayow’ now about 15 years old 
who lives in a boat near our house, who is prettier than either of them.  She is still 
virtuous & has refused an offer of $500, but I suspect will relent before long.”701  The 
Tanka women who plied the Pearl River and lived in Macau may have found foreign 
merchants to be lucrative partners, but, as Heard’s lascivious tone illustrates, relations 
were also fraught and potentially dangerous.   
Austin Coates’s 1967 novel, City of Broken Promises, suggests the overlaps 
between sexuality, morality, politics, and commerce in late eighteenth century Macau.  
Coates offers a fictionalized account of the late eighteenth century love affair between 
British East India Company officer Thomas van Mierop and his mistress and rumored 
wife, Martha da Silva Van Merop.702  In the novel, Thomas van Mierop arrives in Macau 
aboard the Company ship Grenada on March 12, 1780.  Instead of living at the lavish 
Company house there in Macau, Mierop follows the advice that he should live in a local 
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The Golden Ghetto, 50. 
701 Ibid.  Rosmarie Lamas notes that $500 approximated the annual salary for a Canton clerk:  “the 
offer was definitely not made by a poor man.”  Rosmarie W. N. Lamas, Everything in Style:  Harriet Low's 
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residence.  Only Portuguese were allowed to actually own property, but through a British 
intermediary trading under a local Portuguese family, Mierop manages to procure the 
house of a former Company officer.  With the house, Mierop acquires the house’s 
baggage—a caretaker for the household, the servants, and above all, a “pensioner.”  
Mierop had seen “pensioner” as a line item on many an account book, but now, after 
asking to see “him,” he discovers his error.  He was a she:  “Her eyes, up-tilted and 
almond-shaped, and her pale, exceptionally smooth skin suggested that she was Chinese; 
yet the way she wore her fine black hair, and her black dress, short and shapeless, was 
more European than Chinese.”703  Mierop accepts Martha as his mistress.  In the Lolita 
tradition, she makes the first advance.  But never within the story does he completely 
appreciate Martha’s abilities.  She seems powerless:  an orphan, a pensioner, looked 
down upon by the servants.  And yet her ability to negotiate the myriad worlds of Macau 
allows her to thrive time and again.  She speaks multiple languages and is clever to the 
point that she eventually becomes one of the wealthiest merchants in Macau.704   
                                                 
703 Austin Coates, City of Broken Promises (London,: Muller, 1967), 21.  The characters of the 
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uncanny resemblance to Thomas Beale, Pedro Gonçalves Sequeira to São Joao de Porto Alegre, and Judge 
Dom Paulo Mascarenhas Pereira to Miguel de Arriaga. 
704 Christina Miu Bing Cheng reads the relationship between Martha and Thomas as a classic 
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Macau : A Cultural Janus (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), 143, Coates, A Macao 





In Coates’s reading, the illicit and licit sexuality, love, and family-making of the 
British in Macau paralleled the illicit and licit commerce of opium.  A tension on which 
the story turns is the competition between Mierop and another Company officer, George 
Cuming.  While Cuming traffics in opium and Mierop does not, Cuming has no mistress, 
so that when British wives create a new social world in Macau at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, the British women create a social rift.  Cuming and other officers with 
their wives were the moral clique, with British men with local, illicit families pushed to 
the outside.  Cuming’s group then represents the moral choices made by the British in 
China:  to traffic in opium and to deny British men the ability to care for their Macanese 
families.  This unfortunate “choice” then presages the descent into the Opium War. 
In the end, Mierop dies, killed by disease caught in Canton and the “death 
sentence” of Company policy to send home all officers unable to manage their posts in 
Canton.  Before Mierop passes away, he attempts to marry Martha and the authorities 
rush to stop him.  He had promised he would, but Macau is the city of broken promises, 
filled with merchants who make many promises to their local mistresses and children.  
Thomas and Martha plan to marry in a Catholic church, but in the end they simply make 
a promise each other, “married before God.”705  Mierop writes up a will leaving much of 
what he owns to Martha, “his wife,” including something she has long sought:  a name.  
She becomes Martha Mierop.  In seeking to convey this newfound legitimacy, she has her 
name emblazoned on the side of a ship she has built to carry on her trade.  As Christina 
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Cheng writes, the phallic “i” is left off, leaving her a name that is hers alone, a pidginized 
“Martha Merop.”     
Coates penned several short histories of Macau and Hong Kong in which he 
similarly suggested that the coming of the “ladies”—British women—marked a social 
change amongst the Anglo-American inhabitants of Macau.706  In City of Broken 
Promises, Coates wrote that: “Men with pensioners in the unseen mystery of their homes 
were not entirely acceptable socially in the new conditions.  Though they were invited, it 
seemed to others as if they stood apart, estranged from the gaiety of the proceedings; and 
as time passed they were invited less.  Privately the ladies referred to such men as 
‘Asiatics.’”707  While mistresses may have provided other advantages such as insight on 
local customs and resources, by the nineteenth century at least, they did not provide the 
social advantage of wives at Macau.708  Portuguese elites overlapped with British and 
American social circles; creole Macanese and Chinese mistresses did not.   
Yet Harriet Low implied that even to the ladies, morality was more fluid in 
Macau than it was at home.  In doing so, however, she suggested that Americans in 
Macau adapted to British sensibilities of sojourner morality.  On March 27, 1832, Harriet 
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wrote to her sister of Chay Beale, the illegitimate son of British trader Thomas Beale, 
“This youth perhaps (with your scrupulous ideas of what is good and proper) might not 
make one of your circle, as he is an illegitimate, but he has been educated in England and 
visits the best society here.  Alas these misdeeds are too common in the eastern world to 
be looked upon with the shame they should be.”709  Even though such bastard children 
should be looked down upon, she implied, they were not, even by the ladies.  And Harriet 
mocked the innocence of another Yankee, Mr. Warriner, who was new to Asia.  The man 
noted of Mr. Blight’s house “his delight in everything” and that he had “‘often heard of 
eastern magnificence, but he had no idea of it before.’”  She added that her sister might 
be in on the joke:  “You must know Mr. Blight’s house is one of the plainest in the place, 
very comfortable, but no elegance about it.”  She continued that he knew little of the 
wickedness of the world.  “We have had several good jokes at his expense, but I shall not 
note them, for my sister would say I was getting scandalous.”710  Obviously Harriet did 
not worry too much that her sister would think ill of her, but she implied that her own 
standards were not what they would be in Massachusetts. Harriet’s adaptation to what she 
saw as local morality raises questions about Coates’s argument that the arrival of foreign 
women marked the change in social standards.  Did the terms of sociability change?  And 
if so, what sparked the change? 
Miscegenation was so common in Macau the consequences seem to have been 
more connected to the metropole than local society.  John Hartt, a clerk at Perkins & Co., 
Benjamin Wilcocks, and later William C. Hunter of Russell & Co. all fathered children 
                                                 
709 Lamas, Everything in Style. 





by their Chinese or Macanese mistresses.711  While these children show up because the 
fathers stood by their offspring, the existence of such children could also prove awkward.  
Wilcocks’ partner shipped his young daughter to Philadelphia to be with her father, at a 
time when the aging merchant was in the market for a wife.712  And John and Robert 
Bennet Forbes were both involved in efforts to secure the inheritance of John Hartt’s 
Macanese daughter against challenges from his family in the United States.713  There is 
no evidence that Perkins kinsmen who lived for many years in China had lovers or mixed 
families abroad, yet it is hard to imagine that they did not:  John Perkins Cushing lived 
abroad for close to thirty years and James Perkins Sturgis for over forty. 
And in fact, James Perkins Sturgis’s experience with courtship in Macau sheds 
insight on the import of domesticity as a symbol of masculine achievement and maturity. 
Here we return to the story of James P. Sturgis and his proposal to Harriet Low.  Sturgis 
traveled to China at the age of 18.  He sailed in 1809 aboard the Atahualpa, captained by 
his cousin William Sturgis.  Sturgis lived in the Suy Hong in Canton for about 25 years 
before removing to Macau where he lived for another 18 years.714  He ensconced himself 
within the Western expatriate community in Asia, far removed from the larger 
responsibilities of family although, given the large number of Sturgises who thronged to 
Canton, Macau, and Manila, not family itself.   
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While kinsman all spoke warmly of “Uncle Jimmy” and visited with him as they 
passed through Canton and Macau, he was universally seen as socially awkward, 
unconventional, and perhaps a little mad.  Julian Sturgis told of a family tale passed down 
to him in which a man came to his office with “Uncle Jimmy” on his heels.  The man 
asked if the proprietor was in only to be told he was not.  Uncle Jimmy then stepped into 
the office, proceeded to his desk and got to work.  The man waited for some time before 
finally inquiring once more after the proprietor—which of course was Uncle Jimmy 
himself.715  The humor lay in the oddity that typified Uncle Jimmy Sturgis for those who 
loved him best.  Whether China provided a refuge for a family eccentric or exacerbated 
awkwardness in a young man is hard to say.  But his letters home from late in life reveal 
a man who felt keenly the loss of family and home.   
In China, Sturgis’s business was enmeshed with that of his more successful 
cousins John Perkins Cushing, William Sturgis, and Russell Sturgis, yet he himself never 
obtained sufficient wealth to return an expected East India nabob.  In 1818, James formed 
James P. Sturgis & Co. in partnership with John Perkins Cushing.  Through this new 
house, the partners handled the opium trade for the Perkins network.716  Opium came 
largely from Smyrna (now Izmir, Turkey), to a ship stationed off of Lintin Island just 
outside of Canton, and from there the drug was smuggled into China.  This structure of 
trade—the use of the second partnership and the outside vessel—provided distance 
between the Perkins’s drug trafficking and their relationship with Chinese merchants, 
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especially the esteemed Houqua.717  The opium trade was lucrative, but if it made a 
fortune for Sturgis as it did several of his cousins, he must have lost it.  Given the arrival 
and departure of so many vessels owned by family and friends, Sturgis’s inability to 
return likely had less to do with inaccessibility of homeward bound passage than the lack 
of sufficient funds to establish himself in New England.  This was certainly the view of 
his status reported by others who visited with him.  Of course, Sturgis may well have 
preferred life in Macau.  Yet the adventure co-financed by John Perkins Cushing and Wu 
Bingjian in Sturgis’s name suggest that financial troubles were at least partly at issue.  As 
discussed in chapter four, the explicit goal of the adventure was to shore up Sturgis’s 
finances.   
Life in China was hard on Sturgis.  He watched two of his brothers follow him out 
to Canton and die at young ages.  First Henry died in Macau in 1819 and George 
followed in 1826.  Merchants shared expectation that financial success enabled social 
success.  In 1812, just a few years after leaving him in Canton, his cousin William Sturgis 
teased Jimmy about his prospects:   
I predict you will hereafter be a richer fellow than you ever expected or 
ever deserved.  Your old dissipated friends are nearly all gone.  Some 
hanged and some luckily died a natural death.  Frank Foster was the last 
and he died a few days since at the Havana.  Staying at Canton was a 
lucky think for you my Bog—ninety nine hundredths of the young men in 
Town envy your situation and well they may for there is nothing to be 
done here.  You have a good reputation now and pretty well 
established.  Only care to keep it a few years longer and there will be no 
charge of hurting it, do what you will.718 
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The letter underscored the shared expectation of the commercial arc:  travel abroad for 
opportunities not available at home and return with the capital and reputation to live 
comfortably amongst family and friends.  But this commercial arc offered little room for 
failure.  Several men within the Perkins network felt that they lacked the capital to return 
home despite feeling stranded abroad.719 
By the mid-1830s, Sturgis claimed to have given up all desire for hearth and 
home.  In an exchange of letters with his sister Betsy, Sturgis decried the prospect of 
marriage—turning “Benedict”—but the story behind the letters reveals how dearly he 
desired precisely what he claimed to deplore.  In 1832, he had proposed to Harriet Low.  
As one of the few American women in visiting range of Canton, Harriet Low had her 
share of suitors, including both James and his nephew, Samuel Sturgis.  Low recorded the 
stream of visitors to the bungalow she shared with her aunt in volumes of journals that 
she mailed off to her sister.  James was already a crotchety old bachelor by the time 
Harriet made his acquaintance.   When he called on her in November 1829, she noted in 
her diary that this was “the first time he has called on a lady these 20 years.”720  Uncle 
Jimmy called again six months later, at which time he stayed a good two hours.  “He is an 
odd fish,” Harriet reported at another intermittent visit.   
Macau may have yielded few opportunities for courtship, but Jimmy did fall for 
Harriet.  In 1832, John Murray Forbes wrote an assessment of Harriet and her compatriot 
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Caroline Shillaber to a business partner and shared the gossip that Sturgis was quite 
smitten.721  On June 30, 1832, Sturgis asked for her hand.  That night, Harriet recorded 
her astonishment in her journal: 
After dinner walked upon the Campo.  Only think how strange—but what 
makes it more wonderful that James P. Sturgis, Esq. condescended to offer 
me his arm.  Walked home, took tea with us, and made himself extremely 
agreeable.  Perhaps it will be in The Courier!!  Sam [Sturgis] took tea with 
us.  He [JPS] has been here 23 years, is to be sure an excuse for any 
enormity he might commit.  Never been in ladies’ society.  Is of a most 
reserved and singular temper, but when in the humour can be quite 
delightful.  He let me step into a heap of mud tonight, which I did not 
much like, because it was so heavy it took my shoe off and broke the 
string.  However, he’s near sighted, and then the honour.722   
 
The flirtation, if it can even be called that, did not last long.  She was his guest for his 
birthday party, but then declined his hand.   
For Harriet, there had never really been a connection.  But Sturgis was stung, and 
sought retribution.  He wrote a poem revealing a scandal surrounding her aunt’s relatives 
back home.  Aunt Low’s brothers were implicated in a murder.  Given the importance of 
reputation in Macau and the fact that the Lows had been able to make a social splash, the 
family hoped to keep the rumor quiet.  Not only did Sturgis write the poem723, but he 
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posted a copy of it on the door of the East India Company’s factory in Macau (itself a 
sign of the English significance to the Americans’ social world), with 500 left behind for 
ease of distribution.  There may have been other reasons for such nasty behavior724, but 
Sturgis’s correspondence with his sister Betsy indicate that he felt snubbed by Harriet and 
the Low family, and took it very personally: 
Had there been any unmarried woman in this country 10 years since, I 
should most probably have become a Benedict, that is, if any one would 
have taken me; but I should have looked for something better than the 
Yankee women now here; they appear a little vulgar; and the old one, 
Low’s wife, arrogant as well as weak.  I fancy that the acquisition of a 
little money has effected her mind.   
 
I was told by a lady at Macau that Mrs. Low had stated that ‘she could not 
know our family at home, as the father of it was a hatter’; You know the 
old saying of set a beggar on horseback.  I know not anyone to whom 
more applicable than the woman in question.  If the reputation of the 
Knapp gang was known to the English females at Macau, and it will not 
be long a secret, this great character would soon be rather more guarded in 
her remarks, for the English ladies, with whom she is tolerated only from 
their good feelings towards one who is in a manner a stranger amongst 
them, would be a little mortified ….725 
 
One would hardly suspect from his tone that he had himself proposed to one of these 
“vulgar” women. 
                                                                                                                                                 
For after sticking the old Wretch 
And knocking on the knob him,  
How it subdues my weaker part 
To think they did not rob him. 
Hodges and Hummel, eds., Lights and Shadows of a Macao Life, fn 18, p. 809-810. 
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exchange of letters with Latimer, Sturgis denied writing the letters, arguing that he disliked Mrs. Low 
because “she had cast a stain on his character in Macau by ‘asserting that my father’s ‘reputation’ was such 
that She could not know his family at home.”  Hodges and Hummel, eds., Lights and Shadows of a Macao 
Life, fn 18, p. 809-810. 





It must have taken a lot for Sturgis, something of a recluse, to ask for Harriet’s 
hand.  While she wondered at his proposal, he wondered if the opportunities of home life 
had passed him by.  By rejecting his proposal, Harriet denied Sturgis’s aspirations to 
domesticity.  The ability to marry carried very different implications for men as for 
women.  Domesticity was not just an ideal or female world of home and hearth, but a 
stage of life that signaled a man’s maturity and vigor.  Harriet confirmed what Sturgis 
had long feared:  that the intimacy of marriage and companionship were beyond his 
grasp.  Thus, the spurned Sturgis lashed out by revealing Low family’s secrets and thus 
putting her family in public, political, and social peril. 
In his letters home, Sturgis indicated comfort that at least he was not alone in 
terminal bachelorhood.  John Perkins Cushing who had been his friend and business 
partner for decades was also “free.”  “Be assured that he will remain so,” Sturgis 
scrawled, “I consider a man of 35 years a little too odd for the holy state as some call it, 
but when past 40, he must be a little mad he who thinks of it.”726  Sturgis was wrong.  
Cushing was incredibly wealthy and viewed by New England society as quite the catch.  
References to him as a China or India “nabob” abounded, as if he were a walking silk 
purse and the emblem of all the East Indies had to offer.  Cushing married quickly to a 
young Boston belle with whom he had little in common and spent little time, but the two 
went on to have four sons, one daughter, and a large home partially modeled on what 
Cushing had left behind in China.  Their mutual cousin and friend, William Sturgis, 
worried that Cushing had returned home a stranger to his friends and family.  Unlike 
Uncle Jimmy, Cushing was able to reestablish himself.  But Sturgis had probably never 
                                                 





been talking about Cushing in the first place.  By 1837, Sturgis retired to a little 
bungalow in Macau’s Penha Hill permanently, and became the American consul there.  
In 1851, at the age of 60, Sturgis finally sailed for the United States, and died en route. 
Domesticity symbolized masculine achievement quite different from its 
equivalent meanings for women.  A wife, children, and home signified both a coming of 
age, manhood, and a certain measure of success, the ability to care for a family.  For 
some men, journeying abroad may have been an opportunity to escape the responsibilities 
of life at home.  But others who journeyed lacked the funds to return or the will to return 
with little to nothing to show for their efforts.  The longer abroad, the harder it was to 
return.  And business failure was compounded by an inability to create a home life.  Yet 
this difficulty may well have been furthered by social rules that made it difficult for 
merchants to establish mixed families in Macau.  In Manila and California, merchants 
connected to the Perkins network did marry.  In Calcutta and Batavia (Jakarta), mixed 
families provided commercial advantages for foreign merchants, at least until the mid-
nineteenth century.  In contrast, most Western merchants in China lived as bachelors until 
commercial success allowed them to return to the metropole.  Sometimes, however, these 
merchants returned with their wives.   
Macau:  Wives & Sociability 
Foreign women’s social circles in Macau provide another venue for considering 
the impact of sex segregation on trade in southern China.  For months at a time, Macau 
emptied of foreign merchants whose entire purpose for being abroad was trade.  The 
women left behind formed a society that both connected to these men and respective 





described a ladies’ society that was less formal than either home or that of their menfolk 
and yet more demanding.  For merchants, wives abroad could prove advantageous.  
Given the expense of maintaining a family abroad, wives and children could be the 
ultimate status symbol.  Wives could also make trading abroad feel less like an exile to a 
husband, and could broker the challenges of having a spouse so far away for wives.  And 
further, within this cluster of Anglo-American women, the sociability of wives could 
open doors for husbands or even prove socially disruptive.   
Two wives who traveled with their husbands and left correspondence during their 
time abroad were Mary Greene Hubbard Sturgis, wife to Russell Sturgis, and Valeria 
Wright Forbes, wife to Paul Sieman Forbes.  Both Russell Sturgis and Paul Sieman 
Forbes were partners in Russell & Co. (successor to Perkins & Co., Canton) in the 1830s 
and 1840s.  Mary and Valeria were not the first wives to travel in connection with the 
Perkins network:  Sarah Perkins followed her husband James to Cap François (Haiti), 
Nancy Higginson traveled to London in 1809, and Margaret Curzon resided in Havana 
with her husband in 1816 until she became pregnant.  Yet many others did not.   
Why did Mary Hubbard Sturgis and Valeria Wright Forbes elect to go?  Both had 
children which must have made the decision more difficult.  Residing near kin provided a 
support network that buttressed social life and childrearing in the nineteenth century.  
Home provided a known women’s society.  Both Mary and Valeria gave this up to live in 
China with (or at least near) their husbands.  Where to Mary living abroad was about 
being near her husband, Valeria seemed more inclined to adventure (and perhaps to 
escape her own kin).  Both discovered that the exigencies of life in China meant that 





as trade with China offered a space for the remaking of self and family through economic 
success, so the relative social anonymity of Macau allowed for a fair degree of lassitude 
for personal remaking through sociability.  James P. Sturgis intimated as much respecting 
the social position of Harriet Low and her aunt.  In this sphere, the education into 
domesticity discussed in chapter three takes on new significance.   
In Macau, socializing was an occupation.  While manners in Macau—unlike in 
Canton—were quite informal, social engagements were currency.  Harriet Low once 
remarked that the only respite from visiting in Macau was to get ready for a ball.727  She 
and her aunt complained that, contrary to New England norms, residents of Macau spent 
the day paying and receiving calls even on Sunday.  So much for the day of rest.  Being a 
woman, especially a young unmarried woman, made it difficult to say no to anything.  
Initially the Low ladies resisted the lure of the social whirl.  They declined an invitation 
to a ball when first formally greeted by representatives of the East India Company upon 
their arrival in Macau.  But they found it hard if not impossible to find a middle ground 
between social activity and reclusion.  When in 1832 the Low ladies finally threw a party 
themselves, they felt pressured into reciprocating the many parties they had attended 
themselves.  Yet Harriet Low confessed to her sister that such constant gaiety could be 
terribly lonely.  She only felt kinship with a few individuals, including Mrs. Emily Davis 
and a Mr. Vachell.728 
There were many social divisions in Macau.  Lines of race, class, and nation, 
between Portuguese from Portugal and those who had “gone native” and formed families 
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in Macau, political splits between Company traders and private British merchants 
engaged in the “country” trade between India and China, and more.  Thus, despite the 
small community, petty infighting abounded.  When Elizabeth Fearon arrived in Macau 
in 1826 with her husband, British “country trader” Christopher Fearon, for example, she 
faced an uphill battle gaining acceptance from the Company wives.729  According to 
Susannah Hoe, until 1830, Elizabeth Fearon “had not been part of that surprisingly 
gracious and elegant, though small society that revolved around the Company.”730  
Harriet Low described Elizabeth as “well-born and well bred,” “with one of the sweetest 
dispositions possible.”  Her husband, however, had a “foolish and ostentatious 
disposition,” seemed inclined to live beyond their means, and told “everyone that his wife 
was the daughter of a baronet and a general officer.”731  Thus, it was likely for her 
husband and not for herself that Elizabeth Fearon received a cold reception. 
Nation itself became an important identifier in the context of life abroad.  
Americans were at often pains to distinguish themselves from their British counterparts, 
but they nonetheless lived within a British-dominated social world in Macau.  When 
Harriet Low and her aunt arrived, they were the only American women in residence.  
Harriet vacillated between fearing or disdaining the aristocratic pretensions of the British 
in residence and basking in their attentions.  In October 1829, soon after her arrival, 
Harriet proclaimed that her opinion of the English had been utterly transformed:  “We 
have found none stiff, as we anticipated.  On the contrary, affable, polite, and pleasant.”  
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Part of her delight stemmed from socializing with Lady Claridge who was about her age 
and, though titled, did not hold herself above Harriet.732   
The ability to consume and to consume well was another form of social 
expression.  The ladies as much as the men took pleasure in displaying their wealth, 
donning opulent dresses and jewels simply because they could.  Homes, gardens, and 
entertaining all expressed aspiration and means.  Servants were relatively inexpensive, 
available, and, most importantly, socially expected.   Harriet reported that it was 
impossible to keep up with the extravagance of their social circle at Macau and while she 
had no wish to do so, her uncle insisted.  “All I wish is to make a decent appearance,” she 
confided to her sister, “but Uncle wishes us to have everything handsome, but had much 
rather save the money to help us to get home for I cannot say that I have any desire to 
spend my life here.”733  Harriet’s uncle understood that the ability to sustain a certain 
lifestyle for his wife and niece in Macau—and the key was sustain—sent a message of 
creditworthiness to potential business partners. 
The experience of the “ladies” at Macau was quite apart from that of their 
menfolk and, interestingly enough, was less formal.  When the traders made their 
seasonal departure to Canton, Western women at Macau entertained themselves.  Harriet 
Low described a “lady party” at Mrs. Thornhill’s villa on a November evening in 1831 as 
follows:  “We took our tea at the center table, then had a couch on each side of the table, 
Mrs. Fearon on one, Mrs. Davis on another, Mrs. Low on the third, Miss Low [herself] on 
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the fourth, our feet up, which is generally the custom when no gents are present.”734  And 
Macau, like Manila, was famous for keeping Latin hours and a Latin pace:  revelers 
socialized into the wee hours of the night and slept late in the morning and even into the 
afternoon.  While the “bachelor society” at Canton demanded greater formality, the 
women at Macau took the opportunity of their “ladies’ society” to relax social 
constraints. 
Yet this ladies’ society also offered an opportunity for remaking oneself through 
sociability.  The party Harriet Low attended at Mrs. Thornhill’s villa brought together the 
Low ladies with the previously socially excluded Mrs. Fearon.  To what extent did the 
presence of American women disrupt hierarchies set within British social circles?  And to 
what extent did mingling between the ladies create business opportunities for the 
menfolk?  As the next example will show, Russell Sturgis saw his wife’s social appeal as 
part of his own business potential.  
 
Mary Greene Hubbard Sturgis 
Mary Greene Hubbard was Russell Sturgis’s second wife and traveled with him to 
the East Indies between 1833 and 1837.  The couple first lived in Manila while Sturgis 
worked for Russell & Sturgis before moving to China where, due to the prohibition on 
Western women in Canton, the two lived apart.  Mary and the children settled into a villa 
on Macau as Russell moved into one of the factories where the traders lived and worked 
in Canton.  The couple arrived in May 1834, almost a year after Harriet Low departed in 
November of 1833.  The separation was difficult for Russell and Mary, but the distance 
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gave rise to a correspondence that sheds light on their views of marriage, parenting, and 
their place within the foreign community at Macau in the early nineteenth century.  
Living abroad shaped their understanding of their responsibilities to each other, to their 
children, and to Russell’s business.  But for Russell Sturgis, having Mary in Macau also 
provided a unique opportunity:  Mary’s sociability with other merchants’ wives provided 
him a social opening as well, and a potential competitive edge.  As one of the few 
English-speaking women in Macau and the only American for a time, Mary depended 
upon the British ladies for social intercourse.  Englishwomen in Macau, by and large, 
were wives to the wealthier and more powerful merchants.  Russell thus monitored his 
wife’s sociability carefully.   
Despite the proximity between Canton and Macau, the separation fostered a sense 
of love in peril, of trials and tribulations akin to those faced in novels.735  The couple 
wrote almost daily between Canton and Macau, and at times more frequently even than 
that.  As he first sailed away from his wife for Canton, Russell worried about that the 
sacrifice she made for him.  He had written to her at the moment of his arrival in Canton, 
but sat down again the next day.  Perhaps “I have asked too much of you in bringing you 
away from home, and leaving you away from me at Macau,” he worried.736  “If by 
writing I can at any time help to make my dearest wife’s banishment less heavy and 
painful, I am sure I ought not to lose a chance by doing so.”  He, too, was homesick, and 
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the two wrote almost daily of their longing to be together.  In October 1834, six months 
after her arrival in Macau, Mary wrote to her husband that she missed him, that what she 
feared had come to pass:  “we have parted without knowing when we shall again 
meet.”737  As far as she had come to be with him, they were still apart.     
Russell Sturgis was the oldest son of Nathaniel Russell Sturgis, and was grandson 
to Russell Sturgis and Betsy Perkins, the eldest sister of James and Thomas Perkins.  He 
must have been a charming man, or at least a dashing one:  he married three times and set 
the men about him grumbling with jealousy each time.738  Sturgis trained in law at 
Harvard and became a partner at Jonathan Amory & Sons in Boston.  At the time he and 
Mary wed in 1829, he was a recent widower.739  Mary Hubbard may well have been 
peculiarly suited to a man who gave up law for a career in international trade.  On the one 
hand, Mary came from such wealth that one might assume her delicate.  When the 
Marquis de Lafayette came to visit Boston in 1824, the town borrowed her family’s 
chaise.  The Hubbards were one of the few families to still have liveried servants.  But 
she grew up with one foot in Boston and another abroad.  Her father had inherited 
Plantation Mainstay, a sugar plantation in the British colony of Demerara on the northeast 
coast of South America (present-day Guyana).  The family often wintered at their 
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plantation, and at least one of her siblings was born there.  If Russell Sturgis had ever 
hoped for a wife accustomed to sea travel and life abroad, Mary fit the bill.   
While living in Macau, Mary raised their children Russell, Jr., Lucy, and John.  
Of the three children, Russell, Jr. was born in Boston in 1831, Lucy was born in Manila 
in 1833, and John was born in Macau in 1834.  Their children were part of how they 
explained their distance from their family circles to each other.  Russell confided to his 
wife:  “In coming to this country we may be considered as having come to the conclusion 
that we have to live for each other and our children only.  I feel, I know, that I have only 
one great object in life, the welfare of my children and the happiness of her who daily and 
hourly gives me proofs of her anxious wishes to consult my views, even at the sacrifice 
of personal comfort.  Believe me, dearest, I appreciate your endeavors to prove you’re 
content.”740  The two shared parental authority, even across the distance:  Russell and his 
eldest son had an ongoing correspondence at the bottom of the letters.  Russell warned his 
son not to “wake up every morning shouting ‘Naughty Rority,’” to mind his mother and 
look after his sister and baby brother.  He expressed pride that his son worked on his 
letters with his mother, and should teach them to his younger sister.  And young Russell, 
the more rambunctious child of the three, repeatedly sought his father’s approval in the 
letters. One has an image of Mary telling Russell, Jr. to just wait until his father got 
home . . . from Canton.  Even across the distance, Russell saw himself as guiding Mary, 
urging her to be firm, and to not let the children think they could play the two parents off 
each other to get their way.   
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But Russell also advised Mary on how her daily behavior could improve his 
prospects.  Repeatedly, he counseled her on decorum.  Mary’s behavior and sociability 
had very real implications for Russell’s mercantile ambitions.  He expressed pride when a 
business partner reported Mary made a splash in Macau: “I am confident that the longer 
her residence is at Macau, the more she will be esteemed and respected.”741  When Mary 
and their son were both ill, Russell urged her to mind her social obligations.  “When you 
feel able you I think you had best return the visits of those ladies who have called a 
second time on you and let them know you have delayed by illness.  Mrs. Davis, Mrs. 
Whiteman, and Lady R – as I do not wish to be outdone in courtesy.”742  By her mere 
presence, Mary represented Russell and his firm.  Just as he shared his business prospects 
with her, “entre nous,” he sought the details of her social engagements and the children’s 
public as well as private behavior.  
Further, Russell recognized the implications of their national identity for their 
social prospects.  The English community dominated the social scene of Macau, even 
after the British East India Company lost its monopoly in 1833.  In a letter to Joshua 
Bates, the Perkins’s London banker and the husband to a Sturgis cousin, Russell revealed 
his desire to ingratiate himself with English merchants in Macau and Canton.  
My wife finds Macau much more agreeable than she had 
anticipated.  Mine is the only American family in the place, and the 
attentions and kindness of the English ladies to them has been marked & 
constant and have given by all without an exception.  My forced residence 
there during the troubles brought me much in contact also with English 
Gentlemen who manifested a readiness to meet me in terms which have 
placed my family and myself on a most agreeable footing there.  I have 
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also the pleasure of being on the most pleasant terms with our neighbours 
here in Canton.743 
 
Sociability and business went hand in hand.  On the 4th of July, Russell urged Mary, 
“You are the Representative of America you know (today is 4th July you observe) and 
must do honor to our ‘great and happy country.’”744  When Mary wrote to Russell of her 
wariness of singing at a gathering, he replied that they should discuss this: “You must not 
sing sometimes and refuse at others for it looks like coquetry.”745  Mary’s presence 
abroad enabled Russell to participate in a world of sociability with British officers who 
also had wives and families abroad. 
While the Sturgis example makes it tempting to think that all men would want to 
bring wives, there were several reasons why they might not.  Not all wives wanted to go.  
This was likely the case for John Murray Forbes.  Forbes first traveled to Canton in 1830, 
returned to Boston in 1833, before returning to Canton in 1834 for two more years.  
While in Boston, he married Sarah Hathaway.  Forbes was in a position where he might 
well have brought Sarah, but claimed she got too seasick for such a voyage.  Forbes was 
reluctant to return himself, and Sarah likely did not want to leave her twin sister.  But a 
more significant reason is the one suggested by the experience of Valeria Wright Forbes, 
wife to John’s cousin Sieman:  the cost of maintaining a wife in Macau.  If life was 
extravagant for men abroad, the financial requirements for a wife were exorbitant.  
According to Suresh Ghosh, expense was one of the reasons so few Englishmen married 
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Englishwomen abroad, even those who traveled in search of a more advantageous 
marriage market.  The upkeep for an English wife in Calcutta was simply too 
expensive.746  Yet this fact also meant that a wife abroad could be the ultimate status 
symbol, for those with the means.  
 
Valeria Wright Forbes 
Valeria traveled with two of her children to Canton in the years just following the 
end of Canton’s heyday and the rise of the treaty port era in China’s trade with the West.  
The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing brought peace following the Opium War between China and 
Great Britain. The Americans followed in 1844 with a similar treaty, the Treaty of 
Wangxia, the French with the Treaty of Whampoa, and others followed.  The treaties 
included a variety of concessions from the Chinese government, from the opening of a 
variety of new ports to foreign merchants to allowing the presence of foreign women in 
China.  Thus, by the time of Valeria’s arrival in 1846, women were allowed to reside in 
the factories in Canton with their husbands.  The sea breeze and more comfortable 
environment of Macau still attracted traders and their families, but the establishment of a 
British outpost at Hong Kong signaled Macau’s decline.  Still, foreign men far 
outnumbered women in the region.  To Valeria, the social obligations were far more 
extensive than in any of the myriad places she had called home, from Boston to 
Baltimore, New York, or Rio de Janeiro.  Women were much in demand, whether 
married or single.747  But Valeria’s husband traveled to Canton at a very different 
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personal and political moment than Russell Sturgis.  Considering Valeria’s experience 
not only gives us a sense of the meanings of being and bring a foreign wife in the trading 
community in southern China, but also the changes taking place in Canton.    
Valeria Wright Forbes was the daughter of one of Baltimore’s first families, and 
grew up in the world of foreign commerce as much if not more than Mary Howard 
Sturgis.  Valeria’s mother was the daughter of John Warner, a ship captain and merchant 
of Delaware who served as American consul to both Havana and Puerto Rico.748  When 
her father died, Valeria’s mother married William Henry DeCourcy Wright, the youngest 
son of Maryland Governor Robert Wright and Sarah DeCourcy.  Valeria’s stepfather was 
the U. S. Consul to Rio de Janeiro from 1825 to 1834 and a founding partner of Maxwell, 
Wright & Co.  With Joseph Maxwell, an Englishman, Wright is said to have begun the 
Brazilian coffee industry.  Even after the end of his consular appointment, Wright 
continued to be one of the most important Americans in South America.  It was here, in 
South America, that Valeria met Paul Sieman Forbes.  In 1835, the two married. 
Paul Sieman Forbes first traveled to China in 1843.  He did not send for Valeria, 
she lobbied to be able to join him.  Not long after Sieman embarked, Valeria wrote to her 
husband’s cousin that her place was with her husband, in China.  Warren Delano, another 
partner in her husband’s firm, had taken his wife to China.  Should she not also be by her 
husband’s side?  The letter circled within the family from the cousin who had received 
the letter (John M. Forbes) to his brother (R. Bennet Forbes) who in turn responded to 
Sieman with the expectation that the “no” would then make its way from Boston to China 
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and back to Baltimore where Valeria and the children resided with her parents.  “Valeria 
in writing to John draws a parallel between Delano’s taking his wife out and her not 
going – but she must be aware of the difference of your positions,” Bennet Forbes 
commented.  “I look on her remark as a good joke.”749  While Delano returned to China 
with a considerable nest egg and a new wife, the Forbes cousins sought to mask the fact 
that Sieman’s financial troubles drew him to China. 
The three cousins all had a stake in the Canton-based commission house, Russell 
& Co., which was why Valeria had hoped the cousins might smooth her path to China to 
be with her husband.  The cousins were the ones who sent her husband to China in the 
first place, when his own South American business dealings fell apart.  Sieman Forbes 
literally escaped to China, leaving his creditors behind.  He hoped for a fresh start in a 
new circuit of trade.  At the moment when Valeria sent her plea, her husband was in dire 
financial straits, propped up by his cousins who hoped to help him back onto his feet.  
Both John and Bennet Forbes made their fortunes in Russell & Co. through their Perkins 
family connections.  In backing Sieman with letters, influence, and funds, they also 
needed Sieman to succeed.  Bennet Forbes attempted to explain the issue as follows:  
“Retirement and economy must be her lot for a time and it is far better for her to live in 
retirement here – it cannot be done respectably in China.”750  
A wife was not just a partner in family life, but a symbol of her husband’s social 
and economic status.  If Valeria joined her husband in China, her husband would be 
required to provide for his wife and children at a level he could not then afford.  They 
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would become a drain on capital he did not have.  A fashionable lifestyle and wardrobe 
would be a necessary business expense, an investment even, in order to provide a visible 
display of the firm’s financial health.  And life amongst Western traders in China and 
Macau was incredibly expensive.  The situation of Warren Delano’s wife, referred to 
above, was a case in point.  The Delanos lived in a grand villa in Macau with Warren’s 
younger sister Deborah.751  The villa went by the name of “Arrowdale” and had extensive 
grounds complete with geese, turkeys, pheasants, calves, deer, horses, and monkeys.752  It 
was one thing for Valeria and the children to live with her family while her husband was 
away, quite another for them to live “in retirement” while in China, where the 
expectations of sociability and status were much higher.  With so few women abroad, 
social engagement with Western and Chinese merchants and their families was required.  
And until Sieman could establish himself and build up his own capital, he needed his 
family to live quietly and cheaply. 
No one was more aware of the lavish lifestyles of Canton and Macau than Sieman 
himself.  He reported in a journal entry for May 18, 1843, that his first response to 
Canton was a deep, visceral disappointment.  “When I see men about me who are about 
returning with fortunes and the same fortune has been at my command at any time during 
the last 10 years if I had only chosen to come and get it and then think that during that 
time I have been wasting my time, energy and breath, not only to no good purpose, but to 
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a bad one that is in involving myself in pecuniary matters.”753  In 1837, Sieman’s cousin 
John had written to him that of hearing of his luck in both marriage and markets, he felt 
bad for trying to persuade him to leave for “villainous Canton.”754  Sieman turned John 
down, and now regretted that decision bitterly.  Now, finally in Canton, he saw 
opportunity about him, but on the wane:  now, “just as I am on the ground, the tide is 
about changing, the trade is becoming divided and full of risk and uncertainty and I have 
the laboring oar to stem the current.”755  Still, he resolved to do his best, for himself, for 
his family, and for his cousins.  His youth had passed him by, but here was a chance to 
start again. 
 Sieman reported that in the early months of his residence at the factories, despite 
the end of the formal prohibition, foreign women were still barely tolerated in Canton.  
Women who sought to enter or leave Canton still had to do so under the cover of night as 
the boatmen feared being “squeezed” by the Mandarins.  And once in Canton, they had to 
keep to the factories until night, when the Chinese men had retired.  Only then could they 
stretch their legs walking in the garden in front of the factories.756   
This careful negotiation of public space was no trivial matter.  In the handful of 
riots that followed the August 29, 1842 signing of the Treaty of Nanjing, rioters targeted 
foreign women.  The treaty signaled the defeat and concessions of the Chinese to the 
British aggressors and thus rioting against the women’s presence was one way to protest 
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the treaty.  To local residents, the foreign women may well have embodied the treaty 
concessions.757  In the riot of December 7, 1842, for example, the arrival of foreign 
women may well have caused the riot.758  A dispute between Chinese locals and several 
lascars (Indian sailors) provided the spark.759  Protesters vandalized both the American 
and the Creek factories and set them ablaze.  But according to Englishman William Hall, 
commander of the Nemesis, anonymous Chinese posters plastered the walls behind the 
factories in the days prior to the violence.  Hall claims that the posters “misstated the 
terms of the treaty, and asserted the belief, that foreigners were hereafter coming to build 
houses for themselves at Canton, and to reside there with their families.”760  Hall 
connected this to the “bad feeling” that followed a parade of three or four wives of ship 
captains and their children up China Street near the factories of Canton.  It was not that 
the novelty of foreign women was shocking, he felt, but that “not even Chinese ladies are 
ever to be seen in public, except in sedan-chairs.”761  The first factory attacked was the 
one hosting the ladies.  While the women and children escaped, “the mob destroyed and 
tore into shreds every article of their wardrobe which they could find.”762 
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One of the ladies who escaped the riot was the first foreign woman to move to 
Canton following the treaty’s signing, the American Harriet Parker, wife to the well-
known medical missionary, Peter Parker.763  Peter Parker had worked with the local 
Chinese population for years.  As he and his wife explained to a Chinese linguist sent by 
Houqua and Puantingqua to ascertain their intentions, they intended to be as discreet as 
possible.  Mrs. Parker would not venture into the streets or into the public eye.  The 
emperor had promised families could reside with foreigners.  Imperial officials charged 
the linguist with stemming any riots that arose from the foreigners’ travels.  In 
November, Peter noted in his journal his relief that while his wife’s nighttime walks on 
the veranda could be seen by Chinese residents from the river, from the street, and from 
rooftops, no discontent or rude expressions could be seen, but rather people remarking on 
her appearance such as how she dressed her hair.764   
To the Parkers, the cause of the disturbance was “our proximity to the English, 
who, in the course of the late war, had rendered themselves particularly obnoxious to the 
Chinese.”765  The lascars, not the ladies, were to blame.  Where Hall emphasized the 
burning of the American factory, Parker wrote of the burning of the English (Creek) 
factory and the theft of nearly half a million silver dollars.  Harriet escaped with an 
English friend of hers, Mrs. Isaacson, via Mingqua’s factory, where they were secreted 
down river to Whampoa.  While Parker soothed his sister by noting that it was unlikely 
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such violence would occur again and that he had “so many friends among the Chinese, as 
well as foreigners, that, on the approach of a similar riot, it would be easy for her to 
escape,” it was clear that he recognized the danger Harriet faced.  A mere four days later 
he wrote his sister again, noting that Harriet had already returned (on Christmas), but 
hidden from the Chinese and living secluded in her chambers.  “For the present, it would 
not be prudent for her to be seen abroad.”766  Despite their assertions otherwise, the 
Parkers clearly felt that the riots had been about more than the lascars. 
The transition between 1842 and 1846 seems to have been relatively gradual.  
Catherine (Katie) Delano and her sister-in-law traveled to live in China with her husband 
Warren, arriving in December 1843.  Originally the ladies settled in at Warren Delano’s 
estate at Macau, the lavish Arrowdale.  But when Arrowdale burned to the ground with 
all of their belongings, the entire family took up residence in the Canton factory.  Even as 
the formal rules relaxed regarding foreigners, allowing freer travel, Warren insisted that 
the ladies remain within the foreign compound that housed the factories on the outskirts 
of Canton, for their own safety.767  
By the time Valeria Forbes arrived in 1846, relations had relaxed considerably.  
Valeria described a less inhibited social existence than seemed possible in 1842 and 
perhaps even 1844.  In 1847, Valeria reported attending a dinner party given by Houqua 
II (son of Houqua).  Houqua II was an esteemed merchant in his own right, and she 
bragged to her sister-in-law that he had deigned to call upon her, but not on Warren 
Delano’s wife.  This was quite an honor, as was the invitation to the dinner party.  Mrs. 
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Forbes was not the only foreign woman in attendance, and her young daughter Nell also 
attended.  Prior to the dinner, the foreign women joined the Chinese women and female 
children in a separate chamber.  “We were fortunate in having very good interpreters in 
some missionary ladies,” reported Valeria.   
They asked a great many questions, wanted to know if our small waists 
and tight dresses did not hurt us.  Miss Bale told them it was not half as 
bad as their small feet.   They put on our gloves and laughed like children 
at them, took our bonnets and tried to put them on, and got them hind part 
before.  Miss Deblois was with me, and her hair curls.  They said they did 
not like it, it was not as smooth and nice as mine.768 
 
Nell at first was upset and shy in company, but when a Chinese girl of about six was 
placed next to her and bowed “chin chin,” Nell quieted down and took the girl’s hand.  
Apparently Nell warmed up quite a bit, and amused the dinner crowd with her quick 
facility with chop sticks. 
 Yet being a woman in Canton was work.  For one, Valeria complained that for 
having traveled half the world, she had little contact with her husband.  Sieman did not 
come to bed for hours after she retired.  “I think women in such cases should be allowed 
more than one husband so that one could always be with the wife,” she despaired to her 
sister-in-law.769  For another, she constantly had to entertain and let others entertain her 
lest they think her rude.  In February 1847, she already reported that she was tired of the 
“company, company, company all the time.”  Whenever a visitor to Russell & Co. passed 
through, Valeria had to invite them for tea and entertain them.  It was good for business, 
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but combined with her responsibilities with the children, socializing was exhausting.770  
Returning visits from other ladies—and more ladies seemed to arrive every day—
organizing whist parties, attending and hosting parties for Chinese and Western 
merchants:  somehow voluntary socializing had become part of her list of duties and she 
wondered that she could not pass them along to someone else.771  Yet even as she 
protested her labors, Valeria’s tone suggested her own success.  She was busy because 
she was in demand, she hinted.  Amongst the Americans, the English, and the Chinese 
who made up the majority of people with whom she socialized, she had made a splash.  
 Her complaint about her husband’s work schedule, however, was sincere.  While 
several individuals (such as Russell Sturgis, above) noted that the English set the terms of 
the social calendar, Valeria contended that the Americans set the terms of the business 
calendar.  “I must agree with the English when they say all an American thinks of is 
dollars and cents,” she wrote.772  The Yankees had changed the tenor of work, she had 
learned.  There was no longer a difference between Sunday and Monday.  They worked 
all the time.  This was certainly true of her husband.  But it was true of her as well.  As 
Harriet Low and Mary Sturgis discovered before her, being a woman in the foreign 
trading community in southern China was hard work. 
Few American China traders brought their wives with them abroad, but for the 
wives of those that did, they discovered that they were expected to commit themselves to 
their husbands’ enterprise.  Domestic pursuits of music and literature, proper 
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comportment, and social ease all were in high demand in the mercantile society of 
Canton and Macau.  One imagines that, as Russell Sturgis well knew, having womenfolk 
in residence in foreign ports opened social spheres that also opened business 
opportunities.  While Sieman Forbes himself never remarked on this, Valeria certainly 
saw her labors as important.  One wonders that even little Nell, charming a dinner crowd 
with her ease with chopsticks, did not help single out Sieman as he negotiated business 
with fellow merchants at that very table.  Yet at the same time that foreign women were 
allowed—and increasingly able—to live in Canton, Canton itself became less significant 
as a trading center.  The Treaty of Nanjing between the Chinese and the British opened 
up five new treaty ports.  Shanghai (as well as Hong Kong) soon became the new center 
of China’s foreign trade.  Still, as treaty port scholars are quick to note, many of the 
practices and structural legacies of Canton made their way to Shanghai and beyond.   
Conclusion 
Many regulations governing the foreign community in Canton in the early 
nineteenth century proved fluid, but the prohibition on foreign women was not.  The 
Chinese government enforced the rule against women.  While this rule likely aimed to 
limit the ability of foreigners to settle in China, the result was the development of a 
foreign community in nearby Macau connected to the traders at Canton.  The tensions 
that arose over the rule against the presence of foreign women in Canton, over the actual 
presence of foreign women in Canton both before and after the Treaty of Nanjing, and 
over the sexual behavior of foreign men in Canton suggest that these issues did have the 
potential to incite considerable conflict.  Yet the two communities were not necessarily 





while homosocial gatherings of ladies at Macau provided a respite from proper decorum.  
This itself suggests that the gendered dynamics may not have been all they seemed:  the 
advent of an Anglo-American community of women at Macau may not have been the 
reserve of decorum Austin Coates supposed it to be.   
It mattered that social experiences in both Canton and Macau provided 
opportunities to remake self and family by mobilizing economic and social capital in the 
trading enclave and, hopefully, the metropole.  The boomtown environment of Canton 
combined with its necessarily temporary nature may well have made it all the more of a 
geopolitical hothouse.  When traders wondered repeatedly in letters to kith and kin 
whether or not they had wasted their prime away in the hopes of making their fortune, 
these frustrations spilled into other relationships.  And the gendered sociability of Macau 
opened particular opportunities for men able to maintain wives abroad.  Traveling abroad 
as a family could be a comfort and support to both spouses.  But the level of consumption 
required for traders who brought wives and families was prohibitive:  not every merchant 
could afford the extravagance of bringing a wife to live in Macau.   
Ultimately, however, this chapter raises more questions than it answers.  The 
social norms of Macau were not the same as Boston or even London.  While norms and 
meanings seemed specific to Macau, how did they also connect to metropoles in Britain, 
the United States, and Portugal, as well as broader colonial circuits of British and 
Portuguese India?  To what extent did Americans disrupt the social and political worlds 
of British residents abroad as they did in commerce?  What difference did it make that 






CHAPTER 6.   
FREE TRADE AS A WAY OF LIFE:   
AMERICANS AND THE EAST INDIA COMPANY MONOPOLY IN CHINA 
 
Free as the winds, and chainless as the sea, 
Should trade and commerce unrestricted be; 
Wherever land is found, or oceans roll, 
Or man exists, from Indus to the pole, 
Open to all, with no false ties to bind, 
THE WORLD SHOULD BE THE MARKET OF MANKIND.773 
--Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine (1842).  
 
In the summer of 1839, as tensions in southern China sizzled over the “opium 
question,” Robert Bennet Forbes took up the mantle as head partner of Russell & Co. of 
Canton.  It fell to the thirty-five year old Forbes to answer for his firm as British 
merchants departed for Macau and Hong Kong and called on the Americans to leave, too.  
Forbes famously refused.  The British chief Superintendent of Trade, Charles Elliot, 
personally entreated the partners of Russell & Co. to join them in the dramatic gesture. 
“‘If your house goes, all will go, and we shall soon bring these rascally Chinese to 
terms.’”  But Forbes demurred, replying that he had “not come to China for health or 
pleasure, and that I should remain at my post as long as I could sell a yard of goods or 
buy a pound of tea; that we Yankees had no Queen to guarantee our losses.’”774  The 
quote was one Forbes himself relished.775  He gambled that American merchants would 
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be able to continue to trade in the absence of their British competitors and he was right.  
Russell & Co. profited from both their American clients as well as new British 
commissions.  But the quote offers a departure for thinking about the position of 
international traders as carriers of the nation-state and particular understandings of trade.  
The partners of Russell & Co. found themselves in the middle of war between the British 
and the Chinese and, in lieu of siding with one or the other, attempted to chart a middle 
path. 
In many ways, this anecdote epitomizes the Anglo-American relationship from 
the birth of the American republic.  Anglophobia and Anglophilia were both part of the 
American sentiment toward their erstwhile mother country.776  Whether or not Americans 
had a “special relationship” with China, they sincerely believed they did.  Leading 
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merchants with experience in the region urged American officials to mediate the tensions 
between Britain and China as friends to both, provoking neither.777  It was a difficult 
position to maintain, yet for much of the nineteenth century, this stance allowed 
American merchants to take advantage of European diplomacy and aggression—
especially British—while imagining themselves apart from the fray in China and beyond.     
 This final chapter examines the dialectic between British and American observers 
of Anglo-American trade in Asia and the Pacific over meanings and methods of trade 
itself.  Participants in the Perkins network did not write of themselves as “free traders.”  
Rather, they depicted themselves as ordinary merchants—often downplaying the extent 
to which the American state was willing to support American merchants abroad—seeking 
to keep trade open to all comers against the threats of imperial powers.  This “open trade” 
argument was central to private rationalizations of smuggling as well as public arguments 
legitimating American diplomatic and naval practice in Asia from the 1830s to the 1850s 
and beyond.  The Tyler Doctrine of 1842, for example, was an early example of what, in 
the late nineteenth century, would be termed the “Open Door” policy.  As Americans 
themselves debated the appropriate role of the state in trade during the Anglo-American 
Opium Wars of 1840-1842 and again in 1856-1860, participants in the Perkins network 
advised American officials.  To historian Michael Hunt, the Perkinses and their 
counterparts were part of the early “Open Door constituency.”778  As Lars Magnusson has 
argued, the concept of “free trade” is something that needs to be historicized within its 
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practical manifestations—that is to say, not simply within the writings of theorists, but 
also in the logs of mariners and the consequences of merchants’ actions.779  This chapter 
provides that more personal account, looking at debates over monopolism in trade and its 
connections to notions of imperialism through the experiences of the Perkinses.  Despite 
this narrow focus, the insights the Perkinses help to provide are surprisingly rich.   
Participants in the Perkins network actively lobbied for specific policy stances, 
but they also served a symbolic function.  The Perkinses—Perkins & Co. and later 
Russell & Co.—featured frequently as exemplar American merchants.  Yet the Perkinses 
could not control how others represented them.  British opponents of the East India 
Company monopoly referenced the Perkinses to demonstrate the promise of “free trade.”  
Americans cited the success (and failure) of firms and traders to tout the promise of 
American involvement in the Pacific and the perils of European empire and state-backed 
commerce.  Whatever their specific political influence, the Perkinses were embedded in 
much larger debates about fairness in trade.  
  
Monopoly, Markets & Niche Trading  
From the nation’s founding, many Americans remained suspicious of monopoly 
power.780  The Perkinses did not share this disquiet.  The Perkinses recognized that 
                                                 
779 Magnusson, The Tradition of Free Trade.  
780 Thomas Jefferson, for example, suggested to a correspondent in February 1788 that he wished 
to as part of the bill of rights (then as a “declaration of rights”) attached to the Constitution with such rights 
included as “freedom of commerce against monopolies.”  Thomas Jefferson to A. Donald, 7 February 1788, 
as quoted in H. A. Washington Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson., vol. 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: Taylor & Maury, 1853), 355.    As James Fichter notes, early debates over the first Bank of the 
United States grappled with the issue of whether or not the bank would set a precedent that would allow for 
the establishment of West Indian or East Indian chartered monopolies.  Fichter, So Great a Proffit : How 





having the run of a market—with government assistance if possible—was good for 
business.  As a commercial network, the Perkinses time and again attempted to construct 
monopolies around specific markets and commodities, from furs and ginseng to 
quicksilver and opium.  When letters discussed cornering the market for a specific 
commodity, they had no compunction about touting their “monopoly.”781  On numerous 
occasions the Perkinses wielded the influence rooted in their broader network to 
dominate a market or commodity.  The associational power of their regular collaboration 
often worked to this advantage.  But they were not reticent to solicit state support for 
their trade as well, whether in lobbying for favorable maritime duties and policies, 
petitioning for consular posts or diplomatic support, or, as I showed in chapter two, in 
turning to the courts to enforce a contractual monopoly.  Yet the Perkinses were also 
cognizant of the potential to be had in locating preexisting “niche markets.”  Foreign 
monopolies by their very nature restricted competition and sometimes created niches for 
non-nationals to profit.  The Perkinses shaped debates about monopolism in trade through 
their niche trading and smuggling.   
Americans who favored commercial monopolies did so on the grounds that 
certain markets required monopolism to be competitive.782  Some contended that state 
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support for rivals of other nations made it difficult to gain entry into especially lucrative 
markets.  Thus, in 1789, Thomas Randall was not the first but the second merchant to 
propose the United States should charter an East India Company of its own.783  John 
Jacob Astor’s rationalization for seeking state support for Astoria in 1808 relied upon this 
logic as well.784  As British and Russian competitors in the fur trade had state backing, 
Astor argued that he needed support from his own government to be able to enter the 
market on equal footing.  An alternative argument, used by the Perkinses, suggested that 
uncontrolled traffic threatened to destabilize an otherwise profitable trade within specific 
markets.  Thus, when the Perkinses turned to the judiciary to enforce their contract-based 
efforts to monopolize the fur trade in the Pacific Northwest, as discussed in chapter two, 
this was precisely the claim they made:  the trade was fragile; it could support six ships 
annually at best.  State-support to limit the trade was thereby justified.   
In the early years of the nineteenth century, John Jacob Astor and the Perkinses 
similarly sought to corner the market in furs of the Pacific Northwest.  When Astor drew 
up plans for the Pacific Fur Company and his famed Astoria experiment, he explicitly 
used British mercantilist companies such as the North West Company and the Hudson 
Bay Company as his model.785  Thus the Pacific Fur Company planned to establish a trail 
of trading posts along the path blazed by Lewis and Clark in 1806, down the Missouri, 
over the continental divide, to the Columbia River through to the Pacific Ocean.  The 
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company would set up an outpost for trappers to collect furs year round (Astoria), with 
company ships bringing in supplies and carrying out the furs for trade in China and 
Europe.  Even without a state-chartered monopoly, Astor felt, a monopoly could be 
constructed through commercial and political muscle.  And according to historian James 
Ronda, Astor desired more than incorporation; he desired the “approbation” and implicit 
backing of the United States government.786   
 Whatever their feelings about monopolies, the Perkinses recognized that 
European chartered monopolies created an opportunity for them as Americans.  The 
monopolies restricted access to nationals within specific markets, and thus restricted 
competition.  As Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf have argued, smuggling could be a 
“colorful and conspicuous” argument against trade restrictions, whether or not smugglers 
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intended them as such.787  Similarly, by taking advantage of the “niches” opened up by 
chartered trading company-based monopolies, the Perkinses and merchants like them 
nonetheless functioned as a critique of the system.  Perkins schemes at niche trading did 
not always bear fruit, as with speculations to ship goods between the Philippines and 
Spanish America.  But they recognized that mercantilist companies created barriers for 
certain competitors and thus opportunity for themselves.  They sought out such niches of 
trade for themselves. Accordingly, the Perkinses were able to ship furs into the 
jurisdiction of the East India Company monopoly in China on behalf of the British North 
West Company.  And thus the East India Company monopoly in Indian opium allowed 
the Perkinses to build a market for themselves selling Turkish and Persian opium in 
China.  
Furs:  the North West Company & the East India Company  
 The Pacific fur trade is one example of a niche trade created by competition 
between British mercantilist trading companies.  From 1815 to 1822, the Perkins network 
shipped furs on behalf of the British North West Company (NWC) from the Columbia 
River to China.788  In crossing the Pacific Ocean or “South Seas” to Asia, the furs arrived 
in the jurisdiction of the British East India Company (EIC)789, a competing corporation 
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with monopoly rights delineated by the British government and thus applicable only to 
British nationals.790  East India Company officials willingly licensed NWC vessels to 
trade furs into China, albeit reserving the right to sell them at a hefty commission.  But 
they prohibited the more profitable leg of the trade:  importing tea home to Great Britain.  
To circumvent the costs of dealing with the East India Company directly, NWC fur 
trappers hired American merchants to supply them with provisions and ship their furs 
across the Pacific.  The situation proved highly profitable to the Americans, less so to the 
British.   
 The British East India Company jealously guarded its hard won trading privileges 
in the East Indies and it is little wonder why.  The EIC began in 1600 with a royal charter 
and a mandate to assist England in preventing a Dutch stranglehold on the spice trade.  
The English had just defeated the Spanish Armada.  Yet, as K. N. Chaudhuri has written, 
English confidence in their naval prospects did not blind the newly styled East Indiamen 
to the fact that they proposed to compete with not only with powerful Dutch financial 
interests, but also with the then joined Spanish-Portuguese Crown.791  The EIC grew 
tremendously over the course of the seventeenth century, but faced increasing challenges 
from outsiders culminating in the successful rise of a competing company in 1698.792  
While the two trading companies merged in 1708 (the first company essentially bought 
                                                 
790 There was also ambiguity about the monopoly rights of the then-defunct South Seas Company, 
and some aspiring British merchants hedged their bets by seeking permission to enter the trade from that 
company as well. 
791 K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company; the Study of an Early Joint-Stock 
Company, 1600-1640 (New York,: Reprints of Economic Classics, 1965), 3-4, 10. 
792 K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760 





up the stock of the second), this was not the first or last challenge the Company would 
face at home or abroad. 
British fur traders based in North America tried on several occasions to partner 
with the EIC to sell furs in China, both before and after their engagement with American 
shippers, but with little success.  As early as 1789 Alexander Dalrymple published his 
Plans for Promoting the Fur-Trade and Securing It to This Country by Uniting the 
Operations of the East India and the Hudson’s Bay Companies.  As hydrographer to the 
East India Company since 1779, Dalrymple knew the markets for the fur trade well.  
Dalrymple proposed that a combined effort between the Hudson’s Bay and East India 
Companies could cut Russian middlemen out of a trade between London and Beijing via 
Russia.  In 1793, the Hudson’s Bay Company and the EIC tried just such a joint venture, 
but with poor results.793  The fur shipment received little attention from the EIC 
supercargoes, and thus received poor prices.  Worse, EIC supercargoes charged a hefty 
commission for their efforts.  As one ship captain complained, furs valued at $80-90 
brought only an approximate $20 to the speculator.794   
Between 1792 and 1798, a second company, the North West Company, 
experimented with methods for sending furs to China.795  The North West Company 
officially commenced business in Montreal in 1783 as a competitor to the older Hudson’s 
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Bay Company, but its leaders increasingly shifted their attention to the Pacific.796  
Representatives of the NWC even lobbied the British government for Lord Macartney, 
scheduled to embark on a diplomatic mission to Beijing in 1793, to seek rights for British 
merchants to sell furs directly into northern China to compete with the Russians.  
Macartney made little headway in his mission, however, and instead became famous for 
refusing the kowtow before the Chinese Emperor, Qianlong.797  Thus, as other methods 
failed, NWC officials turned to Americans. According to James Gibson, the NWC 
employed Americans to carry furs to China from 1792-1822, save the 1802-3 season and 
1810-12.798  The earlier trade seems to have been furs smuggled from Montreal to New 
York, with local merchants such as John Jacob Astor shipping the furs to Canton on 
NWC account.799 
As early as 1809, Colonel Perkins proposed to the company’s leaders that Perkins 
& Co. might be hired to assist the NWC establish themselves near the Columbia River.  
In a letter to William McGillvray in August of that year, Perkins tisked at McGillvray’s 
“unfavorable accounts” of visits NWC traders had paid to the Columbia River.  NWC 
employees lacked experience in this particular trade, he implied, overlooking the “many 
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1783.  G. C. Davidson, The North West Company (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1918), 9-11. 
797 Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar : Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793.  
Between 1792 and 1797, the NWC shipped over £40,000 worth of furs to China via the Russian route:  
through Moscow to Irkutsk and then to Beijing.  The downside of this route paralleled that of shipping via 
the EIC.  Russian middlemen extracted significant commission fees.  
798Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods, 26. Gibson cites “Account of Beaver 
Skins Returns from the Trade of the NWCO…,” 1 September 1823, HBCA A.7/1.  This source may or may 
not list who the Americans were that the NWC collaborated with at different points.   
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inconveniences that w’d attend so distant excursions; the inconvenience of returns, the 
precarious support the country affords, etc.”  Perkins reminded McGillvray that not only 
had he warned Simon McTavish of these risks, at a later meeting with Mr. R. Mackensie 
in New York, he had proposed a partnership.  “I suggested an Establishment for 
supplying the Traders with goods, by way of Cape Horn, and taking the furs to China.”  
Perkins warned that they both faced Russian competition.  While the primary Russian 
settlement was at Kodiak where they employed Onalaski Indians as hunters, Russians 
were pushing south and intent on establishing a trading post at the Columbia River.  “It is 
to be feared that unless superseded, they will engross the whole trade.”800  Once again, 
Perkins proposed collaboration.  In 1809, McGillvray declined offers from both Perkins 
and John Jacob Astor.801   
In 1815, perhaps due to the end of the War of 1812, the Perkinses reached an 
agreement with McGillvray.802  Under special arrangement with the NWC and the firm 
McTarret, McGillvray & Co., the Perkinses purchased provisions for the British 
Canadian trappers at Fort George (formerly Astoria) as well as commodities for trade 
with the local Haida Indians, especially beads, iron, clothing, and rifles.  In exchange, 
New England mariners took on board NWC beaver, land otter, seal skins, and some sea 
otter pelts and carried the cargo to Canton as well as some to Smyrna.  In China, 
middlemen shipped the furs north to be used as winter coats for Chinese consumers.  
Varying qualities of skins and pelts allowed for the manufacture of coats for Chinese 
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buyers at varying income levels.  The diversity of the market was part of what allowed 
the fur trade to continue as long as it did.  Zealous hunters drove the finer sea otters to the 
brink of extinction by the early 1830s.   
When convenient for them, the Perkins vessels stopped at the Sandwich Islands 
for kanaka (Hawaiian) mariners.  NWC officials promoted the practice, arguing that the 
kanaka mariners were “more vigilant than our men” respecting the Chinook hunters and 
traders of the Pacific Northwest.  “As they both fear and abhor the N.W. Indians,” one 
letter related, “they keep a constant eye upon them in guard against surprise.”803  Yet the 
kanakas were also a skilled maritime labor force and worked for cheaper wages than 
Yankee mariners.  Richard Henry Dana, who did his time aboard a Bryant & Sturgis ship 
in his research for Two Years before the Mast, told several stories of his experiences and 
friendships with Sandwich Islanders.  In one memorable anecdote, Dana relayed his 
memorable first experience landing a boat on a California beach.  As the sun melted into 
the ocean, Dana and part of his ship’s crew waited in a small outrigger just outside the 
surf.  They were trying to figure out how to land the thing without crashing into the 
shore.  Along came a boat “with a crew of dusky Sandwich Islanders, talking and 
hallooing in their outlandish tongue. They knew that we were novices in this kind of 
boating, and waited to see us go in. The second mate, however, who steered our boat, 
determined to have the advantage of their experience, and would not go in first.”  The 
Yankee sailors watched and learned, but this would not be the last time Dana would find 
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himself impressed by the prowess of kanakas.804  The Perkinses, however, expressed 
ambivalence about the Hawaiians.  The Perkinses were amongst the early American 
merchants to recognize the potential of the Sandwich Island products in trade, especially 
sandalwood, but they also urged their ship captains to spend as little time there as 
possible.805  While part of this may have been a fear of desertion by crew members, 
James and Thomas H. Perkins both came of age with stories of Captain Cook’s grisly 
death at the hands of Hawaiians. 
For the Perkinses, their contract with the NWC allowed them to profit in a market 
they likely would have otherwise abandoned.  The NWC trappers themselves faced 
declining yields.  Their annual shipment of pelts averaged as follows:  36,822 pelts 
between 1792-96, 20-25,000 1804-1808 and 15,000 1813-1823.806  And these numbers 
mask a bigger shift:  the depopulation of the more lucrative species and targeting of 
alternative animal populations.  … In early 1816, the Perkinses dispatched their first such 
vessel:  the Alexander under Captain John C. Bancroft.  In the years 1819 and 1820, 
James & T.H. Perkins & Co. sent the Hamilton, Levant, Nautilus, and Augusta to carry 
$124,042.84 worth of furs and sandalwood.807 
The collaboration between the NWC and the Perkinses ended in 1822.  That year 
the United States imposed an ad valorem duty of 50 per cent on three-quarters of the 
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profits.  At about the same time, the Hudson’s Bay Company absorbed the NWC.  
Ironically, the new combined Company once again tried to collaborate with the East India 
Company to the same effect.  In 1824 and 1825, the HBC shipped 20,000 beaver and 
7,000 otter skins to China to be sold by the EIC.  But the EIC agents in Canton had little 
experience selling furs and viewed such a small cargo as insignificant.  The prices they 
got for the goods brought a profit to neither the HBC nor the EIC.   
The East India Company’s monopoly in China meant that to ship furs to China, 
the NWC and HBC required a license and employ EIC agents in China or had to seek out 
alternate modes of trade.  Thus, as ridiculous as it felt to British observers and even to the 
Americans, Canadian companies still fared better paying American merchants to carry 
their goods than to deal with the EIC.  Little wonder then that as the East India 
Company’s monopoly came up for discussion in Parliament, American niche trading 
emerged as a sore spot.   
Opium:  the British Levant Company & the East India Company  
Turkish opium was yet another boom commodity that the Perkinses aimed to 
control, purchased in another “niche” market where competition between larger powers 
provided an opening.  Further, it is another example of how maintaining a robust 
mercantile network increased the influence of the core participants.  By the 1817-1818 
season, the Perkinses virtually controlled the Chinese market in Turkish opium.808  They 
did so through a combination of betting that increased stringency in anti-opium efforts by 
the Chinese government would scare off competitors—which it did, including such 
wealthy American merchants as Stephen Girard—and by employing a bit of muscle in 
                                                 





their business tactics.  Ironically, the existence of the British East India Company’s 
monopoly once again enabled this niche market.  Company officials clamped down on 
British competition in importing opium from other regions into its jurisdiction in order to 
protect the Company’s own interest in Bengali opium.809  The devastation of the French 
Wars limited European competition, thus creating a niche market for American 
merchants.  Further, in a second irony, Americans traded in Smyrna under the protection 
of the British Levant Company. 
While the East India Company and the Levant Company shared obligations to 
Britain and to their respective shareholders, they did not necessarily owe allegiance to 
each other.  Yet clearly the matter was not so simple:  in December of 1809, the consul-
general of the Levant Company, Isaac Morier, defended extensively the practice of 
providing protection to Americans in a letter to the British ambassador.  Morier explained 
that if Americans did not receive protection from them, they would only go to the French, 
Swedish, Dutch, Austrian, or Danish.  Thus, why not reap the benefits of the American 
trade for themselves?  He asserted that the Americans brought only colonial articles and 
thus did not compete with British exports, namely, manufactures.  Besides, “our 
Government would probably prefer to avoid fresh occasions of dispute with America.”  
But there were tangible benefits as well.  First, the Americans consigned their cargoes to 
British firms and the Levant Company in Smyrna and Constantinople.  And second, the 
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Levant Company received a duty paid to their treasurer.810  After 1811, the British Levant 
Company no longer allowed foreign vessels to sail the Union Jack in Turkish ports, but 
they continued to offer merchants their protection in exchange for a consulage fee of 
approximately 1% of imported and exported cargoes.  While relatively affordable for 
merchants, the fees still provided a decent income for the Company.  Between 1799 and 
1810, the Levant Company received $65,500 in fees from American merchants alone.811   
The Perkinses tested opium from Smyrna (modern-day Izmir), Persia, and India  
in order to locate the most promising supplies.812  While they experimented in opium 
trading during the French Wars, shipping the drug to South East Asian ports as well as to 
China, their dealings in opium accelerated rapidly following the peace treaties of 1815.813  
As early as 1807, the Secret Committee of the East India Company Court of Directors in 
London directed their representatives in Canton to monitor the American trade.  Initially, 
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813 In 1811, they wrote to Joseph Langdon, supercargo for the John Adams, to look into 
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the Company Supercargoes at Canton dismissed the Americans as a threat, noting that 
Turkish opium was known to be inferior, was held in low estimation by the Chinese, and 
was largely used to adulterate their own product of Bengali opium.  Jefferson’s 1808 
Embargo cut down any threat of American competition at this earlier date, but by 1818, 
Company officials were not so sanguine.  Estimates of the opium traffic are notoriously 
unreliable, but, according to Charles Stelle, the level of American importations of opium 
to China shifted from 2-4% of the total imports in the seasons 1805 to 1807 to between 
10 and 30% in the seasons 1816 to 1818.814  There were three varieties of Indian opium 
sold in China:  the higher quality Patna and Benares varieties which became the 
Company trademark and the Malwa opium produced by the Indian Native States, usually 
sold by the Portuguese.815  Yet because the East India Company’s separated opium 
production in India from the selling opium in China to subcontracted private traders, the 
Company had few strategies at its disposal for reining in American competition.  Instead, 
they increased yields of the Bengal drug in India.816  While the Americans increased their 
trade of Turkish opium in the 1820s, its percentage within the overall traffic declined.817 
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By the late 1810s, most local American commission firms, from Samuel Russell 
& Co. to Wilcocks & Latimer, accepted the leadership of John Perkins Cushing in the 
Chinese opium market.818  For merchants willing to brave confiscation of their entire 
cargo, Cushing pressured arriving agents to accept prices as set by the Perkinses.  Those 
who refused risked being ruined anyway:  the Perkinses would use their own supply and 
contacts to drive down prices below what arriving agents could accept, often purchasing 
the opium themselves.  As Benjamin Latimer reflected in 1833, “the agent had to come 
into some arrangement with them to sell conjointly . . . or be obliged to dispose of it, at 
much below what the quotations just previous to arrival led him to expect, and then 
immediately after he has sold out, and before his Drug has been delivered, greatly to his 
mortification the market rises without any apparent cause.”819  It helped that the Perkinses 
had loyal agents in Boston, London, Leghorn, Canton, and Macau, thus providing for a 
smooth flow of products and information:  agents were usually aware of potential 
competitors well before their arrival.820     
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Two linked changes shook up the Anglo-American trade in ways that revealed 
precisely how significant opium was to merchants of both nations, the Chinese, and the 
continued importance of the East India Company in framing American strategies.  First, 
the Chinese imperial government clamped down on the opium trade.  While the Emperor 
(Yongzheng) issued an edict against trafficking opium as early as 1729, enforcement was 
erratic.  Of course, the nature of the traffic changed considerably over the course of the 
eighteenth century.  On March 24, 1811, the then Emperor (Jiaqing) issued a new edict 
ordering the superintendents of maritime customs to enforce the prohibition on opium.821  
Chinese memorialists in Beijing wrote that opium threatened “China like a poison, 
draining the people’s wealth and destroying their lives,” challenging the Qing 
government’s very legitimacy.822  Foreign merchants in China countered that local 
Chinese officials alternately cracked down on the opium trade and abetted its existence.  
To them, the willingness of Chinese officials to “wink” at the opium trade (and profit 
from it) justified the trade’s existence.823     
                                                                                                                                                 
1819, 14 April 1819.  Perkins & Co., Canton to F. W. Paine, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29 September 1820.  JEC 
Extracts.   
In 1823, Joseph W. Langdon became their agent in the region.  As mentioned above, James and 
Thomas Perkins had employed Langdon as early as 1811 when he served as a supercargo for their ship the 
John Adams, bound for Gibraltar.  By the 1820s, Langdon was one of the most prominent American 
merchants in Smyrna.  The Perkinses relied upon Langdon at least through 1832.   
821 Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 1644-1820 (Tucson,: 
Published for the Association for Asian Studies by the University of Arizona Press, 1966), 381.  See also 
Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1964). 
822 See Chen, "Power and Politics in the Making of Modern Western Knowledge of Chinese Law 
and Society, 1750–1900," 373. 
823 See for example Robert Bennet Forbes’s commentary on precisely this to his wife on 12 
December 1838, as quoted in Forbes and Kerr, Letters from China : The Canton-Boston Correspondence of 





Americans were deeply implicated in the crackdown, as was the vast majority of 
the foreign trading community at Canton.  The Wabash affair of 1817 and the Emily (or 
Terranova) incident of 1821 both led to surges in anti-opium crackdowns by Chinese 
officials.  In the former case, Chinese pirates captured and ransacked the Wabash, a 
Baltimore ship, off the coast of southern China.  In the latter, a member of the Emily’s 
crew (Francis Terranova) reportedly dropped a pot on a Chinese peddler woman’s head 
and killed her.  In both, controversy opened cargoes from American vessels to public 
view and both vessels carried opium.  In both, Chinese trials and executions became 
public spectacles over the nature of Chinese justice.  To a number of scholars, these trials 
drove British and American merchants together 824  The official response focused 
critiques of the Chinese government as lawless and corrupt.  Foreigners complained that 
Chinese law was unnecessarily severe, inconsistent, and thus despotic.825  After all, local 
Chinese officials normally colluded with the trade.  Their participation made it possible.  
Opium smuggling was not a foreign project, but a hybrid, Chinese-Western enterprise.  
Complaints against the opium crackdowns thus intersected with a number of regulations 
that seemed less about morality or statecraft than about enriching venal mandarins—
including the prohibition of women as discussed in chapter five, but also including 
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prohibitions on trading with shopkeepers rather than Hong merchants, limits on 
geographic mobility, and more.   
The 1817 and 1821 crack downs successfully frightened off Hong merchants now 
refused to serve as security merchants on foreign cargoes known to include opium.  From 
1817 to 1819, Houqua joined with the Perkinses to purchase Turkish opium.826  But these 
early ventures did not last.  By October 1818, John Perkins Cushing formed a co-
partnership with James Perkins Sturgis that allowed Houqua to maintain his interest in 
Perkins & Co. without involvement in the opium trade.  That would be handled by James 
P. Sturgis & Co.  But Cushing considered a variety of other mechanisms for limiting risk 
in opium importations as well.827  At issue was not a desire to end the trade, but safer 
methods for smuggling.        
Second, as a result of the crackdowns on opium trading, British and subsequently 
American merchants set up what H. B. Morse referred to as “the Lintin system.”  Under 
this mode of smuggling, opium importers brought their cargoes to a ship docked off of 
Lintin Island downriver from Whampoa and Canton.  The storeship would hold the 
opium while the vessels, opium-free could proceed upriver with their legal commerce.  
Chinese brokers would then purchase quantities of opium from merchants upriver and 
send separate “fast crab” or “smuggling dragon” boats to pick up the goods. These boats 
were long, narrow highly maneuverable (and heavily armed) crafts well-suited to their 
illegal purpose.  The boats pulled alongside the storeship, presented “opium chits” as 
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evidence of purchase, pay off requisite cumshas and any balance due, and sidle away 
with the contraband.  Thus, storeship owners made money off demurrage fees and a 
commission paid by the opium importers.  And thus the Chinese opium brokers dealt 
with the elements of the trade that made the Western merchants most uncomfortable:  
paying off officials, transporting the opium into China, delivering the good to 
consumers.828  The British initiated this system, Americans quickly followed.  But as 
Charles Stelle argued, the Americans once again reaped the benefit of the British East 
India Company’s policies:  British vessels were not allowed to handle Turkish opium 
which might threaten the Company’s investment in the production of Indian opium.  “By 
the grace of the East India Company, Americans were assured the same freedom from 
English competition in the storage of Turkish opium at the outer anchorages as they 
already enjoyed in the carriage of the drug.”829 
Americans opium importations to China were small relative to the British, but 
their participation in the trade significantly shaped the nature of the trade overall.  From 
their entrance into the trade until the end of the East India Company monopoly on 
importing Chinese tea into Britain in 1833, Americans were by far the largest purchasers 
of Turkish opium, and Perkins & Company alone comprised anywhere from a half to 
three-quarters of this trade.830  To Jacques Downs, the American opium trade was 
significant in two primary respects.  First, even if Americans did not believe they 
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supported British aggression against China and demands for restitution for confiscated 
opium, private American involvement in opium trade nonetheless shaped the American 
posture toward diplomacy with China and ultimately other nations as well.  Second, 
American actions shaped British behavior as well by demonstrating that Chinese 
consumers were willing to absorb more opium than the British had believed possible, by 
fostering new sources of opium supply, and by spurring the British in India to greater 
opium cultivation through competition.831 
These niches in trade became sore spots for British merchants who felt this 
commerce should have been rightfully theirs.  As we have seen, the existence of foreign 
monopolies actually proved beneficial for numerous American traders who, like the 
Perkinses, located niches of trade as “free” and neutral merchants.  British complaints 
about Americans in many ways echoed a longer-standing ebb and flow of jealousies of 
Dutch free trade in the seventeenth century and the French and Spanish in the eighteenth 
century.832  As one “anti-Jonathan” wrote, the “peculiar advantages” of American 
merchants ranged from cheaper freight costs, better behaved mariners, and a toleration 
for smuggling and commercial avarice to the ability to profit from trade routes that 
should be in British hands.833  In parliamentary debates over the state of British trade and 
the value of the British East India Company, American niche trading surfaced as a 
primary example of everything that was wrong with mercantilism.  To critics of the EIC, 
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American “free traders” demonstrated the superiority of commerce without state-
chartered monopolies. 
 
Americans “free traders” & the end of the East India Company monopoly in China   
In the early nineteenth century, when Americans spoke of “free traders,” they 
often referred to British merchants who operated on the outskirts of the East India 
Company monopoly.  Also known as “country” or “private” traders, British free traders 
profited from carrying cotton, indigo, and opium between the Indian Ocean and the South 
China Sea.  Many of these British firms began through principals who worked with the 
East India Company before striking out on their own:  William Fairlie and John 
Fergusson of Fairlie, Fergusson & Co.—themselves connected to Beale-Magniac and 
Jardine Matheson—to John Palmer of Palmer & Co.834  Parsee merchants such as 
Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy also dominated this trade.  The East India Company retained the 
cream of the China trade for itself by monopolizing the direct trade from China to Britain, 
but they conveniently outsourced the traffic of its Indian opium crops with China to these 
private firms.  For decades, the arrangement profited both.  By the 1810s, however, the 
division of labor increasingly chafed British free traders who wondered that they couldn’t 
handle the Company’s trade better than the Company itself.  To them, Americans were 
the real free traders.  And the grass was infinitely greener. 
 American China traders provided an important foil for British opponents to the 
East India Company’s monopoly on trade with China.  The French Wars cleared 
international waters of Britain’s traditional rivals, France, Spain, and Holland, providing 
                                                 





commercial opportunities for not only British traders, but also Americans.  In East India 
Company correspondence between London and foreign outposts, attention to rivals 
shifted from the Dutch, the French, and the Portuguese in the 1790s, to the Americans in 
the 1810s.  A central argument, made in 1813, 1821 and then again and again in the 1830 
Parliamentary hearings on the Company monopoly on Chinese tea sold in the British 
empire, was that free trade was necessary to allow British traders to compete with 
Americans who themselves demonstrated the advantages of a free and open trade.  
Monopoly opponents described American merchants as evidence of the advantages to be 
had in foreign trade without the fetters of the East India Company’s monopoly.  The 
Perkinses may not have referred to themselves as free traders, but this did not stop others 
from depicting them as demonstrating the promise of trade without the barriers of 
chartered monopolies. 
In a recently published history of Anglo-American involvement in the East Indies 
trade, James Fichter argues that American trade with India “was one of the primary 
reasons that in 1813 Parliament revoked the Company’s monopoly on Indian trade.”835  
The historiography on the demise of the Company’s monopoly in India usually turns on 
the lobbying of British manufacturers, but Fichter counters that “Even Leeds’s 
manufacturers failed to make the strictly industrial argument against the Company that 
one might have expected.”  Instead, manufacturers themselves promoted the view that 
“‘The extensive and flourishing commerce which the citizens of America have carried on 
for several years with India, and particularly with the Chinese empire, without any sort of 
restraint, is a proof that these expectations of the advantages to be obtained from the 
                                                 






exertions of private individuals are not unfounded.’”836  And the Company’s detractors 
were right.  With the end of the Company’s monopoly in India, British exports surged.  In 
the years 1814-1822, British exports to Asia grew to an average of £2.9 million, up from 
an average of £1.8 million for the period 1804-1812.837 
American competition was a genuine source of concern.  By official count, 
American imports from China peaked at about $5.2 million in 1821-22.  The trade 
vacillated over the next two decades, but by 1841-1842, the final years of the Opium War 
between Britain and China, imports stood just shy of $4.9 million.  The total American 
trade in China outstripped that of the East India Company before the Company lost its 
China monopoly in 1834.838  At the same time, preoccupation with American merchants 
served as a foil for domestic debates about the appropriate role of the British state in 
trade.  The 1813 debates connected to a number of domestic political concerns, from 
dissatisfaction with government subsidies for the Company, to concerns over the 
stoppage of cotton and wheat imports and other unrest coming out of war with the United 
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States, to frustrations over the stymieing of the Canadian fur trade’s China connection.839  
Yet two things are interesting here.  First, the decisions were not merely instrumental but 
also bound up in ideological shifts over the possibilities of liberalization for expanding 
trade overall.  Thus, as Anthony Webster has shown, the “gentlemanly capitalists” of 
London took complex political stances rooted in a hedging of bets within different 
markets.  Company directors increasingly had a foot in the Company and another in 
private trade as well.  Second, British and American thinkers were more self-referential 
than scholars tend to allow—especially British historians who, as Fichter argues, have 
tended to see Americans as producers (of cotton, especially) and as purchasers, but have 
skipped over the discussions of American merchants within the historical record. 
Ironically, as James Fichter notes, East India Company officials’ penchant for 
recording and tracking competitors large and small made their own records a potent 
source for its detractors.  One example of the “American threat” as revealed in the 
Company records was a surge in the East India knock off goods being smuggled into 
China by American merchants.  In April of 1820, the East India Company’s Secret 
Committee in London complained of a discovery that Americans were selling imitation 
Company textiles in China.840  The knock-offs accorded to Company specifications in 
                                                 
839 Anthony Webster, "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization:  The East India Company 
Charter Act of 1813," The Economic History Review 43, no. 3 (1990): 404-419, Webster, The Twilight of 
the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790-1860.  Webster and 
Fichter provide rather different political readings of the changes taking place.  To Fichter, Robert Dundas, 
Lord Melville, was the key figure, even after Buckhinghamshire took over.  Both advocated an end to the 
Company’s monopoly.  To Webster, the London interests were less inept and more indecisive with some 
Company directors themselves favoring an end to the monopoly.  
840 Minutes of the Secret Commercial Committee in London, 18 April 1820.  L/P&S/1/14 [India 
Office: Political and Secret Department Records 1756-c1950].  British Library, London.  On early 
American attitudes toward trademarks and other intellectual property measures, see Doron S. Ben-Atar, 
Trade Secrets : Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American Industrial Power (New Haven, CT: Yale 





shape, size, and even in packaging, complete with an insignia designed to match the 
Company’s mark with the slight adjustment of replacing the “V” with an “N” [see 
photograph below].  The object, the London Committee felt, was to pass “inferior 
Articles the character and value of those of superior description exported by the 
Company,” thus capitalizing on (and compromising) the Company’s reputation.841  The 
insult to the injury was that the articles—bombazetts, long ells, camlets, and other woolen 
cloths—were made not in the United States, but in Britain, and exported out of London 
and Liverpool.  Two ships they knew to carry such goods were the Ophelia and the 
Robert Edwards.  One ship alone carried £40,691 worth of textiles.842  The Ophelia was a 
Perkins vessel.843 
 
IMAGE 5.  1791 Copper Coin showing 
the British East India Company 
trademark.   
Source:  Coinarchives.com    
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The knock-off goods forced Company officials to examine their business 
practices.  London directed the EIC secretary in Canton, N. H. C. Plowden, to inform the 
Chinese Hong merchants of the ruse immediately and to warn them that while the 
merchandise was known to be carried under the American flag, it was not unlikely that 
vessels bearing other flags might try as much as well.  Worse, committee members 
worried that the Hong merchants themselves might consider it more profitable to traffic 
in the imitation goods than the originals.  Thus the London committee members advised 
Plowden that “it will be highly desirable that you should consult with such of the Hong 
Merchants are the most unconnected with the American trade.”844  Two years later, the 
market was particularly tough:  a letter from the Select Committee in China informed 
London of price drops on textiles of all descriptions ranging from 20-30% lower than the 
preceding season.  The supercargoes in China offered two reasons for the crash in the 
textile market: “the impoverished state of the Dealers and the alarming and increased 
importation of Woollens (sic) by American ships.”845  The letter discussed at the April 24 
meeting defended that “considerable quantities of Broad Cloth are imported under the 
American Flag, but the greater part are smuggled from the ships at Whampoa.”846  By 
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smuggling the goods into Canton and avoiding the regular duties of the trade, knock-off 
goods outcompeted Company merchandise. 
The knock off goods not only compromised the Company’s reputation, they 
depreciated prices for the Company’s textiles as well.  The Company thus employed a 
“confidential Chinese” to spy on the Americans.  Company agents instructed the man to 
purchase a selection of patterns of the imitation woolens and to report on the prices, sizes, 
and “relative estimation in which the Company’s and American Woollens (sic) are held 
by the Chinese in Canton.”847  Through this informant, the Company learned that 5-6,000 
pieces had been imported in the 1821-2 season.  In addition to the staple patterns sold by 
the Company, the Americans had introduced new colors such as olive, light green, and a 
variety of mixed-pattern fabrics.  This was not cause for concern however, “as these 
Colors are chiefly adapted for particular purposes, principally for the use of Women they 
have only been brought in small quantities, and are entirely approved for the purpose 
intended.”848  The American goods were “decidedly inferior” and could not compete “on 
fair terms”—the smugglers succeeded only through the evasion of duties.   
As a further step, the Superintendent of Imports called on the resident agent in 
Canton for the Ophelia, “a Person of great respectability long resident in China, and who 
had besides been more largely engaged in the Woollen (sic) Trade than any of his 
Countrymen, to gain what information he could on the subject.”849  Given the fact that the 
Ophelia was a Perkins vessel, it is quite likely that this agent was John Perkins Cushing.  
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By 1822 Cushing was one of the most established, esteemed Americans in Canton.  The 
Company felt from the “great respectability of the authority” that they could trust the 
American gentleman and hoped that the woolens trade would return to normal.  
According to the Superintendent, the American informed him that the early voyages had 
been profitable, but that the overstocked state of the market meant that the more recent 
ventures had been losses.  The American claimed that on the news of the low prices to be 
had, their London agents had attempted to sell off a more recent cargo in Britain at 15% 
below cost.  Unable to find a buyer even at that price, the agent decided to send along the 
goods and try the Chinese market.  The American concluded that “there was little chance 
of their interfering anymore with the Company in the Woollen (sic) Trade, that past 
experience had taught them it was not to be carried on on a permanent footing whilst such 
a preference was always given to the Company’s Woollens (sic), and he likewise 
believed that every other American House that had been concerned it would soon be 
compelled to adopt the same course.”850  At the time of the interview, the drop in prices 
would have been enough to turn any casual trader away from woolens.  Yet if the 
American was indeed Cushing, the Perkinses did not stay out of the woolens trade, at 
least not in the long run.851   
The Secret Commercial Committee recommended two remedies.  First, the 
Company could take action to ensure that foreign vessels, especially American and Dutch 
traders, could not carry British manufactures to China.  This seemed impracticable: 
foreigners could transship goods legally.  Second the Company could reduce the amount 
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of staples exported to China.  But this seemed opposed to the purpose of the East India 
Company:  if foreign merchants could profit from British manufacturers, the Company 
should be able to do so as well.  Given the end of the Company’s India monopoly in 1813 
and the subsequent surge in British textiles exported to those ports, this was not a 
politically viable option.852  How could the Company demand a monopoly of the Chinese 
tea trade if Parliament could argue that they had failed to provide as many British 
manufactures as were demanded by the Chinese?853 
Concern over this encroachment by Americans was no small thing.  The imitation 
goods combined with the near doubling in American vessels arriving in Canton from 
1821 to 1822 to forty-two vessels total roused Company agents to action.854  By their 
estimate, Americans brought imports into Canton valued at $7,413,096 compared with 
the Company’s own $6,199,242 that season.  According to David Igler, this perceived 
threat led the Company to increase its dependence on the highly addictive Patna opium in 
order to maintain profitability.855  But the specter of American competition also 
structured British debates over monopoly and trade.  After all, if Americans could profit 
from selling British manufactures in China (and this was a question), was there not room 
for British private traders to profit as well?  Was American competition not an indication 
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of the Company’s laxity in marketing British goods abroad?  Did it not indicate that the 
monopoly hampered British entrepreneurialism, both in manufacturing and in trading?  In 
testimony before Parliament in 1821 and again in 1830, Company officials and other 
observers continued to look at American traders to understand what was right and what 
was wrong with the East India Company’s monopoly on the Chinese tea trade.   
1821 hearings on Expanding British Trade in Asia 
In 1820 and 1821, a Select Committee of the House of Lords gathered with the 
purpose of investigating prospects for expanding British trade in Asia.     856  The 
Committee claimed not to be interested in the East India Company specifically, save in 
respect to the “present state of and future prospects of free trade,” but the Company could 
not help but be a focus.  When the 1813 Charter Act ended the East India Company’s 
commercial monopoly in India, exports of British manufactures in India tripled.  Thus, a 
keen area of interest to the Select Committee was whether or not the Company’s 
monopoly hindered the export of British manufactures in Asia.  Americans featured in the 
hearings as both competitors and as exemplars of free trade in action. 
The hearings questioned witnesses on the structure and profitability of trade by 
various merchants throughout Asia.  The central issue was what an end to the Company’s 
monopoly would mean: would an end to the Company’s monopoly “enable the British 
free trader to enter into an immediate and successful competition with those of other 
countries, and more particularly of the United States, by whom these branches of 
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commerce have been carried on for some years past” as private British traders claimed?  
Or, by ending the stable relationship between the British Company and Chinese Hong 
merchants, would an end to the monopoly drive up the prices while degrading the quality 
of teas available in Britain?857  Did the existence of the EIC monopoly enable American 
free traders to outcompete their British counterparts?  Of the twenty-seven witnesses who 
testified before the Select Committee, ranging from British ship captains to  American 
commission merchants to members of Parliament and of the EIC’s court of directors, all 
received questions about the American trade.   
Members of the 1821 Select Committee were interested in precisely the type of 
niches in trade discussed earlier in this chapter.  For example, Edward Ellice, a member 
of the House of Commons, testified on the cost of the EIC’s monopoly to the North West 
Company’s fur trading.  Ellice seemed unaware of the North West Company’s relatively 
recent practice of hiring American vessels to carry furs to China on their behalf.  He 
argued nonetheless that the necessity of receiving a license from the EIC to carry on such 
trade in British vessels “greatly impeded” such trade and that it “most assuredly” created 
an advantage for American and Russian merchants.  To Ellice, the Pacific trade was on 
the rise, not the decline, and could readily be extended by carrying East Indian produce to 
South America.  “Those who can carry on the trade at least expense, and with the fewest 
restrictions, will succeed”:  the Americans possessed no natural advantage here, Ellice 
argued; the trade could and should be British.858 
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 Concerns about the smuggled textiles surfaced as well.  During his testimony, EIC 
employee James Goddard answered questions specifically about the Perkinses, Houqua, 
and shipments of British manufactures to China.  The Marquess of Lansdowne quizzed 
Goddard as follows:  
 Are you acquainted with a  house at Canton of the name Perkins? –
Yes. 
 Do you know a merchant of the name Howqua? –Yes, he is a merchant 
of the Chinese Hong. … 
 Do you know of any agreement entered into between those persons 
and the house of Perkins and Co. with this country, for the export of a 
large quantity of manufactured goods from hence? –I am not 
particularly acquainted with it; I have heard of such a thing existing, 
but the particulars have not come to my knowledge. 
 Would you be surprized (sic) at hearing that an agreement has been 
entered into by the house of Perkins and Co. in conjunction with 
Howqua the Hong merchant, to be supplied with goods of British 
manufacture, to the amount of nearly a million sterling, within one 
year, and through the Americans? –Certainly not; because I know 
American have for several years past been in the habit of supplying 
themselves with the goods of English market, of English 
manufactures, for the China seas and Canton.859 
The Company’s own reports on American competition came back in the hearings as 
evidence of Company weakness.  While Goddard argued that the EIC monopoly enabled 
the British market to acquire the first selection of fine teas brought to market, he 
suggested that the China market held untold potential for selling British woolens and 
cottons, if only given the opportunity.  The EIC did no great service to British 
manufacturers.860   
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For each argument Company officials made for the necessity of their monopoly, 
they received questions about those pesky Americans.  How was it that Americans were 
able to profit from the trade without a monopoly when the Company ostensibly had all 
the advantages?  If Americans did not have a governing body in order to maintain order 
amongst merchants and mariners abroad, why did their British counterparts require such 
oversight?  Americans, the defense came, were both lawless smugglers and better 
behaved than the infamously quarrelsome British mariners, thus lawful mediated by an 
American consul.861  It was not until 1830, however, that the opposition to the East India 
Company’s China monopoly really organized.     
1830 Hearings and the End of the Company’s China Monopoly 
In 1830, Parliament once more reviewed the East India Company’s monopoly on 
the Chinese tea trade to Britain.  The outcome of these hearings was the 1833 Reform 
Act, legislation that ended the Company’s lucrative monopoly on Chinese tea.  Following 
this, the East India Company morphed into a purely administrative body whose central 
purpose was the governance of colonial India.  In the hearings, a variety of witnesses 
came forth to testify as to the benefits and impediments of the Company’s monopoly to 
trade and stability in the region, to domestic manufactures and prospects for their exports, 
and to the state in general.  Americans featured once again as a central example of what 
could be done without a monopoly.  A variety of Americans and British familiar with 
American traders answered questions as to the profitability of American trade with China 
and what the Americans revealed about Company weaknesses.   
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According to historian Anthony Webster, Joshua Bates was one of the most 
influential of the witnesses to appear before Parliament in the 1830 hearings in large part 
because he was not associated with the free trade campaign.862  Joshua Bates was an 
American partner for the British banking powerhouse, Baring Brothers.  And, as 
discussed in more depth in chapter 4, Bates was also connected to the Perkins network 
through friendship and professional connection, as well as marriage to Lucretia Sturgis.  
Bates testified before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on three separate 
occasions in 1830 – March 15, March 30, and June 3 – before appearing before the Select 
Committee of the House of Lords on June 10.  In these hearings, Bates spoke on the 
nature of American involvement in trade in the East Indies, especially China and Manila, 
relative to East India Company.  His specific reference point was the trade of Perkins & 
Company.   
Bates favored an end to the Company monopoly.  He used his experience with 
Perkins & Company to repeatedly suggest that the monopoly left the British at a 
disadvantage.  Bates argued that unfettered access to China for British traders would not 
only allow private merchants to compete on a par with other “free traders,” namely the 
Americans, but would likely increase the demand for British manufactures in China 
overall.863   
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 Bates was no doctrinaire free trader.  In 1832 he scoffed at the reductions in tariffs 
that were likely to come in response to the protests against the “tariff of abominations” 
(and South Carolina’s threat of secession).  The American textile industry would do well 
enough, he felt, “but for the power of the large capitalists engaged in the business on this 
side who will glut your market as soon as the duties are reduced for no other purpose than 
to crush your infant establishments.”864  More dangerous than Britain’s industrialists, 
however, were British political economists “who calculate to raise themselves into 
importance on the cry of free trade in Corn and everything else.  Our ministers do not 
agree to these doctrines but Poulett Thomson, Hume, Doct. Bowring, and a few worthless 
people of that stain who never could take care of their own money … think themselves 
fully competent to guide others.”  The threat, Bates felt, was that these men would take 
advantage of the political turmoil in the United States to push British ministers into some 
proposal that America’s popular government could not refuse.865   
 Rather than ideological advocacy, two other explanations for Bates’s support for 
the Reform Act seem more likely.  First, Baring Brothers aspired to broaden its interests 
in China on its own account.  Bates himself proposed a China trade plan with his partners 
in 1833 following the passage of the Reform Act.  He wrote the details in his diary:  “My 
plan is to engage those manufacturers who have hitherto supplied the Company to ship on 
consignment the returns to be made in Tea for superintending the business we to have.  1 
½ on the shipment outward and 2 ½ when we make an advance and 2 ½ % on the returns 
suppose we were to ship £400,000 at 2%; £8000, returns 600,000 – 2 ½ 15000, going by 
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ships 3000, total £26,000.  To effect this we should require a capital of £100,000 to be 
employed.”866  While this might put the Barings in competition with their clients in the 
region, especially the Perkins firms of Perkins & Co. (Russell & Co. as of 1830), Bryant 
& Sturgis, and Russell & Sturgis, Bates did not see this as a problem.  In an 1832 letter to 
the Barings’ agent in the United States, Bates congratulated himself and the Barings for 
having established their Liverpool house in advance of the Browns:  Liverpool, not 
London, was the future.  But in closing the letter, he directed Ward to share the details of 
the China business with William Sturgis, hardly the actions of someone who saw himself 
as breaking ties.867 
Bates directed the new order of trade with China in other behind-the-scenes roles 
as well.  In April 1832, for example, Bates wrote to the Barings’ American agent, 
Thomas Wren Ward, that he had played an important role in the shape of the new post-
EIC trade in China through his consultations with British officials.  “As to the opening of 
the China trade,” he wrote, “Mr. Grant has consulted me and desired I would give in a 
plan opening it with a system of duties which I have done and he tells me that the 
deputies from Liverpool, Glasgow, etc. have come to the conclusion that the plan I 
submitted is the best one and the only way to do it.”  According to Bates, it was his idea 
that the China trade should be opened by April 1835, that the government should 
announced fixed periods for dispensing surplus tea (and that it was better to allow the 
monopoly prices here to fade away in order to promote good relations with the Chinese), 
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and that the trade should be confined to ships above 400 tons in order to “insure 
respectability” in the merchants entering the trade.868   
 Letters from Company officials in Macau to the London-based Court of Directors 
decried the attempts to end the Company’s monopoly.  On November 17, 1831, the 
Secret Committee headed by Charles Millett and William Baynes wrote that unrestricted 
trade would make China a refuge for men bankrupt both “in circumstance and character,” 
and that while British law could catch these men in India, they would be as lost to 
authorities in China as in the Americas.  “Under what is called a Free Trade,” they 
surmised, “such instances would no longer be of rare occurrence.”869  While these 
comments ring of sour grapes, they were not unfounded.  Following the termination of 
the EIC’s monopoly in India, local agency houses faced an onslaught of competition.  
Traders with little capital and perhaps only a single vessel leapt at the opportunity, 
flooding the market with British manufactures.  Many of the agency houses had poured 
capital into shipping in anticipation of freer trade following the 1813 act, leaving even 
reputable firms stretched thin.870  
The fact of the matter was, no one knew what the end of the Company’s 
monopoly in China would mean.  In 1833, when Goodhue & Company of New York 
wrote to Jardine Matheson & Co. as to their expectations of the repercussions from the 
end of the Company’s China monopoly for the United States, they confessed they were at 
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a loss.871  Sam Cabot, a lead partner at the Perkins & Company Boston office, wrote to 
Joshua Bates on the subject in March of 1832.  Cabot did not expect much change and, to 
the contrary, felt the Americans could still do well shipping British manufactures for tea 
and silks for the American trade, undercutting “British Corsicans” through cheaper 
freight, commissions, etc.872  But only a month prior, one of the China trading partners 
argued the reverse from Canton.  As small as the foreign community at Canton was, he 
wrote, “it is our world, and that the stoppage of the Company’s trade would affect us 
more here than the appearance in Europe of a second Napoleon, or the Embargo upon 
every port on the Continent.”873   
The Perkinses were not critics of the East India Company’s monopoly, but their 
mode of trade provided a potent example for those who were.  While the American threat 
was surely exaggerated in parliamentary testimony, this matters less than the larger 
debates about the nature and modalities of trade.  The American model seemed to 
spotlight everything that was wrong with British trade and thus shaped British arguments 
of how trade should operate.  To American merchants, the threat was that the British 
would use their naval and financial prowess to push them out of global markets.  In the 
1830s and 1840s, the United States was a rapidly growing commercial and industrializing 
nation.  Americans grappled with the changing meanings and moralities of commerce in 
their daily lives.  In many ways, Americans continued to do so in Britain’s shadow. 
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American Perspectives on Trade and the “Commercial Interest” 
The Perkins firms and their alumni were on the front lines of views of trade at 
home as well.  The firms produced a handful of prominent individuals who contributed to 
newspapers, lobbied and advised politicians, and served in consular posts abroad.  Not 
surprisingly, they particularly aimed to shape views related to China.  In the 1830s and 
1840s, China continued to occupy a privileged space in the American imagination as a 
source of luxuries and philosophy, a political foil as a distant, despotic empire, and, 
increasingly, as a prospective market for American produce and manufactures.  Yet much 
of American opinion and diplomacy filtered through a relationship closer to home:  
Anglo-American ties.  When tensions flared between Britain and China over official 
seizures of smuggled opium in 1838, for Americans, the conflict was one of a number of 
British actions around the globe that bore on American interests.  Part of what was 
interesting about these Perkins merchants was that, in spite of their own diversity of 
views, they came together to advocate a common policy stance on relations with China.  
Viewing the past through the mirror of history, scholars tend to see the Opium 
War as a wedge issue for “opening China” for “the West” and a step toward overt 
imperialism in the Pacific for the United States.874  This is because, in practice, it was.  At 
the time, however, many Americans disdained what they saw as British aggression 
against China.  John Quincy Adams advocated American support for the British cause 
and elicited outrage as much as support.  Secretary of State Daniel Webster oversaw a 
diplomatic policy that attempted to garner benefits from British military action while 
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maintaining trade relations with China.  The aftermath of the conflict, however, was a 
sequence of formal declarations of American interest in the Pacific beginning with the 
Tyler Doctrine of 1842, the advent of American extraterritoriality in China through the 
Treaty of Wangxia in 1844, and several foreign policy stances abroad in accord and 
alliance with British policy abroad, including American naval incursions “opening” 
Korea and Japan to foreign trade.  
The Opium War attracted Americans’ interest not only because of national 
commercial and missionary involvement in the region, but also for the war’s moral and 
geopolitical implications.  The distant war between Britain and China may have seemed a 
remote concern both literally and figuratively, but tensions with Britain hit home.  The 
Opium War began at a time of considerable controversy with Great Britain over a host of 
issues:  disagreements over the borders of Maine and Oregon, British support for Mexico 
in disputes over Texas, and the British navy’s assertion of the right to search American 
vessels off the coast of Africa.875  To some scholars, the events of the early 1840s 
provided a final conclusion to enduring tensions between the Americans and British born 
in the American Revolution.876  Undeniably, tensions between the two nations rode high 
during these years.  Whether viewed as the poor downtrodden Chinese or the corrupt, 
despotic Chinese, few Americans seemed to see the Chinese as offering much resistance 
to the British naval juggernaut.  The Opium War thus represented more than China or 
opium to Americans, but also the question of whether Americans naturally allied with the 
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British in questions of empire and international law or whether this was an example of 
British imperial incursion that Americans, in the legacy of the Revolution, should 
oppose.877  
Participants in the Perkins network found themselves in the thick of this 
controversy.  They were well-known China traders, relative experts on the region, and 
traffickers in opium.  Much of the news on the conflict to reach the United States came 
from British newspapers, China papers, and letters from merchants and missionaries 
abroad.878  To most scholars, the Perkinses formed part of the “commercial interest” 
within the budding “open door constituency,” but what this meant in the 1840s was 
considerably different from what it would mean in the 1890s or even 1870s.  While 
Americans eyed Asian markets as a space for surplus production, industrial 
overproduction was not as much of an issue as it would be by the century’s end.879  Yet 
the controversies at mid-century were significant in laying the groundwork for ideas 
about fairness in trade and diplomacy.  
                                                 
877 Kinley J. Brauer, "The United States and British Expansionism, 1815-1860," Diplomatic 
History 12, no. Winter (1988): 19-37. 
878 See for example, “Canton; Messr. Forbes, et. al.” 5 December 1839 The North American, p. 2, 
which included excerpts of merchant letters; “Late from China,” New York Spectator 6 February 1840, p. 1 
which was one of many to include the letter of protest from American merchants against the British 
blockade of Canton and submitted to the United States Congress; “Important from China,” Salem Gazette 
26 October 1841, p. 2, an article that included a republished article from the Boston Daily Advertiser with 
details on the conflict from Robert Bennet Forbes.  
879 This is not to deny that Americans viewed Asian consumers as potential outlets for American 
manufactures at this point.  As noted in chapter 4 as well as below, the Perkinses themselves viewed 
Canton and Manila as potential outlets for American textiles.  LaFeber, The New Empire : An 
Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, Thomas J. McCormick, China Market : America's 
Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901, 1st Quadrangle pbk. ed. (Chicago, [Ill.]: Quadrangle Books, 1970).  
On how Americans perceived China as a trade partner in the 1840s, see John M. Belohlavek, Let the Eagle 
Soar! : The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), Mary W. M. 
Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 
Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Involvement : American Economic Expansion across the Pacific, 1784-1900, 
William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire (Lexington, Ky.: University Press 





Merchants did not dictate policy, but their experiences were influential to how 
Americans imagined their involvement in the Pacific and global trade.  More than this, 
merchants mattered more than distant policymakers and periodic envoys in engaging in 
practices that shaped policy needs.  To take opium smuggling as an example, one of the 
critiques leveled at members of Russell & Co. who served as American consuls in China 
was that the firm itself engaged in opium smuggling.  This was a practice unbecoming 
representatives of the American government.  For those who made the critique, the 
complaint likely had more to do with jealousy and a desire to break the firm’s hold on the 
consulship than wounded national honor.880  Yet it was nonetheless true.  When 
questioned by the State Department via letter in 1854, Paul Sieman Forbes lied.  Noting 
that the communiqué targeted Russell & Co., he would confine his remarks to a defense 
of the house.  “I would state that it has never to my knowledge smuggled a single Chest 
of Opium, nor would I have permitted it, had the attempt ever been made.”881  As Forbes 
himself knew, however, the firm did continue to sell opium.882  Whatever the official 
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policy of the United States government, merchants and missionaries abroad were largely 
left to set the terms of relationships abroad themselves.  Still, diplomatic and naval 
missions could have profound effects. 
While looking at this handful of New England merchants would seem to tell us 
little save perhaps a more personal vantage on the so-called “commercial interest,” the 
diversity of their views shows that their understandings of tensions in China developed in 
conjunction with changing self-perceptions of themselves as Americans in the world.  
But these shifts transpired in conjunction with changing ideas about Britain and 
commerce itself.  Consider, for example, John Murray Forbes words to his wife Sarah in 
1836.  “I used to think the English our superiors, but faith I am changing my mind fast 
the more I see and know of them” he wrote.  “They are almost as much governed by old 
custom as the Chinese are, while we are daily advancing.”883  In the same letter, John 
delights in noting his boat’s victory in a recent sailing contest on the Pearl River.  If only 
his countinghouse could out trade the English, he writes, “the Bulls will have less to say 
against Yankee notions.”884  British expectations of superiority formed one part of 
Forbes’s complaint, but just as significant were these “Yankee notions.”  By the 1820s 
and 1830s especially, Americans expressed exuberance at their prospects as Americans.  
The United States seemed a nation on the rise.  American merchants abroad embraced 
perceptions of the United States as a commercial republic, as open to change and 
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progress via trade.  The Chinese and the British both provided convenient foils as closed, 
tradition-bound societies, less amenable to progress as the young and vigorous American 
entrepreneurs.885   
Yet also by the 1830s, some Americans saw naval force as a viable strategy in 
Asia.  Between 1819 and 1830, American merchants in Canton shifted from the view that 
their trade was precarious and existed at the pleasure of Chinese officials to the view that 
their position in China was negotiable and best handled with a veiled threat of force.  Part 
of the reticence American merchants initially felt toward naval support was the common 
perception that Americans had a special relationship with China.  To American observers, 
arrogance kept British merchants at loggerheads with the Chinese.  Americans saw 
themselves as an alternative to the British—but in an increasingly measured way as the 
bluster seemed to achieve results.886  As mentioned above, the Perkinses were not reticent 
to seek state support for their trade, but desires for such support was highly contingent.  
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American merchants trading in China initially refused offers of naval support out of fear 
that the Chinese government would perceive naval presence as a threat and revoke 
trading privileges.  While Americans living in Asia cannot be said to be a single, coherent 
community, merchants largely opposed a state presence—until it became evident to them 
that the British naval bluster was achieving results.   
The first American naval missions to Asia sailed during wartime to protect 
American merchants from European belligerents halfway across the world.  The first 
such ship was the Essex, a frigate charged with traveling to Java during the Quasi-War 
with France to escort a convoy of American merchantmen safely home.  This the Essex 
did.  The frigate arrived in the Sunda Straits in the summer of 1800 and departed soon 
after.  The next such vessel, the Peacock, arrived during the War of 1812 to answer 
British depredations on American shipping in Asia.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the War 
of 1812 between the United States and Britain was a global conflict:  confrontations 
transpired wherever nationals from the two countries came into contact.  Thus American 
merchants sent Letters of Marque—private ships with authorization from their 
government to plunder foreign belligerents—and the navy sent a sloop of war, the 
Peacock.  The Peacock captured four British vessels in Asian waters, but, again, had no 
permanent mission in the region.  Following the war, the United States re-deployed its 
frigates into permanent squadrons to protect American merchants in the Mediterranean 
(1815), the Pacific off of Latin America (1821), the West Indies (1822), and a South 
Atlantic Squadron near Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (1826).  An East Indies Squadron was not 
formed until 1835.887   
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There were three primary reasons for an American naval presence in Asia in the 
early nineteenth century.  First, pirates in Asian waters were even more prolific than their 
more famous Caribbean counterparts.  Second, European wars also manifested in Asia 
and the Pacific, leaving Americans abroad vulnerable to attack by European belligerents. 
And, finally, as the British repeatedly attempted, an official presence could be used to 
force intercourse with foreign governments abroad.  It was the last that American 
merchants in Asia, in China especially, originally aimed to avoid. 
In 1819, the United States sent its first peacetime mission to the South China Sea 
to offer American merchant vessels protection from local pirates.  On November 3, 1819, 
the U.S. frigate Congress arrived at the mouth of the Pearl River leading to Canton.  
Despite the Congress’s ostensible purpose of supporting merchant mariners in Asia, 
Captain John Henley and his men received a chilly reception from Chinese officials and 
Americans alike.  To the Americans trading out of China, their situation was precarious.  
They recognized that they operated at the sufferance of the Chinese government.  If 
Chinese officials chose to order American merchants out of Canton, to refuse them trade, 
confiscate their property, or even arrest them, they had little recourse.  The United States 
was not likely to go to war to ensure their access to the trade or even to indemnify their 
losses.  Thus, the naval protection offered by Captain Henley presented serious risks for 
little gain.   
For his part, the Chinese viceroy ordered the Congress to depart immediately.  In 
1816, a mere three years’ prior, the British H.M.S. Alceste had demanded entrance to 
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Canton and forced her way up the river.888  Chinese officials no doubt feared a similar 
effort by the Americans.  The American consul reluctantly allowed that the Congress 
would surely be sold supplies out of Canton, and the vessel pressed north.  Henley 
secured food, fresh water, and firewood, but was compelled to depart for Manila with a 
broken mizzenmast.  For much of the spring and summer of 1820, the Congress cruised 
the South China Sea, but in September, Captain Henley again sought supplies from 
Canton and advertised safe passage for any vessels returning to the United States.  None 
accepted:  when the Congress set sail for home, she returned alone.889   
Yet when the U.S. frigate Vincennes arrived in Canton in January 1830, American 
merchants in China felt rather differently.   The Vincennes sailed as part of the Pacific 
Squadron, commissioned to protect American merchants, mariners, and whalers abroad.  
Unlike the unfortunate Captain Henley, American expatriates—then mostly in Macau for 
the off-season—received Commander W.C.B. Finch and his crew warmly.  Rather than 
viewing the naval vessels as a threat to their ability to remain in China, occasional visits 
by American frigates such as the Vincennes demonstrated to the Chinese that the United 
States was a nation of consequence.  It improved the stature of the merchants as 
Americans.  In 1832, when the Peacock arrived in 1832, her arrival marked the start of a 
continuous American naval presence in the region.890  This did not imply any real naval 
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power in the region:  the naval budget yo-yoed with presidential administrations and was 
frequently stripped to the bone.  Rather, the change in attitude of the merchants 
themselves is significant. 
Force ebbed and flowed as a politically viable weapon for establishing American 
an presence in Asia.  Thus, for example, well before the naval missions of Commodore 
Lawrence Kearney to China in 1842 (to protect Americans but prevent opium smuggling) 
or James Biddle’s unsuccessful attempt to “open” Japan in 1846891, the United States 
government had already expressed a willingness to use the state to expand the 
commercial prospects of American nationals abroad.  On February 6, 1832, under orders 
from Washington, the U.S.S. Potomac leveled the Sumatran village of Quallah Battoo in 
retaliation for the attack and looting of a private vessel, the Friendship of Salem.  In their 
attack, the Potomac killed more than 150 Sumatran villagers with two American 
casualties.  The mission was explicitly punitive.  Commodore John Downes had orders to 
take on Sumatran offenders en route.  The Secretary of the Navy, Levi Woodbury, 
recommended that funds be set aside for a regular naval force to patrol the Indian Ocean 
and South China Sea in order to protect American vessels from such insecurities.892   
To historian David Pletcher, China held a “magnetic” appeal to Americans in the 
1840s, foremost as a promising export market.893  Yet views on appropriate relations with 
China in these years were more diverse than this implies.  Take, for example, reactions to 
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John Quincy Adams’s speech on the Opium War.  On November 22, 1841, a miserably 
wet Monday night, John Quincy Adams stood before a packed house at Boston’s 
Masonic Temple.  In spite of the inclement weather, a curious audience huddled together 
to hear the former president and then chair of the House Committee on Foreign Relations 
explain his views of the war raging in the South China Sea between Britain and China.  In 
the speech, Adams unabashedly took the side of Great Britain against China.  He argued 
that the Opium War had little to nothing to do with the British opium trade and 
everything to do with China’s arrogance.  China saw itself as above other nations, as 
exemplified in the kowtow.  Citing theorists of international law and Christian morality, 
Adams suggested that Her Majesty’s Navy did the world a service by humbling the 
Chinese and forcing them to open ports to foreign trade and influence.  This call for open 
trade as an international right seems like something Americans might be expected to 
support.  But many did not.894   
Adams knew that his opinion would spark controversy, but even he was surprised 
at the extent of the reaction.895  John Palfrey, the editor of the North American Review 
who had originally asked him to put pen to paper on the controversy, delicately withdrew 
his invitation to publish the piece.896  Editorials popped up in newspapers all across the 
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nation expressing everything from measured support to outrage.  The Baltimore Sun 
complained that prior to Adams’s speech, the American public opposed Britain’s 
aggression.  But after the “Honorable eccentric or the eccentric Honorable, whichever the 
reader may see fit to consider him, ‘defined his position,’” suddenly, it was “‘as clear as 
mud’” that the Chinese emperor had no moral right to prohibit smuggling or interdict 
opium.  “What!” the Sun’s editors mocked,  “He, a barbarian, and the ruler of the 
barbarians!  Why should he refuse to have his people civilized (!) after whatever fashion 
England might see fit to prescribe? … Such views of human rights may do for England; 
they are in character, and they are also necessary to the accomplishment of her ambitious 
views, her purposes of commercial supremacy … but who would have dreamed of ever 
seeing her seconded in these designs by any portion of the American press?”897  “The old 
man must be getting out of his senses!” exclaimed a letter in the Philadelphia Public 
Ledger.898  By contrast, the Boston Atlas and the Boston Courier both lauded Adams, 
writing that while the former president countered prevailing opinion that disagreements 
over opium caused the war, he “clearly showed that in the Chinese War, Great Britain 
had right on her side.”899  As reactions to Adams’s speech show, there was no single 
American view on the war.900  
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For the handful of Perkins merchants observing the Opium War controversy, 
opinions on the conflict similarly ran the gambit—at least, amongst themselves.  John Q. 
Adams reported in his journal that Col. Thomas H. Perkins, then a stalwart seventy-two 
years of age, attended his lecture and approached him at the close along with Abbott 
Lawrence and Francis Parkman.901  Adams reported only praise that night, so one 
presumes Perkins offered kind words.  A letter the elderly merchant wrote to his nephew 
in Canton indicates that he sympathized with Adams in at least one key respect:  the 
Chinese needed to be “taught a lesson.”902  “Altho’ I think the extent to which the Opium 
trade has been carried on has been of great moral evil … the manner of pulling it down, 
has been … unjustifiable,” he wrote.  ”I should like exceedingly to see the high and 
disrespectable tone of the Chinese brought down, and if the British could get with their 
ships within striking distance of Pekin (sic), I think the Gov. would be taught a lesson, 
she would long remember.”903  However, Perkins predicted this was not realistic, that the 
British would resort to a blockade and attack on Canton.  The British would not be able to 
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stop neutrals from continuing the trade without a declaration of war, thus opening a space 
for American traders.  Stemming the opium trade would impede the China trade “as Bills 
will not be wanted and Specie is not to be had.”  But there was an even better silver 
lining:  American domestic manufactures might well replace British imports in exchange 
for tea.  Ever the shrewd merchant, even in retirement, Perkins noted that American 
weavers used a crude cotton better suited for the China market than British manufactures.  
British war in China promised to open opportunities for American merchants. 
For Robert Bennet Forbes, the so-called China question was personal.  Bennet 
made much of his early fortune off of smuggling opium into China on behalf of the 
Perkins inner circle.  He took the public censures of opium trafficking to heart.  He wrote 
gentle letters to his wife, asking her to not think too poorly of him.  He explained himself 
as follows, so that she “may speak learnedly”:   
The import of Opium has gradually increased under the connivance of the 
local authorities until the quantity has amounted to near 50,000 Chests 
worth nearly 15 million dollars- it has been in general use & although 
contrary to Law the trade has been carried on with greater facility than any 
other branch of business here … all at once the Gov determined to cut off 
this trade which has been demoralizing the minds, destroying the bodies, 
& destroying the country of money – the trade has been carried on by the 
most respectable merchants here & the great & honorable East India 
Company who have been the Lords of the East has been the cultivator of 
the drug in India consequently there has been no moral feeling of 
indignation connected with the business & if anything were wanting to 
give it respectability in your eyes I would mention that I made my first 
fortune by the same.904 
 
Several of the rationalizations made in the letters crystallized into a public argument that 
he made in his 1844 “Remarks on the China Trade.”  Specifically, Bennet argued that 
respectable men engaged in opium trading, that the Chinese government enabled and 
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even participated in the trade, and, most famously, that opium was no worse than 
alcohol.905  Even his memoirs, first published in 1879, reverberate with the concern that 
his life would be reduced to Robert Bennet Forbes, opium trader.  One central argument 
made by Bennet resounded amongst both British and American merchants who partook 
in the opium trade (that is to say, most all):  the involvement of Cantonese officials in 
opium selling seemed to sanction the drug.  Thus, to these men, for the Chinese 
government to now confiscate chests of opium seemed hypocritical.  Indeed, the 
misunderstandings of motives and layers of government bureaucracy for both the British 
and the Chinese were profound.906 
By the time of Adams’s speech, Bennet Forbes had returned to Boston and thus 
arranged to meet with the American statesman to discuss China’s predicament.  Notes in 
Adams’s journal indicate that, in writing his lecture, he especially relied upon British 
sources for his understanding of the conflict.  He read through thick stacks of 
parliamentary records, news articles, and published histories such as Sir John Francis 
Davis’s 1836 The Chinese: A General Description of the Empire of China and Its 
Inhabitants.907  Adams consulted with Forbes and John Perkins Cushing, but after the 
speech.  There is no indication that the meetings altered his views.  While he detailed the 
visit to Cushing’s Belmont mansion in his diary—specifically writing on the gardens and 
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greenhouses—he offered no particulars of their advice.908  Ben Forbes and John Cushing 
may well have preferred Adams’s explanation for the war to those that centered on the 
immorality of the opium trade.  It is possible they did not alter his views because they 
affirmed them. 
But not everyone agreed.  Another Perkins nephew, Russell Sturgis, wrote an 
extensive rebuttal to Adams’s speech.  Sturgis never completed his remarks much less 
published them, yet they are of interest as the perspective of a China trader in accord with 
many of the editorial criticisms of Adams.  At the time he put his reflections to paper, 
Sturgis had lived in Asia in 1834 as a partner in Russell, Sturgis & Co. of Canton as well 
as Russell & Sturgis of Manila.  He would join Russell & Co. in 1842.  First and 
foremost, Sturgis argued, the war was undeniably about opium.  If the conflict really 
turned on the principles of the law of nations and the law of nature as Adams contended, 
the British would be at war with Japan—a far more “closed” country than China.  
Second, Sturgis refused the popular contention that the Chinese caused the war by 
refusing to accept the principles of international law.  Rather, the law of nature applied to 
the matter because the Chinese refused to accept the law of nations as universal.  To 
Sturgis, the law of nations existed to facilitate commerce and interaction between 
civilized nations.  But if a nation desired to refuse such connections, Sturgis argued, the 
nation should be allowed to do so.  “Is such a nation to be forced to adopt these arbitrary 
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rules, the necessity of which is not felt, or has she a natural right to say how far she will 
admit foreign intercourse?”909   
The most circumspect of the group was John Murray Forbes, who wrote his 
brother Bennet a cautioning letter in December of 1839.  At the time, Robert Bennet 
Forbes still resided in Canton as the head of Russell & Co.  John noted that he had had a 
hard time convincing clients at home that his more hot-headed brother would “let John 
Bull fight his own battles and that your only idea is money (and this I hope is true) that 
you will neither be wheedled nor frightened out of Canton.”  Just think, John soothed, if 
the Akbar arrives in Boston while the blockade is on, they will do quite well.  “But this is 
moonshine … I would not risk the chance of competence for the chance of wealth unless 
the risk of loss was small under the worst aspect and the prospect it gave very good.”910  
John, like Colonel Perkins, sought a measured policy stance that would best allow for 
Americans to press their advantage in trade.  
 With the exception of Russell Sturgis who was in China at the time, all of these 
merchants signed on to a letter written by John Murray Forbes to Daniel Webster with 
advice for the proposed mission to China.  In 1842, when the United States Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster needed to consider potential responses to war between Britain and 
China, he turned to the nation’s foremost experts in China and Chinese-American 
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relations:  the merchants and missionaries who had long been active in the region.911  In 
addition to the missionary Peter Parker, merchants connected to the Perkins network and 
Russell & Co. predominated.912  The most influential letter came from the hand of John 
Murray Forbes with the signatures of a number of Boston merchants connected to trade 
with China:  Thomas Handasyd Perkins, Robert Bennet Forbes, Samuel Cabot, William 
Appleton, Nathan Appleton, and John Lowell Gardner.913  The instructions Webster drew 
up for Caleb Cushing, the American envoy to China, laid out the first official policy of 
the United States toward China in addition to laying the groundwork for the 1844 Treaty 
of Wangxia.914  And in writing those instructions, Webster borrowed extensively from 
Forbes’s letter. 
Forbes offered a variety of advice, from the technical—the best season for sailing 
to China, the hiring of translators, protocol in dealing with provincial versus imperial 
authorities—to overarching strategies.915  Many of the strategies Forbes suggested 
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emerged out of lessons Americans developed out of decades of observing British-Chinese 
relations.  First, Forbes suggested sending a sizeable naval force to accompany the 
diplomatic envoy, for example, at least three to four square rigged vessel and a small 
schooner to carry messages.  Here, Forbes made explicit the rationale visible amongst 
American traders based in Canton as early as 1830:  “The Chinese think we have few 
ships of war having never seen more than two at a time, one of these always being a 
small vessel.”  In order to make an impression of national prowess, the mission required a 
respectable entourage.  Second, Forbes recommended the mission not send “presents … 
as such, lest the Chinese should call them tribute.”  Rather, Americans should send 
scientific drawings, models, and, if possible, an engineer who could explain recent 
advances in casting technology.  The chief lesson Americans had learned from observing 
the British, apparently, was the need to negotiate from a position of strength. 
Yet more than this, Forbes advised a careful mediation between Chinese and 
British powers.  The letter signers aspired to the benefits of British concessions while 
maintaining their “special relationship” with the Chinese.916  “All we could ask,” Forbes 
wrote, “would be to admit our trade upon the same footing with the most favored nation 
& we think it would be impolitic to accept anything less.”  The letter signers feared that 
sending an envoy was a gamble:  if left alone, they felt confident they would be allowed 
any advantages granted to other nations.  So why send an envoy?  “We can only say that 
the time now seems more favorable than ever before for sending an envoy and securing 
by treaty what we otherwise will only enjoy through sufferance.”  Thus, the best path was 
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to allow the British to take the lead in sending an envoy to Beijing and thereby secure the 
same terms allowed in an Anglo-Chinese treaty.  On the one hand, the letter urged 
supporting the Chinese cause in the war:  “The Chinese look at us as friends, but fear 
encroachment.  If we could support their defense without angering the British, it would 
open the eyes of the Emperor [Dao Guang] to the value of an Alliance with us, more than 
the prospect of increasing their trade one hundred fold.”917   Yet on the other hand, the 
letter resounded with concern that the British might out the Americans by telling the 
Chinese:  “‘Make your own terms with these Americans, their government is so different 
from ours that there is no possibility of their going to War.’”  The Americans recognized 
their dependence upon British good will.  They wanted to have it both ways:  to benefit 
from British belligerence while still being “special friends” with the Chinese. 
Comparing Forbes’s recommendations to the letter that Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster delivered to the American special envoy demonstrates either Forbes’s influence 
or alliance of views with Webster.  On May 8, 1843, Webster wrote two letters to 
Cushing, the first explaining structural details, the second delineating the goals of the 
mission and offering advice.  Webster’s measured stance matches that of Forbes, 
following the bulk of the Bostonian China trader’s recommendations.918  The central goal 
                                                 
917 Forbes underscored that both the Chinese and the British had been down this road before and 
were skilled in diplomatic niceties:  “Let the envoy remember he is in no way stronger than those who have 
gone before.”  John Murray Forbes, et al., Boston to Daniel Webster, 29 April 1843 in Webster et al., The 
Papers of Daniel Webster, 917-921. 
918 Thomas H. Perkins to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, 3 April 1843, and Edwin M. Lewis to 
Daniel Webster, 20 April 1843 in Kenneth E. Shewmaker, ed., The Papers of Daniel Webster:  Diplomatic 
Papers, 1841-1843, vol. 1 (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1983), 903-904, 
912-915.  Edwin Lewis listed ambitious reforms, including an entire new system of tariffs and regulations 
for the Chinese government.  Colonel Perkins signed on to the Forbes letter, but also sent a second, 
personal note to Webster, respecting concerns that foreigners in Canton had no legal means of recourse if 
debts went unpaid or contracts ignored.  He expected that the British envoy, Henry Pottinger, would 
address the issue of law, but urged Webster to ensure the American envoy addressed it as well.  Webster 





of the mission was to receive official permission to trade in the treaty ports opened to 
British nationals.  Cushing should try to meet the emperor, but this was not of the 
essence.  Rather, Webster urged Cushing to at all times express respect and pacific 
intentions while, at the same time, resisting any pressure to take an inferior position be it 
through the kow-tow or demands for tribute.  Webster recognized the need for discretion 
according to circumstance, but he recommended explaining that the nations differed in 
religious observances and that he could not do anything his religion or his nation’s 
sentiments of honor forbade.919  Included in the small circle of voluntary attachés were 
engineers, as Forbes recommended, and Webster set aside $1500 “for the purchase of 
models of machinery, instruments of arts and sciences, or other articles … such as may 
be supposed most useful in intercourse with the Chinese.”920  The first Webster letter has 
been noted for its import as the first official exposition of American foreign policy ideals 
respecting Asia and as a step toward the Tyler Doctrine.  Yet for all that the letter is a 
rather tepid document.  Webster, like Forbes, urged the American envoy to take a 
measured stance between the British and the Chinese in order to benefit from both and 
offend neither. 
Yet the fact of the matter was, pragmatism guided the stance advocated by 
Webster and the Forbes letter.  Detractors in Congress already complained about the 
expense of the Cushing mission; war had never been an option or a desirable outcome.  
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While some scholars argue that Daniel Webster’s instructions to Cushing made official a 
foreign policy with China of nothing much—most favored nation status—it was a 
positive policy stance at a time when Webster’s detractors would have preferred no 
action at all.921  Of course, the actual Treaty of Wangxia did much more than this.  The 
treaty ensured Americans most of the same treaty rights secured by the British under the 
Treaty of Nanjing of 1842 and the addendum Treaty of the Bogue of 1843. Amongst the 
new treaty rights were access to additional Chinese ports and extraterritoriality.922   
In those few early years before his resignation in 1842, Daniel Webster set the 
tone for America’s political relations in the Pacific.923  Webster’s influence was evident 
in American diplomatic negotiations with China.  Even the 1843 letter from President 
John Tyler to the Daoguang Emperor via the new secretary of state, A. P. Upshur, was in 
fact written by Webster.  But Webster also directed key interactions with envoys from 
Hawai’i seeking diplomatic recognition from the United States and British emissaries 
respecting the Canadian border with American claims in Oregon and Maine.924  
Furthermore, Webster wrote what would become known as “the Tyler Doctrine.”  In a 
special message to the House of Representatives, Tyler explicitly pronounced a national 
interest in protecting American mercantile interests in China and in maintaining 
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Hawaiian independence as a central provisioning point en route to China.  Often seen as 
presaging the “open door” policy of late in the century, the message presented the United 
States as a commercial nation in alliance with other commercial peoples who favored 
engagement in a free and open trade:  “It cannot but be in conformity with the interest 
and wishes of the Government and the people of the United States that this community 
[Hawai’i], thus existing in the midst of a vast expanse of ocean, should be respected and 
all its rights strictly and conscientiously regarded; and this must also be the true interest 
of all other commercial states.”925  Like the Monroe Doctrine before it, the Tyler Doctrine 
presented an ideal of the United States as a protector of adjacent lands and waters against 
imperial incursion.  The 1823 Monroe Doctrine targeted South and Central America; the 
Tyler Doctrine extended the American “sphere of influence” to the Pacific.   
Webster wrote President Tyler’s message to congress in the context of 
negotiations with British officials on a number of issues, a strong thread of which 
pertained to a sense of American destiny in the Pacific.  The 1842 Webster-Ashburton 
treaty resolved several border disputes between the United States and Canada, especially 
those of Oregon and Maine, as well as prohibiting slave trading on the high seas.  
Oregon, like Hawai’i, was seen as a necessary stepping stone for continued American 
trade with China and Asia.  This sense of a Pacific-American destiny was not imagined as 
one of empire or even necessarily expansion, but it was always one of trade. 
 
Conclusion 
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Free trade as a concept has a long, contested legacy within American history.  As 
Cathy Matson has emphasized, mercantilism and liberalism in trade were not sequential 
economic systems, but complex and contradictory rationalizations.926  This chapter has 
shown that in considering the evolution of free trade thought and practice, American 
merchants had greater influence than is apparent by simply looking at dollar amounts or 
percentages of trade in the early nineteenth century.  For the Perkinses, their commercial 
network enabled a more extensive mercantile apparatus for cornering niche markets.  
They were conscious of opportunities presented by competing monopolies.  Little wonder 
then that their activities, and those of merchants like them, excited the jealousy of foreign 
competitors.  The Perkinses were more influential advocates of “free trade” as smugglers 
and niche traders than by pushing policies. 
By the time the Perkinses engaged in opium smuggling in China in the early 
nineteenth century, smuggling was not a new strategy developed to grapple with China’s 
unique legal and trading regime—as was argued during the first Opium War—but a 
mercantile strategy with a direct legacy for many of those same merchants, including 
Americans.  If we see continuity in smuggling as a tool, the implication is that smuggling 
practices had less to do with the exigencies of demand or corruption in the China market 
than the character and capaciousness of mercantile capitalism itself.  The question 
becomes not, why would they smuggle opium, but why would they not?927 
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As I have shown here, Perkins merchants were also part of a commercial interest 
favoring state efforts to guarantee trading privileges.  In 1897, in the twilight years of his 
life, John Murray Forbes wrote to William Rathbone of Liverpool that he hoped to find 
his old friend “still a leader in progress and still able to show that Liberal Englishmen still 
stand shoulder to shoulder with those of advanced opinions on this side of the 
Atlantic.”928  The great question of the day, Forbes felt, was how to keep the United 
States and Britain “in cordial alliance against the autocrats of the old world.”929  Forbes 
and Rathbone both began their careers in trade, rode waves of industrialization to even 
greater wealth and influence, and actively participated in politics and great reform 
movements of the nineteenth century.  Long active in debates over trade and foreign 
policy, Forbes’s explanation of progress turned on free trade, but a particular vision of 
free trade as openness:   
“My idea is the very simple one that we Americans ought to avoid 
entangling alliances with the European powers East of us, but that on the 
Pacific, the United States ought to insist upon holding that sea open to the 
commerce of the world.”930 
 
Forbes’s vision for American provenance in the Pacific was not unique, but rather was 
embedded in a longer trajectory of American foreign policy:  the Monroe Doctrine 
(1823), the Tyler Doctrine (1842), and late in the century, the Open Door Notes (1899).  
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These proclamations of American diplomatic doctrine were more principles than policy, 
but they served an important idyllic function nonetheless.  They typified how Americans 








Few people remember the name Perkins today.  In Boston, there are landmarks:  
the Perkins School for the Blind, the stones memorializing an old Perkins estate on the 
banks of Jamaica Pond, and Perkins Street cutting through Brookline and Jamaica Plain.  
The name appears on the fine print for paintings, sculptures, and any number of Boston 
cultural bulwarks from Harvard University and the Fine Arts Museum to the Boston 
Athenaeum and the Massachusetts Historical Society.  But we know this family better 
than we think.  Through literature, landscapes, and institutions, the Perkinses and their 
commercial network became embedded in America’s self-fashioning of the nineteenth 
century.  Richard Henry Dana sailed in a Bryant & Sturgis ship in Two Years before the 
Mast.  Herman Melville, himself inspired by Dana, drew upon Perkins’ sea voyages in 
his novels as well, specifically referencing the 1790 Hope in his maritime escapade, 
Typee.931  Few writers complete a work on the “fabled” American China trade without a 
mention of Robert Bennet Forbes’s personal memoirs, himself a Perkins nephew and 
legacy.932  Money made through Perkins connections financed involvement in the utopian 
experiment Brook Farm and Transcendental circles.  However we remember them, if we 
remember them at all, the Perkinses are a part of America’s cultural fabric.   
This study has suggested that the Perkinses are a part of the nation’s cultural 
fabric as capitalists as well.  Peers accepted merchants connected to the network—
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Thomas Handasyd Perkins, William Sturgis, John Murray Forbes, Russell Sturgis—as 
capitalist icons to model.  In 1845, for example, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story held 
up Thomas H. Perkins as an exemplar of the values connected to a commercial life well-
lived.933 Story dedicated his commentaries on the laws of promissory notes to Perkins 
with the following words:   
You justly stand at the head of our commercial community; and you have 
achieved this enviable distinction by a life of successful enterprise, in 
which one knows not which most to praise, the skill, and intelligence, and 
integrity, which have deserved that success, or the liberal spirit, and 
unostentatious hospitality, which have constantly been its 
accompaniments.934 
 
In addition to his influence on the Supreme Court, Joseph Story published widely in the 
field of commercial law.  Story felt his manuscript on promissory notes seemed 
admirably suited as a tribute to the 81-year old Perkins.  “Sir,” Story penned, “It has long 
been my intention to ask your permission to dedicate some one of my works on 
Commercial Law to you.”  Thus, to a justice of the Supreme Court noted for his role in 
overseeing the legal facet of the market revolution, Colonel Perkins epitomized economic 
man.935  Yet Story aimed not merely to recognize Perkins’s economic prowess, but to 
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Houghton and Haywood, 1851, 1845), viii.   
935 This vision of Perkins receives support from the paeans to Colonel Perkins at his funeral in 
1854.  There were certainly wealthier men—Peter C. Brooks, John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, and many 
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during his lifetime and beyond as a commercial leader and pioneer.  He opened paths of commerce to 
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need to examine historicize entrepreneurs within the values of their own times.  See Joseph Persky, 





extol Perkins’s public character, his “noble charity,” and his “elevated principles of 
action.”  Invisible to this view was the fact that Perkins’s story was rooted in a larger 
group.  He owed much of his success to capital from his and his wife’s families, the hard 
work of his mother, and his involvement in a broader commercial network.  Perkins was 
economic man, but of his era.  For early nineteenth century capitalists of New England, 
with great wealth came great civic responsibility.     
What are we to make of this seeming contradiction between views of Perkins as a 
reputable merchant, civic patriarch, and family man with the possibility of coexisting 
images of Perkins and his allies as shadow traders and even smugglers?936  How different 
were they from the “citizens of the world” that David Hancock described as “marginal, 
opportunistic, global, improving, and integrative”?937  The fact of the matter is, not much.  
But in spite of their Atlantic and later Pacific trade, the Boston-based Perkinses found 
themselves outside Hancock’s “British Atlantic community.”  This made a tremendous 
difference in the types of mercantile strategies open to them.  This dissertation has shown 
that the Perkinses deliberately sought out a space for themselves within the margins of 
European, especially British, commercial interests.  Through their own brand of 
opportunism, striving, as well as good fortune, the Perkinses sought out advantages in 
trade rooted in their peripheral geopolitical position:  as Americans.   
Family Values  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995): 221-231, Tucker, "The Limits of Homo Economicus: An Appraisal of Early American 
Entrepreneurship." 
936 In Alan Karras’s study of smuggling, he argues that illicit trade proved an “essential source of 
state building” by providing cheap, desired goods to a consuming public, even as they deprived states’ of 
revenue through duties and fees.  Karras, Smuggling : Contraband and Corruption in World History. 
937 David Hancock, Citizens of the World : London Merchants and the Integration of the British 





For the Perkinses, the success of their commercial network relied upon their 
ability to mobilize kinship-based and kinship-like strategies to minimize risk and 
maximize loyalties.  Cultural and social capital—knowledge and connections—and not 
just financial capital formed the basis of attempts to maintain bonds of trust and 
obligation over space as well as time.938  This was not surprising in the context of the late 
eighteenth and even the early nineteenth centuries, a time when formal institutions for 
amassing capital and protecting interests across long distances were still developing.  Yet, 
as we saw, many kinship-based strategies continued in both trade and industry well after 
banks, insurance companies, and other institutions and technologies would seem to have 
obviated their need.  This dissertation has argued that rather than approach the 
relationship between family and capitalism as one of a past stage of economic history, 
that we should recognize the dynamic ways that they evolved together.  And more 
specifically, in considering early American merchant capitalism, that trust and obligation 
did not derive axiomatically from kinship, but that kinship provided a fertile field for the 
production of both.  In considering the internal strategies and experiences of the 
Perkinses, we saw that this connection thus had far-reaching consequences. 
An examination of the Perkinses’ social strategies revealed several things.  First, 
we saw that obligation and responsibility did not emerge effortlessly from family ties.  
Such responsiveness took work.939  Leaders within the commercial network mobilized 
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kinship, paternalism, and other hierarchical social ties as forms of obligation.  But this 
obligation went both ways:  bottom-up as well as top-down.  Younger kin and employees 
made claims on their elders just as parents and employers, patriarchs and matriarchs, 
sought fidelity and contributions from them.  Internal tensions and inequalities within 
families themselves served as levers for invoking obligation and compliance.  Thus, 
economic inequalities not simply between families but also within them shaped 
marketplace opportunities—hence the geographic split between sons and cousins as 
cousins were stationed abroad, for example.  And thus, obligation was itself gendered, 
not simply in terms of the divergence of expectations as daughters and sons, but in the 
use of gender to exhort kin into compliance.  Strategies and values of gender and 
commerce were thus yoked together as manly duty and motherly care.  Thus, the tensions 
and divisions within familial and business circles did not just draw upon norms of social 
difference, but did essential work to produce them.  
Second, the Perkinses’ private correspondence exposes the importance of behind-
the-scenes interventions to business choices.  Putting personal and business lives into 
conversation at times transforms explanations for cause and effect.  Beyond the familiar 
negotiations of uncles, brothers, and cousins, we see the “maternal networking” of 
mothers and sisters shaping the very choices that young people recognized in their lives, 
from career paths and education to marital options and more.  The importance of private 
networking is not surprising, but it points to the need to think about the variety of types of 
entrepreneurialism available not only to individuals but to groups.  Of course, these 
hidden sources of influence must be approached with cynicism.  When did women 





available, as opposed to being assessed more effective?  In recent years, scholars have 
attacked the concept of separate spheres as inadequate for understanding gender in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.940  At a time when the concept has become static, 
glossed over, and yet still a staple of history writing and teaching, this revitalized 
literature is exciting.  While some of these works elide the extent to which individuals at 
the time used the very phrase to understand their own lives, others offer new analytical 
frameworks for thinking about gendered dynamics of the Victorian era through 
examinations of urban geography, literature, and politics.  The problem is, many of these 
new works tend to privilege the public to the exclusion of the social, behind-the-scenes 
work done by women as well as men.  For the Perkinses, gender proved a strong fault 
line of the types of influence available to women.  Changes in women’s educational and 
commercial opportunities created very real vulnerabilities for several Perkins women and 
their children.  Yet this should not shroud the clout of charismatic women who may not 
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have run a business in their own right, but who guided family and even community 
decision making.   
Further, the experiences of the Perkinses suggest that risk, profit, and even the 
exigencies of the path to becoming a merchant itself must be understood within the 
aspirations and expectations of life cycles.941  The majority of the youth who traveled 
abroad voiced doubts and regrets at being exiled from family and friends.  Time and 
again they argued that their sacrifice was not simply about lucre, but about family.  Even 
discounting the extent to which such protests were intended as a balm for distant kin, 
persistent expressions of impatience and doubt remind us that most of the men who 
traveled really did aim to make their fortune and return quickly home.   Meanings of 
domesticity for men become all the more apparent when considered not simply as a perk 
of marriage, but as a marker of independence, maturity, and achievement.942  Not just 
anyone could marry in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Rather, 
marriage required stable wealth or a source of income to support a family.  Risk and 
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profit could not help but be social concepts in a world in which failure was often seen as 
a marker of poor character and profit carried with it clear social obligations.943  For the 
Perkinses, families rather than simply individuals grappled with the evolving question of 
how to protect vulnerable kin (and the family itself) from the vicissitudes of markets.   
While firms bearing the Perkins name disappeared by the 1840s, the commercial 
network itself continued through Cary, Sturgis, and especially Forbes kin into the final 
decade of the nineteenth century.  As the network shifted hands from the Perkinses to the 
Forbeses, there were continuities as well as changes.  John Murray Forbes & Co. served 
as a training ground for Forbes’s sons and son-in-laws just as much as James & T. H. 
Perkins & Co. of Boston had, but meanings shifted.  A compelling example of how these 
ideals shifted remains the coming of age letters from parents to children.  Where Colonel 
Thomas H. Perkins called upon his son to be virtuous in order to protect the reputations 
of his mother and sisters and to earn his fatherly respect, John Murray Forbes saw his 
children’s duties as to society.944  Forbes cousins played key roles in Russell & Co. of 
Canton until that firm’s bankruptcy in 1891.  William F. Cary & Co. of New York closed 
in 1881, not long after the tragic death of the heir apparent, William Cary, Jr.  And while 
Russell & Sturgis of Manila failed in 1875, the firm sparked the careers of a number of 
Sturgis cousins, with varying degrees of success.  Thus, nodes of commerce continued in 
the latter half of the century, but those who bore the Perkins name retained only the 
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capital, prestige, and consumer legacies of their involvement within the commercial 
network.   
If we follow the capital, rather than simply the trade network, the story continues 
along a somewhat different path.  By the 1840s, the balance of investments tipped from 
overseas trade to domestic stocks and bonds.  Increasingly, specific kin with training in 
law or finance became investors for larger family clusters or oversaw investments 
handled through trusts, especially the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company.  
These funds could provide a financial backbone for maintaining familial wealth and thus 
allowing daughters as well as sons to engage pursuits other than business.   And, as the 
experience of John Murray Forbes showed in chapter four, social and kin-based networks 
still provided an important mechanism for accessing substantive sums of capital.  
William Sturgis is a similar case in point.  Both Forbes and Sturgis proved influential in 
shaping the flow of Boston capital far beyond their own means by adapting their 
commercial connections into investment networks.  Trusts proved an increasingly 
important legal mechanism for mediating between families and markets, or between 
family members themselves.  Stocks and bonds were more fungible investments than 
trade or land, but they carried their own risks.  How wealthy families invested their 
money had serious implications for social and human capital requirements within 
business networks. 
Free Trade 
Kinship and kinship-like strategies enabled the Perkinses to establish a trade and 
investment network of global proportions.  But the norms that guided their mercantile 





statist.  They had no qualms about turning to state representatives for support in 
protecting their property at home and abroad, lobbying for preferential duties and 
barriers, and soliciting consular posts for themselves and their allies.  But when federal 
officials hindered their ability to trade, as they felt the Jefferson and Madison 
administrations did during the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, they willingly 
undermined their own government by seeking out means to skirt federal prohibitions on 
trade.945  To say that these merchants had a relatively instrumental view of the role of 
states’ in protecting trade is not to argue that they were only instrumental.   But from their 
position as Americans, on the periphery of established circuits of European trade, seeking 
out niche markets made sense.   
The Perkinses consciously acted on their position as neutrals during the French 
Wars. Following the American Revolution, merchants within the family shifted from a 
transatlantic fur trade to the French West Indies.  Thus, their firms were especially 
fortunate in being well-placed to take advantage of the United States’ political neutrality 
during the French Wars.  From 1793 to 1807, neutrality allowed American merchants to 
reap the windfall from new export opportunities.946  The wars enabled a virtually 
monopoly of the re-export trade between European powers and their American colonies, 
especially those in the West Indies.  Such trade was incredibly dangerous and not without 
controversy, but also immensely lucrative.  More than their economic resources, the 
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Perkinses had considerable social resources on which to build:  established firms in the 
French West Indies, an existing network of correspondents and creditors, a broad circle 
of kin, and political connections.  To Douglass North, the significance of American 
wartime opportunity was more than simply the immense influx of profits from a carrying 
trade enabled by the French Wars, but the channeling of that capital into domestic 
industry and financial institutions.947  As I showed in chapter two, the Perkinses certainly 
provide evidence of this.  Yet the Perkinses also used the wars as an opportunity to 
experiment and expand their interests—especially by usurping Asian and South 
American trade routes disrupted by the European wars.   
While scholars usually see this type of mercantile outlook as ending with the 
peace of 1815, the Perkinses reveal otherwise.  Their firms deliberately sought out re-
export trading opportunities rooted in their geopolitical position as Americans.  Thus, 
they were “neutral traders” during the war, but they were also “niche traders” in that they 
sought out niches of mercantile opportunity created by competition between larger 
powers.  The Perkinses also colluded with foreign merchants and officials to smuggle 
contraband goods before, during, and after the wars.  They were not alone in this range of 
illicit and licit commerce, by any means.  But the Perkins’ correspondence laid out the 
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maritime and mercantile strategies that enabled this contraband trade and the role of illicit 
practices within their broader range of business interests.  
The Perkinses’ position as Americans enabled other trading opportunities as well.  
In their close, cultivated ties with the fabulously wealthy Wu Bingjian, the Hong 
merchant better known as Houqua, their national and geographic status likely proved 
appealing on several fronts.  For one, Americans tended to carry silver to China, imported 
at considerable cost through South American channels.  For another, because Americans 
were not British, a connection with American merchants allowed Houqua to diversify his 
interests away from the British East India Company—especially during the French 
Revolutionary Wars, when most other European merchants disappeared.  Their 
relationship with Houqua and his family firm, the I-he Hong, gave the Perkinses greater 
financial clout far beyond China.  Houqua suggested they establish a satellite firm in 
Manila.  He smoothed introductions and ties with Parsee merchants based out of Calcutta.  
Perhaps ironically, his favor made them more appealing to British bankers such as Baring 
Brothers & Co.  
More than simply profit from niche markets, the Perkinses and merchants like 
them excited the jealousy of competitors, especially the British.  Where the Perkinses 
used the term “free traders” to refer to British merchants operating outside the bounds of 
the monopolies of chartered trading companies, to British observers of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, American merchants were the real free traders.  While 
Americans lacked the kinds of naval and diplomatic supports offered by more active 
European states, they benefitted from the work of those states without facing the 





the United States, Great Britain, or other states.  Nor were their mercantile strategies 
unfamiliar to the British themselves.  But their actions as neutral traders, niche traders, 
and smugglers shaped arguments at home and abroad about the appropriate relationship 
between the state and trade.   
In recent years, scholars have integrated New England into the Atlantic World; 
this project demonstrates the importance of New Englanders in shaping American 
involvement in the Pacific as well.  The Pacific continues to be a central space of 
American empire and influence, from former colonies to trust territories.  Its history 
merits a more robust place in American historical consciousness.  Perkins firms played a 
significant role in pushing American interests west.  When President John Tyler 
announced the “Tyler Doctrine” in a special message to Congress in 1842, he argued that 
the interests of American merchants in Hawai’i and China legitimated American 
involvement in the region.  Much like the Monroe Doctrine and later Open Door Policy, 
the Tyler Doctrine declared a policy of enforced noninterference and free trade in a 
region—in this case, the Pacific.  And the Perkinses were amongst the principal experts 
that state officials turned to for advice in handling conflicts over China and Oregon.  The 
Perkins network advanced not only American interests into the region, but also 
contributed to universalizing discourses of commerce and diplomacy. 
This project has followed two integrated yet distinct lines of analysis.  The first 
centered on the geopolitical implications of early American mercantile strategies.  The 
second focused on the social strategies employed by the Perkinses in navigating 
commerce, especially as their investments shifted from transatlantic to global trade.  





century:  mercantile capitalism and family economies.  The Perkins network embodied 
them both.  Tracing the rise and passing of the trade network established by an extensive 
circle of Perkins kith and kin suggests the intimacy of evolving capitalist strategies and 
the value of American family life to remaining competitive in global trade.  Indeed, for 
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Bill of Exchange:  A proof of debt; specifically, a written order that binds one person 
(the acceptor, in that this person accepts the obligation of paying the bill) to pay a fixed 
amount of money to another at a specified future date. 
Bill of Lading:  a document issued by a carrier (ship captain, firm) to certify that a 
specific cargo has been received on board a ship to be carried to a specified recipient or 
consignee.   
Brig or Brigantine:  a larger vessel with two square rigged masts. 
Blotter:  a diary of transactions divided into cash and non-cash; transactions were first 
recorded into waste books, blotters, or diaries, and then transferred into ledgers and 
journals and as such were the only account books admissible in court. (See also, waste 
book.) 
Catty:  a standard measure of weight of 16 taels, or 1.33 pounds. 
Chop:  most commonly refers to a Chinese seal stamped to make a document official, but 
was often akin to a signature as well.  A “Chop House” was a customs house.   
Co-Hong (see also Hong merchants):  here, the guild of Chinese merchants authorized 
by the central government to trade with foreign merchants in Canton (Guangzhou) 
between 1684 and 1843. 
Commission House:  a firm that buys and sells for customers, not on its own account. 
Comprador:  Chinese employees of foreign factories in China who kept the accounts for 
all domestic and household transactions, and operated as an intermediary in business.  
Double-entry Bookkeeping:  a double entry includes a “charge” and a “discharge,” and 
affects two or more accounts in the ledger.  A charge is when a merchant sells an article 
on credit, making the purchaser a debtor for the account.  When the purchaser pays for 
the item, the merchant discharges their debt by crediting the purchaser’s account for the 
amount paid, and debits the inventory. 
Factory:  in a trading entrepôt, a factory houses factors and is thus akin to a 
countinghouse; it is not a space of production. 
Hong merchants (see Co-Hong).  Hong (hang in pinyin) literally translates as company 
or firm, but in English commonly refers to members of the Co-Hong. 





Journal:  account book of information taken from all diaries, blotters, or waste books 
arranged systematically. 
Junk:  a Chinese sailing vessel known for its horizontally constructed sails or “battens.”  
They varied tremendously in size.  The “junk trade” is another common term for inter-
Asian trade for the common use of these vessels in Asian waters.   
Ledger:  book of current accounts, systematically arranged by account. 
Letter of Marque:  official license from a state to a private person or vessel to act as a 
privateer and thus attack and plunder belligerent vessels during wartime, although also 
used to describe the vessel itself. 
Linguist:  Chinese employees licensed to mediate between foreign merchants and the 
Chinese state.  While they might act as translators, this was only one of a number of 
duties that included helping foreign merchants negotiate the complex terms of trade, fee 
system, arrange audiences with the Hoppo, and more.  
Malwa:  a kind of opium grown in northwest India, commonly exported out of Bombay. 
Patna:  a kind of opium grown in Bengal under the direction of the East India Company, 
sold in Calcutta for shipment to Canton. 
Picul:  a picul is a standard measure of weight, equaling 100 catties or 133 1/3 pound. 
Pirate:  a private person or vessel who attacks or plunders other persons or vessels 
outside the bounds of state approval (thus, as opposed to those acting on a state’s behalf 
or privately but with authorization from a state). 
Privateer:  a private person or vessel authorized by a state by a letter of marque to attack 
and plunder belligerent vessels during wartime. 
Profit & Loss Account:  on the debtor side is posted the amount lost; on the credit side 
the amount gained; the difference between the two is the amount lost or gained. 
Remittance:  sending of money to remove an obligation. 
Schooner:  a larger fore-and-aft rigged vessel with two or more masts. 
Spanish Dollar:  a high quality silver coin made from Spanish American silver.  
Between 1619 and 1815, Spanish dollars invoiced at 5s. per dollar or £1 = $4.  From 
1815 it was invoiced at the actual cost per ounce.  Bills on the East India Company in 
London were issued at rates ranging from 4s. 10d. to 6s. per dollar, for bills payable at 
365 days after sight.   





Tael:  the trade name for the “liang” or ounce in Mandarin Chinese; it thus also stood for 
the currency, a silver tael, which meant one tael of standard silver.  Treated in accounts as 
6s. 8d. (1£ =Tls. 3), Tls. 100 – 120.8 ounces troy. 
Waste book:  a diary of transactions divided into cash and non-cash; transactions were 
first recorded into waste books, blotters, or diaries, and then transferred into ledgers and 











Generation 1:  Peck 
- Thomas Handasyd PECK (ca. 1712-1777), m. Elizabeth Spurrier (?-
1788) in 1733. 
 
Generation 2:  Peck-Perkins 
- John Peck (1735- 1768), m. ? Brewer. 





Generation 3:  Elizabeth Peck, m. James Perkins in 1755. 
- Elizabeth Perkins (1756-1843), m. Russell STURGIS (1750-1826) in 1773. 
- Ann (Nancy) Maynard Perkins (1759-1793), m. Captain Robert CUSHING     
(1755-?) in 1781? 
- James Perkins (1761-1822), m. Sarah PAINE (1764?-1841) in 1786. 
- John Peck (1763-1763). 
- Thomas Handasyd Perkins (1764-1854), m. Sarah (Sally) ELLIOT (1768-1852) 
in 1788. 
- Samuel Gardner Perkins (1767-1847), m. Barbara HIGGINSON (1774-1843) in 
1795. 
- Mary Perkins (1769-1863), m. Benjamin ABBOT (1762-1849) in 1797. 
- Esther Perkins (1771-1810), m. Captain Thomas DOUBLEDAY (1769-1790),  
  m. Josiah STURGIS (1767-1835) in 1795. 
- Margaret Perkins (1773-1856), m. Ralph Bennet FORBES (1773-1824) 
in 1801. 
 
Generation 4:  James Perkins, m. Sarah Paine in 1786. 
- Sarah Perkins (died in infancy). 
- Sarah Perkins (1789-1812). 
- James Perkins, Jr. (1791-1828), m. Eliza Green Callahan (1789-1860) in 
1812. 
 
Generation 4:  Thomas H. Perkins, m. Sally Elliot in 1788. 
- Sarah Elliot Perkins (1788-1792). 
- Elizabeth Perkins (1791-1885), m. Samuel CABOT (1784-1863) in 
1812. 
- Sarah Elliot Perkins (1792-1856).  
- Ann Cushing Perkins (1794-1799). 
- Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. (1796-1850), m. Jane Frances DUMARESQ 





- Mary Ann Cushing Perkins (1798-1860), m. Thomas Graves CARY 
(1791-1882) in 1820. 
- Caroline Perkins (1800-1867), m. William H. GARDINER (1794-1882) 
in 1823. 
- Charles Elliot Perkins (1801-1803). 
- George Cabot Perkins (1803-1868). 
- Ann (Nancy) Cushing Perkins (1806-1889), m. William Ferdinand 
CARY (1795-1881). 
- James Elliot Perkins (1809-1809). 
 
Generation 4:  Samuel G. Perkins, m. Barbara Higginson in 1795. 
- Barbara Higginson Perkins (1796-1822), m. Walter Channing (1786-
1876) in 1823.  
- Susan Cleveland Perkins (1798-1825), m. George Searle (1788-1858). 
- Elizabeth Peck Perkins (1798-after 1846). 
- Nancy Maynard Perkins (1801-1887). 
- Stephen Higginson Perkins (1804-1877), m. Sarah Sullivan, m. Elizabeth 
Welles, m. Elizabeth Sumner Waters. 






Generation 3:  Thomas Sturgis, III, m. Sarah (Sally) Paine in 1745. 
- William Sturgis (1748-1826), m. Sarah Burdick in 1777, m. Hannah Mills. 
- Russell Sturgis (1750-1826), m. Elizabeth PERKINS (1756-1843) in 1773. 
- Abigail Sturgis (1752-1793), m. Christopher Lovell in 1774. 
- Thomas Sturgis (1755-1821), m. Elizabeth Jackson (1768-1844) in 1786. 
- John Sturgis (1757-?), m. Rebecca Simpson in 1794. 
- Elizabeth Sturgis (1759-?). 
- Samuel Sturgis (1762-1825), m. Lucretia Jennings (1764-1811) in 1786. 
- Josiah Sturgis (1767-1835), m. Esther PERKINS Doubleday (1771-1810) in 
1795. 
 
Generation 4:  - William Sturgis, m. Sarah Burdick in 1777, m. Hannah 
Mills. 
- Sarah Pope (Burdick). 
- William F. Sturgis (1782-1863), m. Elizabeth Marston Davis (?-?) in 1811. 
- Hannah Sturgis, m. Isaac Hinckley. 
 
Generation 4:  Russell Sturgis, m. Elizabeth PERKINS in 1773. 
- James Perkins Sturgis (1774-1790). 
- Elizabeth Peck Sturgis (1776-1776). 






- Thomas Sturgis (1781-1782). 
- Charles Sturgis (1784-1801). 
- Sarah Paine Sturgis (1786-1855), m. Elisha Pope. 
- Elizabeth Perkins Sturgis (1788-1873). 
- Henry Sturgis (1790-1819). 
- James Perkins Sturgis (1791-1851). 
- George Washington Sturgis (1793-1826), m. Mary Ann CHANNING in 1824. 
- Ann (Nancy) Sturgis (1797-1892), m. Frederick W. PAINE. 
- Mary Perkins (1800-1801). 
 
Generation 4:  Thomas Sturgis, m. Elizabeth Jackson in 1786.  
- Nancy Sturgis (1786-1866). 
- Hezekiah Jackson Sturgis (1789-1829). 
- Thomas Sturgis (1781-1792).  
- Elizabeth Jackson Sturgis (1793-1870), m. Russell Freeman. 
- Martha Russell Sturgis (1797-1846). 
- Catherine Sturgis (1801-1880). 
- Russell Sturgis (1804-1872). 
- William Sturgis (1806-1895), m. Elizabeth Knight Hinckley in 1831, m. 
Catherine Gore Torrey in 1857, m. Jane  Lay McChesney in 1873. 
 
Generation 4:  Samuel Sturgis, m. Lucretia Jennings in 1786. 
Thomas Sturgis (1786-1805). 
Lucretia Sturgis (1788-1863), m. Joshua BATES (1788-1864) in 1811. 
Nancy Sturgis (1789-1857), m. Philip Tewksbury in 1819. 
Samuel Sturgis, Jr. (1791-1822). 
Hannah Bourne Sturgis (1793-1803). 
Josiah Sturgis (1794-1850).  
Abigail Lovell Sturgis (1795-1875), m. John Tewksbury. 
Eliza Sturgis (1797-1875), m. Barnabas Turner Pratt. 
Harriot Hinckley Sturgis (1798-1877). 
Mary Paine Sturgis (1798-1819) 
John Sturgis (1799-1851), m. ? 
Sally Hill Sturgis (1800-1879), m. S. Tewksbury  
Charles Russell Sturgis (1803-1870), m. Mary J. Gray. 





Generation 3:  Judge Timothy Paine, m. Sarah Chandler in 1749. 
- Dr. William Fitz Paine (1750-1833), m. Lois Orne (1756-1822) in ?. 
 - Timothy Paine (1752-1775). 
- Samuel Paine (1754-1807). 
- Hannah Paine (1755-1841), m. Ebenezer Bradish. 





- Hon. Nathaniel Paine (1759?-1840), m. Elizabeth ?. 
- Anthony Paine (1760?-1788). 
- John Paine (1762-1832). 
- Sarah Paine (1764-1841), m. James PERKINS (1761-1822) in 1786. 
 
Generation 4:  Dr. William Fitz Paine, m. Lois Orne. 
- William Fitz Paine (1783-1837). 
- Frederick William Paine (1788-1869), m. Ann (Nancy) Cushing STURGIS 





Generation 3:  Major General Simon Elliot, m. Sarah Wilson. 
- Simon Elliot (1762-1832), m. Eliza Barnard (1768-1852). 





Generation 3:  Hon. Stephen Higginson, m. Susan Cleveland in 1741, 
m. Elizabeth Perkins in 1789, m. Sarah Perkins in 1792. 
- John Higginson (1765-1810?), m. 1796 or 1797 Josephine de Breget, m. 
Elizabeth ? in 1808? 
- Sarah Higginson (1766-1808), m. Hon. Dudley Atkins Tyng (1760-1829) in 
1792. 
- Nathaniel Higginson (1768-1794), m. Sarah Rhea (1769-1844) in 1792. 
- Stephen Higginson, Jr. (1770-1834), m. Martha Salisbury (1771-1803) in 1794, 
m. Louisa Storrow (1786-1864) in 1806. 
- Barbara Cooper Higginson (1774-1843), m. Samuel Gardner PERKINS (1767-
1863) in 1795. 
- Elizabeth Higginson (1776-1842), m. Hon. Dudley Atkins Tyng (1760-1829) in 
1809, Rev. James Morss in 1831 (1779-1842). 
- George Higginson (1779-1812), m. Mary Hubbard Babcock (1781-1863) in 
1800. 
- Henry Higginson (1781-1838), m. Anne (Nancy) Maynard CUSHING (1782-
1847) in 1803. 
- Susan Cleveland Higginson (1783-1865), m. Francis Dana Channing (1775-
1810) in 1806. 
- James Perkins Higginson (1791-1878), m. Mary Hubbard Babcock (1781-1863) 
in 1813. 
 
Generation 4:  Henry Higginson, m. Nancy CUSHING  in 1803. 
- Henry Higginson (1807-1824). 





1909) in 1841. 
- Stephen Cleveland Higginson (1811-1863), m. Jane Rosalind Cardin (1821-
1896) in 1848. 
- John Cushing Higginson (1813-1874), m. Charlotte Brown (1828-1860), m. 
Anne E. Brown (1832-1874) in 1863. 






Generation 3:  Rev. John Forbes, m. Dorothy Murray in 1769. 
- Col. James Grant Forbes (1769-1825), m. Frances Elizabeth Blackwell (?-1845), 
in 1804. 
- John Murray Forbes (1771-1831). 
- Ralph Bennet Forbes (1773-1824), m. Margaret PERKINS (1773-1856) in 1801.
 
Generation 4:  James Grant Forbes, m. Frances Elizabeth Blackwell in 1804. 
- Rev. John Murray Forbes (1807-1885), m. Anne Howell (?-1849) in 1838. 
- Paul Sieman (Sieman) Forbes (1808-1886), m. Valeria Wright (?-1888) in 1835.
- Mary Josephine (Josephine) Forbes. 
- Frances (Fanny) Blackwell Forbes. 
 
Generation 4:  Ralph Bennet Forbes, m. Margaret Perkins in 1801. 
- Emma Forbes (1801-1847). 
- Thomas Tunno Forbes (1803-1829). 
- Robert Bennet Forbes (1804-1889), m. Rose Greene Smith (1802-1885) 
in 1834.  
- Margaret Forbes (1806-?). 
- John Murray Forbes (1813-1898), m. Sarah Swain Hathaway (1813-
1900) in 1837. 
- Mary Abbot Forbes (1814-1904), m. Rev. Francis Cunningham (?) in 
1843. 






III. MAJOR FIRMS CONNECTED TO/EMERGING OUT OF THE PERKINS NETWORK 
 
Cape Francis, Santo Domingo 
Perkins, Burling & Perkins, May 1, 1786-August 15, 1788.  Partners: James Perkins, 
Walter Burling, Thomas H. Perkins. 
Perkins, Burling & Co., August 15, 1788-June 21,1793.  Partners: James Perkins, 
Walter Burling, Samuel G. Perkins. 
  
Boston, Massachusetts 
T. H. Perkins & James Magee, August 15, 1788-n.d.  Partners: Thomas H. Perkins & 
James Magee. 
James & Thomas H. Perkins, Sept. 29, 1792-August 1, 1822.  Partners: James and 
Thomas H. Perkins. 
S. Cabot, Jr., J. & T. H. Perkins January 1, 1817-January 1821.  Partners: Samuel 
Cabot, Jr., James and Thomas H. Perkins, Jr.      
J. & T. H. Perkins & Sons, January 1821-February 20, 1823 (1st est.).  Partners: James 
Perkins, Thomas H. Perkins, Samuel Cabot, James Perkins, Jr. Thomas H. Perkins, Jr. 
J .& T. H. Perkins & Sons, February 20, 1823-June 22, 1828 (2nd establishment).  
Partners: T. H. Perkins, Samuel Cabot, James Perkins, Jr., T. H. Perkins, Jr. 
J. & T. H. Perkins & Sons, June 22, 1828-January 1, 1838 (3rd est.).  Partners: Samuel 
Cabot, Thomas G. Cary, T. H. Perkins, Jr.   
Bryant, Sturgis, & Co., 1811-1841.  Partners:  John Bryant and William Sturgis.   
Bryant, Sturgis & Co.  Partners:  John Bryant, William Sturgis, John Bryant, Jr., Samuel 
Hooper. 
Bryant & Sturgis, 1841-1863.  Partners:  John Bryant and William Sturgis. 
William Appleton & Co., 1841-1866.  Partners:  William Appleton, James Amory 
Appleton, and Samuel Hooper. 
Samuel G. Perkins & Co., August 2, 1813-May 1, 1822, Boston, Calcutta.  Partners:  
Samuel G. Perkins, Edward A. Newton, James Perkins Higginson. 
  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
Hazard & Cabot, December 1, 1806, partnership agreement for seven years.  Partners:  
Sam Hazard and Sam Cabot, Jr.   
Perit & Cabot, March 20, 1815 - January 1821.  Partners: John Webster Perit of 
Philadelphia, Joseph Cabot, and Samuel Cabot, Jr.  
  
New York, New York 
Perkins & Sturgis, 1827-May 25, 1830. Partners: George C. Perkins & John Sturgis.  
Thomas G. & William F. Cary & Co., 1818-1881.  Partners at various points:  Thomas 
Graves Cary, William F. Cary, Henry Cary, Samuel Carey, William F. Cary, Jr.  
HP Sturgis & Co., 1859-? (NY and Boston).  Partners:  Henry P. Sturgis, James Sturgis, 
Robert S. Sturgis, Chandler Robbins. 
 
 
Charleston, South Carolina 







Ephraim Bumstead & Co., July 15, 1803-December 5, 1805.  Partners: Ephraim 
Bumstead , James and TH Perkins. 
Perkins & Co., December 6, 1805-August 1, 1822 (1st Establishment).  Partners: James 
and Thomas H. Perkins, John P. Cushing.  
Perkins & Co., February 20, 1823-June 22, 1828 (2nd est.).  Partners: James Perkins, Jr., 
TH Perkins, John P. Cushing. 
Russell & Co, Canton, 1823-1891.  Partners: 
Samuel Russell (1823-36) 
Philip Ammidon (1824-30) 
William H. Low (1830-3) 
Augustine Heard (1831-36) 
John C. Green (1834-39) 
John M. Forbes (1834-38) 
Joseph Coolidge (1834-39) 
A.A. Low (1837-9) 
William C. Hunter (1837-42) 
Edward King (1837-42) 
Robert B. Forbes (1830-2, captain of the Lintin, 1839-44, 1849-54) 
Warren Delano, Jr. (1840-46, 1861-66) 
Russell Sturgis, Jr. (1842-44) 
William H. King (1843-9) 
Daniel N. Spooner (1843-5, 1852-7) 
Joseph T. Gilman (1843-5) 
Edward Delano (1844-46) 
Paul S. Forbes (1844-73) 
George Perkins (1846-49) 
Russell, Sturgis & Co.  May 1, 1834-1840.  Copartnership in connection with Russell & 




JP Sturgis & Co.  October 26, 1818-1851?  Partners:  James P. Sturgis, George W. 
Sturgis, Henry Sturgis. 
 
Manila, Philippines 
Russell & Sturgis.  July 1, 1828 - 1875, Manila.  Partners:  George Robert Russell and 
Henry P. Sturgis. 
